Judgment 1. THIS is a second appeal filed by the plaintiff/appellant against the judgment and decree passed by the second Additional District Judge, Alipore in Title Appeal No. 5 of 1990 dated 19th December 1990 whereby the judgment and decree passed by the teamed trial Judge dated 28th November 1989 passed in Title Suit No. 127 of 1985 decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiffs/appellants was set aside and the suit was sent on remand for fresh decision as per provisions of law. The Lower appellate Court also directed that the specimen signature of the father and brother of the plaintiff/appellant should be taken in court and the same should be sent to the handwriting expert for verification with the signatures as appearing in the cheques which had been sent to them earlier. It was farther held that the Trial Court should take necessary measures to secure the attendance of the father and brother of the plaintiff /appellant in this behalf. 2. THE fact of this case is that the plaintiff/appellant is the owner of the premises no. 7f, S. R. Das Road, Calcutta-28 and that the plaintiff/appellant with her husband was staying at the relevant time at Pondicheri and at the relevant time she had kept the second and third floors of the said premises vacant and her father Dr. A. S. Ghosh used to look after the entire house. When the plaintiff/appellant and her husband were staying in Pondicheri, the defendant /respondent who is stated to be a close friend and well-wisher of the plaintiff/appellant's family, approached the plaintiff's father Dr. A. S. Ghosh for permitting him to reside as a licensee without payment of any license fee in the portion of the second and third floor of the premises no. 7f, S.R. Das road. Calcutta-26 which is the suit premises. It is the case of the plaintiff/ appellant that the defendant/opposite party was allowed to stay in the said premises by her father as licensee on condition that the defendant would vacate the same as and when the same would be necessary for the plaintiff appellant. It is stated that, the said licence was granted sometime in August 1976. It is the case of the plaintiff/ appellant that the defendant/opposite party was allowed to stay in the said premises by her father as licensee on condition that the defendant would vacate the same as and when the same would be necessary for the plaintiff appellant. It is stated that, the said licence was granted sometime in August 1976. The husband of the plaintiff/appellant died at Pondicheri on 17th April 1980 and the she came back to Calcutta and revoked the licence of the defendant by serving upon him a letter under registered post in that regard. The defendant received the notice for vacating the suit premises on revocation of the licence but failed to vacate the said premises and consequently the suit was filed for eviction of the defendant from the suit premises. The case of the defendant/respondent was that the defendant was inducted by the father of the plaintiff as a monthly tenant at a monthly rental of Rs.250/- which has been stated to have been increased to Rs.300/- per month from September/1990. It is the case of the defendant that after refusal to receive the rent for the month of May 1983 which was sent by Money Order to the father of the appellant Dr. A. S. Ghosh, the defendant started to deposit the rent with the Rent Controller in the name of Dr. A. S. Ghosh, the father of the plaintiff/appellant. The defendant stated to have sent two bearer cheques for a sum of Rs.1200/- after revocation, of licence. Both sides adduced evidence and the learned Trial Judge on the basis of the evidence on record and on consideration of the case held that there was no evidence on record that the plaintiff/appellant had authorized her father induct the defendant as a tenant. The plaintiff/appellant in her evidence also stated that she had never let out the second and third! floors of the said premises and the defendant was permitted to reside in the suit premises as a licensee without any licence fee and this fact was corroborated by other witnesses. The Trial Court also found that the defendant/respondent who claimed to be the tenant, failed to produce any rent receipt in support of his case that the defendant was a tenant under the father of the plaintiff/appellant. It was also found by the learned Trial judge that Exhibit 4 and 4a viz. The Trial Court also found that the defendant/respondent who claimed to be the tenant, failed to produce any rent receipt in support of his case that the defendant was a tenant under the father of the plaintiff/appellant. It was also found by the learned Trial judge that Exhibit 4 and 4a viz. counter foils of two self drawn cheques both dated 15th March 1983 which were issued by the defendant/respondent reveal that there is endorsement in both the cheques "rent of second and third floors of premises no. 7f, S. R. Das Road Cal-26, for the month of January to April 1983", and that the said cheques bear a date which is after the plaintiff/ appellant asked the defendant to vacate the suit premises by expiry of month of March 1983 and that the two self-cheques were issued after revocation of the licence. The learned Trial Judge also found that there is no agreement of tenancy and/or any authority by the plaintiff/appellant authorizing her father to induct the defendant as tenant in the said premises. It is not the case of the defendant that the defendant had paid rent to the plaintiff appellant and the father of the plaintiff/appellant used to collect rent on her behalf. On the basis of the evidence on record the learned Trial Judge found that the plaintiff/ appellant permitted the defendant to reside in the suit premises as a licencee without any licence fee on condition that the defendant would vacate the suit premises when ever the same would be required by the plaintiff/appellant. On her return from Pondichery to Calcutta after the demise of her husband, the plaintiff/appellant duly revoked the licence. The Trial Court also found that the plaintiff/appellant has been able to prove that she was the owner of the entire suit premises. Accordingly, the court below decreed the suit on contest and passed a decree for has possession off the suit premises after eviction the defendant/respondent and his men and agent therefrom. 3. BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial judge in Title Suit No. 127 of 1985 dated 28th November 1989, the defendant/respondent preferred an appeal before the Lower appellate Court. 3. BEING aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial judge in Title Suit No. 127 of 1985 dated 28th November 1989, the defendant/respondent preferred an appeal before the Lower appellate Court. The Lower Appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court on the ground that in view of the definition of the word 'landlord' as provided in Section 2 (d) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956 which provides that "the landlord includes any person, who for the time being, is entitled to receive or but for a special contract, would be entitled to receive the rent of any premises whether or not on his own account", and that simply relying on the said definition of the term landlord', the Lower Appellate court found that one was not required] to be the owner of the premises to become a landlord. If one has a control, over any particular premises, and is entitled to receive rent and he can be stated to be a landlord. The Lower appellate Court found that the ownership of the suit premises by the plaintiff/ appellant could not be disputed and that when two self-cheques were produced before the Trial Court, the Lower Appellate Court held that a good number of cheques had been produced before the Lower Appellate Court in that regard. It was further observed by the Lower Appellate Court that a particular cheque along with signature of the father of the defendant as appearing in the deposition sheet had been sent to hand-writing expert for verification of the signature. The hand-writing expert in his report submitted that he could not make comparison to his satisfaction of the admitted signatures with the impugned signature and writings as he was short of proper "particulars. The court below also observed that the defendant sent notices upon the father and brother of the plaintiff/appellant to appear for recording their signatures and handwritings. But notices could not be served upon them by the defendant. The court below also observed that the defendant sent notices upon the father and brother of the plaintiff/appellant to appear for recording their signatures and handwritings. But notices could not be served upon them by the defendant. The Lower Appellate Court condemned the learned Trial judge holding that the learned Trial Judge was not vlgilent to get the summons served upon the particular person, even though the same was taken by the defendant and for failure on the part of the defendant to serve the summons the learned Trial Judge was condemned by the Lower Appellate Court and according to the Lower Appellate Court, the learned Trial Judge was wrong in concluding the case. The Lower Appellate Court also found that when such self-cheques had been sent to the father of the plaintiff/appellant, such payment was been made for specific purpose. According to the Lower Appellate court, when there is no licence fee claimed by the landlord and when it was found that two self-cheques were sent to the father of the appellant, the same must be by way of rent only and that it was necessary to establish first that if payment of money had actually been made to the father of the plaintiff/ appellant and failure on the part of the learned Munsif to consider the aspect of the matter, had resulted in substantial failure of justice and that it was the duty of the court to secure the attendance by a particular person by way of issuing summons. It is for the court to exhaust the process before recording the order that the presence of a person cannot be secured in pursuance of the process issued by the court. The Lower Appellate Court was of the view that the attendance of the father and the brother of the plaintiff/appellant could not be secured by any means far the purpose of verification of their signatures by handwriting expert when the handwriting expert wanted some additional particulars. The Lower Appellate Court put much importance on this aspect of the matter and on that ground, the judgment was reversed and the matter was sent back to the Trial Court for the purpose of examination by any handwriting expert. 4. MR. The Lower Appellate Court put much importance on this aspect of the matter and on that ground, the judgment was reversed and the matter was sent back to the Trial Court for the purpose of examination by any handwriting expert. 