Usha Mehira, J. ( 1 ) PLAINTIFFS, Shri M. P. Matfaur and Others are statedto be allottees of quarters constructed at Hari Nagar, bearing No. 1 to 27 andstaff quarters at G. T. Road, Delhi bearing Nos. 28 -. 072 and 74 to 104. These quarters are in Delhi Transport Corporation Staff Colonies mentionedabove. Municipal Corporation of Delhi under the GOVT. of India Subsidisedhousing Scheme for Industrirl Workers constructed 300 houses known as"integrated Subsidised Housing Scheme for Industrial Workers and Econo-mically Weaker Sections of the Community. " The construction was startedin the year 1962-63 and completed in the car 1965-66. Total costs incurredworked out to Rs. 3504 Lacs, out of which, a sum of Rs. 6. 25 Lacs andr?, 156 Lacs were provided by the Central Government as loan and subsidyto cover the cost of construction. ( 2 ). The houses consisted of small two rooms and regular two roomsquarters. There were about 100 small two rooms quarters and 200 regularrooms quarters. The allotment was to be made after determining the overallcost for regular two room houses and single two room houses. The Lieute-nant Governor of Delhi (Administrator) in 196566 ta. king into considerationthe various factors, determined the overall cost for regular two room housesat Rs. 4. 200. 00 and single two room houses at Rr. 2500. 00. Subsidised monthlyrent to be charged was fixed at Rs. 16. 00 and Rs. 13. 50p respectively ( 3 ). On account of the Delhi Road Transport Law, Amendment Act),1971 (hereinafter or called the DRTC Amended Act), tbt. Deibi Tianspon Un-dertaking of the Municipal Corporation of Deihi was converted into Delhitransport Corporation (hereinafter called the dtc ) wiih effaci from 3/11/1971. According to the provisions contained in Delhi Roadtransport Laws (Amendment Act), all Rules. Regulations, Notificationsrelating io Transport service, whether made under the Delhi Road Transportauthorjty Act or under any other Act were to remain in force and deemedto be made by the New Corporation. By virtue of the provision of theamended Act, the employee of the erstwhile authorities were deemed to be theemqloyce of the D. T. C. with such designation as the new Corporation maydetermine They were to bold office by the same tenure, on the same termsand conditions of service. They were also to get the same pension, gratuityand all other matters as they would have held, if the new Corporation hadnot been established. They were also to get the same pension, gratuityand all other matters as they would have held, if the new Corporation hadnot been established. It was also the term of the transfer that no conditionwould be altered to the disadvantage of the employees without the approvalof the Central Government. The service rendered previously would becounted in the New Corporation. ( 4 ) , On 9/02/1978 Government of India, Ministry of Worksand Housing intimated the policy of the Government in respect of housesbuilt for Industrial Workers under the integrated subsidised Housing Schemefor Industrial Workers and Economically Weaker Sections of Community. These were required to be retained for allotment to the eligible workers onrental basis. It was further decided that the aforesaid houses built underthe aforesaid scheme could be transferred to those in occupation subject tocertain conditions. Since this letter was addressed to the Secretaries, Incharge of Housing Department of all the State Governments and not to thed. T. C. , therefore. D. T. C. Colony Tenant Association approached the Uniongovernment through Ministry of Works and Housing asking to clarifywhether this policy was applicable to them or not. In response to this representation, intimation was received that the Government of India was not ina position to issue any direction to the employers. Not being satified withthe reply of the Government of India, the Industrial Workers in general andd. T. C. employees in particular resorted to take stringent measure and, therefore, issued notice of strike. On account of the strike notice the Management started dialogues with the employees. As a result of discussion andon account of settlement arrived at between the Management and theemployees action to go on strike was withdrawn. Number of demands wereraised. One of the demand by the employees was transfer of houeses builtunder the integrated subsidised Housing Scheme in favour of occupantswithin six months. The D. T. C. agreed to do so. Vide decision communicated 14/02/1979govetnmentoflndia permitted such of the employers who were willing to sell by way of transfer the built-up houses to Industrial Workers and Economically Weaker Section of the Community under theintegrated subsidised Housing Scheme on the conditions enumerated berein. While the decision was yet to be taken by the DTC, the Delhi Administrationon the other hand approved the decision to sell houses constructed under theintegrated Subsidised Housing Scheme for Industrial Workers and Economically Weaker Sections of the Community at various places at Delhi. While the decision was yet to be taken by the DTC, the Delhi Administrationon the other hand approved the decision to sell houses constructed under theintegrated Subsidised Housing Scheme for Industrial Workers and Economically Weaker Sections of the Community at various places at Delhi. On 18/04/1979 the Board of the DTC passed a Resolution agreeing to sellthe houses to its occupants at G. T, Road and Hari Nagar Colonies. Inthe subsequent meeting on 31/08/1979 the Resolution for the sale ofhouses to its occupants was approved subject to the conditions laid down inthe Government Circular dated 14/02/1979 On a clarificationsought by the DTC, Government of India clarified that the sale price was tobe strictly worked out in accordance with the instructions contained in itsletter dated 14/02/1979. Pursuant to the decision made by thedtc Board, allottees were aiked to furnish the details. However, the DTCBoard, subsequently, reviewed its carlier decision of April. 1979 on theground that occupants of the staff quarters in other colonies of the DTCwould make a similar demand. Moreover the facility of the housing accommodation to its employees was already short, therefore, it was not desireableto sell these houses. The decision has beea taken by the General Managercum-Chairman in order to deprive the benefit to the because of his malafideintentions- On a clarification sought the Government of India communicatedthat the question of implementation of the Scheme will arise after finaldecision is taken by the Board. As a result of this review, the plaintiff is havesuffered irreparable loss. The refusal to implement the Scheme regardingtransfer of houses to the occupants, according to the plaintiffs, malafide,discriminatory, illegal and void, hence the suit. ( 5 ). Defendants were called upon in response to which only D I c filedthe written statement. So far as other defendants are concerned, namely,union of India, and Delhi Administration they choos not to file any writtenstatement ( 6 ). Defendant No. 3 i. e. the DTC took legal and factual objectioninter alia on the grounds that the plaintiffs have no legal right to ask for thesale of the houses, That the Scheme is only recommendatory and not bindingin nature. The implementation of the said Scheme was at the sole discretionof the employer and the plantiff cannot compel the defendant to implementthe same. The implementation of the said Scheme was at the sole discretionof the employer and the plantiff cannot compel the defendant to implementthe same. In the absence of any legal light suit for declaration is notmaintainable For the implementation of the Scheme prior approval of theministry of Shipping and Transport i e. the Ministry concerned is necessary. Since the approval has not been accorded by the said Ministry therefore, thedefendant is not bound to implement the Scheme. Moreover no staffcolonybuild in any other Public Sector has been sold to its occupants nor any suchinstructions have been issued by the Bureau of Public Enterprises. As thedefendant has not committed any breach of the statutory obligation, therefore,the plaintiffs have no vested right to to institute the suit. A writpetition filed by similarly situated occupant of the house namely, Shri J N. Bediwas dismissed by be Division Bench of this court. In view of the presentsuit is not maintainable. Legal and valid orders of eviction have alreadybeen passed by the Estate Officer against the Plaintiffs No 85 and103, therefore, these two plaintiffs have no right to ask for any relief. The suit isotherwise not maintainable because it is not filed in a a representativecapacilty. In the absence of particulars it is not possible for the defendantto as certain whether these plaintiffs are eligible or not. Moreover,few of the plaintiffs have since retired from service they have no right to askfor the transfer of these tenements, which facility was granted to them as partof their service. One of the condition for eligibility of the Scheme is that theemployee does not own a house or property in his name or in the name of hiswife and children nor has he sold or transferred his property in the name ofsome other person So far as plaintiffs No. 19, 26, 29, 31, 37,2, 12,16. 39,36. 40,44,57,55,60,63, 69. 87, 99 and 16 are concerned. theyhave failed to give such a declaration. therefore, they are not eligible forbeing considered. So far as plaintiffs No II. 34, 38, 49, 54, 30, 45. 19, 18. 6,52,86,85,28. 48,51,83, 103, and 87 are concerned, they no longercontinue to be in service with the defendant no. 3 These quarters wereallotted to the employees at the elevant time on account of their beingin employment of the defendant. therefore, they are not eligible forbeing considered. So far as plaintiffs No II. 34, 38, 49, 54, 30, 45. 19, 18. 6,52,86,85,28. 48,51,83, 103, and 87 are concerned, they no longercontinue to be in service with the defendant no. 3 These quarters wereallotted to the employees at the elevant time on account of their beingin employment of the defendant. Since some of these plaintiffs ceasedto be the employee after retirement, therefore, this scheme is not applicableto such of the employees. The scheme as such is not applicable to the housesbuilt by the DTC. The Central Government had granted a meagre amountas loan and subsidy to cover a portion of the cost of construction which inturn was refundable with interest. The Board of the DTC vide Resolutiondated 18/04/1979 only principally agreed to consider for the sale ofthese houses. The said resolution is not an actual decision. Moreover it wasonly an Administrative action not quasi judicial decision. Apprehending thatsuch demands would be raised by other employees in other colonies of thedtc like Shadipur colony, the Board had to review its earlier decison regardingthe transfer of ownership right in these two colonies. While reviewingthis decision, the Board has also taken into consideration the acute shortageof accommodation to its employees and also the financial implications involved. On 28/02/1986 the Ministry of Transport i. e. the concernedministry of the Defendant has declined to approve the proposal of transferof quarters The initsa allotment to the employees were made in accordancewith the rules flamed by the Allotment Committee constituted by the Defendant-Corporation,therefore, these allotments were made in pursuance to thedecision of the Managing Committee and not on account of any scheme. The Government of India has left the discretion with the employer to adoptthe Scheme or not to adopt, but if it does, then in that case positionof housing stock has to be considered and these have to be replaced forother eligible workers. Since DTC was not in a position to replace thehousing stock hence it had to review the proposal. These tenements if areallowed to be sold, the defendants will suffer irreparable loss because its otheremployees who are wailing for allotment would be deprived of the same. DTC is not in a position to replace the housing stock with the meagre resourcesat its command and also on account of acute shortage of land availability. These tenements if areallowed to be sold, the defendants will suffer irreparable loss because its otheremployees who are wailing for allotment would be deprived of the same. DTC is not in a position to replace the housing stock with the meagre resourcesat its command and also on account of acute shortage of land availability. It was in this background that the matter was reviewed by the Board. The Board s decision of review is in the larger interest of its employees. Theministry concerned has also not given the approval for the sale of thesehouses. ( 7 ). In replication plaintiffs refuted the averments of the defendant andin particular the fact that the DTC agreed only in principal to consider thesale of the houses. In fact the DTC actually agreed to sell these houses andthereafter sought approval for the sale of the quartess of the Govt. ofindia. other averment of the written statement have also been denied. 8. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:- 1. Whether the suit is not maintainable for the reasons stated in thewritten statement ? OPD2. Whether the suit is bad fot misjoinder of cause of action ? OPD3. Whether the suit is bad for misjoinder of parties, OPD4. Whether the suit is not correctly valued for the purposes of courtlee and jurisdiction ? If so, what is the correct value ?5. Whether the suir for declaration as framed is not competent? OPD6. Whether the withdrawal of the scheme for transfer of houses toallottees/occupant is illegal, discriminatory and vnid formentioned in paras 20 (a) to (f) and (h)? OPP7. Whether defendents 1 and 2 are estopped from withdrawing theschence OPP8. Whether the defendants 1 and 2 were duly served with noticeunder Section 80 CPC?9. Whether the implementation of the scheme in question is notmandatory? OPD10 Whether the decision for the transfers of quarter to allottees/occuupantscontained in Resolution dated 18/04/1979 was not afinal decision and could, therefore, be withdrawn ? OPD11. Whether defendants 1and 2 are estopped from withdrawing andreversing the decision contained in Resolution dated 18/04/1979 by the act and conduct?12. Relief. ( 9 ). I have heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff Shri O. N. Vohraand for the defendant Shri B. S. Banerjee. During the course of argumentsmr. OPD11. Whether defendants 1and 2 are estopped from withdrawing andreversing the decision contained in Resolution dated 18/04/1979 by the act and conduct?12. Relief. ( 9 ). I have heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff Shri O. N. Vohraand for the defendant Shri B. S. Banerjee. During the course of argumentsmr. Banerjee conceded that in view of the amendment of the plaint, theobjections raised by him on the basis of which the issues No. 2, 3 and 5 wereframed no longer survives and therefore, he is not pressing issuess No. 2,3and5. These issues are accordingly decided in favour of the plaintiff and againstthe defendants. ( 10 ). Plaintiff herein are the occupants of tenements constructed underthe Integrated Subsidised Housing Scheme for Industrial Workers and Weakersection of the Community (hereunder called the Scheme ). They are, therefore,claiming the right of transfer of these tenements in their favour in termof the Scheme as modified in the year 1978 by the Government of India. Mr. Vohra, therefore, contended that the objection of the defendant that theplaintiffs have no right to file the suit in the absence of any legal characteror to any right to property 18 without force in view of Section 34 of thespecific Relief Act. Since the plaintiffs are claiming transfer of tenementswhich are in their occupations and which were constructed to be ultimatelysold and transfeired in their name, they have got a legal character and a righton that property. ( 11 ). In order to appreciate the objection of the defendants, one hasto keep in mind the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act whichreads as under :- "discretion of court as to declaration of status of right : any personentitled to any legal character, or to any right as to any properly,may institute a suit against any person denyindeny, his tle to such character or right, and the court may inits discretion make there in a declaration that he is so entitled andthe plaintiff need not in such suit ask for any further relief. " ( 12 ). A bare reading of Section 34 makes it clear that a decreedeclaring status can be passed. The plaintiffs in order to make themselvescentitled for the transfer of the tenements by sale have to establishtheir legal character and the right in the property. " ( 12 ). A bare reading of Section 34 makes it clear that a decreedeclaring status can be passed. The plaintiffs in order to make themselvescentitled for the transfer of the tenements by sale have to establishtheir legal character and the right in the property. The perusalof documentary as well as oral evidence placed on record provesthat plaintiffs are occupying these tenements which were constructed underthe Scheme subsequently. Under the said Scheme followed by various clarificationsand directions issued by the Government of India, allottees of suchtenements are entitled to the transfer by sale. On account of the scheme andthe clarification issued by the Government of India, the plaintiffs acquireda legal character and a vested right in these tenements. They thus seekdeclaration both in regard to property as well as their legal character. Theircontentions are fortified from the documents Ex. P-l and Ex. P-13. Ex. P-l isa letter issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housingdated 3/08/1979 which is reproduced as under : "government of Indiaministry of Works and Housing (Nirman Aur Awas Mantralaya)No. N. l4018/l/76-IIT New Delhi,dated the 3/08/1979to,the Administrative Officer (II)Delhi Transport Corporationindraprastha Estate,new Delhi-110002. Subject : Integrated subsidised Housing Scheme for Industrialworkers and Economically Weaker Sections of community - saleof house built by the employees to their workers. Sir,lam directed to refer to your letters No. Admn-l-107 (3)/79 dated 25/05/1979 and 15/06/1979 and to say that the clarifications sought for therein on various points involving policy arefurnished in the enclosed statement. 2. As regards the other points, the DTC may decide themselves, inconsultation with the Administrative Ministry if necessary. Yours faithfully,sd/- (K. S. Narayana)Under Secretary to the Government of India. "with Ex P-l (here is an Annexure D-l attached which is a statementshowing various points raised by DTC and answered by Government of India. Some of the point answered by Govt. of Indiaand which are relevant for the determination of this issue arereproduced as under:- "points raised. Clarification/comments. 1. In respect of 300 houses built by As already advised in this Ministry sthe DTC at Hari Nagar and G. T. Road letter of even No, dated the 25. 5. 79,for Industrial Workers and Economi- the sale price strictly to be workedically Weaker Section of community, out in accordance with the instruc-they received only half of the sub- tion contained in letter datedsidy against the full subsidy of 25% 14. 2. 5. 79,for Industrial Workers and Economi- the sale price strictly to be workedically Weaker Section of community, out in accordance with the instruc-they received only half of the sub- tion contained in letter datedsidy against the full subsidy of 25% 14. 2. 79, i. e, full original cost ofof the approved cost of construction. construction minus 20% of thethus they accepted only 12/1-2 inst- admissible subsidy. The questionead of 25% of the approved cost of as to how much subsidy (5% or 2/1-construction, as subsidy, 2%) is to be refunded to the Centralas such (it is presumed) the pur- Govt. can be decided along withchasers will be given an adhoc the case relating to the payment ofof 10% (as against 20% as per our outstanding amount of loan by theletter of 14. 2. 79) and that only 25% DTC. (as against 5% as per our letter of14. 2. 79) will be credited to the Govt. of India. 3. Whether such of the employees Para 4 of this Ministry s letter datedas were initially workers within the 14 2. 79 clearly stipulate that the meaning of the Factories Act. 48 at employers, who are willing to sell thethe time of allotment, but subsequ- houses, may sell the houses to theirently ceased to be so because of workers. Eligibility of the intendingtransfer, promotion to officers cadre purchasers may be determined accor-etc. are also entitled to purchase dingly. houses occupied by them". 4. Whether the workers who retired Each case will have to be decided onseveral years ago and in whose cases merits, in consultation with theeither eviction orders have been Labour Commissioner. Delhipassed or their cases are subjudice Administration, and if necessarybefore the Estate Officer for eviction,with this Ministry. but have continued to hold on thepossession unauthorisedly, are alsoto be given the ownership rights. 13. The Wage limit of Rs. 350/500 This question is not relevant in thewas fixed several years ago and on context of the sale of houses. account of a rising trend in the However, this question has alreadywagesof the employees, it should been examined and it has been decidedbe raised to Rs. 1000. 00 p. m. not to raise the existing limits," ( 13 ). Vide Ex P-13 dated 18/08/1978 the Government of India clarified regarding sale of these houses to the Labour Commissioner, Delhi Administration. account of a rising trend in the However, this question has alreadywagesof the employees, it should been examined and it has been decidedbe raised to Rs. 1000. 00 p. m. not to raise the existing limits," ( 13 ). Vide Ex P-13 dated 18/08/1978 the Government of India clarified regarding sale of these houses to the Labour Commissioner, Delhi Administration. By these clarifications, the Government of India made it clear that it was for the employer to decide whether these houses were to betransferred by sale to the economically weaker sections of the communitywho were in occupation of these houses. It was also made clear that eachindividul case has to be decided on its merit in consulation with the Ministryof Works and Housing. In view of this clarification, the plaintiffs can claimthe benefit underthe Scheme. Mr. Vohra contended that the benefit oncegiven cannot be withdrawn. To strengthen his argumenthe has placed reliancenthe decison of Govt. of India communication to the Chairman-cum-Generalmanager, DTC dated 16. 5. 86 Ex. P-2 which is reproduced as under : "government of Indiaministry of Shipping and Transport (Transport Wing)No. TGD (60)/76 16/05/1980. Tothe Chairman-cum-General Manager,delhi Transport Corporation. 1. P. Estate, New Delhi. Sub: Sale of houses at G. T. Road and Hari Nagar DTC coloniesto the occupants thereof. Sir. I am director to refer to your letter No. Admn. 107 (3)/80 dated 3/03/1980 wherein you bad intimated that the Board bad alsodecided that the decision already taken by it in this behalf bere-examined in consulation with the Government and matter bebrought up again for its consideration. This matter has beenconsidered and it is observed that it would beadvisable that theboard stick to its earlier decision of July, 79 as it would not beproper to revere a decision which bad been taken in the interestof the employees. 2. After the Board has reconsidered the matter and approves theproposal, Government approval may be sought in due course. Yours faithfully,sd/- (B. R. Chavan)Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India. " ( 14 ). Since the defendants have decided to withdraw the benefit underthe modified scheme, therefore, the right of the plaintiffs which was there inthe property if being deprived, hence they have status as envisaged undersection 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to invoke the jurisdiction ofthis Court. ( 15 ). Mr. of India. " ( 14 ). Since the defendants have decided to withdraw the benefit underthe modified scheme, therefore, the right of the plaintiffs which was there inthe property if being deprived, hence they have status as envisaged undersection 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to invoke the jurisdiction ofthis Court. ( 15 ). Mr. Banerjee then contended that decree if passed would beviolative of the provision of the Public Premises (eviction of un-authorisedoccupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the PP Act ). This argument to mymind is without force. Two provisions i. e. PP Act and the scheme aredistinct and different. These are to be applied in different sets of circumstances. Under the scheme even if a worker ceases to be in employmentstill he would be entitled to the transfer by sale of the tenement provided he18 in "occupation" of the same as intimated by the Government of India videex. P-13 dated 18/08/1978. Retirement, superannuation or crossingof wage limit are not relevant at the time of implementation of the scheme. In the scheme the emphasis is given on the word occupation, the rest of theconsiderations are signifieant at a later stage. Whears the PP Act will comeinto force because of the retirement or termination of service of theemployee. ( 16 ). So far as individual case are concerned, their eligibility fortransfer of tenements under the Scheme would be considered by the employeras clarified and communicated by the Ministry of Works and Housing inex. P-13. Therefore, if at she time of considering the eligibility defendantno. 