Judgment :- The petitioner was appointed as a Sewing Teacher in the Lower Primary School of which the fourth respondent is the Manager in the year 1962. Her appointment was approved by the Assistant Educational Officer. Her services were terminated for want of vacancy on February 19,1963. A subsequent vacancy of Sewing Teacher to which the petitioner could be appointed arose in the school on June 3, 1985. The fourth respondent appointed her to the vacancy by virtue of the preference in appointment which she had under Rule 51A of Chapter XIV-A of the Kerala Education Rules (KER). The appointment was reported to the Assistant Educational Officer for his approval, but he declined approval by the order Ext.P1 on the ground that the petitioner was over-aged at the time of her fresh appointment. She had completed 51 years on January 1,1985 which was beyond the upper age limit prescribed for appointment, under Rule 1(2) of Chapter XIV-A Manager's appeal to the District Educational Officer and further representation to government under Rule 92 of Chapter XIV-A were not successful. The appellate and revisional authorities dismissed the appeal and the revision by the orders Exts.P2 and P4 dated 29-1-1986 and 26-12-1987 respectively. In both these orders it was stated that, besides being over-aged, the petitioner did not also possess the S.S.L.C. qualification which was required for appointment as a Sewing Teacher. Evidently this latter qualification was insisted on, on the basis of the executive order G.O.(P) No.87/80/G.Edn. dated June 39,1980, requiring possession of S.S.L.C. even for a Sewing Teacher. The petitioner filed this original petition on 19-5-1988 challenging the proceedings Exts.P1, P2 and P4. She continued in service, and while the original petition was pending, retired from service on March 31,1989. 2. Two reasons are discernible from the impugned orders, for non-approval of the petitioner's appointment as a Sewing Teacher. One of these reasons which found expression only in the appellate and revisional orders Exts. P2 and P4, is that the petitioner did not possess the S.S.L.C. qualification. The first question for consideration is whether this is correct. Chapter XX " of the K.E.R. prescribes the qualifications for appointment as teachers. Rule 3(3)(iv) relates to Sewing Teachers. One of these reasons which found expression only in the appellate and revisional orders Exts. P2 and P4, is that the petitioner did not possess the S.S.L.C. qualification. The first question for consideration is whether this is correct. Chapter XX " of the K.E.R. prescribes the qualifications for appointment as teachers. Rule 3(3)(iv) relates to Sewing Teachers. At the relevant time i.e. on June 3,1985, when the petitioner was appointed, the qualification for appointment as a sewing teacher was a pass in Standard VII and group certificate in needle work and dress making K.G.T.E. (Higher) or M.G.T.E.(Higher). This was amended by G.O.(P)No.55/ 87/G.Edn. dated March 6,1987 published in the Kerala Gazette dated June 16,1987 by substituting pass in S.S.L.C. examination for pass in Standard VII. Therefore, so far as the statutory rules are concerned, the educational qualification required at the time the petitioner was appointed in June 1985, was only a pass in Standard VII, a qualification which the petitioner possessed. The subsequent amendment to the Rule making it a pass in S.S.L.C. examination cannot affect the appointment already made in June 1985, if otherwise it was in order. But the learned Government Pleader maintains that the petitioner did have to possess the S.S.L.C. qualification by virtue of the government order dated June 30,1980 which I have already referred. But this Government order cannot supplant the statutory rule requiring only a pass in Standard VII and insist on a higher qualification of S.S.L.C. when the rule itself required only a lesser qualification. The respondents cannot on the basis of an executive order refuse approval of the appointment when the teacher was otherwise qualified as per the statutory rule. The departmental functionaries are governed by the statutory provisions and they cannot act on an executive order which runs counter to those provisions. Government cannot in exercise of their executive functions impose conditions which are not warranted by the statutory provisions. Prescription of a qualification other than that laid down in the rules has to be by amendment to the rule and not by executive order - an exercise which government itself undertook later in the year 1987. 3. Government cannot in exercise of their executive functions impose conditions which are not warranted by the statutory provisions. Prescription of a qualification other than that laid down in the rules has to be by amendment to the rule and not by executive order - an exercise which government itself undertook later in the year 1987. 