4. MR. Chandra Nath Mukherjee learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant contended in the first place that it is the case of the plaintiff/ appellant that the defendant was a licensee and that when the defendant claimed to be a tenant, in that event, the defendant who wanted to establish that there exists a tenancy the onus of proof of the existence of tenancy was on the defendant, but the defendant failed to discharge the same and the Lower appellate Court has completely overlooked lifts aspect of the matter. It is a firmly established principle that burden of proof upon the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issurance burden of proof in any particular case depends on the circumstances under which the claim arises. The burden of proof, in this sense, rests upon the party whether plaintiff or defendant, who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. As against -the case of the plaintiff that the defendant was a licencee then the defendant had come forward with the case that he was not a licensee, but a tenant protected under the provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, in our view, the defendant had to prove his case by adducing evidence in support of his case. In deciding which party asserts the affirmative, regard must of course be had to the substance of the issue and not merely to its grammatical form, which letter the pleader can frequently vary at will, moreover a negative allegation must not be confounded with the mere traverse of an affirmative one. The true meaning of the rule is that where a given allegation, whether affirmative or negative, forms an essential part of a party's case, the proof of such allegation rests on him. In order to establish a case of tenancy, one has first to prove the induction of the tenancy and the terms and conditions of such tenancy. Secondly, in order to establish a case of tenancy, there must be a privity of contract between the landlord and. In order to establish a case of tenancy, one has first to prove the induction of the tenancy and the terms and conditions of such tenancy. Secondly, in order to establish a case of tenancy, there must be a privity of contract between the landlord and. the tenant and that according to the definition of the landlord, any person who is entitled to receive rent whether or not on his own account, can be treated to be a landlord. But it has not been proved by some evidence that the father of the plaintiff/appellant had been" conferred with an authority to realize rent after inducting the tenant and that he was entitled to receive rent. Another important aspect of the matter is that in order to substantiate the case of the tenancy, the persons claiming to be a tenant, is required to prove that he has paid rent and he must produce some evidences. In the instant case, as pointed out by the learned Trial Judge that not a single rent receipt was produced. There was no case made out by the defendant before the court below that the father of the plaintiff/appellant who had allegedly received the rent, did not grant any receipt there for. In the written statement there was no stand taken that the defendant had paid rents, but rent receipts had not been granted. Section 25 of the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act provides that "every tenant, who makes a payment of rent to his landlord shall be entitled to obtain forthwith from the landlord or his authorized agent a written receipt for the amount paid by him, signed by the landlord or his authorized agent. " and that "if the landlord or his authorized agent refuses or neglects to deliver to the tenant a receipt referred to in sub-section (1) for any rent paid by the tenant, the Controller shall, on application made in this behalf by the tenant within two months from the date of payment and after hearing the landlord or his authorized agent, by order, direct the landlord or his authorized agent to pay to the tenant, by way of damages such sum not exceeding double the amount of rent paid by the tenant and the costs of the application and shall also grant a certificate to the tenant in respect of the rent paid". 5. 5. IT was not the case of the defendant all through that he had not been given the receipt asked for and that if the receipt had not been given, it was his duty to protect his interests by filing an application before the Rent Controller as provided in Sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the said Act. From the provisions of Section 25 of the said Act it has been made clear by the legislature that the rent receipt Is a very important document for the purpose of proving the case of tenancy and in case the landlord refuses to grant receipt, the legislature has provided proper and effective remedy in such case. Unfortunately, the defendant had not pleaded nor taken the stand before the court below that he had paid rent, but no rent receipt was granted and it is a clear case where the defendant had no occasion to invoke the provisions of Section 25 (2) of the said act. In view of the provisions of Section 25 of the Act, it is clear that in order to claim right of a tenancy, one has to produce rent receipt and in case rent receipt was not granted, he has to satisfy the court that he had taken recourse to the provision of Section 25 (2) of the said Act which provides remedy for such refusal to grant rent receipts. The Lower Appellate Court completely overlooked the object, scope ami ambit of Section 25 of the said Act. It appears to us that the Lower Appellate Court had placed much importance on two self-cheques and/or signatures appearing thereon. If the rents have paid by cheque, in that event, it is not understood why it will be self-cheque and why it is not a cross-cheque or account payee cheque. Admittedly, the defendant stayed in the premises since August' 1973 and from August 197s till the determination of the lease and/or the licence with effect from the end of the month of March 1983. The lower Appellate Court