3 come to the conclusion that some of the plaintiffs are not eligible, thedefendant can declare them so. The point at issue is not whether plaintiffsare eligible or not, the point in issue is whether the benefit once accrued infavour of the occupants of the tenements can be withdrawn by defendantsno. 1 and 3. If the said defendants are going to withdraw such benefit hasthe right not accrued in favour of the plaintiffs? The answer will be in theaffirmative. These plaintiffs will have a right to force the defendants toimplement the decision already taken and if they are coverd under the Schemethey will be entitled to its benefit by way of transfer by sale of tenements. The decision to give the benefit once taken, accepted and acted upon has tobe implemented and, therefore, the relief has been sought by the plaintiffs. ( 17 ). The decision to give the benefit once taken, accepted and acted upon has tobe implemented and, therefore, the relief has been sought by the plaintiffs. ( 17 ). The Scheme so far has not been withdrawn by the Centralgovernment. Para 23 (8) of the Scheme which reads as under : "this scheme will remain in force till withdrawn. The Governmentof India reserves the right to withdraw the scheme or make anymodification in the scheme without notice. "so far it is not the case of the defendants that the Government of India hasinvoked para 23 subpare (8) of the Scheme. Having not done so and thescheme still being in vogue, the plaintiffs have a right to file the suit fordeclaration as well as for mandatory injunction. Therefore, I find that thesuit in the present form is maintainable. The issue is accordingly decided infavour of the plaintiff and against the defendants. ISSUE NO, 4 ( 18 ). The main plank of defendants argument of suit being not properly valued for the purposes of court fees is that the plaintiffs in the garb ofdeclaration are seeking relief of Specific Performance According to Mr. Banerjee, the suit should be valued under Section 7 (VI) (c) of the Courtfee Act and ad valorem court fees should have been paid. Thisargument can be rejected on a short ground, plaintiffs are notasking any specific performance of any act of the defendants. They areseeking a relief with regard to the scheme which according to them was acceptedand acted upon by the defendant and the benefit of the scheme, thesaid defendants are illegally and unauthorisedly going to withdraw. Theywant declaration the effect that this withdrawal of the benefit should be declared illegal, void and discriminatory. They are not asking this court toallot them the tenements, therefore, theae is no question of specific performance. Their case is not covered under Section 7 (IV) (c) of the Court Fee Act,1817. The other contention of Mr Banerjee that plaintiffs should pay individual court fee as they are asking for individual reliefs. This argument isalso without force All the 103 plaintiffs have asked one declarotion i. e. resolution dated 2/03/1981 by which defendants wants to withdrawearlier resolution date 18/04/1979 be declated illegal, void and in-effective. Since there is a breach committed by the DTC of its own decision which wasaccepted and acted upon, therefore, mandate should be issued. This argument isalso without force All the 103 plaintiffs have asked one declarotion i. e. resolution dated 2/03/1981 by which defendants wants to withdrawearlier resolution date 18/04/1979 be declated illegal, void and in-effective. Since there is a breach committed by the DTC of its own decision which wasaccepted and acted upon, therefore, mandate should be issued. A bare readingof the plaint would show that the plaintiffs are asking this court to declarethat the tenements were constructed under the Scheme and accoding to thesaid Scheme which was accepted and acted upon. a right has accrued intheir favour. It is only the subsequent resolution of the Board dated 2/03/1981 which they have challenged. Therefore, to my mind, they arenot liable to pay individual court fes as their case is common and they areasking only one relief and not 103 reliefs. To my mind court fee has beencorrectly paid. Hence this issue is decided against the defendant andin favour of the plaintiffs. ( 19 ). Defendants 1 and 2 have not filed the written statement, therefore,the averments of the plaint are deemed to have been admitted to the effectthat the notice under Section 80 Civil Procedure Code has been duly served on the defendant-UOI. Even, otherwise, Shri M. P. Mathur appering as PWI has provedthat the notice under section 80 Civil Procedure Code was served on the defendant beforefilling the suit. . On this part of his testimony there is no cross examinotion. His statements remained uncontroverted and unrebutted on the record. Inview of the game, the issue is decided in favour of the plaintiff and againstthe defendants. ( 20 ) SINCE these issues are inter-connected and overlapping thereforethese can be disposed of together. The defendanrs No 1 and 2 i. e. Un on ofindia and the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administration have not filed the writtenstatements. Therefore, presumption can be that they are not interested in theout-come of this suit nor have they denied the allegations of the plaint. Butby sheer oversight or may be due to mistaken belief in issues No. 7and11,the words "defendants 1 and 2 has been typed instead of "defendants 1 and 3"this mistake can be rectified because the pleadings as-a-whole have to beconstrued. It is the substance of the plaint and not the from that matters. Parties bad actually understood each other s case and after understandingthe same went to trial and led evidence. It is the substance of the plaint and not the from that matters. Parties bad actually understood each other s case and after understandingthe same went to trial and led evidence. They bad no misunderstandingabout each other s allegati. ons Therefore, a generous construction is to beplaced so that substance is grasped for determination of justice. From the pleading of the parties as they are on record it is not disputedrather it is a forgone conclusion that the plaintiff and the contesting defendant no. 3knew that it is the defendants No. 1and3 who are intending towithdraw the scheme. The plaintiffis bad actually made grievances againsttheir action and not the action of the Chief Secretary, Delhi Administrationi e. Defendant No. 2 Defendant No 3 while defending the reversal of earlierdecision to transfer the tenements knew that it is the defendants No. 1 and 3who are responsible and answerable to the claim set up by the plaintiffs. Therefore, there is omission or mistake while framing the issues, thoughnothing turns on the same since issues are overlapping and if taken togetherleave no manner of doubt that the real controversy is between plaintiffand defendants 1 and 3. The issues framed are for guidance only and thesecan be amended at any time for determining the real controversy between theparties. Mr Banerjee appearing for defendant No. 3 had been justifying theaction of defendants 1 and 3 against these issues. Infact these issues relateto defendants 1 and 3 and not to the defendants 1 and 2. He. in fact, tried tojustify the action of defendants Nos. 1 and 3 whilie discussing these issues. Therefore, for deciding thesefore, for deciding these issues. I am taking intoconsideration that against lssues Nos. 7 and 11 it should be "defendanti 1and 3"instead of "defendants 1 and 2". ( 21 ). It is an adcitted case of the parties that the scheme which wasformulated in 1962 and modified in 1978 is still in force and the Governmentof India has not 80 far withdrawn the same though empowered to do sounder para 28 (3) of the Scheme. 300 tenements were constructed under thescheme in the year 1965-66 by the predecessor of the DTC i e. MCD. MCDhas also transferred such like houses to its employees occupying those houses. 300 tenements were constructed under thescheme in the year 1965-66 by the predecessor of the DTC i e. MCD. MCDhas also transferred such like houses to its employees occupying those houses. In fact the defendants No. 3 had adopted the modified scheme and decided toimplement it for which purpose the price of the tenements were also negotiatedeach employee in occupation of the tenement was asked to furnish therequisite details. This shows that the scheme was accepted by the DTC. The defendant No. 3 took the decision to reverse it only as an after thought. Hence Mr. Vohra, counsel for plaintiff contended that plaintiffs are challengingthe reversal on the grounds, inter alia, of estoppel as well as promissoryestoppel. Therefore there is no reason why these tenements should not betransferred to "occupants" of these houses Delhi Administration has alsoimplemented this scheme so far its employees are concerned. ( 22 ). In order to appreciate the respective contentions of the parties itwould be worthwhile to know the disputes and inter-se relation between thedtc. its employees and the MCD. Delhi Transport Corporation came intoexistence in the year 1971 It is the cteation of Road Transport Laws (Amendment) Act, 1971. Since then it is governed by the Road Transportactl950asaniendedbytbe Laws Amendment Act of 1971, The backgroundof transport service so far as Delhi is concerned has been as under :- ( 23 ). Delhi Transport Undertaking was created by Delhi Transportauthority Act, 1950. This Act was repealed by Delhi Municipal Corporationact, 1957. It was on account of the Delhi Road Transport Laws (Amedment)Act, 1971 that the Road Transport Act, 1950 was made applicable to Delhiby carrying out amendments therein. Delhi Transport Corporation is acorporation of the Union Territory of Delhi. It is an instrumentality of thestate and thus State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution ofindia. It is an autonomous body. The tenements in question which earliervested in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi now vest in the Delhi Transportcorporation. Mr. Delhi Transport Corporation is acorporation of the Union Territory of Delhi. It is an instrumentality of thestate and thus State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution ofindia. It is an autonomous body. The tenements in question which earliervested in the Municipal Corporation of Delhi now vest in the Delhi Transportcorporation. Mr. Vohra contended that Delhi Transport Corporationhas absolute control over the use and the disposal of the tenements in question because of section 19 (2) (b) of Road Transport Corporation Act, 1910which says :-"19 (2) (b) to acquire and hold such property both moveable andimmovable, as the Corporation may deem necessary for thepurpose of any of the said activities, and to lease, sell or otherwisetransfer any property held by it;"since these tenements belong to DTC, therefore, its Board passed theresolution agreeing to transfer these houses by sale. The said resolution Isex P7. This resolution Ex P-7 was subsequently confirmed vide resolution (Ex. P-8) No. 139/79 Item 84/78 dated 31/08/1979 Ex. P-8 is reproducedas under: "minutes of the meeting of the DTC Board held on 31. 8. 79 at 15. 15hoars in the Board Roomresolutionno. 139/79 Item 84/78; Sale of house at G. T. Road andhari Nager colonies the occupants thereof. (Shri T. D. Gupta, Dy, G: M. (P) was called in )Resolved that the proposal of sale of houses to the occupants of G. T. Roadand Hari Nagar Colonies be approved subject to the conditionslaid down by the Central Government in their Circular No. N-14010/1/77-111 dated the 14th Februay, 79 at Annexure c tothe part (d) of the agenda note and also the conditions as enumerated in para 4 of the part (4) of the agenda note, beside thefollowing conditions: (i) The economic rents be charged from the occupants witheffect from the date their wages become more than Rs. 500. 