SHIVASHANKAR BHAL, J. ( 1 ) HEARD. Issue rule. ( 2 ) ALLEGED denial of benefits due to a municipal employee's widow is the subject-matter of this writ petition. ( 3 ) PETITIONER's husband joined the municipal service as a bill collector in the year 1958, in the state of karnalaka. He was thereafter promoted, as a second division clerk, in the year 1963 and as a sanitary inspector in the year 1978. During the lime he was working as sanitary inspector he died on 29-5-1987. These are the undisputed facts. During his service, the petitioner's husband had served in the municipalities situated in various districts generally referred as hyderabad area, in karnataka state, ( 4 ) THE Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 ('the act' for short) was enacted to have a uniform law relating to the management of municipal affairs in the state and on its enforcement, its Provisions continued to apply to all the municipalities and its servants in the state, Section 320 of the act empowers the government to transfer any officer or servant of a municipal council or of any other local authority or of any government department. In the year 1972, Karnataka municipalities (conditions of service of officers and servants) rules, 1972 ('earlier rules' for short) were made to regulate the employees' conditions of service; these were replaced by the Karnataka municipalities (conditions of service) rules, 1987 ('the new rules' for short) and I am told that the new rules came into force on 4-2-1987. ( 5 ) RULE 6 of the new rules, while replacing the earlier rules provided that :"any order issued, any thing done or any action taken under any provision of the said rules shall be deemed to have been issued, done or taken under the corresponding Provisions of these rules. " Rule 122-a of the earlier rules, provided for payment of family pension, where a municipal employee having put in a continuous service for a period of not less than one year dies while in service or after retirement; the scale of the pension is slated in Rule 122-a, itself. Earlier rules were elaborate and covered a vast area of service field; this was reduced while making the new rules, by applying the various rules governing the state government employees. Rule 4 of the new rules, now reads as follows:"4. Earlier rules were elaborate and covered a vast area of service field; this was reduced while making the new rules, by applying the various rules governing the state government employees. Rule 4 of the new rules, now reads as follows:"4. Application of certain rules - the Provisions of : (1) the Karnataka civil services rules; (1-a) the Karnataka government servants (family pension) rules, 1964: provided that the financial benefit under the above rules shall be admissible from the date of publication of the Karnataka municipalities (conditions of service) (Amendment) rules, 1990; (2) the Karnataka civil services (conduct) rules, 1966; (3) the Karnataka civil services (seniority) rules, 1957; (4) the Karnataka civil services (classification, control and appeal) rules, 1957; and (5) the Karnataka civil services (confidential reports) rules, 1985 as amended from time to time shall mutatis mutandis be applicable to municipal employee excluding persons appointed on contract basis or on daily wages, subject to the modifications specified in schedules i and ii. Provided that any financial benefit sanctioned by government of Karnataka, from time to time, to the state civil servants under k,c. s. rs. Or in any other rules shall not create an automatic entitlement for the employees unless the government in housing and urban development department issued general or special orders sanctioning such financial benefits to the employees : further provided that no financial assistance would be given to municipalities and that the concerned municipalities should meet such expenditure out of their own resources. "sub-rule (1-a) referred above was inserted in September 1990, by virtue of the kar- nataka municipalities (conditions of service) amendment rules, 1990. Rule 2 of this amendment rules, 1990 reads thus :"2. Amendment of Rule 4: in Rule 4 of the karnalaka municipalities (conditions of service) rules, 1987 after item (1) the following shall be deemed to have been inserted with effect from the fourth day of february, 1987, namely, l (a) the Karnataka government servant (family pension) rules, 1964: provided that the financial benefit under the above rules shall be admissible from the date of publication of the Karnataka municipalities (conditions of service) (Amendment) rules, 1990. " ( 6 ) A combined reading of the above Provisions clearly shows that till the repeal of the earlier rules, the benefit of the family pension was available to the widow of the deceased municipal employee; and similarly, said benefit is also available to a widow, whose husband dies after the insertion of sub-rule (1 -a) in Rule 4 of the new rules. In other words, there cannot be any dispute that if a municipal employee died prior to 4-2-1987, his widow was entitled to the family pension, and the widow of a municipal employee, who died after 11-10-1990 is also entitled to the family