MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF AHMEDABAD v. CILICO DYEING and PRINTING WORKS AHMEDABAD
1991-02-15
K.G.SHAH
body1991
DigiLaw.ai
K. G. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for getting the delay that has occasioned in filing the appeal under Section 411 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act against the judgment and order dated 15/02/1991 rendered by the learned Chief Judge of the Court of Small Causes in Municipal Valuation Appeal No. 10024 of 1988 condoned. The present Civil Application accompanied by the Memo of Appeal has been presented to this court on 25/06/1991 According to the Registry of this Court there is delay of 68 days in filing the appeal. As stated by the appellant in the Civil Application as originally filed there is delay of 68 days in filing the appeal. However by amending the Civil Application inter alia the applicant has stated that there is delay of 65 days in filing the appeal. Whether there is delay of 68 days in filing the appeal or there is delay of 65 days would not make much of difference for there is a minimum delay of 65 days in filing the appeal. My calculations go to show that there is delay of 66 days in filing the appeal if we compute the time requisite for obtaining the certified copy only upto 4/06/1991 on which date the copy applied for by the applicant was made ready by the lower Court and the delay would be of 74 days if the time so requisite is computed upto 12/06/1991 on which date the appellant obtained the certified copy from the lower court. But even this would not make much of difference. In any case there is a minimum delay of 65 days as stated by the appellant in its Civil Application after its amendment. ( 2 ) AS stated above the impugned judgment is rendered on 15/02/1991 The appellant on My 9 1991 applied for the certified copy of the judgment and order.
In any case there is a minimum delay of 65 days as stated by the appellant in its Civil Application after its amendment. ( 2 ) AS stated above the impugned judgment is rendered on 15/02/1991 The appellant on My 9 1991 applied for the certified copy of the judgment and order. The lower court prepared the copies on 4/06/1991 and the copies were taken delivery of by the appellant on 12/06/1991 The appeal accompanied by this delay condonation application was lodged on 25/06/1991 ( 3 ) IN the Civil Application as originally filed the appellant stated that on receipt of the certified copy of the judgment the Advocate sent the same to the Municipal Corporation alongwith his opinion and thereafter the Legal Department of the Corporation put it before the Officer for approval and the same was forwarded to the Advocate in the High Court for filing appeal in the High Court. In para 4 of the application as originally filed the applicant further stated that due to procedural delay there is delay of 68 days and that delay may be condoned in the interest of justice. ( 4 ) THE applicant thereafter amended the application and added Paragraph 4a therein. In that Paragraph 4a the applicant stated that though the judgment sought to be impugned by the appellant was delivered on 15/02/1991 because of the over-burden the Advocate could not apply for the certified copy and the same was applied for only on 9/05/1991 and after the receipt of the certified copy on 12/06/1991 it was sent to the legal department on the same day i. e. on 12/06/1991 and thereafter it was forwarded to the Tax Department and the Special Branch Section and thereafter to the Supervisor and Tax Collector and then to the Deputy Commissioner and ultimately to the Municipal Commissioner and the same was again returned to the Junior Legal Assistant Officer on 24/06/1991 and the appeal alongwith the delay condonation application has been presented on June 25 1991 By the amendment in the application the applicant stated that the main delay is because the Advocate could not apply for copy in time and therefore the delay should be condoned in the interest of justice. ( 5 ) THE opponent has very heavily opposed this delay condonation application.
( 5 ) THE opponent has very heavily opposed this delay condonation application. It has filed an affidavit-in-reply wherein it is stated that the reasons assigned by the applicant for seeking condonation of delay are false after-thought and got up. It is also stated in the affidavit-in- reply that there is clear inaction on the part of the applicant and that would show that the applicant-Corporation had abandoned the idea to file the appeal. The deponent who has sworn the affidavit-in-reply has stated that the factual statements made by the applicant in para 4a of the application are absolutely false after thought and got up and that the deponent does not admit the same. Thereafter it is stated in the affidavit-in-reply that on 11/11/1992 when this Civil Application came up for hearing this court had orally directed the applicants Advocate to file an affidavit of the Advocate concerned as regards para 4 of the Civil Application. With this statements the deponent reserved his right to file further reply as and when the applicant produced the affidavit of the concerned advocate. The deponent of the affidavit-in-reply has said that he does not admit the averments made by the applicant in para 4 of the application that due to procedural delay there is delay of 68 days. ( 6 ) AFTER the affidavit-in-reply was filed by the opponent an affidavit-in-rejoinder has been filed by an officer of the applicant-corporation for the purpose of meeting with the statements made by the opponent in the affidavit-in-reply. In para 2 of that affidavit-in-rejoinder the deponent has tried to trace the procedure followed by the applicant-Corporation for filing an appeal in such cases. Therein the deponent has stated that the clerk of the Advocate of the applicant is required to see that the applications (for certified copy) are made on the judgments being delivered. It is also sought to be made out in this affidavit-in- rejoinder that the applicant Municipal Corporation has to file a large number of Municipal Valuation Appeals. The applicant-Municipal Corporation has instructed the clerk of its Advocate to apply for copies of every judgment immediately and accordingly applications are being made for getting the certified copies in all cases.