00per month. (ii) The purchaser will have no right to the demolishing thebuilding or hypothecating the same after the transfer of theownership of the house. (iii) Those who have been dismissed from sevrices or haveresigned the job from the Corporation are not eligible for thetransfer of the houses; (iv) Those who have land or house in any residential area in thename of any of their family member including husband, wifeand minor children are not eligible. The Board also desired that liability of DTC to pay the ground rentto DDA be ascertained. The Board also desired that liability of DTC to pay the ground rentto DDA be ascertained. In case it is found that the DTC wouldbe liable to pay ground rent to DDA, it would obviously have tobe provided in the terms of transfer of the houses that thetransferees would pay the ground rent at the same rate to tbedtc. Resolves also that the Chairman-cum-G. M. and is hereby authorisedto decide all the details and formulation of legal documents ontbe basis of legal advice and and also to decide all other relevantand issues which may arise in connection therewith. "( 24 ). According to Mr Vohra it was in pursuance to the above said resolution. that the Administrative Officer, Headquarter, of the DTC issueda circular dated 14/06/1979 asking the workers, representatives and the General Secretary to give the Information in the prescribed form. Thereupon the workers who were allottees of the houses at G. T. Road and Harinagar Colonies were asked to veryfy the form and submit the same latest by 21/06/1979. The said circular is Ex. P-16,ex. P-17 is the form whichwas to be filled up by each individual occupant of the tenement. Vide Ex. P-18 dated 16/06/1979. the same Administrative Officer asked forfurther information regarding the date of retirement of each allottee. ln annual report of the DTC for the year 1978-79 at c on page 56 there is andclear indication that DTC were prepared to transfer the ownership of 300quarters built under the subsidised industrial housing schemes to these occupants as per Government policy annual report is Ex. P-19. ( 25 ). This scheme after modification in 1978 was accepted by thedtc and was also acted upon. The implementation of the scheme by DTCwas duly approved by the Government of India. He further contendedthat DTC tried to withdraw the same but the Government of India,ministry of Shipping and Transport vide letter dated 16/05/1980 Ex. P-2 informed the Chairman-cum General Manager, DTC that the Boardshould stick to the earlier decision of July, 1979 as it would not be proper toreserve the decision which had been made in the interest of the employees. The letter Ex. P-2 is reproduced as under : "government of Indiaministry of Shipping and Transport (Transport Wingto,the Chairman-cum-General Manager,delhi Transport Corporation,i. P. Estate, New Delhi. Sub : Sale of houses at G. T. Road and Hari Nagar DTC Coloniesto the occupants thereof. The letter Ex. P-2 is reproduced as under : "government of Indiaministry of Shipping and Transport (Transport Wingto,the Chairman-cum-General Manager,delhi Transport Corporation,i. P. Estate, New Delhi. Sub : Sale of houses at G. T. Road and Hari Nagar DTC Coloniesto the occupants thereof. Sir, I am directed to refer to your letter No. Adml. 107 (3)/80 dated 3/03/1980 where in you bad intimated that the Board bad alsodecided that the decision already taken by it in this behalf by reexamined in consultation with the Government and matter be broughtup again for its consideration. This matter has been considered andit is observed that it would be advisable that the Board stick to itsearlier decision of July, 79 as it would not be proper to reserve adecision which bad been taken in the interest of the employees. 2. After the Board has reconsidered the matter and approves theproposal. Government approval may be sought in due course. Yours faithfully. sd/- (B. R. Chavan)Deputy Secretary to thegovernment of India. " ( 26 ). Therefore Mr. Vohra contended that in view of this documentaryevidence which is proved on the record, the defendant/dtc is estoppedfrom denying the benefit of the said scheme nor can the DTC be permitted towithdraw the same after giving assurance to its employees that scheme. would be implemented within six months. The principle of estoppel and;particularly promissory estoppel would apply to the facts of this case. Themodified scheme of 19/8 having been accepted and acted upon bydefendant No. 3 it now cannot reverse that decision. The decision takenvide resolution Ex. P-7 is final and binding. The decision Ex. D-12 to reversethe decision dated 18/04/1979 is discriminatory, malafide and againstthe law. ( 27 ). The Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing, thecreator of the scheme bad already permitted the DTC to transfer the tenementsin accordance with the terms of the scheme as modified in 1978. Therefore according to Mr. Vohra the contention of the DTC that there isno approval by the Ministry of Shipping and Rnad Transport is withoutsubstance. In fact it is the Government of India. Ministry of Works andhousing whose decision is binding on the DTC as this scheme is the creationof Ministry of Works and Housing. The said Ministry has alreadygiven the approval. The Ministry of Shipping and Road Transport at nostage directed the DTC not to implement or accept the scheme. In fact it is the Government of India. Ministry of Works andhousing whose decision is binding on the DTC as this scheme is the creationof Ministry of Works and Housing. The said Ministry has alreadygiven the approval. The Ministry of Shipping and Road Transport at nostage directed the DTC not to implement or accept the scheme. It is onlyon the asking of the DTC for reversal of earlier decision that the Ministry ofshipping and Road Transport declined approval ( 28 ). Mr, Vohra laid stress on the evidence abduced by the partics inorder to strengthen his case Mr. M P. Mathur (PW-I) testified that on 14/02/1979 there was a circular of Government of India reiterating the position of 1978 scheme. The Department of DTC invited applications from them for transferring the houses. They submitted the requisite particulars. The DTC board on 18/04/1979 agreed to implement the scheme. During the pendency of the case the Management of the DTC informed the plaintiffs that if they withdraw their case from the court, transfer would be effected. But the plaintiffs did not rely on this assurancebecause of past experience hence refused to withdraw this case. Accordingto him resolution dated 4/09/1985 and 7/11/1985 arestill in vogue. According to him Delhi Administration his already transferredby sale to its occupants the houses in Karampura, Nehru Nagar,vishvakarma Nagar and Giri Nagar. Houses in these colonies were alsoconstructed under the scheme. When subjected to cross-examination, Mr. Mathur however, could not give details about the eligibility of each individual nor could tell the market value of the houses. But so far as the schemeand the allotment is concerned, he withstood the test of cross-examination. Mr. Sameychand (DW 1) Administrative Officer of the DTC admitted thatdtc bad adopted the standard allotment Rules framed under the scheme. He also admitted that these tenements were constructed by the DTC or itspredecessor MCD under the scheme When confronted he had no admitthat letter dated 25/05/1979 (Ex. P-21) was issued under his signature. The perusal of this letter shows that the DTC had decided to sell the housesin two of its colonies to the occupants of the same. He perforce had alsoto admit that a letter was received from the Government of India dated 1 6/05/1980 thereby approving the transfer of these houses to the allotteesof the tame The said letter is Ex. The perusal of this letter shows that the DTC had decided to sell the housesin two of its colonies to the occupants of the same. He perforce had alsoto admit that a letter was received from the Government of India dated 1 6/05/1980 thereby approving the transfer of these houses to the allotteesof the tame The said letter is Ex. P-2 which has already been reproducedabove Shri R. D. Mathur appearing as DW-2 when subjected to crossexaminationadmitted that eviction orders only against plaintiffs No. 28 and45 are pending and those against whom eviction orders had been passed arestill in occupation of these tenements. He also admitted that except plaintiffs No 12 and 99 other plaintiffs have given the requisite declaration anasked for by the DTC. He. further admitted that quarters in colonies likekarampura, Nehru Nagar, Vishvakarma Nagar and Giri Nagar which wereconstructed by Delhi Administration under the scheme have been transferred to the allottees thereof Mr Vohra then placed reliance on the noticedated 20/01/1965 issued by the Delhi Transport Undertaking pursuance to which the applications were invited from the employees under thescheme for transfer of these tenements by sale. He, therefore, contendedthat the control on the user and disposal of these tenements vested with thedtc. Government of India, Ministry of Works and Housing alone was tobe approached for approval if at all approval was necessary. But even thatministry has already given permission to the defendant No. 3 to transferthese houses by sale. The DTC is left with no constraint whatsoever inimplementing the scheme. There is only one constraint which is stipulatedin Section 19-B of the Laws Amendment Act, 1971 which is as under :- "19-B. Corporation to obtain the approval of the Central Government in certain cases In the exercise of any of its powers underthis Act, the Corporation shall not incur on any single work,service or scheme or of any other purpose a capital expenditureof more than twenty five lakhs of rupees except with the previousapproval of the Central Government. "it was therefore contended that constraint is not an disposal of properties, moveable or immovable. It is in fact on the exercise of any power underthe Act and incurring on any single work capital expenditure. "it was therefore contended that constraint is not an disposal of properties, moveable or immovable. It is in fact on the exercise of any power underthe Act and incurring on any single work capital expenditure. Neither ofthese two contingencies arise in thecase in hand The disposal in thepresent case is with the concurrence of the Ministry of Finance by theministry of Works and Housing and so far as the single work capital expenditure is concerned, that would arise subsequently. ( 29 ). Mr. Banerjee appearing for defendant No. 3 on the other bandcontended that under the Delhi Road Transport Authority Act, 1950 it isthe Ministry of Shipping and Road Transport whose permission and approval for the implementation of the scheme is required and not of the Ministryof Works and Housing. The loan for construction of these tenements wasobtained from the Ministry of Shipping and Transport For this reason alsoapproval of the said Ministry is necessary. The necessary arose for reviewof the earlier decision because of financial constraint and on account ofacute shortage of accommodation. DTC is not in a position to replace thehousing stock. The workers similarly situated in other DTC colonies, likeshadipur will raise similar demands for transfer of their tenements and that isnot possible for the DTC to do. Board Resolution No. 30 of 1979 of decision 8/03/1979 sought postponement of the consideration of the DTC sdated 31/07/1978 and of 27/02/1979. It was done because thedtc was under pressure on account of the financial implication as therewas no resources available for the replacement of these tenements. There isin fact dirth of land in Delhi, therefore, there is no chance of replacing thehousing stock. It was in this background that the decision to review theearlier resolution which was a "mere proposal" or could be called "agreeingin principal" was passed. According to Mr Banerjee resolution No. 55dated 18th April, 197^ docs not confer any right on the plaintiff as it wasnot a final decision. Vide the said resolution the defendants only "principally agreed" to consider the adoption and implementation of the scherne. Resolution could becalled a "loud thinking" nothing more Therefore noright accrued in favour of the plainliffs. So far as individual cases areconcerned, Mr. Mathur appearing as PW-1has admitted that he could nottell whether all the plaintiffs are eligible for allotment of these tenements ornot. Resolution could becalled a "loud thinking" nothing more Therefore noright accrued in favour of the plainliffs. So far as individual cases areconcerned, Mr. Mathur appearing as PW-1has admitted that he could nottell whether all the plaintiffs are eligible for allotment of these tenements ornot. He could not tell exactly the salaries drawn by each of the plaintiffsin 1965-66 or in 1978-79. He also could not deny that the plaintiffs No. 82 and 99 were allotted quarters No. 123 and 130 respectively nor could hedeny that the plaintiffs No. 2, 12, 16, 19, 26, 29, 31, 36, 37, 39, 40, 44, 55,57, 60, 63, 69, 80, 87 and 99 did not furnish the required particulars demandedby the defendant; nor could he deny the suggestion that the plaintiffs atsi. Nos. 6, II. 18, 19. 28, 30. 34, 38, 45. 