proceeded on the footing that when the plaintiff claimed that licence was granted without any licence fee and when the defendant had come forward with a case that for about 8/9 years he had issued two cheques and even assuming that the two cheques had been handed over by the defendant to the father of the plaintiff/appellant for a sum of Rs. 1200/- and the said self-cheques had been encashed by the plaintiffs father after putting his signature on the back of the cheque for the purpose of withdrawing money, that is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of determination of a case of tenancy. The said two cheques alone cannot demolish the case of the plaintiff/appellant that there was a licence. The licence may be granted with fees or without fees. For nine years tendering of a cheque for Rs.1200/-cannot throw any light on the issue before the court below. In support of the tenancy, no agreement was produced, no rent receipt was produced. There is no allegation that on failure to issue rent receipt, step was taken under Section 25 (2) of the said Act and that under such circumstances, we fail to appreciate the stand taken by the Lower Appellate Court which is not a proper judgment for reversal. The Trial Court made categorical finding that the said two cheques had been purportedly issued after the revocation of the licence. The Lower appellate Court completely overlooked the aspect of the matter. It is difficult to believe that the defendant would be staying in the premises for 10 years and during 10 years he made payment of rent for all these months without obtaining any receipt, when Section 25 of the said act provides that failure to grant receipt is an offence for which the landlord would be penalized. The lower Appellate Court did not traverse the clear finding made by the Trial court. There was no evidence that the father had authority to induct the tenancies. The Lower Appellate Court, in our view, had completely taken a perverse view of the matter relying upon the definition of the word 'landlord' as provided in Section 2 (d) of the said Act. Section 2 (d) of the said Act provides that apart from the owner any person who is entitled to receive rent either from his own account or someboby's account, would be treated to be A landlord. The word 'entitled' IS very significant. The word entitled' means according to Black law's Dictionary, "in its usual sense, to entitled IS to give a right or legal title to". So the word 'entitle' could not be construed by the Lower Appellate Court that anybody who receives rent, is entitled under the law. The word 'entitled' IS very significant. The word entitled' means according to Black law's Dictionary, "in its usual sense, to entitled IS to give a right or legal title to". So the word 'entitle' could not be construed by the Lower Appellate Court that anybody who receives rent, is entitled under the law. A third party without having any authority may receive rent and that according to the analogy given by the Lower Appellate Court, whether or not A person IS authorized and whether or not A person has any authority and/or right, A mere acceptance of money would clothe him with the; status of landlord. IN our view, IN order to hold A person AS landlord, it must be established that such A person has some legal authority and/or right to receive rent, but unfortunately, such legal' authority and/or right of the plaintiff/appellant's father to receive rent had not been established and not discussed and that in our view, the Lower Appellate court had completely misconstrued and misunderstood the definition of the landlord as provided in the said act. Apart from the said two cheques the Lower appellate Court did not think it fit to give any reason to reverse the judgment of the Trial Court. In our view the Trial Court has considered the matter in its true perspective and that the Trial Court had not committed any wrong and/ or acted illegally and/or without jurisdiction in the matter of enforcing the attendance of the father and the brother for the purpose of verifying the signature. The father and brother of the plaintiff/appellant appeared as witnesses before the court below. The father and brother both denied the signatures and under such circumstances, it was sent to a handwriting expert. In our view, it is not necessary to go into the aspect of the matter, inasmuch as, admittedly, the said cheques bear a date which was subsequent to the determination of the licence and that there was no explanation from the defendant why he could not produce any rent receipt for a period of 10 years and in the absence of any pleading in the written statement that he has paid rent, and demanded rent receipt, but rent receipt was. refused, and law provides that in case the rent receipt is not granted, tenant is entitled to invoke such provisions of Section 25 (2) of the said Act and failure to invoke such provision is very fatal. The legislature intentionally enacted the provisions of section 25 (2) of the said Act in order to meet with a situation where an innocent tenant may go on paying rent but the landlord may refuse to grant receipt and that the legislature's intention was clear that the rent receipt is very vital and was made for the purpose of proving the case of tenancy. 