It is also sought to be made out in this affidavit-in- rejoinder that the applicant Municipal Corporation has to file a large number of Municipal Valuation Appeals. The applicant-Municipal Corporation has instructed the clerk of its Advocate to apply for copies of every judgment immediately and accordingly applications are being made for getting the certified copies in all cases. But so far as the present case is concerned the application for certified copy was not made within the time laid down by law for filing the appeal and that happened because of pressure of work and the lapse on the part of the Advocates clerk of not having applied for the certified copy of the judgment on account of pressure of work came to be noticed for the first time on 9/05/1992 and on the same day appropriate application for obtaining the certified copy had been made. It is stated in the affidavit-in-rejoinder that such a mistake may occur when applications are required to be made in large number of matters. It is also slated in the affidavit-in-rejoinder that in the present case the concerned Advocate had opined that it was a case where appeal need not be preferred. However it being a case on principle the officers of the appellant ultimately decided to file the appeal. ( 7 ) MR. V. C. Desai L. A. for the opponent firstly submitted that in the matter of getting the delay that has occasioned in filing the appeal condoned the appellant has shifted the ground from stage to stage and that would show that the factual averments made by the appellant are incorrect. He invited my attention to the delay condonation application as originally filed and submitted that therein the only ground that was put forward for getting the delay condoned is that the delay had occurred because of procedural requirements. He invited my attention to the affidavit-in-rejoinder wherein the Deponent himself has traced the procedure followed by the applicant-corporation for filing such appeals. He submitted that the procedural aspect of the matter as traced out in the affidavit in-rejoinder would commence only after the certified copy of the judgment sought to be impugned is received by the Corporation and not before that. According to Mr.
He submitted that the procedural aspect of the matter as traced out in the affidavit in-rejoinder would commence only after the certified copy of the judgment sought to be impugned is received by the Corporation and not before that. According to Mr. Desai in the present case the impugned judgment has been delivered on 15/02/1991 The period of limitation for filing the appeal is one month and for about 82 days from the date of the judgment the appellant had not even applied for the certified copy of the judgment and therefore till 9/05/1991 there was no question of any procedural requirement creeping in and giving rise to a ground for saying that the delay that has occasioned in this case is attributable to the procedure requirements. Mr. Desai further submitted that while considering an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay the concept of sufficient cause which prevented the appellant from preferring the appeal within the perriod of limitation should be traceable to the period within the period of limitation and not subsequent to the expiry of the period of limitation. For that proposition Mr. Desai relied upon the decision in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat A. I. R. 1981 S. C. p. 733. In that judgment this is what the Supreme Court has observed:"now it is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation". This judgment relied upon by Mr.
There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation". This judgment relied upon by Mr. Desai clearly postulates that the sufficient cause spoken of in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has a reference to the period preceding the expiration of the limitation prescribed for filing the appeal or the application as the case may be. As clearly posited by the Supreme Court no event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. In the present case according to Mr. Desai not only that no appeal was preferred by the appellant within the period of limitation prescribed for filing such an appeal but even the certified copy of the judgment which was sought to be assailed was not applied for within that period. ( 8 ) ON the other hand Mr. Jhaveri L. A. for the applicant very strenuously contended the the grounds as have been set out by the applicant in the delay condonation application as originally filed and also as it stood after its amendment constitute sufficient cause as shown by the appellant and that sufficient cause existed even before the expiry of the period of limitation. According to Mr. Jhaveri the Municipal Corporation has to file a large number of such appeals and the standing instruction by the Corporation to the Advocates clerk is to apply for the certified copy of each and every judgment and because of over-burden of work as the clerk missed to apply for the certified copy that fact itself would constitute sufficient cause which existed during the period of limitation within which the appeal could have been preferred within time. According to Mr. Jhaveri as in other matters the clerk of the Advocate applies for the certified copy of the judgment on the date the judgment is delivered in the present case the clerk should have done that. But on account of over-burden of work he missed to do it. Therefore sufficient cause was traceable to the first days i. e. 15/02/1991 the date on which the impugned judgment was delivered and continued right ill 9/05/1991 on which date the application for certified copy was submitted.