48, 49. 51. 52. 54. 65,83, 85, 86. 87 and 103 have since retired from service. He also could not tell thateviction, proceedings have been initiated against plaintiffs No. 25, 85 and 103under the PP Act. Nor could he tell that PP Act proceedings were pendingagainst plaintiffs No. 11. 18. 19. 38, 45, 48, 52, 54, 65 and 87. He couldnot deny the suggestion that the Board can review its own resolution. Hecould not tell bow many plaintiffs have their own houses in Delhi. He badno knowledge as to how may plaintiffs have since resigned from service orretired nor could tell the market value of the houses as in the year 1983. On the contrary, according to Mr. Banerjee, the fact that these plaintiffs arenot eligible has been corroborated by the testimony of Shri R. D. Mathur (DW-2 ). For this reason also these plaintiffs are not eligible for thetransferof houses by sate. In the absence of individuals coming in thewitness box their rights cannot be asserted. PW-1 alone cannot prove thelegal character and the right in property of other plaintiffs. ( 30 ). It was further contended that this suit is not maintainablebecause one of the plaintiff Shri J. N. Bedi bad earlier filed a writ petitionclaiming the same reliefs which are claimed in this suit. The said writpetition was listed as Civil Writ Petition No. 2045/81 The said petition wasdismissed in limini by a speaking order of 15th September, 19x2. It was further contended that this suit is not maintainablebecause one of the plaintiff Shri J. N. Bedi bad earlier filed a writ petitionclaiming the same reliefs which are claimed in this suit. The said writpetition was listed as Civil Writ Petition No. 2045/81 The said petition wasdismissed in limini by a speaking order of 15th September, 19x2. Whiledismissing the writ petition the Division Bench held that the plaintiff hadno legal right nor be could ask for the transfer of the tenement Hence thesethese plaintiffs have no right in the property as observed by the Divisionbench. ( 31 ). DTC allotted these tenements to the plaintiff under the rulesformulated by it and not on the basis of the terms and conditions of thescheme. These tenements were allotted some where in 1965-66. The schemeif had not been modified in 1978. would not have been applicable to thedtc, therefore, these allottees of 1965-66 have to be governed by the termsand conditions of their allotment and not by the terms and conditionsstipulated under the scheme. Thus all the plaintiffs against whom evicvtionorders have been passed by the Estate Officer and confirmed by the Appellatecourt are not eligible, qua them the decision of Estate Officer is finalas stipulated under Section 10 of the PP Act. Some of these plaintiffsagainst whom PP Act proceedings were initiated raised these very pleasbefore the Estate Officer but the same were rejected vide order dated 2 6/02/1983 (Ex. D-1) and by the Appellate Court vide order dated 6/08/1983 (Ex. D-2 ). As on 18/04/1979 none of the plaintiffs waseligible as per the term of the allotment. Without conceding Mr. Banerjeecontended that even if the scheme is ordered to be implemented it will notapply retrospectively. At best the right, if any, will accrue from 1 8/04/1979 that is the day the DTC agreed principally and not from 1965-66he further contended that the houses constructed under the scheme bythe State Governments are only covered under the scheme. So far as housesof the employer are concerned that has been left to the discretion of theemployer to transfer or not to transfer. Even if the houses are to be transferred,conditions stipulated in the Govt. So far as housesof the employer are concerned that has been left to the discretion of theemployer to transfer or not to transfer. Even if the houses are to be transferred,conditions stipulated in the Govt. Circular of 4/02/1979have to be adhered to and that is prior approval of the Ministry of Shippingand Transport has to be obtained, furthermore the housing stock has to bereplenished The necessity to obtain the approval of the Ministry ofshipping and Transport is on account of the provisions stipulated undersection 19 (B) of the Laws Amendment Act, 1971. The value of these tenementsadmittedly is more than 25 lacs of rupees hence permission is necessary. The Central Government under Section 19 (B) would mean theministry of Shipping and Transport. The said Ministry has not given theapproval so far, therefore, the question of impiementation of this schemedoes not arise. An agreement was executed between the employees and theemployer. Clause 2 of the said agreement shows that these employees wereallottees as on rental basis or mere licences. They are not eligible for thetransfer of these tenements as they no longer remain employees of the DTCon the date resolution Ex P-7 was passed. Mr. Banerjee in order tostrengthen his argument drew my attention to the statement of PW-1 whoadmitted that decision to dispose of these tenements was taken in l979. Therefore, for this reason the plaintiffs have no vested right in these houses. It is yet to be determined as to what is the terminal dated 1965-66 or1978-79. Unless it is decided the benefit under the scheme cannot be given. So far letters dated 8/07/1975 and 19/02/1976 these-stoodwithdrawn. keeping in view the larger interest of the employees. Clause 20sub-clause (4) (II)- of the scheme deals with the retention of houses byeligible workers. This shows that eligibility is a pre-condition for thetransfer of the houses and to be eligible one has to be an employee of theemployer and be must not have crossed the wage limit of Rs. 500. 00permonth Since the scheme can be modified and/or withdrawn as providedunder para 23 (8) hence no finality can be attached to it. All these plaintiffshad been drawing more than Rs. 500. 00 as on 18/04/1979 therefore alsothey are not eligible. ( 32 ). Mr. Banerjee contended that similar provision like Section 19 (B)exists under the DMC Act. 500. 00permonth Since the scheme can be modified and/or withdrawn as providedunder para 23 (8) hence no finality can be attached to it. All these plaintiffshad been drawing more than Rs. 500. 00 as on 18/04/1979 therefore alsothey are not eligible. ( 32 ). Mr. Banerjee contended that similar provision like Section 19 (B)exists under the DMC Act. Those provision namely Section 200 (d) of thedmc Act came up for consideration before this court and this court setaside the resolution passed by the Corporation of transfer by sale the housesto its occupants. Section 200 (d) of the DMC act which deals with the proposalof property reads as u nder : "200. With respect to the disposal of property belonging to thecorporation, the following provisions shall have effect,namely :- (d) the consideration for which any immovable property may besold, leased or otherwise transferred shall not be less thanthe value at which such immovable property could be soldleased, or otherwise transferred in normal and fair competition. "according to Mr Banerjee the DTC cannot dispose of this property by saleby transfer because that would be against the provision of the Act andrules framed by the DTC. In fact the Board's decision of 18/04/1979was illegal as it was beyond the scope of the statute. The cost of constructionof these tenements in 1965 was Rs. 3504 Lacs. An amount of Rs. 625 lacs and Rs. 156 lacs were given by the Central Government as loanand subsidy respectively to cover the above cost of construction. The loanwas repayable in 15 equal instalments subject to the instrest@ 5-1/2 perannum. Corporation has paid back the loan to the extent of Rs. 1,73,888. 50p upto 20/03/1966 Further repayment could not be madeby DTC because of recurring losses and precarious financial position of thecorporation. Moreover, the Corporation will be loosing the rent beingpaid by the employees The cost of land and construction have increasedmanifold and replacement of an equal number of houses will cost not lessthan Three Crores of rupees. Where as only a sum of Rs. 14. 00to Rs. 15. Moreover, the Corporation will be loosing the rent beingpaid by the employees The cost of land and construction have increasedmanifold and replacement of an equal number of houses will cost not lessthan Three Crores of rupees. Where as only a sum of Rs. 14. 00to Rs. 15. 00lakhs approximately will be recovered by the sale of these tenemants andthat too in instalments spread over a long period, therefore the transferwould be in violation of pridcipal of natural justice and equity particularlykeeping in view the financial position of the DTC and the hardship whichemployees on the strength of the DTC would face as they would be deprivedofficial accommodation. ( 33 ). Section 32 sab-section (2) provides that no sum shall be incursedby or on behalf of the Corporation unless the expenditure of the same iscovered by a current budget grant approved by the State Governmentmr. Banerjee contended that the State Government in this case would mean'delhi Administration' and the Delhi Administration has not so far grantedany approval for this expenditure. The provision of acquiring property anddisposal by sale have been taken away by the Delhi Road Transportauthority Act. Section 25 of the Delhi Raod Transport Authority Act givespower to the DTC to alter or to extend the scheme. Therefore, even if thescheme is applicable or was adopted in 1979 the Board has the power to alteror amend the same as has been done in this case by a subsequent resolutionwithdrawing the earlier proposal of 1979. If the DTC had the power topass the resolution on 18/04/1979 it has the power to withdraw or tomodify the same. Section 52and53 of the Delhi Road Transport Authorityact, 1950 empowers the Authority to frame Rules and Regulations whichmay not be inaccordance with the scheme. Resolution dated 18/04/1979 was an internal decision of the employer. It was passed as a sheergesture to think/consider in principal the demand of the employee Thereforeno finality can be attached to such a resolution. These houses weregiven on rental basis and this find support from Ex. P-9 dated 7/02/1978, a letter issued by the Central Government Reading of this letter showsthat plaintiffs were only licencees and the houses were not to be sold tothem. These houses were to be kept for serving officials which can beinferred from the bare reading of Ex. P-10 dated 14/02/1979, Ex. D-12 gives the reason for the review of the earlier decision. These houses were to be kept for serving officials which can beinferred from the bare reading of Ex. P-10 dated 14/02/1979, Ex. D-12 gives the reason for the review of the earlier decision. The readingof Ex D-12 would show that the earlier decision taken was only in principalto consider the implementation of the scheme but in fact no final decisionwas taken vide the said resolution of 18/04/1979. Ex. D-10 dated 3/12/1979 would show that till 3/12/1979 no finaldecision was taken The eligibility of the plaintiffs was also lacking as isapparent from Ex D-12. So much so. in answer to the Unstarred Questionin the Parliament vide Exp-14 the DTC intimated that no final decisionhad been taken. Vide Ex DW-3/2 dated 28th February. 