ORDER D.M. Dharmadhikari, J. -- 1. This common order is being passed to dispose of a batch of petitions on an identical question in the following petitions :- 1. M.P. No. 745 of 91 Lakhanlal v. M.P.S.R.T.C. & another 2. M.P. No. 26/91 Phoo1chand v. -do- 3. M.P. No. 29/91 Soniram v. -do- 4. M.P. No. 34/91 S.L. Shrivastava v. -do- 5. M.P. No. 35/91 Vasudeo v. -do- 6. M.P. No. 92/91 Lokman v. -do- 7. M.P. No. 30/91 Ratiram v. -do- 8. M.P. No. 755/91 V.P. Shukla v. -do- 9. M.P. No. 757/91 S.A. Gaikwad v. -do- 10. M.P. No. 758/91 Basodilal v. -do- 11. M.P. No. 32/91 Bhagwandas v. -do- 12. M.P. No. 361/91 Durga Pd. v. -do- 13. M.P. No. 496/91 K.K. Jawalkar v. -do- 14. M.P. No. 497/91 Narayan Vithoba v. -do- 15. M.P. No.2946/91 Bhagwandas Tiwari v. -do- 16. M.P. No.3282/91 Kandhilal Rathore v. -do- 2. All the petitioners were ex-employees of Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as 'the C.P.T.S.'). They were all recruited to the services of the above company' prior to 31.8.1955 on which date the company was taken. over by the erstwhile State of Madhya Pradesh. The petitioners have all been prematurely retired at the age of 58 years when they were entitled to continue in service upto the age of sixty years. The point regarding their age of retirement as ex-C.P.T.S. employees being 60 years has been decided in their favour by the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Dubey v. M.P.S.R.T.C. and another 1991 JLJ 97 = AIR 1991 SC 276 . 3. Only a very short history of S.P. Dubey's case (supra) is relevant for the purpose of these petitions. Prior to August, 1955, transport services in the State of Madhya Pradesh were being run by the C.P.T.S. Company. The age of superannuation of the employees of the company except the drivers was sixty years. The company was purchased and taken over by the State of Madhya Pradesh on 31.8.1955. Thereafter the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation was established by the State of Madhya Pradesh w.e.f. 1.6.1962 and the services of the employees including the petitioners were transferred to the said corporation. Some of the employees of the Corporation were those who had originally joined services with the C.P.T.S. Company. Thereafter the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation was established by the State of Madhya Pradesh w.e.f. 1.6.1962 and the services of the employees including the petitioners were transferred to the said corporation. Some of the employees of the Corporation were those who had originally joined services with the C.P.T.S. Company. In the case of S.P. Dubey (supra) the Supreme Court found that the services of the persons who were employed by the company were taken by the Government with the specific assurance to them that their service conditions would not be adversely affected. The Supreme Court, therefore, held that as the State Government took over a private company and gave specific assurance, it is but fair that the State Government should honour the same. The State Service Rules which fixed the age of superannuation at 58 years could not be made applicable to the petitioners and other employees of the taken over company. The Supreme Court, therefore, set aside the retirement at the age of 58 years of S.P. Dubey and directed payment of two years salary to him because by the time the decision was rendered by the Supreme Court, the petitioner had already crossed the age of sixty years. 4. In the petitions before us, it is not disputed that all the petitioners retired at the age of fifty eight years, long back on various dates between the years 1979 to 1985 and they have approached this Court against their pre-mature retirements only in the year 1991 after the verdict of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Dubey's case (supra) was pronounced. 5. The question before this Court is whether the petitioners are entitled to be granted benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court and to what extent. 6. Learned counsel Shri S.K. Mishra appearing for the petitioners and Shri Ravindra Shrivastava who appeared in M.P. No. 1901/91 (which has been adjourned) on behalf of the Union of such class of employees, in the course of their arguments submitted that the decision in the case of Shri S.P. Dubey case (supra) being the verdict of the Supreme Court, holding that the employees had right to continue in service up to the age of sixty years is final and renders their pre-mature retirements at the age of fifty eight years as bad in law. It is argued that delay in approaching this Court could not defeat their rights because when they were prematurely retired, the decision of the M.P. High Court in the case of Vasant Bansod [MP No. 893/76, decided on 13.9.1979 = 1980 MPLJ SN 51], was holding the field. In the aforesaid decision of the High Court, the retirement of Ex-C.P.T.S. employees at the age of 58 years was up-held. The present petitioners on the face of the decision of the High Court in the case of Vasant Bansod, legitimately thought it futile to approach this Court immediately after they were retired. The cause of action to challenge their pre-mature retirement, therefore, arose according to them, only when the Supreme Court in S.P. Dubey's case (supra) overruled the decision of this Court holding the right of ex-C.P.T.S. employees to continue in service upto the age of sixty years. For the proposition that cause of action may arise on the basis of a subsequent verdit of a Court, reliance is placed on the following decisions :- (1) Caltex (India) Ltd. Indore v. Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax, Indore Region and another. AIR 1971 MP 162 . (2) Century Spinning Manufacturing Company Ltd. & another v. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another AIR 1971 SC 1021 . (3) Salonah Tea Company Ltd. y. Supdt. of Taxes Nowgong& others AIR 1990 SC 772 and two recent orders passed by a Division Bench of this Court in M.P. No. 269 of 1989 decided on 20.3.1991 and M.P. No. 149 of 1989 decided on 25.3.1991. 7. The petitioners, thus, claim relief of quashing their pre- mature retirement orders and since admittedly now they have crossed the age of sixty years, relief of salary for the period of two years with all post-retirement benefits by treating them as having retired at the age of 60 years. 8. The petitioners further submit that they have all filed affidavits stating that they were not gainfully employed during the relevant two years period after their retirement and the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation (referred shortly as 'the Corporation'), having not filed any counter affidavit to controvert the fact, they are entitled to the relief of payment of two years salary and of pre and post retirement benefits. In this respect it was argued that they were willing to work, but were forced to retire against their wish and right, hence the salary for two years should not be denied to them. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the Corporation Shri V.S. Dabir assisted by Shri A.G. Dhande opposed the petition on several grounds, including delay, laches and alternative remedies. On behalf of the Corporation, it is submitted that the benefit of S.P. Dubey's case (supra) cannot be granted to the petitioners who did not keep their rights alive. They neither approached this Court nor Labour Courts in due time before they attained the age of sixty years. It was argued that only because S.P. Dubey in his individual case successfully appealed to the Supreme Court, it should not benefit the petitioners who not only slept over their rights, but should be deemed to have given up the same by collecting their terminal benefits on attaining the age of fifty eight years. Learned counsel for the Corporation further argued that payment of two years salary to the petitioners for the idle period in which they discharged no duties in the Corporation and during which they might have been gainfuIly employed elsewhere would amount to conferring double benefit on them and thus reward them for no work. The next contention is that the present petitions which are filed much after attaining age of sixty years, by each of them, is nothing but a money claim for two years' salary and post retirement monetary benefits. Such money claims, had they been filed in Civil Court or in Labour Court, under the provisions of M.P. Industrial Disputes Act, would have been held barred by time. Such purely money claims are not liable to be entertained in writ proceedings. Reliance is placed on the decisions in the following cases :- (1) M.P.E.B. & others v. Basant Kumar Pandey & others 1989 JLL 253 = 1989 MPLJ 457 (2) The Managing Director U.P. Warehousing Corporation & others v. Vijay Narayan Vajpa? AIR 1980 SC 840 . (3) Palluru Rama - Krishnaiah & others v. Union of India 1989 (2) SCC 541 . (4) Jai Bhagwan v. Management of the Ambala Central Co- operative Bank Ltd. & another AIR 1984 SC 286 . 10. AIR 1980 SC 840 . (3) Palluru Rama - Krishnaiah & others v. Union of India 1989 (2) SCC 541 . (4) Jai Bhagwan v. Management of the Ambala Central Co- operative Bank Ltd. & another AIR 1984 SC 286 . 10. So far as the claim for salary for two years idle period is concerned, the further contention on behalf of the Corporation is that the same cannot be made to all of them only on the basis of a bare affidavit filed by each of them that during the relevant periods they were not employed. It is submitted that it is practically impossible for the Corporation now to make a roving investigation into each case, to find out whether each one of them was or was not gainfully employed. In such a situation non- filing of counter affidavit by the Corporation should not lead to an inference that the affidavits filed by the petitioners are factually correct. The question of gainful employment of the employees concerned at the relevant periods need thorough investigation. into the facts which, the Corporation says, could have been done only in a duly constituted suit or in a case instituted in Labour Court where the parties would have an opportunity to lead evidence and cross-examine the witnesses examined by them. Bare affidavits by the petitioners in such a situation, even without a rebuttal by the Corporation, deserve out-right rejection. Reliance is placed on the decisions in the following cases :- 1. Federal India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Anandrao Pandhurang Rao Dixit AIR 1944 Nag. 161. 2. Ramgopal v. D.E.O. Ratlam & others 1986 JLJ 30 = 1986 MPLJ 181 . 