Judgment :- Nainar Sundaram, J. 1. This Writ Appeal is directed against the order of the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 689 of 1991. The petitioner in the writ petition is the appellant in this Writ Appeal. The respondents in the Writ petition are the respondents in this writ Appeal. We find it convenient to refer to the parties as per their nomenclature in the writ petition. 2. The petitioner, who was functioning as the Registrar of the first-respondent, has been hauled up in disciplinary action. With regard to the disciplinary action initiated and prosecuted thus far, certain silient features have got to be set down to appreciate and assess the contentions raised by Mr. Vijay Narayan, learned counsel for the petitioner. The first-respondent, by resolution dated 30th July, 1990 constituted a Special Committee, the second-respondent herein, consisting of four Medical Practitioners to enquire into certain charges against the petitioner, and report to the first respondent. One of the members of the Special Committee was designated as its Chairman. The Special Committee framed the Specific charges on 3-8-1990. The Special Committee, did not conduct the enquiry. The enquiry part was entrusted to a retired District Judge. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report and on the basis of the same, the Special Committee alone issued the second show cause notice on 7-1-1991 intimating the petitioner that the proposed penalty would be termination of his services and calling for his explanation over the same. The petitioner came to this Court impugning the charge memorandum dated 3-8-1990 and the second show cause notice dated 7-1-1991 issued by the Special Committee. 3. The learnedsingle Judge, who heard the writ petition, took the view that the Special committee had no jurisdiction to issue the impugned second show cause notice and quashed it. However, with reference to the attack on the charge memorandum, the petitioner did not succeed before the learned single Judge in having the same quashed. Thus the petitioner is obliged to prefer this Writ Appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge, in so far as he has been declined to quash the charge memorandum. 4. There were two contentions to which our attention was primarily focussed by Mr. Vijay Narayan, learned counsel for the petitioner, coveting interference at our hands in Writ Appeal. Thus the petitioner is obliged to prefer this Writ Appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge, in so far as he has been declined to quash the charge memorandum. 4. There were two contentions to which our attention was primarily focussed by Mr. Vijay Narayan, learned counsel for the petitioner, coveting interference at our hands in Writ Appeal. The first contention is that the Special Committee was not competent to issue the charge memorandum and the disciplinary action prosecuted on the basis of the same must be held to be wholly incompetent and struck down. Expatiating this contention, learned counsel for the petitioner would say that the first respondent is governed by the Tamil Nadu Medical Registration Act IV of 1914, hereinafter referred to as the Act, and while S. 5 of the Act speaks about its constitution, S. 10 of the Act lays down that the appointment of the petitioner shall be done by the first-respondent, and it further says that the first respondent is the authority empowered to remove the appointee, and hence learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the power of removal having been vested with the first-respondent, the initiation of the disciplinary action therefor by formulation of charges could be done only by the first respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further say that under S. 9(A) (3) of the Act, there could be no delegation of the powers and duties of the first respondent to any other body like the special Committee and this being the position in law, the formulation of the charges by the Special Committee must be held to be incompetent and quashed. 5. As against this Mr. M. Kalyanasundaram, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, would submit that the decision to initiate disciplinary action was taken only by the first respondent and the formulation of the charges in that context could be done by the Special Committee whose members are also members of the first respondent, and this Court should not frown upon the charge memorandum on this ground, as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. This ground has been specifically taken in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, we do not find any specific answer set therefor. 6. This ground has been specifically taken in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition and in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, we do not find any specific answer set therefor. 6. The principle that should have been countenanced is that if the power of appointment and the power of removal of a servant are conferred by statutory provisions, they could be exercised only by the authority conferred with them, and they cannot be delegated, unless authorised by statutory provisions either expressly or impliedly. Removal is the culmination point, and there would be very many facets of proceedings preceding it; such as decision to initiate action, initiation of action by formulation of charges, enquiry, findings of enquiry, consideration of them, decision to impose penalty, second show cause notice and consideration of the explanation therefor. These preceding proceedings cannot be dissociated from one another and they go to form a compendium for the exercise of the power of removal. Normally the authority conferred with the power of removal by statutory provisions should alone prosecute these proceedings purely ministerial acts excepted-unless delegation of one or all of them to another body has been permitted by statutory provisions either expressly or impliedly. Each one of these proceedings has its own significance and is a step in aid towards the ultimate order of removal, if that should be the result. Of these proceedings, formulation of charges is the basis for setting the disciplinary action in motion, and that power cannot, unless permitted by statutory provisions, either expressly or impliedly, be delegated. In this connection the pronouncement in Steel Authority of India v. Labour Court, Dhanbad A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 2054can be taken note of, where it is countenanced that the disciplinary authority alone, in the absence of rules empowering delegation is competent to frame the charges. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even at the level of High Courts, there are decisions elucidating the proposition. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that even at the level of High Courts, there are decisions elucidating the proposition. He drew our attention to the pronouncement in Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 193, where a Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh countenanced the principle that “in the absence of a statutory provision permitting expressly or impliedly delegation of disciplinary powers an authority other than the disciplinary authority has clearly no power to frame, on its own initiative, charges against a civil servant and hold an enquiry into them”. When a particular Regulation was pointed out as having delegated such power, the learned Judges of the Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh c onstrued that Regulation as not having delegated any such power. Learned counsel for the petitioner also cited the pronouncement in Munihar Singh v. Superintendent of Police, United Khasi Jaintia Hills, Shillong and others A.I.R. 1969 Assam and Nagaland 1, where having found that there was no rule permitting delegation of the power to frame charges, the ratio in Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 193, was followed. But we find that the pronouncement of the Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Shardul Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh A.I.R. 1966 M.P. 193 was taken on appeal before the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shardul Singh 1970-1-S.C.C. 108, and the Supreme Court took note of the Regulation relied on by the State of Madhya Pradesh as permitting delegation of the power to initiate disciplinary action and found no infirmity in the delegatee initiating disciplinary action as he did in that case. The Supreme Court, in substance, repelled the contention that the guarantee under Art. 311(1) of the Constitution of India that a civil servant should not be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed, would not permit even initiation of disciplinary action by delegation. The Supreme Court found that the concerned Regulation could be considered as one dealing with conditions of service within the meaning of Art. 309 of the Constitution of India and could be acted upon by the delegate. In this view, the Supreme Court upheld the action of the delegatee, differing from the view of the Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. In this view, the Supreme Court upheld the action of the delegatee, differing from the view of the Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh. But, we do not think that the cardinal rule as such, has been negatived; the cardinal rule being delegation of the exercise of the power of removal of a servant conferred by statutory provisions, is permissible only if permitted by statutory provisions, either expressly or impliedly. 7. However, Mr. M. Kalyanasundaram, learned counsel for the respondents, would draw our attention to the pronouncement of a learned single Judge of High Court of Delhi reported in Workmen of Indian Overseas Bank v. Indian Overseas Bank and another 1973-1-LLJ. 316 where the charge sheets were issued by an authority other than the disciplinary authority; but the disciplinary authority himself held the enquiry, heard the concerned workmen and ultimately passed the dismissal order. The learned single Judge of the High Court of Delhi declined to accept the proposition that only if the rules permit such delegation, the action could be upheld; Our analysis and understanding of the proposition being different, we are not able to fall in line with the thinking of the learned single Judge of the High Court of Delhi. The proposition that must govern is that the authority conferred by statute with the power of removal alone should formulate the charges unless delegation of this part of the disciplinary action is permitted by the statutory provisions governing the same. 8. In the present case, S. 10(1) of the Act reads as follows: “10(1). The Council shall appoint a registrar who shall act as secretary of the Council and who shall also act as treasurer, unless the council shall appoint another person as treasurer. Every person so appointed, shall be removable at the pleasure of the Council.” The language of the provision is unambiguous and it empowers only the first-respondent to appoint and remove the petitioner. Every person so appointed, shall be removable at the pleasure of the Council.” The language of the provision is unambiguous and it empowers only the first-respondent to appoint and remove the petitioner. S. 9A(1) of the Act speaks about constitution of the Executive Committee in the following terms: “9A Executive Committee —(1) there shall be an Executive Committee of the Council consisting of its President and Vice-President, ex officio and three other members of the council who shall be elected every year in the prescribed manner by the Council at its first meeting held in that year.” S. 9A(3) of the Act contemplates delegation of the powers and duties of the first-respondent to the Executive Committee and the language of the said provision runs as follows: “9A(3). The Council may, with the previous sanction of the State Government, delegate any of its powers and duties to the Executive Committee.” Certainly the Special Committee is not the Executive Committee constituted under S. 9A (1) of the Act to have the benefit of any delegation of the powers and duties of the first respondent which could be done only as per S. 9A(3) of the Act. There are by-laws, which have come to be formulated pursuant to powers under S. 24 of the Act. The admitted position is that the said by-laws are silent on this question of delegation of power to initiate disciplinary action by formulation of charges, to any other body. When that is the position in law, the provisions of the Act alone must speak and so spoken, there could not be a delegation of the power to initiate disciplinary action by formulation of charges to any Special Committee. Thus, we are obliged to countenance the first contention put forth by Mr. Vijay Narayan, learned counsel for the petitioner. 9. There is the second contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner and that is, the formulation of the charges surfers from another infirmity, namely, that two of the members of the Special committee assuming that they could formulate the charges are themselves witnesses against the petitioner and it is totally not permissible for them to take part in the process of formulation of charges. This grievance is a well-founded one and this element provides an infirmity vitiating for formulation of the charges by the Special Committee, granting that it could formulate the charges. 10. Mr. This grievance is a well-founded one and this element provides an infirmity vitiating for formulation of the charges by the Special Committee, granting that it could formulate the charges. 10. Mr. Kalyanasundaram, learned counsel for the respondents, would advance a stand that the petitioner did not demur over the issuance of the charge memorandum by the Special Committee earlier and in fact, he participated in the enquiry and he cannot at this belated stage, be permitted to tarn round and question the competency of the Special Committee to issue the charge memorandum. Here, we find a case where the Special Committee totally lacked the competency and power to issue the impugned charge memorandum. We can call it a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. This being the position, we do not think that we should ignore that vital infirmity which the impugned charge memorandum suffers on the principle of acquiescence. Hence, we eschew this contention put forth by the learned counsel for the respondents. 11. Sustaining these two grounds, we are obliged to interfere in Writ Appeal. However, we must place on record that the learned counsel for the petitioner wanted to go further and attack also the very conduct of the enquiry by the retired District Judge and he questions the whole process as illegal. There is no need for us to go into these aspects, since the petitioner succeeds on the other two grounds deleting the very charge memorandum. 12. The result is, this Writ Appeal is allowed and besides the quashing of the second show cause notice dated 7-1-1991, issued by the Second respondent already done by the learned single Judge, we quash the charge memorandum, dated 3-8 1990, formulated and issued by the Second respondent. No costs. 13. We make it clear that this decision of ours shall not stand in the way of the respondents to prosecute disciplinary action against the petitioner, if there is still warrant for it, in accordance with law; and if the respondents so conceive that idea, it is open to the petitioner to object to the same in the manner available to him in law.