pension. In the latter case, the family pension is payable under the Provisions of the Karnataka government servants (family pension) rules, 1964, while, the former case is governed by Rule 122-a of the earlier rules. For the sake of convenience the period between 4-2-1987 to 11-10-1990 is referred hereafter as the period of eclipse. ( 7 ) THE petitioner's husband died on 29-5-1987 which fell squarely within the above period of eclipse, caused by the proviso to Rule 2 of the (Amendment) rules, 1990 (referred above ). ( 8 ) THE petitioner questions this denial of the benefit of family pension, as discriminatory and unwarranted. In the statement of objections, the respondents state:"the contention of the petitioner that she has not been paid the d. c. r. g. and family pension may not be correct inasmuch as, the gratuity was sanctioned to the petitioner even though the matter of sanction of family pension was pending with the government. As already pointed out, the k. c. s. rs. Have been made applicable to the municipal employees in terms of 1987 rules, with effect from 4-2-1987 and the same has been made applicable to the municipal employees as per Rule 4 of the notification with effect from 4-2-1987. The effect of application of this Rule is that the family of the municipal employees who died while in service on or after 4-2-1987 or retired and died on or after 4-2-1987 were not authorised family pension as Karnataka government servants (family pension) rules, 1964, were not included in the km (cos) rules, 1987. The effect of application of this Rule is that the family of the municipal employees who died while in service on or after 4-2-1987 or retired and died on or after 4-2-1987 were not authorised family pension as Karnataka government servants (family pension) rules, 1964, were not included in the km (cos) rules, 1987. When this fact was brought to the notice of the government to lake action and to incorporate the family pension rules to enable the families of municipal employees to get the family pension with effect from 4-2-1987, the government has issued a notification incorporating the family pension rules with effect from 4-2-1987 duly allowing the monetary benefits from 11-10-1990 instead of 4-2-1987. Accordingly, the petitioner who is the wife of the deceased employee has been authorised the family pension with effect from 11-10-1990. " ( 9 ) THEREFORE, the real question i$ whether the dental of the monetary benefit for the period (referred by me as the period of eclipse), in view of the proviso to Rule 2 of (Amendment) rules, 1990 referred above is sustainable, and whether the said proviso is constitutionally valid or whether it is discriminatory or arbitrary and thus offend article 14 of the Constitution of india. ( 10 ) EARLIER, the validity of a provision under article 14 was being tested by the application of the test of reasonable classification; when discrimination was alleged, the approach was to find out whether those who were meted out with a particular treatment formed a distinct class, identifiable from others as belonging to a different set, and whether differentiation which distinguishes them from others had a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the law in question. If care is taken to reasonably classify persons for legislative purposes and the law deals equally with all persons belonging to a "well-defined class", those who belong to the said class is not entitled to challenge the validity of the differential treatment. However, the twin conditions to be satisfied by the state, are: (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of that group; and (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law in question. However, the twin conditions to be satisfied by the state, are: (i) the classification must be founded on an intelligible differential which distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of that group; and (ii) the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the law in question. ( 11 ) THE same tests are now applied by the application of the test of reasonableness, and fairness. In Smt. Maneka gandhi v union of India and another, AIR 1978 SC 597 at page 624, p. n. bhagwati, 3. , (as he then was) observed :"now, the question immediately arises as to what is the requirement of article 14: what is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its all-embracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in e. p. royappa v state of tamil nadu, (1974)2 scr 348 : AIR 1974 SC 555 namely, that "from a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the Rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of article 14". Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State Action and ensures fairness and equally of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with article 14. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades article 14 like a brooding omnipresence and the procedure contemplated by article 21 must answer the test of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with article 14. It must be "right and just and fair" and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of article 21 would not be satisfied. "whether the impugned action really is "right, just and fair" is the basic test to be applied, under article 14. In ajay hasia etc. V khalib mujib sehravardi and others etc. , AIR 1981 SC 487 , the Supreme Court reiterated this principle. At page 499, the Supreme Court held:"it must, therefore, now be taken to be well settled that what article 14 strikes at is arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. The doctrine of classification which is evolved by the courts is not merely a judicial formula for determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and therefore constituting denial of equality. If the classification is not reasonable and does not satisfy the two conditions referred to above, the impugned legislative or executive action would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under article 14 would be breached. Wherever, therefore, there is arbitrariness in State Action whether it be of the legislature or of the executive or of an "authority" under article 12, article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State Action. In fact, the concept of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness pervades the entire constitutional scheme and is a golden thread which runs through the whole of the fabric of the constitution. "the impugned State Action may be purely executive or it may be legislative; the omni presence of article 14 will always be there to examine the reasonableness. ( 12 ) THE impugned proviso in the amended rules 1990, denies the financial benefit during a limited period of eclipse, only to a set of people, whose wage earner died while in employment during the said period. If an employee had died, earlier to 4-2-1987, the member of his family continues to receive the family pension even during this period of eclipse. If an employee had died, earlier to 4-2-1987, the member of his family continues to receive the family pension even during this period of eclipse. The dominant intention of the state to pay family pension in the case of every municipal family is clearly brought out by the (Amendment) rules, 1990. However, in the working of the benefit it is denied during the period of eclipse. Can this be termed reasonable and fair? ( 13 ) PAYMENT of pension is not a more gratuitous act on the part of the state; it is not a bounty. It is essentially compensatory in character in recognition of the services rendered by an employee to the state (or its instrumentalities ). The payment of pension is also based on the larger socio-economic policy, in the sense that during the oldage of a person, he should not be exposed to financial difficulties and render him a dependent of others. These principles equally govern the payment of family pension. It is a measure against a possible destitution of the dependents of an employee who dies suddenly while in service. Even in cases, where a retired person (who has been enjoying pension) dies, his dependent is paid the family pension. ( 14 ) THE purpose of payment of pension, stated by the Supreme Court in d. s. nakara and others v union of india, AIR 1983 SC 130 equally governs, to a large extent, the case of the family pension, also. At page 137, it is stated:"the reasons underlying the grant of pension vary from country to country and from scheme to scheme. But broadly stated they are : (i) as compensation to former members of the armed forces or their dependents for old age, disability, or death (usually from service causes), (ii) as old age retirement or disability benefits for civilian employees, and (iii) as social security payments for the aged, disabled, or deceased citizens made in accordance with the rules governing social service programmes of the country. Pensions under the first head are of great antiquity. Under the second head they have been in force in one form or another in some countries for over a century but those coming under the third head are relatively of recent origin, though they are of the greatest magnitude. Pensions under the first head are of great antiquity. Under the second head they have been in force in one form or another in some countries for over a century but those coming under the third head are relatively of recent origin, though they are of the greatest magnitude. There are other views about pensions such as charity, paternalism, deferred pay, rewards for service rendered, or as a means of promoting general welfare (see encyclopaedia, britannica, vol. 17, p. 575 ). But these views have become otiose. "a decision of u. s. Supreme Court is referred wherein it was held that a pension is closely akin to wages and includes the purpose of helping the recipient to meet the expenses of living. Thereafter, at page 138, it is held thus :"summing-UP it can be said with confidence that pension is not only compensation for loyal service rendered in the past, but pension also has a broader significance, in that it is a measure of socio-economic Justice which inheres economic security in the fall of life when physical and mental prowess is ebbing corresponding to aging process and therefore, one is required to fall back on