1286 Centralgovernment did not grant the approval to the proposal sent by the DTC. Vide Ex. P-16 only applications were invited This at best can be calledinvitation of offer In fact no communication was sent to the plaintiffs bythe DTC that it intends to sell these tenements to them. Central Government has been given the power under the scheme itself to withdraw or tomodify the scheme The Central Government has not agreed to extend thebenefit of the scheme to the employees of the DTC. The power has beenrightly exercised by the DTC. It is at the discretion of the employer toimplement the scheme or not do it, therefore, no mandate can be issuedasainst the defendants. The Resolution dated 18/04/1979 (Ex. P- 7)was only a loud thinking. It is an Administrative action and not a quasijudicial decision. Since the defendant Corporation found financial andother difficulties in the adoptihn and implementation of the scheme, it exercisedits power to review the same The review of earlier resolutionwas not arbitrary, but is based on sound financial aspects of the DTC. Even if for argument sake it is said that the resolution of 18/04/1979is a quasi judicial decision, still the DTC has the inherent powers to reviewand modify its earlier decision The principle of estoppel or for thatmatter the principle of promissory estoppel will not apply to the facts of thiscase. In order to strengthen his argument be has placed reliance on thedecision of Supreme Court in the case of Excise Commissioner U. P. Allahabad etc. etc. v Ramkumar etc etc. reported in AIR 1976 Supremecourt page 2237 at 2241. In order to strengthen his argument be has placed reliance on thedecision of Supreme Court in the case of Excise Commissioner U. P. Allahabad etc. etc. v Ramkumar etc etc. reported in AIR 1976 Supremecourt page 2237 at 2241. In that case condition was incorporated in thelicence of the respondents that they would lift the fixed minimum quantityof lipuor and sell the same at their allotted shops. It was also the term ofthe licence that in case of default or violation to lift the requisite quantitythey would be liable to pay compensation equal to the amount of the exciseduty leviable on the unlifted quantity. In fact the U. P. Excise Act did notprovide levy of amount of excise duty as compensation. Therefore, thedemand made by the Excise Commissioner on the unlifted liquor waschallenged. Estoppel against the Government was pleaded. The Supremecourt held that no estoppel can be pleaded against the act of the sovereignnor can a estoppel against the Government will apply when it exercises itsexecutive powers. It was further observed that sales of country liquorexempted from sales tax at the time of auction of the liquor licences thegovernment is not estopped from subjecting sales tax to such sales later. Relying on this decilion Mr Banerjee contended that the Resolution of 1 8/04/1979 being executive decision cannot be challenged nor estoppel isattracted. The Authority which bad the power to pass resolution also hasthe power to withdraw the same. To strengthen his argument further hehas placed reliance on the decision of this court in the case of Indo Foreigncommercial Agency (Produce) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and others reportedin AIR 1976 Delhi p. 4. The Division Bench of this High Court afterconsidering the merits of the case held that the principle of promissoryestoppel will not apply to policy actions of the Government, It wasobserved that while ordinary administrative action is fully subject to judicialreview, the granter the element of policy involved in Government actionthe more difficult it is for the Courts to review such action. In that cagethe scheme was formulated under the Imports and Exports Controlact for cash assistance for a period of three years. But after one yearthe scheme was withdrawn. Validity of this action was challenged. In that cagethe scheme was formulated under the Imports and Exports Controlact for cash assistance for a period of three years. But after one yearthe scheme was withdrawn. Validity of this action was challenged. Thecourt held that the promulgation and withdrawal of the policy of cashassistance were both policy actions and not ordinary administrativeacts and whenever there is a question of policy decision of the Governmentof India the courts will not subject the same to judicial review. The Courts also found that the withdrawal of the scheme was justified inthat case. Therefore, relying on this decision Mr. Banerjee contended thatsince the Corporation will suffer losses andtaking into consideration thefinancial constraint, the DTC has decided vide Resolution of 2/03/1981 (Ex. D-12) to withdrawal the recommeadation or the proposal of theadoption and implementation of scheme. In fact according to Mr. Banerjeeno assurance was held oat to the allottees of these tenements that thesewould be transferred in their favour. The estoppel as envisaged undersection 1 15 of the Evidence Act would not apply to the facts of this case. It is a well settled principle of law that the doctrine of promissory estoppelwill not apply against the State in its governmental, public or sovereigncapacity. The exception, however, arises where it is necessary to preventfraud or manifest injustice. In this case neither any fraud has been impleadednor injustice is going to be caused to the plaintiffis. No estoppel canarise or operate to fetter the powers and discretion of the DTC if its actionis in the interest of administration and in the larger interest of its employees. The adoption and implementation of the scheme is in the discretionof the DTC. Mr. Banerjee therefore contended that this court cannot sitin judgment on the governmental function and decide whether the schemeshould be implemented or not. There cannot be any estoppel in respect ofstatutory acts of the Corporation which are made for the benefit of largernumber of its employees, In this regard be has placed reliance on thedecision of Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Others ;v. Godfreyphilips India Ltd, reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court pages 806 It was'held in that case that there can be no promissory estoppel against thelegislature in the exercise of its legislative functions nor can government or'public authority be debarred by promissory estoppel from enforcing astatutory prohibition. It is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot beused to compel the government or a public authority to carry out a representationor promise which is contrary to law or which was outside theauthority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authorityto make. Attention was also drawn to another decision of thesupreme Court in the case of Jatinder Kumar and others v. State of Punjaband others, reported in AIR 1984 Supreme Court page 1850, M/s Jit Ramshiv Kumar and others v. Ram Niwas Gupta and others, reported in AIR1980 Supreme Court page 1285: G. Govinda Rajulu v. The Andhra Pradeshstate Construction Corporation Ltd and another, reported in AIR 1987supreme Court page 1801 and in the case of Delhi Cloth and General Millsltd. v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1987 Supreme Court page 2414. DTC at no stage held on any promise to the plaintiffs, therefore, there is noquestion of promissory estoppel. Mr. Banerjee then relied on the decisionof our own High Court in the case of Nirmal Kumar Jain and others v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and another, reported in 1989 (3) Delhilawyer page 379 where the MCD tried to dispose off (transfer of ownershipof staff quarters constructed by the Corporation to the employees ). Thesaid action was struck down by this court. It was observed that the provisionof Section 200 bad not been complied with Mr. Banerjee contendedthat the ratio of Nirmal Kumar Jain's case is applicable on all force to thefacts of this case. As in that case, in this case also no personal communicationto the plaintiffs was. made nor any assurance given. The resolutiondated 18/04/1979 cannot be regarded as promise. Moreover, therecannot be any estoppel against statute. As far as the plaintiffs are concernedthese quarters were allotted to them in their capacities are employees. They had been paying license fee in respect thereof at the rate stipulated bythe DTC. Being licencee On rental basis they cannot claim vested right inthose tenements merely on the strength of the resolution of 18/04/1979 Ex P-4 stipulates that these houses can be transferred only when thehousing stock is replenished. The word "stock" as defined in the Dictionarymeans "a corporate wealth, resources etc " The houses being alreadyshort with the DTC, it would not be in the larger interest of the employeesto transfer these houses to the plaintiffs. The word "stock" as defined in the Dictionarymeans "a corporate wealth, resources etc " The houses being alreadyshort with the DTC, it would not be in the larger interest of the employeesto transfer these houses to the plaintiffs. The scheme is a welfare schemeit has to be co-related with various aspects like availability of land, financesand resources. DTC is already running losses. In these houses are transferredto the plaintiffs, other employees will be deprived of the benefits ofthe accommodation. It will work against the workers. Equity is an favourof DTC, The Ministry of Shipping and Transport has therefore rightlyrejected the implementation of this scheme by the DTC For these reasonsmr. Banerjee stressed that the suit be dismissed. ( 34 ). I am afraid I cannot accept the reasonings of the defendantno. 3. Though the submissions of Mr. Banerjee on the face of it appearsto be very attractive and forceful. But if one goes deep into the matter itis not difficult to see that the equity is not in favour of the defendant but itis favour of the plaintiffs DTC may be facing financial implications butthat does not mean that the plaintiffs should be deprived of their rightwhich has accrued in their favour on account of the statute. It is not forthe first time that such like tenements have been asked to be transferred bysale to the employees Delhi Administration and for that matter MCD-predecessor of the DTC have in fact transferred the tenements in so manycolonies to their occupants Mr. Banerjee's contention that the plaintiffsought to have mitigated the losses by acquiring their own flats or lands isan argument in the wilderness. In fact this submission can be argued moreforcefully against the defendant DTC. The DTC instead of giving advantagesof the scheme to its employees started controverting the rights of theplaintiffs. Under the scheme the DTC would have been provided with theloan by the Central Government as well as the land on a subsidised rate. But that the DTC did not do and, therefore, it has no right to blame theplaintiffs It is no body's case that these tenements be transferred to allthe 103 plaintiffs The question of eligibility of each individual will haveto be gone into by the DTC at the time of transfer of these tenements bysale. At this stage, ibis court is called upon to determine the validity ofthe two resolutions namely Ex. At this stage, ibis court is called upon to determine the validity ofthe two resolutions namely Ex. P-7 and Ex D-12 by virtue of which schemeis alleged to have been adopted and second by virtue of which the saidresolution is decided to be withdrawn. The fallacy in the arguments of thedefendant No. 3 is that it consider the resolution of 18/04/1979 (Ex. P-7) a mere loud thinking, a mere agreeing in principle. This argumentthough very tempting but has no substance The resolution of 18/04/1979 came into existence because of its past history, which is very relevantto understand in order to appreciate the correct position. As alreadypointed out above, and as brought on record by the evidence of PW-l, theemployees of the DTC submitted a Charier of demands to their employer. One of the Charter of demands was the implementation of the scheme. Negotiations look-place and ultimately settlement (Ex P-15) dated 2 8/10/1978 was arrived at between the employee and employer before theconciliation Officer. As per Memorandum of Settlement Ex. P-15 themanagement and the Sangh discussed the matter and the Sangh withdrawtheir threat of strike. The individual hunger strike was called off with effectfrom 27th September. As a result of mutual discussions the Managementand Delhi Parivahan Mazdoor Sangb agreed to enter into an agreement infull and final settlement of the demands. Para XIII of the term of settlementof Ex. P-15 provided as 'under :-"xiii. The demand for transfer of houses built under subsidisedhousing scheme will be decided in six months". This settlement is covered under Sub-section (3) of Section 18 cf the industrial Disputes Act, Subsection (3) of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputesact reads as under ;- " (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of condition proceedingsunder this Act (for and arbitration award in a case where a notificationhas been issued under Sub-section (3-A) of Section 10-A)or (an award of a Labour Court. Tribunal or National Tribunal)which has become enforceable shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute ; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings asparties to the dispute, unlegs the Board, (arbitrator, Labourcourt, Tribunal or National Tribunal), as the case may be,records the opinion that they were summoned within propercause". ( 35 ). Tribunal or National Tribunal)which has become enforceable shall be binding on (a) all parties to the industrial dispute ; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings asparties to the dispute, unlegs the Board, (arbitrator, Labourcourt, Tribunal or National Tribunal), as the case may be,records the opinion that they were summoned within propercause". ( 35 ). The bare reading of Section 18 (3) of the Industrial Disputesact makes it clear that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliationproceedings is binding not only on the actual parties to the Industrialdispute but also on the heirs, successors or assigns of the employer on theone hand, and all