Judgment :- 1. This petition by Fareeda, defendant No. 1, in O.S.No.18/91 is against the order in C.M.A.No. 73/91 made by the District Judge, Kozhikode, who reversed the order of the Munsiff, Kozhikode in I.A.No. 87/91 and granted to the plaintiff, P. Rajan Fareeda v. Rajan Babu (Guttal, J.) Babu, an injunction restraining the defendant No.1 from taking possession of or interfering with the possession of a shop consisting of two rooms. The defendant No.1 is the owner of the shop. The defendant No. 2, Krishnan, claim to have been the sole tenant of the defendant No. 1. 2. The defendant No.1 filed C.M.P.No. 3370/91 with a prayer that the judgment in R.CP. No. 154/86 be taken on record of this revision petition as additional evidence. The judgment in R.C.P.No.154/86 is between Fareeda, defendant No. 1, and Krishnan, defendant No. 2. Although counter affidavit has been filed by the plaintiff, there is no opposition to the grant of C.M.P.No. 3370/91. Accordingly, I allow this C.M.P. 3. There is one more C.M.P. viz. C.M.P.No. 2954/91 by the plaintiff Rajan Babu. According to him, the petitioner taking advantage of the interim stay of operation of the impugned order granted by this court, forcibly dispossessed the plaintiff. He, therefore, prays that since the plaintiff has been dispossessed by abuse of the process of this court, possession of the shop be restored to the plaintiff. I will consider this petition after disposal of C.R.P.No.1687/91. 4. The shop in dispute comprises of two rooms. The defendant No.1 acquired ownership of the shop from Imbichibi. Krishnan, Defendant No. 2 claims that he was the owner of tyre retreading business run in the name of "Vijaya Tyres" and also the tenant of the shop. According to the plaintiff, on the other hand, Yesoda, his mother was the owner of the business and tenant of the shop. Yesoda died on 10-5-1986. According to the plaintiff, the defendant No. 2 was an employee of Yesoda, in the capacity as Manager of the business. After her death, defendant No. 2 managed the business on behalf of the plain tiff and other heirs of Yesoda. The plaintiff is in possession of the shop on behalf of all heirs of Yesoda. Yesoda died on 10-5-1986. According to the plaintiff, the defendant No. 2 was an employee of Yesoda, in the capacity as Manager of the business. After her death, defendant No. 2 managed the business on behalf of the plain tiff and other heirs of Yesoda. The plaintiff is in possession of the shop on behalf of all heirs of Yesoda. Since defendant No.1 on 1-1-1991, tried to trespass in the premises, the plaintiff filed the suit No. 18/1991 and sought the injunction restraining the defendants from taking forcible possession of the shop and the premises. The defendant.No. I alone con tested the application for injunction in the trial court. He claimed that defendant No. 2 and not Smt. Yesoda was the tenant. He asserted that defendant No. 2 surrendered the tenancy and returned possession of two rooms. The possession of one room was given on 31-7-1990 and of the other on 1-8-1990. Upon receiving possession from the defendant No. 2, the defendant No.1 claims to have let out the shop to a gentleman by name Suresh Babu. According to the defendant No. 1, the plaintiff took forcible possession of the shop by trespassing into it on 14-12-1990. 4. The learned Munsiff, Kozhikode set out the respective cases of the parties and listed the documents. In paragraph 7, he observed that "on a perusal of the documents, it can be seen that the allegation of the respondent (defendant No. 1) is true". He accepted that defendant No. 2 vacated the premises upon surrendering the tenancy to the defendant No.1 and that thereupon the possession was handed over to Suresh Babu. Since the plaintiff did not explain as to how he got into possession, the learned Munsiff concluded that the plaintiff must have got possession by committing trespass. Finally, he held that the plaintiff did not come to the court with clean hands and therefore, dismissed the application for interim injunction. 5. In appeal, the learned Add L District Judge, Kozhikode, on analysis of all the documents and considering the contentions of the parties, made four findings. Firstly, he came to the conclusion that prima facie the plaintiffs mother Yesoda was the tenant and that therefore the defendant No. 2 alone was not a tenant. This finding was based on circumstances which I will set out just now. Firstly, he came to the conclusion that prima facie the plaintiffs mother Yesoda was the tenant and that therefore the defendant No. 2 alone was not a tenant. This finding was based on circumstances which I will set out just now. In his written statement in O.S.No. 404/ 90, which was filed by Nalinakshan another brother, for partition, the defendant No. 2 admitted that the license for the tyre business stood in the name of his mother Yesoda. Secondly, the telephone bills Ext. A3 (1-8-1983) and Ext. A4 (1-12-1987) in respect of the telephone in the shop, named Yesoda as the proprietor ix. Thirdly, although the defendant No. 2 claimed that the tenancy had its origin in a contract between Krishnan and the defendant No. 1, the rent notes Ext.1 and B2 executed by defendant No. 2 show that the original rent notes were not executed by the defendant No.1 but by Imbichibi. This evidence being inconsistent with the case of the defendant No. 2 that he was a direct tenant of defendant No. 1, the version of the defendant Nos.1 and 2 was suspect. The original letting of the shop dates back to 1972 and 1973. This admitted fact was construed to be 'contrary to the assertion that the defendant No.1 let out the shop directly to defendant No. 2. For this reason, the learned Addl. District Judge considered that the version of defendant No.1 and defendant No. 2 was not reliable. Fourthly, the wage register in respect of the tyre business produced as Ext. A5 records the defendant No. 2 as Manager on payment of salary which is inconsistent with the claim of the defendant No. 2 that he was the sole tenant and consistent with the case of the plaintiff that the defendant No. 2 was an employee. On these facts, the learned Addl. District Judge came to the conclusion that it was the mother Yesoda who was the tenant. This makes the plaintiff and other heirs of Yesoda lawful tenants. 