Judgement SRIVASTAVA, J.:- This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 14-3-1986 passed by the learned District Council Court, Aizawal. 2. Briefly, the undisputed facts in this appeal are that one Saia (Saikapthianga) had properties including the residential house with compound in dispute at Aizawal. Saia died on 20-3-1961 leaving his wife Khawkungi. Saia had no issue. On 12-1-1961 Saia had executed a will and bequeathed his various properties to different persons. The residential house with compound in dispute was bequeathed to Khawkungi. Saia had two brothers Biaka and Nagila. Some money was bequeathed to one son of Biaka and one son of Nagila. Biaka had predeceased Khaw-kungi. The appellant herein is the daughter of Saias sister Lali. The respondent herein Thanpari is the widow of Biaka who died in 1983. Khawkungi had made transfer by gift of the house with compound on 24-5-1985 to the appellant. Khawkungi had died on 23-6-1985. 3. The appellants case was that she had been adopted as daughter by Saia and had looked after Saia and Khawkungi in their old age. After the death of Saia the properties left by him had been distributed in accordance with the provision in the will and Khawkungi his widow had obtained heirship Certificate in respect of the house with compound in dispute and had been in her possession. On 24-5-1985 Khawkungi had transferred her properties in favour of the appellant and accordingly the appellants name was record-ed in place of Khawkungi in respect of the residential house and compound in dispute. Thanpari, respondent claimed heirship certificate and filed an application before the Additional Subordinate District Council Court, Aizawal on the ground that Saia had not given the properties in dispute absolutely to Khawkungi that after her death the pro-perty as to devolve on his aforesaid brothers Biaka and Nagila and as such the claim was -filed on behalf of the sons of Biaka by their mother Thanpari. The sons of Nagila did not make any claim. The claim was resisted by the appellant who pleaded that the properties in dispute had become the absolute property to Khawkungi under the will and she had trans-ferred the same to the appellant and as such the appellant was the owner and in possession of the property. The sons of Nagila did not make any claim. The claim was resisted by the appellant who pleaded that the properties in dispute had become the absolute property to Khawkungi under the will and she had trans-ferred the same to the appellant and as such the appellant was the owner and in possession of the property. The learned Magistrate, Additional Subordinate District Council Court, Aizawal by judgment dated 9-12-1985 held that Khanwkungi on the strength of heirship certificate No. 50 of 1961 exactly according to the will granted to her had rightly transferred the property to the present appellant and that the sons of Biaka could not have any claim which was accordingly not accepted. In appeal, the learned District Council Court, Aizawal by judgment and order dated 14-3-1986 impugned in this appeal held that in view of the provisions in paras 2, 5 and 9 of will, Khawkungi could not transfer the property in dispute to the ap-pellant and that after her death, the property was to be inherited by the sons of Biaka and Nagila. The appeal was accordingly allowed. 4. Aggrieved, Smti. Lalrutlungi has come in appeal and Shri R. C. Thanga, learned counsel appearing on her behalf has submit-ted that the view taken by the learned District Council Court in appeal was erroneous in that under the will Khawkungi had inherited the property and had become its absolute owner and her right was recognised by issue of heirship certificate on the basis of which her name had been recorded and as such she had made the necessary competence to make the transfer in favour of the appellant. The view taken by the learned District Council Court in appeal that Khawkungi had no right to transfer was erroneous. Shri D. K. Das, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has contended that under the provision of the will itself as has been held by the learned District Council Court below entire property bequeathed to Khawkungi on her death was to go to the sons of Biaka and Nagila and as such the impugned judgment and order do not require any interference. 5. We have considered the submissions for the parties, the will executed by Saia on 12-1-1961 and the judgments of the learned courts below. 6. 5. We have considered the submissions for the parties, the will executed by Saia on 12-1-1961 and the judgments of the learned courts below. 6. The only question which arises for consideration is that whether Khawkungi, widow of Saia had taken the property in dispute absolutely or that she had only limited life interest in the property, i.e. that Khaw-kungi could not make transfer in favour of the appellant and on her death the property reverted back to the sons of the brothers of Saia. 7. The question involves consideration of the will, the relevant part whereof in paras 2, 5 and 9 may be extracted. The property in dispute was bequeathed to Khawkungi in clause (2) which was as under: "(2) as long as she remains my faithful wife Khawkungi my wife will, in the event of my death, inherit the house with all movable and immovable properties within it as well as within the compound." Its clauses 5 and 9 are also relevant on which the learned District Council Court has rested its decision were as under: "(5) I leave the garden below cemetery held in my name, to Khawkungi my wife for their (with Dari and Lalnuntluangi) subsistence. (9) Since we are without issue, the sons of Nagila and Biaka also will partake of the entire share of Khawkungi when she dies of old age, and no one else will lay claim to it." 8. While provisions of clause 2 are impor-tant to show