JUDGMENT S.R. Singh, J. - By means of the present petition, the petitioner has sought for quashing the order dated 18-1-1989 passed by respondent No. 1 (&Regional Secretary Board of High School and Intermediate Education Regional Office, Bareilly thereby debarring the petitioner from all the remuneration work of the Board for three years. 2. Factual matrix of the case is delineated in a short compass. The petitioner, who is the Vice-Principal of Falah-O-Darain Higher Secondary School, Kath Darwaza, Moradabad, was appointed Centre Superintendent, for High School and Intermediate Examinations, 1988, vide order dated 27-7-1988, annexed to the petitioner as Annexure No.1. By means of a notice dated 17-5-1988, he was called upon to show cause as to why action be not taken against him for his misconduct referred to in the notice. The misconduct for which the petitioner was called upon to show cause consists of the allegations that his son namely, Mohd. Zeeshan, a class 4 employee of the College, was sent in another college to perform the work as an Invigilator, and while deputing him to perform the duties as invigilator, he was shown as Assistant Teacher in the aforesaid College. It is also alleged in the notice that in the college, where the aforesaid Mohd. Zeeshan was to work as invigilator, another son of the petitioner namely, Mohd. Kamran was appearing as a Private Candidate in the Board's High School Examination, 1988. The petitioner put in a reply to the aforesaid show cause notice vide reply dated 29-5-1988. In paragraph 2 of the said reply, it has been conceded by the petitioner that Mohd. Zeeshan, class-4 employee of Falah-O-Darain Higher Secondary School, was sent to work as invigilator under special circumstances in consultation with the concerned Centre Superintendent of the college, on account of the fact that strength of the teachers to work as invigilator was inadequate. It is in consequence of the above that the impugned order dated 18-1-1989 was passed debarring the petitioner from remuneration work of the Board for three years excepting the year in question namely the year 1988. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner invoked this Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by means of the present petition. 3. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the petitioner invoked this Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by means of the present petition. 3. The main contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner had sent his son not as an Invigilator but as an Attendant and that his reply was not considered and the impugned order was passed in breach of the principles of natural justice without taking into account the explanation given by him. To my considered view, the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not sustainable in law inasmuch as the reply as stated supra, was not to the effect that his son was sent as to perform his duties as an Attendant. Rather the reply to the show-cause notice does indicate that the aforesaid Mohd. Zeeshan, son of the petitioner, though a Class-4 employee, was sent to work as Invigilator showing him as an Assistant Teacher in the college under special circumstances taking refuge behind the plea that teachers were under staffed. Reverting to the impugned order, the aforesaid order clearly mentions that the petitioner was adjudged guilty of the charges levelled against him after due consideration of the entire materials. It would be useful to state that the impugned order was passed by the Board on the recommendation of the committee constituted under Chapter VI-B of the Regulations made in U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that the order is without jurisdiction. This contention too is not sustainable in view of the fact that the impugned order was passed by the Board on the recommendation of the Committee constituted under Chapter VI-B of the Regulations made in U. P. Intermediate Education Act. A perusal of clause 2(2) of Chapter VI-B indicates that the Committee is empowered to consider complaints against Centre Superintendents and to make recommendations of the Board for punishment to be awarded. The order substantially contains reasons for awarding punishment. It is well settled that such authority is not required to pass an order of the type expected of a competent court of law. Sri Ansari, learned counsel has further contended that the power under Clause 5 of Chapter VI-B of the Regulations to award punishment, vests with the State Government. The order substantially contains reasons for awarding punishment. It is well settled that such authority is not required to pass an order of the type expected of a competent court of law. Sri Ansari, learned counsel has further contended that the power under Clause 5 of Chapter VI-B of the Regulations to award punishment, vests with the State Government. This contention is based upon misconception of the provisions of Clause 5 of Chapter VI of the Regulations referred to above. For proper appreciation, Clause 5 of Chapter VI of the Regulation is reproduced below: "5. Where any action is required to be taken against any employee of the Education Department of the Government or any employee of an institution maintained by the State Government, or any employee of any Degree College or University, the Board shall refer the matter to the Head of Education Department of the Head of the Institution or Degree college or the Registrar of the University concerned for action against the employee concerned. It is thus clear that this clause cannot be stretched to be made applicable to a case of misconduct of the Centre Superintendents. This clause in all fairness, applies in a case where action is required to be taken against any employee of the Education Department or the Government or any employee of an institution maintained by the State Government or an employee of any degree college or University. In these cases, the Board is expected to refer the matter for taking appropriate action to the Head of the Education Department or the Head of the Institution or Degree College or the Registrar of the University as the case may be. The case of a Centre Superintendent is specifically dealt with in clause 2 of Chapter VI-B of the Regulations and not by clause 5 of the Chapter. 5. It is next contended by the learned counsel that according to the show cause notice, the District Inspector of Schools was expected to hold an enquiry and submit a report in the matter but he did not do so and this has resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice, vitiating the order impugned in the writ petition. 5. It is next contended by the learned counsel that according to the show cause notice, the District Inspector of Schools was expected to hold an enquiry and submit a report in the matter but he did not do so and this has resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice, vitiating the order impugned in the writ petition. The show cause notice dated 17-5-1988 was addressed to the petitioner in his capacity as Centre Superintendent and a copy of it was endorsed to the District Inspector of Schools with a request to probe the charges and submit his report. Reply to this show cause notice was given by the petitioner straightaway to the respondent No. 1 i.e. Regional Secretary, Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Regional Office, Bareilly vide letter dated 29-5-1988. A copy of this reply appears to have been endorsed to the concerned District Inspector of Schools. Along with the counter affidavit, a report dated 26-8-1988 submitted by the District Inspector of Schools in the matter, has been annexed. The said report of the District Inspector of Schools was submitted in due consideration of the explanation submitted by the petitioner. It therefore does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to say that the District Inspector of Schools conducted no enquiry or that the report of the District Inspector of Schools was submitted in breach of the principles of natural justice. 6. Having regard to the discussions made above, I am of the view that the order impugned in the present writ petition, does not suffer from any taint of illegality much less an illegality apparent on the face of the record. 7. In the result, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. No order as to the costs.