6. On the question of possession of the shop the learned Addl. District Judge rejected the case of the defendant No.1 and defendant No. 2 that the plaintiff committed trespass and acquired possession illegally. Accordingly to the case of the defendants, Suresh Babu was supposed to be in possession from 1-8-1990. The trespass is alleged to have been committed on 14-12-1990. On the question of possession of the shop the learned Addl. District Judge rejected the case of the defendant No.1 and defendant No. 2 that the plaintiff committed trespass and acquired possession illegally. Accordingly to the case of the defendants, Suresh Babu was supposed to be in possession from 1-8-1990. The trespass is alleged to have been committed on 14-12-1990. In view of what he found in the police report, the learned Addl. District Judge concluded that in all probability, the business originally belonged to the father of the plaintiff and the defendant No. 2. The institution of the suit for partition at the earliest opportunity on the basis of the joint ownership of the shop impressed the learned Addl. District Judge, as conduct of a wronged person. He found that except the fact that the police complaint was made, there was nothing to prove that the plaintiff acquired possession in an illegal manner. The report of the Commissioner dated 4-1-1991 shows that Vijayan a brother of the plaintiff was in occupation and carrying on business in tyres. This, therefore, belies version of the defendant No.1 that Suresh Babu was in occupation as a lessee inducted after the surrender of tenancy by the defendant No. 2. Since it was nobody's case that Suresh Babu was also engaged in the business of tyre retreading and having regard to other circumstances set out above he held that it was the plaintiff who was in possession of the shop. 7. In view of the conclusions summarised in paragraphs Sand 6 the learned Additional District Judge held the plaintiff has a prima facie case, and that there fore he was entitled to the interim relief prayed for. 8. On the basis of certain judicial decisions learned counsel for the defendant No.1 urged that the Addl. District Judge, exercising appellate jurisdiction exceeded his authority in reversing the trial court's order, in the circumstances of this case. The trial court exercised the jurisdiction in accordance with law. The refusal to grant injunction to the plaintiff, in the circumstances of this case, was the result of sound exercise of discretion. According to learned counsel, the appellate court erred in interfering with the exercise of discretion by the trial court. 9. The trial court exercised the jurisdiction in accordance with law. The refusal to grant injunction to the plaintiff, in the circumstances of this case, was the result of sound exercise of discretion. According to learned counsel, the appellate court erred in interfering with the exercise of discretion by the trial court. 9. In the Printers (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. (The Printers (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pothen Joseph, AIR 1960 SC1156) and Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. (Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros. Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 249),the Supreme Court considered the scope of the appellate court's power in interfering with the discretionary orders of the trial court made under S.34 of the Arbitration Act. The following propositions were laid down: (i) Where the trial court has exercised its discretion, the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of such discretion. (ii) It is not open to the appellate court to interfere with such discretion on the sole ground that had it considered the matter as a trial court, it would have come to a contrary conclusion. (iii) The appellate court's power to interfere with discretionary powers, is limited to cases in which (a) in the exercise of its discretion the trial court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or (b) has ignored relevant facts or (c) adopted an unjudicial approach. 10. The Karnataka High Court, (Smt. Lalithakshi Annadanagouda v. Sadashivappa Basappa Patil and another (AIR 1984 Kar. 74), following the two judgments of the Supreme Court, referred to above, its own earier judgments, and the judgment of Rajasthan High Court in Smt. Vimaladevi (Smt. Vimaladevi v. Jang Bahadur AIR 1977 Raj. 196) extended the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Printers (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. (The Printers (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. v. Pothen Joseph, AIR 1960 SC 1156) and Uttar Pradesh Co-operative Federation Ltd. (Uttar Pradesh Cooperative Federation Ltd. v. Sunder Bros. Delhi, AIR 1967 SC 249), to cases of injunction. 11. Since the judgments of the Supreme Court arose out of orders under S.34 of the Arbitration Act, it is necessary to consider whether the appellate power under the Arbitration Act and under the Code of Civil Procedure are similar in their nature and content. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to appeals under the Arbitration Act (Section 41 of the Arbitration act). The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to appeals under the Arbitration Act (Section 41 of the Arbitration act). Therefore, S.107 of the Code of Civil Procedure applies to the appeals under the Arbitration act). The order staying or refusing to stay legal proceedings under S.34 of the Arbitration Act which is a discretionary order is appealable (Section 39(1)(r) of the Arbitration act). Similarly, an order granting or refusing to grant injunction by a Civil Court which too is discretionary is appealable. (Rule (1)(r) of Order XLHI of the Code of Civil Procedure). The appeals against the two discretionary orders are therefore marked by the common feature, that the court of first instance makes the orders by exercising its discretion. The Supreme Court's decision laying down the nature, extent and scope of the powers of the appellate court to interfere with discretionary orders, are applicable to appeals against orders granting or refusing to grant injunctions. Although the two cases cited in paragraph 9 above, arose under the Arbitration Act, the rules of law laid down therein apply to appeals against orders granting or refusing to grant injunctions. The reason is that both the orders partake the same character, as discretionary orders and are subject to the same provisions as to appeals. 