But on account of over-burden of work he missed to do it. Therefore sufficient cause was traceable to the first days i. e. 15/02/1991 the date on which the impugned judgment was delivered and continued right ill 9/05/1991 on which date the application for certified copy was submitted. ( 9 ) MEETING this contention of Mr. Jhaveri Mr. Desai however submitted that even on facts the averments on this line cannot be said to have been proved for the clerk has not filed his affidavit in this case. Mr. Desai submitted that initially the appellant wanted to contend that because of procedural requirements there has occasioned a delay which should be condoned. However realising that that ground will not stand the appellant in good stead the appellant amended the petition and came out with a case that because of over-burden the Advocate could not apply for the certified copy within time. Mr. Deasi pointed out that when this application was taken up for hearing on 11/11/1992 this Court had directed the learned Advocate appearing for the applicant appellant to substantial the aforesaid averment by producing the affidavit of the Advocate. But no affidavit of the Advocate has been produced and in order to get out of this difficulty the appellant has in the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by some officer of the appellant shifted the ground and has tried to put the blame on the shoulder of the clerk of the Advocate in whose regard it is staled that that clerk on account of pressure of work missed to make the application for certified copy within time and that fact would furnish the appellant sufficient cause for getting the delay condoned. I think Mr. Desai is perfectly right in his submission that the appellant is shifting grounds. Initially the appellant rest content by saying that the procedural requirements caused delay. Then the delay was attributed to the Advocate who as stated in the amendment in the application due to over-burden of work failed to apply for the certified copy of the judgment. When the affidavit of the Advocate was insisted by the court and finding that the Advocate would no oblige the applicant by filing an affidavit the. applicant tried to place the blame on the shoulder of the clerk of the Advocate and there again as rightly submitted by Mr.
When the affidavit of the Advocate was insisted by the court and finding that the Advocate would no oblige the applicant by filing an affidavit the. applicant tried to place the blame on the shoulder of the clerk of the Advocate and there again as rightly submitted by Mr. Deasi the affidavit of the clerk of the Advocate is not produced. In this view if the matter- the affidavit-in-rejoinder of some officer of the corporation who could have no personal knowledge about the facts constituting the reasons why the application for certified copy was not made within the prescribed period can be no substitute for the proper affidavit either of the Advocate or of his clerk. The deponent of the affidavit-in-rejoinder does not have any personal knowledge about the facts constituting the reason as to why the application for certified copy was not made within time. Mr. Desai buttressed his argument by relying upon the judgment in the case of Muktinath Das v. Smt. Brinda Das. A. I. R 1990 Gauhati p10. That Gauhati case was a case for condonation of delay. The District Judge had rejected the request for condonation of delay and the matter was taken to the High Court. There was delay of 12 days in filing the appeal. In that matter the appeal before the District Court was admitted subject to the question of limitation being kept open. The final arguments in the appeal were heard and thereafter the matter was adjourned to 31/05/1978 for pronouncing the judgment.
There was delay of 12 days in filing the appeal. In that matter the appeal before the District Court was admitted subject to the question of limitation being kept open. The final arguments in the appeal were heard and thereafter the matter was adjourned to 31/05/1978 for pronouncing the judgment. However after the conclusion of the arguments but before the judgment was pronounced the appellant on 29/05/1978 moved an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay and it was sought to be canvassed that there was a mistake on the part of the Lawyer which should be held to be furnishing sufficient cause to the appellant for not having filed the appeal within the period of limitation That argument did not find favour with the learned District Judge and the holding of the learned District Judge came ultimately to be confirmed by the High Court The High Court said that the alleged mistake of the Lawyer cannot be taken to be sufficient ground for condonation of the delay It was stated in the application for condonation of delay that the appellants Advocate through oversight did not look into the papers carefully and was not aware if any question of limitation arose Para 2 of the affidavit sworn and filed by the appellant stated "that the facts stated in paras 1 2 3 4 5 6 and 8 are true to my knowledge and belief and the facts stated in para 7 are true to my information and belief" the affidavit in support of the delay condonation application filed by the appellant did not state the source of his information The learned single Judge of the Gauhati High Court therefore stated that in such a case the affidavit should be modelled on the lines of Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure and where averment is not based on personal knowledge the source of information should be clearly deposed The deponent has to disclose his source of information so that the other side gets a fair chance to verify it and make an effective answer Slipshod verification of affidavit may lead to its rejection The learned single Judge of the Gauhati High Court in support of the view that he took relied upon the decision in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Prakash Rao (1982) 2 SCC 385 .
