JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur J. 1. This is an appeal under Section 19 of family Courts Act, 1984. The appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 1371990 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Lucknow, rejecting her application for grant of interim maintenance. 2. The appellant filed application under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the respondent, Syed Sarwar Husain Rizvi. Along with the application she also made an application for grant of interim maintenance. The learned Judge, Family Court, passed the following order on this application on 2541990: Perused affidavit. Applicant has a prima facie case. Opposite party is directed to pay Rs. 300/ per month to the applicant as interim maintenance with effect from today, In this order no direction was made for issue of notice to the respondent. However, the respondent on acquiring knowledge of the order filed objection dated 1551990 supported by affidavit. In the affidavit he stated that he had divorced the appellant on 421990 and 'Divorce Dead' had been sent to the appellant by registered post, the number of the postal receipt being 0340 dated 721990. It has also been stated in paragraph 3 of the affidavit that the registered envelope was received by the appellant on 1521990. On the basis of the facts stated in the affidavit the respondent prayed that the order dated 2541990 may be cancelled. The respondent filed separately objection against the application under Section 125 CrPC as Annexure2. With the abjection he filed the 'Divorce Deed' dated 421990 which purports to bear the signatures of two witnesses and a Vakil Talaq. 3. The appellant opposed the respondent's application for vacation of the order dated 2541990 by filing affidavit dated 1371990. In this affidavit she did not dispute receipt of the divorce deed sent to her by the respondent. However, she challenged the validity and legality of the said Deed. 4. By order dated 1371390 the Principal Judge, Family Court, rejected the appellant's application for interim maintenance in the following terms: The Opposite Party has pleaded divotce through a Maulvi and has filed documentary evidence. The applicant has challenged the factum and legality of divorce. The controversy shall be decided at the trial. For the present interim maintenance cannot be granted in view of plea of divorce by the Opposite Party. Application is rejected. The applicant has challenged the factum and legality of divorce. The controversy shall be decided at the trial. For the present interim maintenance cannot be granted in view of plea of divorce by the Opposite Party. Application is rejected. The ex parte order dated 2541990 was passed by the Judge, Family Court, while the order dated 1371990 was passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court. The order dated 1371990 is under challenge in the present appeal. 5. At the hearing of the appeal learned counsel for the respondent raised a preliminary objection against the maintainability of the appeal. He stated that the impugned order is interlocutory and is, therefore, not appealable in view of the provision contained in subsection (1) of Section 19 of the Act. In support of his contention he has cited 1990 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 515 Haryana Land Reclamation and Development Corporation Ltd. v. State of Haryana and another. 6. The above objection has been countered by the learned counsel for the appellant who has submitted that the present order cannot be said to be interlocutory inasmuch as it is final order on the application for interim relief. In support of his contention he has cited 1986 Cr LJ 41, Smt. Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat: AIR 1986 Supreme Court 984 read with 1987 Cr LJ 1396 Sumer Chand alias Sumer Nath v. Sandhuran Rani and another. Section 19(1) reads as follows: Save as provided in subsection (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law.. (Emphasis supplied). From the provision it is apparent that an appeal to this Court does not lie from an interlocutory order passed by the Judge, Family Court. However, it has been held in 1987 Cr LJ 1396 (Supra) that an order passed on application for grant of interim maintenance is not an interlocutory order but is a final order so far as that application is concerned and, therefore, appeal under Section 12(1) is maintainable. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in this case. We are, accordingly, of the opinion that the appeal is maintainable. 7. We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in this case. We are, accordingly, of the opinion that the appeal is maintainable. 7. Coming to the merits of the appeal the impugned order has been challenged on the following grounds: (i) The order has been passed without giving opportunity of hearing to the appellant, (ii) the Principal Judge could not set aside the order of the Lady Judge, and (iii) the appellant was not given opportunity to prove her case. 8. So far as the first ground of challenge is concerned the same cannot be sustained as the order sheet dated 1371990, when the impugned order was passed, shows that the parties were present. The ordersheet also contains the signature of the appellant. The ordersheet further records the fact that an affidavit was filed by the appellant. This affidavit is dated 137990 and it contains the endorsement of the respondent of having received its duplicate on the same date. This affidavit contains denial of the respondent's plea that he has divorced her. Duplicate of respondent's objection dated 1551990 against the grant of interim maintenance had been served upon the appellant much prior to 1371990. Obviously appellant's affidavit dated 1371990 is in reply to the respondent's objection against the grant of interim maintenance. On these facts the appellant's plea that she had not been given opportunity of hearing before the passing of impugned order dated 1371990 cannot be sustained. 