3. This precise question in relation to the very same rule came up for consideration by a Division Bench of this Court in Jesilet v. State of Kerala, 1987 (2) KLT 984 where the Bench held that the executive order of the State Government prescribing S.S.L.C. qualification for promotion in addition to the other qualifications prescribed by the Rules was without competence and cannot be enforced. The ground of want of educational qualification of S.S.L.C. stated in Exts.P2 and P4 has therefore to fail. 4. The learned Government Pleader made a further submission that the petitioner did not possess even the technical qualification of group certificate in needle work and dress making KGTE (Higher) or MGTE (Higher). He relies for this on an averment made for the first time in the counter affidavit in this court. This ground of disqualification has not been mentioned or relied on in any of the impugned orders Exts.P1, P2 and P4. All of them have proceeded on the basis that the petitioner possessed the requisite technical qualification and that what was lacking was the educational qualification. The order of a statutory authority has to be decided on the basis of the reasons stated in that order. The authority cannot be allowed to supplement the reasons stated therein by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. In Mohinder Singh v. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 S.C. 851, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by 'fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order had in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out." It is not therefore possible to entertain this additional ground relied on by the learned Government Pleader based on the averments in the counter affidavit. I decline his invitation to go into this question. 5. I decline his invitation to go into this question. 5. The other fundamental ground which finds reflection in all the three impugned orders relates to the age of the petitioner. The contention is that under Rule 1(2) of Chapter XIV-A, the age limit for appointment applicable to teachers of government schools shall apply mutatis mutandis to teachers of aided schools. The upper age limit for appointment to government schools is 50. The petitioner was aged 51 in June 1985 when she sought reappointment in the fourth respondent's school. She was therefore not qualified for appointment. So goes the argument. The petitioner however bases her claim on Rule 51A of Chapter XIV-A, with the contention that the age limit prescribed by rule 1(2) is not applicable to appointments under Rule 51 A. Rule 51A (omitting the Notes, which are not relevant) reads: "Qualified teachers who are relieved as per Rule 49 or 52 on account of termination of vacancies shall have preference for appointment to future vacancies in schools under the same Educational Agency provided they have not been appointed in permanent vacancies in schools under any other Educational Agency." 6. It is true that if the appointment is a fresh one, without reference to Rule 51 A, Rule 1(2) of Chapter XIV-A must come into operation and no person who is above the age limit prescribed for appointment in government schools can be appointed as teacher in an aided school. But the position is different where the appointment is based on the preference under Rule 51A The provision is one meant for the benefit of teachers and any interpretation of the rule should be one which will advance the object of the rule, namely to confer a benefit on teachers thrown out of employment. Apart from the absence of any age limit in the rule itself, the obvious intent of the rule is that a teacher should be entitled to reappointment in the school in an identical post provided he is within the age of retirement. This rule is intended to benefit teachers who are relieved under rule 49 or 52 on account of termination of vacancies or otherwise. One of the cases postulated by rule 52 is where a teacher is relieved on account of reduction in the number of posts under orders of department, that is consequent on the reduction in the number of posts on staff fixation. One of the cases postulated by rule 52 is where a teacher is relieved on account of reduction in the number of posts under orders of department, that is consequent on the reduction in the number of posts on staff fixation. A teacher who is past 50 and is thrown out consequent on the reduction in the number of posts, will not, on the respondents' contention, be entitled to reappointment despite eligibility and despite his having served the school for long. This certainly could not have been the intent of the rule-makers. In fact, the very purpose of the rule namely protection of teachers will be defeated by such an interpretation. It has therefore to be held that the age limit prescribed by rule 1(2) will not apply in the case of teachers claiming preference in appointment under Rule 51A. 7. I am fortified in the view which I have taken by the decision of Sivaraman Nair, J. in O.P. No.1328 of 1986 where the learned judge observed that rule 1(2) of Chapter XIV-A has no application where a qualified teacher is appointed again in a subsequent vacancy by virtue of the preference under Rule 51 A. He stated that Rule 51A recognised a right or a title to be appointed and that cannot be defeated by any assumption or restriction relating to age to be read into the rules. 8. All the grounds stated in Exts.P1, P2 and P4 are therefore invalid. These orders are liable to be quashed. Since the petitioner has already retired from service, the only direction that is called for is to direct approval of her appointment from June 3,1985 to March 31,1989 and give her the benefits which are due on such approval. The original petition is therefore allowed. Exts.P1, P2 and P4 are quashed. The third respondent is directed to approve the appointment of the petitioner as sewing teacher in the fourth respondent's school from June 3,1985 to March 31,1989 and to grant her the benefits which are due on such approval. This shall be done within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.