( 10 ) IN the case relied upon by the Gauhati High Court i. e. in the case of Government of Andhra Pradesh (supra) the application for condonation of delay on behalf of the appellants was made and therein it was stated that the reason for delay was misunderstanding on the part of the Offices of the Government who had been required by the Counsel for the State to get a copy of judgment of the High Court It was said that Officer thought that he was to wait till the High Court disposed of the question of grant of certificate about the fitness of the case of appeal and that he therefore went on waiting till the matter was finally disposed of by the High Court Even though the Special Leave Petition was time barred by 69 days no attempt was made by the appellant to put in an affidavit of the Officer concerned In the context of those facts Their Lordships of the Supreme Court said that there was thus no material before the Court in support of the truth of the allegation which formed the reason for delay In that view of the matter the delay was not condoned in that case ( 11 ) RELYING upon these two judgments - one of the Gauhati High Court and the other of the Supreme Court. Mr. Desai very strenuously contended that in the present case no affidavit of the Advocate is filed nor is the affidavit of the clerk of the Advocate filed; and the affidavit-in-rejoinder filed by the Officer of the Corporation does not disclose the source of this information when he purports to say that it was because of over-burden and pressure of work that the clerk of the Advocate missed to apply for the certified copy within the period of limitation That being the position submitted Mr. Desai the appellant has miserably failed to make out a case of sufficient cause for getting the delay condoned I think Mr. Desai is perfectly right ( 12 ) MR. Jhaveri on the other hand relied upon the decision of the learned single Judge of this High Court in Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. Manish Enterprises Ltd. 1992 G. L. R. 1252. That case stands entirely on a different footing.
Desai is perfectly right ( 12 ) MR. Jhaveri on the other hand relied upon the decision of the learned single Judge of this High Court in Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad v. Manish Enterprises Ltd. 1992 G. L. R. 1252. That case stands entirely on a different footing. In that case the judgment which was ought to be assailed was delivered on 17/01/1991 and immediately on the next day i. e. on 18/01/1991 the certified copy was applied. That case therefore could have no assistance to render to Mr. Jhaveris submission that in the instant case in the matter of non-application for the certified copy upto 9/05/1991 there was sufficient cause inasmuch as the clerk of the Advocate or for that matter the Advocate was over- burdened with work. If the case of over-burden was established by proper affidavits or other evidence the matter perhaps would have stood on a different footing and the court would have been required to consider whether the fact that the Advocate or his clerk on account of being over-burdened missed to apply for the certified copy of the judgment would constitute sufficient cause for getting the delay condoned. But in the recent case as neither the affidavit of the Advocate nor the affidavit of the clerk of the Advocate has been produced it has got to be said that the case as advanced by the appellant by amending the petition and further by the affidavit-in-rejoinder about the over burden on the part of the Advocate or his clerk being the reason for not having applied for the certified copy within time factually cannot be said to have been proved. Going by the Supreme Court judgment relied upon by Mr. Desai the affidavit of the person concerned on whose account the delay has occasioned is almost a must if the application for condonation of delay is opposed by the other side and in the present case as pointed out by the opponent in the affidavit-in-reply this court had directed the Opponent to file the affidavit of the Advocate to substantiate the averments made in para 4a of the application. But the appellant has so far not produced any such affidavit of the Advocate and as rightly pointed out by Mr.
But the appellant has so far not produced any such affidavit of the Advocate and as rightly pointed out by Mr. Desai in order to get out of this difficulty in the affidavit-in-rejoinder the ground was shifted and it was sought to be contended that it was the Advocates clerk who on account of pressure of work missed to apply for the certified copy of the judgment with promptitude. But then even there the appellant has failed to produce the affidavit of the clerk of the Advocate. That being the position the substratum of the appellants case about the certified copy not having been applied on account of pressure of work or over-burden is lost. The appellant-applicant has thus in my opinion failed to make out a case of sufficient cause for getting the delay condoned. The application or getting the delay condoned is therefore rejected. Rule is discharged. (ISS) Application rejected. .