9. Section 2(a) of the Family Courts Act defines the term Judge to mean the Judge or, as the case may be, the Principal Judge, Additional Principal Judge or other Judge of a Family Court.. This definition is wide enough to denote the Principal Judge as well as any other Judge exercising powers of the Family Court. It is not disputed that the Principal Judge who passed the impugned order had the powers of a Judge of Family Court. Accordingly the second ground of challenge also fails. 10. While disposing of the appellant's application for interim maintenance and the application of the respondent for vacation of the order granting interim maintenance the court below was required to consider the pleas of both the parties in a prima facie manner. In the impugned order the learned Judge has observed that the factum of divorce shall be considered at the time of trial. In the impugned order the learned Judge has observed that the factum of divorce shall be considered at the time of trial. Indeed that was a substantial question and is directly involved in the main case itself. On that question parties may have to lead oral evidence. Final opinion on the dispute of divorce could not be recorded at this stage. Parties had already exchanged affidavits to which certain papers have been annexed as documentary evidence. The court below was obviously of the opinion that the documents brought on record prima facie established the respondents case. It is on this basis that the court below has declined to grant interim maintenance. Under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 d divorced Muslim woman is not entitled to claim maintenance from her former husband. She is entitled to such maintenance from the persons referred to in Section 4 of the said Act. In case the order of interim maintenance had been allowed to operate there would have been violation of Section 4 in case the court below upheld finally the plea of the respondent on the question of divorce. It is obviously because of this that the court below did not maintain the previous order passed on 2541990. Although the learned Judge has not said it in so many words he, it appears, was of the opinion that to maintain the order dated 2541990 may ultimately result in violation of a statutory provision. He was, however, not oblivious to the rights of the appellant as he fixed an early date for evidence, the same being 2781990. Thereafter the present appeal was preferred in this Court and the lower court record was summoned. It is perhaps on this account that there could be no further progress in the trial of the suit which has given rise to the present appeal. 11. Grant of interim relief is in the discretion of the trial court and the exercise of that discretion can be interfered with in exceptional circumstances. In the present case no exceptional circumstance exists to warrant interference by this Court. Accordingly the appeal lacks merit. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, strenuously submitted that no appeal having been preferred by the respondent against the order dated 2541990 the same became final and, therefore, the respondent was debarred from making application for setting aside the said order. Accordingly the appeal lacks merit. 12. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, strenuously submitted that no appeal having been preferred by the respondent against the order dated 2541990 the same became final and, therefore, the respondent was debarred from making application for setting aside the said order. Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain any specific provision conferring power upon the court to pass an order of interim maintenance. However, such a power has been held to be implicit in the jurisdiction conferred under Section 125 in Smt. Savitri v. Govind Singh Rawat (Supra). In paragraph 6 of the report (AIR) it has been observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Such an order may also be made in an appropriate case ex parte pending service of notice of the application subject to any modification or even an order of cancellation that may be passed after the respondent is heard. Earlier their Lordships have stated There is no room for the apprehension that the recognition of such implied powef would lead to the passing of interim orders in a large number of cases where the liability to pay maintenance may not exist. It is quite possible that such contingency may arise in a few cases but the prejudice caused thereby to the person against whom it is made is minimal as it can be set right quickly after hearing both the parties. From these statements/observations it is apparent that while recognising the right of the applicant to apply for interim maintenance right is recognized in the husband also to make an application for setting aside the order of interim maintenance. Accordingly, instead of filing appeal in this Court under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act it was open to the appellant to make application to the trial court for setting aside that order. This is exactly the procedure followed by the respondent. In our opinion the respondent's application for setting aside the order dated 2541990 was as much maintainable as the appellant's own application for interim maintenance. The impugned order cannot, therefore, be faulted on the ground urged by the learned counsel. 13. In view of the above the appeal is hereby dismissed.