6. IN the absence of production of any written agreement or the proof of the existence of any oral agreement creating tenancy, the only evidence of a tenancy is payment of rent and production of rent receipt therefor. Mere occupation of a premises without payment of rent is no proof of existence of any tenancy. Further agreements contained in the tenancy are not only contracts, they also creates a positive interest in the immovable property. It has to be proved that the intention of giving and taking possessions of the property was for the purpose of creating a tenancy and the use and occupation of the premises was as a tenant. The relationship between landlord and tenant is legal and not equitable. Such legal relationship when governed by an Act, in that event, the court has to look into the provisions of the Act. There cannot be any tenancy merely on the basis of occupation. If there is no transfer of interest in the property on the basis of oral or written agreement, it is a case of license. The licensee does not acquire any interest in the property and in case of license the relationship is not governed the law as in the case of tenancy. This aspect of the matter throws light and clearly indicates that the claim of the defendant that he was the tenant, was a myth and after thought. The Lower appellate Court had proceeded in the matter erroneously and the Lower appellate Court did hot traverse the clear finding made by the Trial Court that no tenancy was created. The tenancy is not a mere contract. It is a transfer of an interest in immovable property which entitles the tenant to enjoy the property for a consideration which is known as rent. The tenancy is not a mere contract. It is a transfer of an interest in immovable property which entitles the tenant to enjoy the property for a consideration which is known as rent. Non-payment of rent negatives the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant. In the instant case, no rent receipt was produced, even though the respondent was in occupation of the premises in question for more than 10 years. There was no allegation that even though the respondent paid rent, but rent receipt was refused. Admittedly, the respondent was in occupation of a vast area in an important part in the city of Calcutta and that he was also enjoying electricity and other benefits. But there was no whisper either in the pleading or in the evidence that he used to pay even electric and other essential charges which were required for the purpose of enjoying the property apart from rent. In case of tenancy which is protected under the provisions of West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, it has to be established that there was an agreement for inducting the tenancy either in writing or orally and that rents were paid in accordance with the provisions of the said Act. In the fact and circumstances of the case, it is clear that the Lower Appellate Court, had completely overlooked the important factors of tenancy. In the absence of protection of rent receipt and in the absence of any allegation that the respondent has paid rent but rent receipt was not granted and In the absence of any demand for rent receipt for so many years, the respondent had no occasion to take steps in accordance with the provisions of Section 25 (2) of the said Act which protects the tenant in case the landlord accepts rent and does not grant receipt. In the instant case, for the conduct of the respondent. It us clear that no tenancy had been created. It is well established principle that to ascertain whether a lease or licence has been created, the substance of the matter has to be looked into. If the respondent claims to be a tenant, he; has to discharge initial onus by proving that the intention of the parties was to create a tenancy and the most incident in the tenancy is the payment of rent. If the respondent claims to be a tenant, he; has to discharge initial onus by proving that the intention of the parties was to create a tenancy and the most incident in the tenancy is the payment of rent. But in the absence of payment and non-payment of rent has clearly negatived the existence of the relationship between landlord and tenant. In our view, tine judgment and decree passed by the Lower Appellate Court cannot be sustained, inasmuch as, verification of the signature on the two cheques, is wholly irrelevant and that even assuming that the signature in the said cheque was given to the father, that cannot improve the case of the defendant and that fact alone cannot establish the creation of a tenancy under the provisions of West Bengal Premises Tenancy act. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the question whether the tenancy is created or not, cannot be said to be dependent mererly on the said cheqes for a sum of Rs.1200/-. If it was a case of tendering the rent, there would have a demand for rent receipt and that in any event, in ordinary course, such a cheque should not have been drawn self by the defendant either crossed or account payee cheque. In the instant case, the defendant had miserably failed to make out a case of tenancy and in our view, the court below was wholly wrong in reversting the judgment of the learned Trial Judge. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and decree passed by the Lower appellate Court is set aside. Accordingly, the judgment and decree passed by the 2nd Additional District judge, Alipore dated 19th December 1990 passed in Title Appeal No. 5 of 1990 is set aside and the judgment and decree passed by the Third Additional Munsif, Alipore in Title Suit No. 127 of 1985 dated 28th November 1989 is affirmed. The appeal is allowed without any order as to costs. B. P. BANERJEE, J. Amal Kanti Bhattacharjee, J. 7. I agree to the views expressed by my learned brother, but want to add a few WORDS of my own. 8. WHEN the plaintiff proves his title to a property and seeks to evict the defendant from the said property treating him to be a licensee the onus of proving the right to stay on the property is upon the defendant who asserts such right. 