the workmen in the establishment, present or future onthe other. Sub-section (3) of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act infact departs from the ordinary law of contract and gives effect to theprinciple of collective bargaining as held by the Supreme Court in the caseof Jhagrakhan Collieries v. G. C. Aggarwal, reported in AIR1975 SC 174,this settlement has a binding effect and is enforceable in law Pursuance tothis the Board of the defendant DTC took the decision to implement thescheme and, therefore, passed a resolution on 18/04/1979 i. e. , prior tothe expiry of the period of six months. Hence it would not be appropriatefor the DTC now to lay that the resolution Ex P-7 was only a loud think ing and a mere "agreeing in principle". This contention is devoid of meritand against the settlement. If this resolution had not been the outcome ofa binding settlement like (Ex P-15), the contention of DTC could havebeen justified But this settlement and subsequent conduct of the partiesspeaks otherwise. As observed above, the Board took decision to implement the scheme which was in pursuance to the lawful settlement arrived atbetween the parties. Therefore, it cannot be said that the resolution of 18/04/1979 was in the form of loud thinking or bad no legal binding. The decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Nirmal Kumar Jain andanother v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another referred to above isin fact not applicable to the facts of this case. Therefore, it cannot be said that the resolution of 18/04/1979 was in the form of loud thinking or bad no legal binding. The decision of the Delhi High Court in the case of Nirmal Kumar Jain andanother v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Another referred to above isin fact not applicable to the facts of this case. That decision is distinguishableon two grounds one in that case the resolution was passed by thecorporation without the concurrence or agreement of the Commissioner asrequired under Section 200 of the DMC Act and secondly employees of themcd were not held out any assurance that these quarters would be transferredto them by sale. In fact there was no such communication betweenemployer and employee in that case. Where as in the present case theresolution dated 18/04/1979 had been passed by a competent andappropriate authority i. e. the Board of the DTC It is not the case of thedtc that the Board had no authority to pass this resolution. This resolutionwas in pursuance to the settlement Ex P- 15 which has a binding force. It is also not disputed that these tenements had been constructed under thescheme and loan was received from the Central Government for this purpose. DTC had principally agreed to adopt the scheme and thereafter actedupon the same when it asked the plaintiffs to furnish the requisite detailsregarding their length of service, salary, dependents, whether any dependentown a house or not and verify the form filled for transfer of these tenements for sale as required by the Central Govt. Whereas in the case of Nirmal Kumar Jain and Another (supra) there was no communication regarding the acceptance of the scheme to its employees by the MCD. ( 36 ). The required details were furnished by all the plaintiffs asadmitted by Shri R. D. Mathur (PW 2 ). Therefore, in fact in the case inhand DTC held out assurances to the occupants of these tenements that thesetenements are going to be transferred to them by sale. It is in fact thisassurance and promise which the DTC now wants to resile. Therefore, theprinciple of promissory estoppel would apply. Lord Denning in "hightrees Houses case" 1974 KB 113 revived the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The principle formulated by Lord Denning was, "that a promise intended tobe binding, intended to be acted on an in fact acted on, is binding so far asits term properly apply. Therefore, theprinciple of promissory estoppel would apply. Lord Denning in "hightrees Houses case" 1974 KB 113 revived the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The principle formulated by Lord Denning was, "that a promise intended tobe binding, intended to be acted on an in fact acted on, is binding so far asits term properly apply. Lord Denning rejected detriment as an essentialingredient of promissory estoppel. "in Motilal Padam Pat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. The State of Uttarpradesh and Others. AIR 1979 SC 621 . Mr. Justice P. N. Bhagwati, who spoke for the Court, observed about promissoryessoppel that it is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice, it isneither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The trueprinciple of promissory estoppel" it has been held, "seems to be that whereone party has by his words or conduct made to the other party a clear legalrelations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future knowing or ntendingthat would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is madeand it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would bebinding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go backupon it" Whereas in the case of Nirmal Kumar Jain and Another (supra)there was no communication regarding the acceptance of the scheme to itsemployees by the MCD. Applying to above principle of law to the facts ofthis case it could safely be said that in this case the DTC Board through itsresolution Ex. P-7 and subsequently confirmed by resolution dated 3 1/08/1979 (Ex. P-8) held out assurance to the plaintiffs that they wouldbe vested with ownership rights of these tenements On the basis of thatassurance these occupants waited for a long period to see that their cherisheddesire to own a house will be fulfilled. They submitted the particulars andcomplied with all the formalities Therefore, now it does not lie in themouth of the DTC to say that there was no assurance given or that thecommunication of acceptance of the scheme and askine them to furnish thedetail was only a loud thinking or merely agreeing in principle to considertheir request There is in fact no question of considering. Considerationtook place prior to the settlement. After the settlement only implementationwas left and that was done vide Ex. P-7. Considerationtook place prior to the settlement. After the settlement only implementationwas left and that was done vide Ex. P-7. Hence principle of prmoissoryestoppel squarely applies to the facts of this case. As already pointedout above, and even at the risk of repetition it would not be out of place tomention that in the case of Nirmal Kumar Jain (supra) the communicationof the passing of the resolution by the Corporation which bad no concurrenceof the Commissioner as required under Section 200 of the Municipalcorporation Act, was never given to the employees. Therefore, in that casethe court held that in the absence of assurance principal of promissoryestoppel was not made applicable. But the facts of this case are otherwise. To that extent the ratio of Nirmal Kumar case would rather help to theplaintiffs. In the case in hand assurance was given, resolution was passedby the appropriate authority and the employees were duly asked to submittheir particulars for the purposes of processing their cases in pursuance tothat resolution. Numerous clarifications were obtained by the DTC fromthe Government of India and ultimately it was finally confirmed on 3 1/08/1979 Various exceptions to the applicability of the doctrine ofpromissory estoppel can be enumerated and reference can be had to the caseof State of Rajasthan in re : Malu Khan v. State of Rajasthan and another,reported in AIR 1990 Rajasthan 112. Those are :- (1) that there can be no promissory estoppel against the Legislaturein the exercise of its legislative functions; (2) that the Government or public authority cannot be debarred bypromissory estoppel from enforcing a statutory prohibition; (3) that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be used to compelthe Government or a public authority to carry out a representationor promise which is contrary to law; (4) that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is not applicable incases where the authority or power of the Officer of the Governmentor of the public authority is outside the authority of thepower to makethat; and (5) that the doctrine of piomissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can beshown by the government that having regard to the facts as theyhave subsequently transpired it would be inequitable to bold thegovernment to the promise made by it, the Court would not raisean equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promiseagainst the government. " ( 37 ). If it can beshown by the government that having regard to the facts as theyhave subsequently transpired it would be inequitable to bold thegovernment to the promise made by it, the Court would not raisean equity in favour of the promise and enforce the promiseagainst the government. " ( 37 ). The decision of the DTC dated 2/03/1981 Ex. D-12 towithdraw the benefit of the scheme is not covered under any of the exception. Ex. D-12 is not in the nature of legislature function, nor was passed onaccount of any statutory prohibition. Nor the assurance or promise madevide resolution Ex. P-7 could be called contrary to law rather scheme of1978 empowers the DTC to take such a decision as Ex. P-7 and then implementis subject to certain conditions. It is also not the case of DTC thatresolution Ex. P-7 was not passed by any competent authority. Nor hasdtc shown any subsequent event on account of which it has becomeinequitable for DTC to implement the said resolution. In fact all action ofthe government and Government aurhorities should have a legal pedigree. The DTC was aware of the financial implications and also the acute shortageof accommodation when when it passed the resolution Ex P-7 and confirmedthe same on 31/08/1979. Infact, the assurance or the promise givenby the DTC was meant to be performed in the future. To resile from it,the DTC bad to prove and disclose to this court as to what were the interveningevents and circumstances which compelled it to change its earlierdecision. The five reasons given in Ex. D-12 for reversal of the earlierdecilion bad not arisen after the passing of the resolution nor they can becalled subsequent events. DTC is a State as defined under Article 12 of theconstitution of India and state must act fairly and equitably. Having givenassurance and promise for the implementation of the scheme, if now it ispermitted to withdraw the same, then the employees will suffer an irreparableloss. By permitting the State to withdraw the benefit it would amount topeople losing faith in the Governmert as well as their employers. Theexample is not far to be found. According to PW-1 during the pendency ofthis case DTC authority asked the plaintiffs to withdraw the suit so that DTCcould implement. the scheme. The same is mentioned in Ex. DW-3/1 whichis roproduced as under :- "c. L. Chhabradelhi Transport Corporationsenior Personnel Officer-11. P. Estatephone: 3315085no. Theexample is not far to be found. According to PW-1 during the pendency ofthis case DTC authority asked the plaintiffs to withdraw the suit so that DTCcould implement. the scheme. The same is mentioned in Ex. DW-3/1 whichis roproduced as under :- "c. L. Chhabradelhi Transport Corporationsenior Personnel Officer-11. P. Estatephone: 3315085no. DO (l07)/3/85/958dated : l8th October, 85the deputy Secretary to the Govt. of India,ministry of Transport,department of Surface Transport,transport Bhavan,new Delhi-110001. Sab. : Sale of houses at G. T. Road and Hari Nagar Colonies to theoccupants thereof Approval of the Central Government. Sir. I am directed to refer to your letter No. TGD (60)/78 dated J 6/05/1980 and also No. TGD (60)/78 dated 15/06/1981 on theabove subject. The matter has remained under the consideration ofthe DTC Board which vide its resolution No. 115/85 dated 4-9-1985,has again decided to refer the mattre to Government for approval. The Resolution if reproduced below :"the Board, after detailed discussion, decided to refer the matterregarding transfer of quarters to the allottees on ownership basisat GT. Road and Hari Nagar Colonies to the Government forapproval subject to the withdrawan of the case pending in thehigh Court, Labour Commissioner or any other Court by theoccupants". To Ministry has already been provided complete information videletter No. ADMI-107 (3)/79 dated 17-9-1979 and a brief note aboutthe scheme was also sent vide letter No. ADMI-107 (3}/80 dated3-3-1980. A copy of the Item No. 71/85 is