JUDGMENT 1. - This revision petition has been filed against the order of the Addl. District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur dated November 14, 1990, holding that the Photostat copies of the unstamped original receipts cannot be permitted to be read as their secondary evidence even on payment of required penalty under Section 35, Indian Stamp Act, (hereinafter to be called 'the Act'). File facts of the case giving rise to this revision petition may be summarised thus. 2. The plaintiff-non-petitioner has filed a suit for the recovery of certain amount against the defendant-petitioners. In their written statement, the defendants have averred that payments of total amount of Rs. 29,046.70 ps. have been made on different dates to the plaintiff and the latter has issued eight receipts whose Photostat copies have been filed alongwith it. An application under Section 65, Evidence Act was moved by the defendant-petitioners stating that the plaintiff requested them for giving the original receipts to enable him to make necessary entries in his account-books, they accordingly gave them keeping their Photostat copies, subsequently he did not return them and the same have not been produced in the court by him despite moving an application under Order 11, Rule 14 Civil Procedure Code. and praying that these Photostat copies may be allowed to be produced and proved as secondary evidence of the original receipts. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, the learned trial court held that in secondary evidence of the original unstamped receipts their Photostat copies cannot be permitted to be proved and accordingly rejected plaintiff's application by its order under challenge. 3. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the defendant-petitioners that the learned trial court did not take into consideration the proviso (b) of Section 35 of the Act requiring payment of penalty only for admitting an unstamped receipt and non-applicability of Section 42 of the Act requiring endorsement of payment of duty and penalty on an instrument on which duty and penalty have been paid. He further contended that in Champalal v. Pannalal, 1951 RLW 258, and Jupadi Keshava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1070 , the proviso (a) of Section 35 of the Act was under consideration and not proviso (b) relating to unstamped receipts and such these rulings are not applicable in the present case. 4. He further contended that in Champalal v. Pannalal, 1951 RLW 258, and Jupadi Keshava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao, AIR 1971 Supreme Court 1070 , the proviso (a) of Section 35 of the Act was under consideration and not proviso (b) relating to unstamped receipts and such these rulings are not applicable in the present case. 4. In reply, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-non-petitioner that the revision petition is not maintainable under Section 115, Civil Procedure Code. He relied upon Harak Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 1970 RLW 320 (F.B.). He also contended that 'instrument' has been defined in Section 2(14) of the Act, it does not include a copy of a document and Sections 33, 35 and 42 of the Act deal with original instruments and not with their copies and this aspect of the matter has duly been considered in both the aforesaid rulings. 5. There is no substance in the revision petition. It is not disputed that all the eight original unstamped receipts could be admitted in evidence on payment of penalty of Re. 1/- each as provided in proviso (b) of Section 35 of the Act. Section 35 speaks of an instrument as defined in Section 2(14) of the Act and not its copy. It has been observed in Jupudi Keshava Rao v. Pulavarthi Venkata Subbarao, (supra), as follows: "Section 35 is not concerned with any copy of an instrument and a party can only be allowed to rely on a document which is an instrument for the purpose of Section 35. 'Instrument' is defined in Section 2(14), as including every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded. There is no scope for inclusion of a copy of a document as an instrument for the purpose of the stamp Act." It has further been observed at para 24 as follows : "As we have expressed our view already Section 35 imposed a bar on the reception of any but the original instrument and forbade the reception of secondary evidence. Section 36 only lifted that bar in the case of an original unstamped or insufficiently stamped document to which no exception as to admissibility was taken at the first stage, it did not create any exemption in the case of secondary evidence which a copy would undoubtedly be. Section 36 only lifted that bar in the case of an original unstamped or insufficiently stamped document to which no exception as to admissibility was taken at the first stage, it did not create any exemption in the case of secondary evidence which a copy would undoubtedly be. In the case before the Judicial Committee the copy was one other than the final draft of the original document which had been lost through no fault on the part of the person intending to prove it and yet it was held that the stamp act ruled out its admissibility in evidence." Similarly, in Ganga Ram v. Het Ram, 1964 RLW 573 (D.B.) at page 578 it has been observed as follows : "....In Champalal v. Pannalal, 1951 RLW 251, the plaintiff had filed along with the plaint a copy of the agreement keeping the original with him. Plaintiff case came up for trial. Original agreement was stated to be lost. Trial court allowed the plaintiff to lead secondary evidence. The agreement was insufficiently stamped. It was urged that the copy of this insufficiently stamped agreement was not admissible in law. Bapna, J. observed : "The view of law taken by the lower court is entirely incorrect. It is settled law that the contents of a document which is required to be executed on a stamp, if not stamped or if insufficiently stamped cannot be proved by secondary evidence. It is the original document which, if unstamped or insufficiently stamped, can be validated by payment of stamp duty and penalty under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. If such document is lost, the penalty cannot be levied. A careful examination of the language of Section 36 of the Stamp Act makes it clear that it is applicable only when an unstamped or insufficiently stamped instrument has to be admitted in evidence but where the instrument itself is not produced the Section has no application to the secondary evidence". In Mool Chand's case (8) a similar question arose before Bapna, J. and he adhered to the view he had taken in Champalal's case (7). In Mool Chand, s case (8) the 'Bahi' which contained the original Khata was lost and the learned Judge held that no reason was made out to depart from his earlier decision." (8) Mool Chand v. Lachman (1956 RL W 58). 6. In Mool Chand, s case (8) the 'Bahi' which contained the original Khata was lost and the learned Judge held that no reason was made out to depart from his earlier decision." (8) Mool Chand v. Lachman (1956 RL W 58). 6. It is clear from the provisions of Section 42 that endorsement is made on the original document and not on its copy. The provisions of this Section are also applicable to an unstamped receipt for which penalty is only required to be paid. Section 6 of the Act only speaks about duplicate of any instrument and no other provision of the Act speaks about a copy of an instrument. No local amendment has been made providing payment of stamp duty on copies, counterparts of duplicate when that duty has not been paid on the original or principal documents as had been done in Uttar Pradesh by Section 6 by U.P. Act No. 111 of 1936 adding Section 6A in the Act. 7. It is correct that under the proviso (b) of Section 35 of the Act, no stamp duty is required to be paid for admitting an original receipt, but only penalty of Re. l/- is required to be paid for admitting it in evidence. Proviso (a) of Section 35 of the Act contemplates payment of stamp duty and penalty for admitting an unstamped or insufficiently stamped document other than a receipt, bill of exchange and promissory note. The distinction drawn by the learned counsel for the defendant-petitioners is of no material consequence. It does not go to include a copy of an unstamped original receipt in the definition of 'instrument' for which the provisions of Sections 33, 35 and 42 of the Act are applicable. 8. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed with costs.Petition dismissed. *******