savings. " further, "the discernible purpose thus underlying pension scheme or a statute ihtroducing the pension scheme must inform interpretative process and accordingly it should receive a liberal construction and the courts may not so interpret such statute as to render them inane (see american jurisprudence 2d. 881 ). "proceeding to next paragraph,"from the discussion three things emerge: (i) that pension is neither a bounty nor a matter of grace depending upon the sweet will of the employer and that it creates a vested right subject to 1972 rules which are statutory in character because they are enaclcd in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to article 309 and clause (5) of article 148 of the constitution, (ii) that the pension is not an ex gratia payment but it is a payment for the past service rendered; and (iii) it is a social welfare measure rendering socio-economic Justice to those who in the hey day of their life ceaselessly toiled for the employer on an assurance that in their old age they would not be left in lurch. It must also be noticed that the quantum of pension is a certain percentage correlated to the average emoluments drawn during last three years of service reduced to ten months under liberalised pension scheme. " ( 15 ) THE denial of the financial benefits of the family pension to the dependent of an employee for a few years, who died during the period of eclipse, obviously, seem to be the lack of financial resources of the state; as otherwise, there is absolutely no reason to deny this benefit during the said period. The omission to include reference to "karnataka government servants (family pension) rules, 1964" in Rule 4 of the new rules when the new rules were made, certainly was unintentional, as otherwise, it would not have been retrospectively inserted in the said Rule subsequently. Having committed a mistake in not covering a necessary and important subject of family pension, normally, the action taken should have been to erase the effect of the mistake altogether. Instead of doing so, the state has tried to take advantage of its earlier mistake to save itself of some amounts at the cost of these unfortunate dependents of municipal employees. The object with which a law or a Rule is enacted, by itself is not a factor to uphold its validity. The object of every fundamental right is to protect the right of the individual (or group of individuals, as the case may be), against the State Action. The nature of the infringement of a particular fundamental right has a decisive say while judging the validity of the infringement. ( 16 ) IN r. c cooperv union of india, AIR 1970 SC 564 , shah, j. , speaking for the full court, held at page 593, thus :"under the constitution, protection against impairment of the guarantee of fundamental rights is determined by the nature of the right, the interest of the aggrieved party and the degree of harm resulting from the State Action, impairment of the right of the individual and not the object of the state in taking the impugned action, is the measure of protection. To concentrate merely on power of the state and the object of the slate action in exercising that power is therefore to ignore the true intent of the constitution. To concentrate merely on power of the state and the object of the slate action in exercising that power is therefore to ignore the true intent of the constitution. In this court, there is, however, a body of authority that the nature and extent of the protection of the fundamental rights is measured not by the operation of the State Action upon the rights of the individual, but by its object. There by the constitutional scheme which makes the guaranteed rights subject to the permissible restrictions within their allotted fields fundamental got blurred and gave impetus to a theory that certain articles of the Constitution enact a code dealing exclusively with matters dealt with therein, and the protection which an aggrieved person may claim is circumscribed by the object of the State Action. Protection of the right to property or personal freedom is most needed when there is an actual threat. To argue that slate action which deprives a person permanently or temporarily of his right to property or personal freedom, operates to extinguish the right or the remedy is to reduce the guarantee to an empty platitude. Again to hold that the extent of, and the circumstances in which, the guarantee of protection is available depends upon the object of the State Action, is to seriously erode its effectiveness. Examining the problem hot merely in semantics but in the broader and more appropriate context of the constitutional scheme which aims at affording the individual the fullest protection of his basic rights and on that foundation to erect a structure of a truly democratic policy, the conclusion, in our judgment, is inevitable that the validity of the State Action must be adjudged in the light of its operation upon the rights of the individual and groups of individuals in all their dimensions. "therefore, if the dependents of a municipal employee died during the period of eclipse, are in no way different from the