enclosed here with. Inpursuance of the above Resolution of the Board, the allottees. throughtheir Associations have been asked to withdraw the cases in thecourts. Their reply is awaited. "in view of the above, the approval of the Government of India isrequested for sale of the houses to the occupants subject to theconditions laid down by the Ministry of Works and Housing andalso the DTC Board. Enclosure: As aboveyour faithfully,sd/- (CL. Chhabra)Sr. Personnel Officer-1"nothing can be more appropriate than the laying once bitten twice shy. Theemployees did not fall for this offer of withdrawing the suit because theywere aware that the DTC was capable to resiling from the stand any time. Hence this offer was not believed nor accepted by the plaintiffs because ofpast experience. Unless it is a policy matter or an act against law or contrarylaw, any promise made by the State, people expect that it would beimplemented and adhered to. Hence this offer was not believed nor accepted by the plaintiffs because ofpast experience. Unless it is a policy matter or an act against law or contrarylaw, any promise made by the State, people expect that it would beimplemented and adhered to. It was not a mere proposal but an actualpromise/assurance which was made after considering all the pros and cons ofthe problem and its ramifications. ( 38 ). The reason given for the withdrawal of the earlier soheme videex. D-12 dated 2/03/1981 cannot be considered exceptions to promise. So far as the first ground for reversal as mentioned in Ex. D-12 ie. the absence of the government decision, it is against the record. Thelengthy correspondence exchanged between DTC and Government of Indiashows that this ground is an "off the cuff remark". Documents placed onrecord show Government of India bad given the approval and left the discretionwith DTC. So far as the second ground that no public undertakinghas sold the houses constructed under the scheme is in fact contrary to theevidence. Sh. R D. Mathur (DW-2) admitted in his cross-examination thatquarters in colonies of Karampura, Nehru Nagar, Vishvakarma Nagar andgiri Nagar constructed by the Delhi Administration under the scheme hadbeen transferred to its allottees. This shows that the ground taken by thedtc is based on no evidence. Mr. Same Chand, DW-1 has in no uncertainwords admitted that the quarters constructed by the State Governmentunder the scheme had been allotted to its employees and this fact wasbrought to the notice of the DTC by the plaintiffs much before the resolutionex. D-12 was passed. This fact in itself proves that DTC by raising thisground wanted to mislead and had. in fact misrepresented the facts. ( 39 ). As regarding the third ground the discretion was left with theemployer and the DTC in exercise of the discretion passed the resolutionex. P-7 and thereafter confirmed the same on 31/08/1979 vide Ex. P-8. Not only it confirmed but the said resolutions were communicated andacted upon when plaintiffs were asked to submit the date and particularsregarding their service, dependents, wages etc ( 40 ). As regard the grounds 4, 5 ft 6, DTC was aware of the lame andbad discussed the pros and cons of the scheme at length before taking decisionand financial resources, acute shortage of land and demand by otheremployees were known to the employer, however, inspite of these constraintspassed the resolution Ex. As regard the grounds 4, 5 ft 6, DTC was aware of the lame andbad discussed the pros and cons of the scheme at length before taking decisionand financial resources, acute shortage of land and demand by otheremployees were known to the employer, however, inspite of these constraintspassed the resolution Ex. P-7 and confirmed the same on 31/08/1979 (Ex. P-8 ). ( 41 ). Now dealing with the 7th ground regarding the eligibility of theemployees that question will arise at the time of transfer of the houses. Tomy mind, the DTC will be within its right to declare a person, ineligible. It is also for the DTC to decide from which date the scheme would to applicableparticularly in view of the fact that prior to modification of 1978 thisscheme was not applicable to DTC. Constraints were removed only with themodification of this scheme in 1978 when discretion was left with theemployer to adopt this scheme or not. ( 42 ). Admittedly the discretion to transfer these houses rest sloley withthe DTC. There is no constraint now attached to the same. Approval ofthe Ministry of Works and Housing is already there. DTC cannot insist thatthis approval should be by the Ministry of Shipping and Transport, Section19-B of the Delhi Road Transport Law (Amendment) Act of l97 envisagesprior approval of the Central Government. Government for the purposesof Union Territory of Delhi would mean Delhi Administration. From recordit is apparent that Delhi Administration had been corresponding withministry of Works and Housing for clarification and for implementation ofthis Scheme. Mr. J. R. Kapoor, Desk Officer of the Ministry or Surfacetransport. Government of India appearing as DW-3 slated that this Ministrywas previously known as 'ministry of Shipping and Transport'. He admittedon the basis of the record that there was no correspondence exchangedbetween Ministry of Works and Housing and his Ministry Shri Jagdishsharma, Assistant Personnel Officer. DTC appearing as DW-4 admitted thatthis matter was not referred to Mininstry of Works and Housing by DTCSince Ministry of Works and Housing with the concurrence of Ministry offinance has already given the approval, to my mind, separate approval ofthe Ministry of Shipping and Transport is not essential nor from theevidence of Shri J R. Kapoor DTC has established that the said Ministry of itsown rejected the scheme for DTC. Factual apart, 'legally also Mr. Factual apart, 'legally also Mr. Banerjee'scontention that under Section 19-B of the Delhi Road Transport Law (Amendment) Act, 1971 prior approval of the Central Government is necessaryin the case is without substance. The fallacy in his argument is that heis missing the significant words in Section 19-B ie. "on any single work,service or scheme or if the capital expenditure is more than 25 lacs, theprior approval of the Central Government is required In this case the DTCis not going to incur the capital expenditure on any single work, service orscheme. Transfer of houses by sale cannot be covered under these words,it is not a single work to be carried out by defendant No. 3. Hence in the. strict sense and on interpretation of Section 19-B it can be said for implementationof the Scheme prior approval of the Central Government is notrequired Even otherwise, DTC having once exercised the discretion andpassed the resolution which was subsequently confirmed cannot now takeshelter under this provision in order to pull fast one on the plaintiffs in orderto reverse the earlier decision. The Ministry of Works and Housing havingalready accorded approval nothing remains to be the houng stock or not, approval of Central Government Is not necessary. It was for DTC to decide before passing the resolution ( 43 ). Supreme Court's decisions relied by Mr. Banerjee in the case ofjatinder Kumar, N. Ram Natha Pillai, Jit Ram Shiv Kumar and Excisecommissioner UP are distinguishable from the facts of this case. In thecase of Jatinder Kumar the point involved was whether a person selected bythe Public Service Commission bad a right to ask for mandamus for hisappointment. It was held that it is right of the Government to decide howmany appointments are to be made and. therefore the plea of promissory,estoppel failed. ( 44 ). In the case of N. Rama Natha Pillai the question was of thepower of the Government to create, continue and abolish any civil post. This was a Sovereign function and, therefore promissory estoppel could notapply. ( 45 ). So far as Jit Ram Shiv Kumar case is concerned, in that casenew Mandi was set up and promise was made to keep it immune from paymentof octrio duty for all times. Subseqnently, the orders were set aside. This was a Sovereign function and, therefore promissory estoppel could notapply. ( 45 ). So far as Jit Ram Shiv Kumar case is concerned, in that casenew Mandi was set up and promise was made to keep it immune from paymentof octrio duty for all times. Subseqnently, the orders were set aside. The action was upheld by the High Court as it was strictly in accordancewith the power confirmed under Section 70 (2) (c) of the Municipal Act Itwas in this background that the Supreme Court held that there could not beestoppel against State-Legislature and Statutory function In the case ofexcise Commissioner UP, the plea of estoppel was not entertained becausein that case when the liquor licence was given at that point of time sales taxwas not leviable. Later on it was levied. This was considered to be sovereignfunction hence the question of promissory estoppel failed. ( 46 ). Mr. Banerjee had relied on Sections 16 and 21 of the Generalclauses Act in order to justify the action of Defendant No. 3 to reverse theearlier decision. Section 16 of the General Clauses Act says that power toappoint includes power to suspendand dismiss This section is not applicableto the facts of this case. A valid order of suspension or dismissal ispossible only in accordance with the relevant provision of law. ( 47 ). Section 21 of General Clauses Act reads as under :- "power to issue, to include power to add to, add to demand, vary orrescind, notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws where, by any (Central Act) or Regulation, a power to (issue notifications)orders, rules, or by-laws is conferred, then that power includes apower, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the likesanction and conditions (if any), to add to, amend, vary orrescind any (notification), orders, rules or bylaws so (issued ). (a) Cf. the interpretation Act, 1989 (52 and 53 Vict C. 63)Section 32 (3), Ibid (1978 C. 30) S. 14. (b) Substituted for "act of the Governor-General in Council"by A. 0. 1937. (c) Substituted for "make" by the Amending Act. 1903 (1 of1903),section 3 and Schedule II. (d) Inserted, ibid. (e) Substituted for ''made", Ibid. "section 21 came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in the caseof Lachhmi Narain v. Union of India (1976) 2 SC 953 at 972. (b) Substituted for "act of the Governor-General in Council"by A. 0. 1937. (c) Substituted for "make" by the Amending Act. 1903 (1 of1903),section 3 and Schedule II. (d) Inserted, ibid. (e) Substituted for ''made", Ibid. "section 21 came up for interpretation before the Supreme Court in the caseof Lachhmi Narain v. Union of India (1976) 2 SC 953 at 972. The Supremecourt while interpreting Sedion21 held that Section 21 embodies only arule of construction and the nature and extent of its application must begoverned by the relevant statute. which confers the power to issue the notification. In S C. and W. S Welfareassociationv. State of Karnataka (1991)2 SCC 604 , the Supreme Court discussed the scope of Section 21 at lengthvis-a-vis the principle of audi alterom partem in a case arising under thekarnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 and held :- "the source of power to issuing the notification rescinding the earlierone could be traced under Section 21 of the General Clauses Actwhich is in pari materia with Section 10 of the Karnataka Generalclauses Act Under Section 21 a power to issue a notificationincludes a power to rescind it subject to the qualification that thepower should be "exercisable in the like manner and subject tothe like sanction and conditions (if any)". When a notificationis made rescinding the earlier notfications without bearing theaffected parties, it is dear violation of the principle of naturejustice. Such action in exercise of the implied power to rescindcannot then be said to have been exercised subject to the likeconditions within the scope of Section 21 of the General Clausesact" ( 48 ). It is not the case of defendant No. 3 that the reversal of theearlier decision to transfer the tenements was made in the ''like mannersubject to the like sanction A conditions". The earlier decision containedin resolutions dated 18-4-79 and 31-8-79 (P-7 and P-8) was made pursuantto Settlement (Ex. P-15) which formed the origin and genesis of the agreement to sell the tenements by resolution dated 18/04/1979. The persons effected or their representatives were heard, their demands were discussed and deliberated upon before the Settlement was reached on 28/10/1978 and pursuant thereto the resolution dated l 8/04/1979 (P-7) was passed. Nothing of that kind was done when the resolution dated 2/03/1981 (D-12) was passed