that Khawkungi was to be the beneficiary in regard to the property in dispute, it should not be considered in isolation but the other provisions in clauses (5) and (9) should also be taken into consi-deration and all of them considered together to gather the intention of the testator in order to determine the motive and extent of the right bequeathed to Khawkungi. We think it shall neither be proper not justified to consider only clause (2) and ignore clauses (5) and (9). The above provisions in the will considered together lead to the clear con-clusion that the intention of the testator, i.e. Saia was to give to Khawkungi only limited life interest for otherwise there was no need or clause (9) in the will. The above provisions in the will considered together lead to the clear con-clusion that the intention of the testator, i.e. Saia was to give to Khawkungi only limited life interest for otherwise there was no need or clause (9) in the will. Sri R. C. Thanga learned counsel for the appellant argued that clause (9) could come into operation only if Khawkungi had not made the transfer and since she had already made the transfer, she had on her death left nothing of the property as could go to the sons of Biaka and Ngila under Clause (9) of the will. Sri Thanga also contended that Saia had died on 20-3-1961 and heirship certificate No. 50 of 1961 had been obtained by Khawkungi in respect of the house and had been in her possession, which further established that Khawkungi had absolute right over the property in suit. 9. Sri R.C. Thanga, learned counsel for the appellant and Sri D. K. Das, learned counsel for the respondent both have referred to Mizo Custom in relation to the inheritance contained in Mizo Dan. The Mizo District Council had made Mizo Hanam Dan. This booklet published by the Mizo District Council on 10th April, 1957. In Chapter VII at page 28 contains Mizo Customary Law of Inheritance. Sri D. K. Das, learned counsel for the respondent has referred to para 109(2) ROKAWM (Inheri-tance) to contend that except as provided in para 110 of this chapter, no Mizo can appoint any person to be his heir. The nearest male relative of the deceased was his legal heir, with the order of preference in the following order A son, the youngest son in the case of the deceased having many sons. In the case of a man who has no issue, it is his brother who inherits and in the absence of a brother, a nearest male relative inherits. In the absence of near male relatives, a woman inherits to the exclusion of distant kinsman. If a man dies leaving behind him his wife and children and if they can maintain themselves nobody should disturb them. The submissions for the respondent was that Khawkhungi being a woman could not inherit and as such she could have only limited life interest in the property in suit. If a man dies leaving behind him his wife and children and if they can maintain themselves nobody should disturb them. The submissions for the respondent was that Khawkhungi being a woman could not inherit and as such she could have only limited life interest in the property in suit. Shri J. K. Das, learned counsel for the respondent has also referred to clause (10) of Mizo Dan where it is observed that ordinarily woman cannot inherit pro-perties; however, if a person has daughters but no son, his daughters may inherit proper-ties. The above provision does not however mean that woman cannot inherit. It only means that ordinarily woman does not inherit. 10. The question of the application of customary law of inheritance, in our opinion, should not arise, because Saia had executed a will and it was an admitted fact that it had been accepted and acted upon by all con-cerned persons. The learned counsel on both sides agreed that among Mizos, the right of a person to make will was well known and well-recognised. 11. We think that the submission of Sri R. C. Thanga, learned counsel for the appellant that since Khawkhungi had made the transfer there could be no question of clause (9) of the "will becoming operative hardly has any merit, because clause (9) in the will is to be considered together the intent of the testator in regard to the right given to Khawkhungi. As noted earlier clause (5) in regard to garden clearly indicated that it was given to Khaw-khungi for subsistence and clause (9) pro-vided that after her death the property in suit was to go to the sons of testators brothers Biaka and Ngila, that is that Khawkhungi had not been given absolute ownership rights but only limited life interest in the property in dispute. 12. The grant of heirship certificate to Khawkhungi after the death of Saia was in order according to the will. The heirship certificate was only a certificate that Khaw-khungi had succeeded to the property but the certificate could not create fresh right or enlarge the right Khawkhungi had under the will. The learned trial Court had laid con-siderable emphasis on the heirship certificate to take the view that Khawkhungi, had full ownership rights to the property. The heirship certificate was only a certificate that Khaw-khungi had succeeded to the property but the certificate could not create fresh right or enlarge the right Khawkhungi had under the will. The learned trial Court had laid con-siderable emphasis on the heirship certificate to take the view that Khawkhungi, had full ownership rights to the property. We think the view taken was not justified and that the view taken by the learned District Council Court in regard to the nature and extent of the right of Khawkhungi under the will, i.e. that she could not make the transfer by gift was sound in law. 13. For the aforesaid reasons, we think that the impugned judgment and order of the learned District Council Court requires no interference. This appeal fails and is dismissed. No costs. Appeal dismissed.