dependents of other similar employees (though died earlier or later to 11-10-1990) in the matter of eligibility to receive the family pension, the denial of such a benefit to the former cannot be upheld as reasonable. The special treatment meted out to these dependents has no rational purpose behind it, except, probably the state is trying to take advantage of its own mistake in not providing for payment of pension to the said persons. The special treatment meted out to these dependents has no rational purpose behind it, except, probably the state is trying to take advantage of its own mistake in not providing for payment of pension to the said persons. ( 17 ) THE impact of the proviso to Rule 2 of the (Amendment) rules, 1990, results in hostile discrimination unwarranted by any standard. Consequently i declare the said proviso as violative of article 14 of the Constitution resulting in its nullification altogether. ( 18 ) THE further question raised by the petitioner, pertains to the non-consideration of services rendered by the deceased employee during 26-10-1987 to 29-5-1987 for the purpose of death-cum-retirement gratuity ('d. c. r. g. ' for short), etc. ( 19 ) THE contention of the state on this question is based on the fact that the salary of the deceased employee was being paid by the government out of its consolidated fund and not by the municipality wherein the employee was working. This is a peculiar position that was prevailing in the hyderabad area of the Karnataka state, the old practice of making the payment out of the consolidated fund of the state seems to have been continued in the said area even after the enactment of the act which governs all the municipalities in the state. No doubt the salary will have to go out of the municipal funds, but if in a given set of circumstances the salary was being paid from the consolidated fund of the state to a municipal employee, it is a matter of adjustment between the state and the municipality. In the instant case, admittedly, the municipal council drew the amount from the consolidated fund of the state and the payment made to the employee, was by the municipal council. The employee concerned was not responsible for this practice being adopted in a part of the state. There is no dispute that every municipal employee in the state is entitled to have his entire services considered for the purpose of d. c. r. g. there is also no dispute that during the period 26-10-1978 to 29-5-1987 the husband of the petitioner was serving under the various municipalities and that he was not on deputation or was working as an employee of any one else. The accident of the source of salary, being the consolidated fund of the state in that part of the state (hyderabad area) has been held out as a ground to deny this benefit to the petitioner's husband and the similar denial seems to have been made in respect of similar employees who were working in hyderabad area of the state. Here again the basis of excluding these municipal employees for an unfavourable treatment in the matter of computing the d. c. r. g. looks to me arbitrary. The basis of the classification depending upon the source of the payment of the salary has no relevancy and the real basis ought to be the mode of service rendered by the employee concerned. When there is no differentiation in the matter of rendering the service by these municipal employees when compared to the services rendered by the employees of the municipalities in other areas of the state, it is understandable as to how the employees of the municipalities serving in hyderabad area should be denied the benefit of the services rendered by them for a certain purpose (d. c. r. g. , etc. ). Such a denial of the benefit also is contrary to the Provisions of article 14 of the constitution. ( 20 ) FOR the reasons stated above this writ petition is entitled to succeed in its entirety. the writ petition is accordingly allowed and i make the following order : (1) proviso to Rule 2 of the Karnataka municipalities (conditions of service) amendment rules, 1990, is declared as ultra vires article 14 of the Constitution and hence it is a nullity. (2) the petitioner shall be paid the family pension consequent upon her husband's death, immediately from the date of the death of the husband and all financial benefits shall be paid to her in that regard with effect from 29th may, 1987. (3) the service rendered by the petitioner's husband from 26-10-1978 to 29-5-1987 shall be included for the purpose of computing d. c. r. g. and the balance amount payable shall be paid to the petitioner. (4) the amounts due to the petitioner as above shall bear the interest at the rate of 10% per annum from 27-11-1990 (dale of the writ petition) till the entire amount is paid to the petitioner. (5) first respondent shall pay a sum of Rs. (4) the amounts due to the petitioner as above shall bear the interest at the rate of 10% per annum from 27-11-1990 (dale of the writ petition) till the entire amount is paid to the petitioner. (5) first respondent shall pay a sum of Rs. 1,500/- to the petitioner towards costs of this proceedings. (6) Rule made absolute. --- *** --- .