12. The Karnataka (Smt. Lalithakshi Annadanagouda v. Sadashivappa Ba-sappa Patil and another, AIR 1984 Kar. 74), and Rajasthan (Smt. Vimaladevi (Smt. Vimaladevi v. Jang Bahadur, AIR 1977 Raj. 196) High Courts have held that the appellate court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order passed by the trial court merely on the ground that another view of the matter was possible. In order to justify interference by the appellate court, with discretionary orders, the impugned order must be arbitrary, capricious or perverse. The view of these High Courts is based on the principles emerging from the two judgments of the Supreme Court referred to in paragraph 9 above. 13. The limitation on the exercise of the appellate power is consistent with the discretionary nature of the trial court's orders. The grounds on which the appellate court may reverse the order of the trial court, based on exercise of discretion, are such as would either vitiate the exercise of discretion or would show that discretion was not exercised at all. The limitation on the exercise of the appellate power is consistent with the discretionary nature of the trial court's orders. The grounds on which the appellate court may reverse the order of the trial court, based on exercise of discretion, are such as would either vitiate the exercise of discretion or would show that discretion was not exercised at all. This is the rationale of the limitation on the appellate powers, laid down by the j judicial decisions. I respectfully concur with the views of the Karnataka and Rajasthan High Courts. 14.The substance of the whole matter is this: The appellate court may interfere with the discretionary order of the trial court on limited grounds. The trial court must have, in the exercise of its discretion, acted, arbitrarily, capriciously, without evidence or in any other manner which would vitiate the exercise of discretion or would show that discretion was not exercised at all. If the appellate court interferes without the existence of such grounds it acts with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. In such a case the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction is justified in interfering with the order of the appellate court. 15. The learned trial judge, the Munsiff, ignored that Yesoda the mother of the plaintiff was named as the owner of the business in the telephone bills. He did not evaluate the fact that admittedly the license for the tyre retreading business carried on in the premises was held by Yesoda. The fact that the defendant No. 2 was recorded in the wage register as employee was also ignored. He assumed that the police complaint about the trespass, was, by itself evidence of trespass. He ignored the fact that in the premises there was physical evidence of tyre business which negatives the case that Suresh Babu, a stranger was inducted in the premises. So also the admission of the defendant No. 2 in O.S.No. 404/90 was lost sight off. The trial court arrived at its finding by ignoring crucial telling facts and made arbitrary conclusions. Therefore, the Addl. District Judge was justified in interfering with the Munsiff s order. In my opinion, the learned Addl. District Judge was entirely justified in interfering with the order of the trial court. He has acted within his authority laid down by the law. 16. There is a C.M.P.No. 2954/91 by the plaintiff. Therefore, the Addl. District Judge was justified in interfering with the Munsiff s order. In my opinion, the learned Addl. District Judge was entirely justified in interfering with the order of the trial court. He has acted within his authority laid down by the law. 16. There is a C.M.P.No. 2954/91 by the plaintiff. According to him, defendant No.1 took advantage of the interim stay of further proceeding granted by me on 17-9-991 and armed with this order dispossessed him from the suit premises. He, therefore, seeks an order that possession should be restored back to him. The finding of the Addl. District Judge is that theplaintiffwasinpossessionatanyrateon4-1-1991. The learned trial judge has also found that the plaintiff was in possession, though according to him, the possession was, a result of the trespass. The effect of these facts is that the plaintiff was in possession until the appellate court granted the injunction. It is not the case of the defendant No.1 that after the two judgments the plaintiff handed over possession to him. If this is so, some explanation as to how the defendant No.1 came to be in possession is expected of him. None has been offered. In my opinion, therefore, the only manner in which the plaintiff could lose the possession, was by an act offered by the person now inoccupation. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the plaintiff has been wrongfully dispossessed with the aid of the order of this court. The present possession of the defendant No.1 is the result of abuse of the process of this court. It is, therefore, necessary to reverse the gains of abuse of the process of this court and restore possession to the plaintiff which he held on the date on which the suit was instituted, and this court admitted the petition. 17. For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the C.R.P.No.1687/ 91 is dismissed with costs and C.M.P.No. 2954/91 is allowed. I order that the defendant No.1 shall hand over possession of the two shop rooms to which the suit relates to the plaintiff. Subject to this, the petition is allowed. This order shall be complied within one week from today. Issue carbon copy of the order to the parties on usual terms.