8. WHEN the plaintiff proves his title to a property and seeks to evict the defendant from the said property treating him to be a licensee the onus of proving the right to stay on the property is upon the defendant who asserts such right. In the instant case, the plaintiff has succeeded to prove her title and the defendant is in possession of the property claiming to be a tenant. The onus is absolutely on the defendant to prove that he is a tenant and it is not for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant is not a tenant. The main point which ought to have been considered by the first appellate court was if the defendant had discharged his onus to the satisfaction of the court. Reading the 1st appellate court's judgment as a whole it must be held that the said court has not considered the point from a proper angle. The easiest way to prove the existence of a tenancy is to produce the rent receipts and/or any co-lateral document showing the creation of the tenancy. Since the eviction of a premises tenant is now possible. only on certain specified grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 some sort of presumption about the continuance of the tenancy can be inferred the landlord fails to show that an accepted tenant was evicted by a legal process after the inception of the tenancy or that the tenant voluntarily surrendered the tenancy. In this case no document creating the tenancy was proved. No rent receipt granted by the landlord could also be produced although the possession is claimed from as far back as in 1976. There is no explanation why no rent receipt was granted by the landlord and why it was not insisted by the tenant. So prima facie the onus has not been discharged by the defendant. 9. SOME smoke has obviously been created by the defendant's claim of payment of rent by two self payee cheques. The signatures on the cheques could not be satisfactorily compared of want of proper particulars. The lower appellate court's view is that the trial court failed in its duties to SUMMON the plaintiffs father and brother for recording their signature and handwriting. The said appellate court, therefore, remanded the suit for the PURPOSE OF examining the HAND writing expert. 10. The signatures on the cheques could not be satisfactorily compared of want of proper particulars. The lower appellate court's view is that the trial court failed in its duties to SUMMON the plaintiffs father and brother for recording their signature and handwriting. The said appellate court, therefore, remanded the suit for the PURPOSE OF examining the HAND writing expert. 10. THE lower appellate court has examined the definition of a landlord as given in section 2 (d) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The landlord has been defined as follows. "landlord" includes any person who, for the time being is entitled to receive or but for a special contract, would be entitled to receive, the rent of any premises, whether or not on his own account". It is an inclusive definition. Intrinsically a landlord is a "lessor" within the meaning of Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The term "rent" has also been defined in the said section. By creating a lease a right to enjoy a certain immovable property is transferred to the lessee. So legally this transfer cannot be made by a trespasser on the property. Obviously however, such a transfer can be made by a person other than the owner if he is so authorized by the owner. In such a case he is entitled to receive rent for the property, either on his own account or on account of the lessor-owner depending on the terms of authorization. 11. IN this case the defendant claims that the tenancy was created BY the plaintiffs father. No authorization in this respect is proved. Even assuming that a privity of contract could be created between the plaintiffs father and the defendant giving rise to a relationship of landlord and tenant as between them, the position was completely changed after the plaintiff's assertion of her own title by the service of a notice to quit on the defendant. The defendant, if his claim of tenancy was bona fide, would have chosen to attorney to the true owner on her return and assertion of ownership. It is not understood why he decided to send two self payee cheques to the plaintiffs father even after the receipt of the notice to quit from the plaintiff. His total rejection of the plaintiffs claim is not compatible with the stand taken in the suit. It is not understood why he decided to send two self payee cheques to the plaintiffs father even after the receipt of the notice to quit from the plaintiff. His total rejection of the plaintiffs claim is not compatible with the stand taken in the suit. Moreover, the cheques for being meaningful as rent ought to have been made payable to the landlord Indeed a self cheque is no indication of payment of money to the person who enchases it as a bearer. So even if any self payee cheque is encashed by the plaintiffs father on presentation it is not a discharge of the liability to pay rent, firstly because it was not made payable to the landlord and secondly, the plaintiffs father was evidently not authorized to receive any rent on his own account or on account of the plaintiff after the plaintiff asserted her right of ownership by the service of a notice to quit. 12. FO all the above reasons I endorse the views expressed by my learned brother and hold that the appeal should be allowed. Appeal allowed.