11. Before deciding the controversy, it may be recorded that on last dates of hearing we suggested the standing counsel appearing for the Corporation that it would be better if the Corporation took a uniform policy decision in the matter of giving benefit of S.P. Dubey's case to all similarly placed employees who were prematurely retired and approached the Court only after the above verdit of the Supreme Court. We twice granted time to the Corporation to formulate its policy and disclose its stand as the matter was to affect a large number of ex-C.P.T.S. employees already before this Court and many more waiting to file similar cases. We twice granted time to the Corporation to formulate its policy and disclose its stand as the matter was to affect a large number of ex-C.P.T.S. employees already before this Court and many more waiting to file similar cases. The Standing Counsel for the Corporation V. S. Dabir stated at the Bar that after careful deliberations, the Corporation without giving up its legal rights and contentions, is willing to grant only post retirement benefits to all such ex-C.P.T.S. employees by treating them to have notionally retired at the age of 60 years. It is pointed out that the services of the petitioners are not pensionable, but they can be granted Provident Fund Contribution for two years, gratuity on that basis and benefit of leave encashment admissible as per rules. The Corporation, however, was strongly opposed to pay each one of them two years salary for the idle period for the reason and contentions already recorded and will be discussed later on. It was also informed by the counsel for the Corporation that such post retirement or terminal benefits in few individual cases have been calculated and they work out to almost half of the back wages payable for two years period. It was then submitted that all the petitioners have already received all post terminal benefits at the age of fifty eight years in lumpsum and that payment is also liable to be taken into account in considering the question of granting further relief to them after such a long delay. 12. Having given our careful consideration to the circumstances and submissions made by the parties and also keeping in view a fair and just stand taken by the Corporation, in our opinion, the petitioners are entitled only to partial relief of post-retirement benefit in this batch of petitions. It is true that the petitioners have approached this Court after a long delay challenging their pre-mature retirement, but that should not debar them from claiming no relief at all. The contention of the petitioners, however, cannot be accepted that the cause of action for them to challenge their retirements arose only after the verdict of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Dubey (supra) pronounced on 23.10.1990. The cause of action arose on the relevant dates in individual cases of the petitioners, when they were pre-maturely retired at the age of fifty eight years. The cause of action arose on the relevant dates in individual cases of the petitioners, when they were pre-maturely retired at the age of fifty eight years. It is a different consideration to excuse delay on their part because when they retired the verdict of the M.P. High Court in a similarly situated case of Vasant Bansod(supra) was against them and they legitimately thought that approach by them individually to the High Court at that time, would have been futile; but that did not prevent them from keeping their rights alive by approaching the Labour Court or the High Court, as was done by S.P. Dubey. The delay, however, is satisfactorily and reasonably explained, hence deserves to be excused. The petitioners, there-fore, cannot be completely denied the benefit of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Dubey (supra) only on the ground of delay. We seek guidance and support in our view from the observations of the Supreme Court in a latest decision in the case of Nand Kishore Nayak v. State of Orissa AIR 1991 SC 1724 . The Supreme Court extended the benefit of the judgment in an individual case to other similarly situated in the following words: "After this declaration was made by the High Court, certain employees, who had retired at the age of 58 years but were entitled to continue till attainment of 60 years, filed petitions in the High Court. The appellant was one such employee. The grievance of the appellant is that although the benefit was granted to others similarly situated by the High Court it was refused to him on the ground that he approached the High Court after a lapse of 4 1/2 years since his retirement. His submission is that he could approach the High Court only after this pronouncement was made on 22nd December, 1987. In fact, he approached the High Court on 19.1.1988, i.e. within less than a month after this pronouncement. We think that the High Court was not right in refusing to grant benefit of the judgment to the appellants". 13. The next important question is to what relief the petitioners, in the given circumstances are entitled to. The Supreme Court's decision in the case of Nand Kishore Nayak (supra) can act as a guidance in that matter as well. We think that the High Court was not right in refusing to grant benefit of the judgment to the appellants". 13. The next important question is to what relief the petitioners, in the given circumstances are entitled to. The Supreme Court's decision in the case of Nand Kishore Nayak (supra) can act as a guidance in that matter as well. In the above case it was directed by the Supreme Court as under :- "In the present case, we, therefore, direct the State Government to extend the benefit of the judgment to the appellant, refix his date of superannuation, add two years to his qualifying service and refix his pension and grant the same from the deemed date of superannuation. The arrears of pension should also be paid after refixing the pension within a reasonable time not exceeding three months." 14. It is true that the decision in the case of Nand Kishore Nayak (supra) , in so far as it relates to denial of relief of payment of salary for the idle period of two years service, is distinguishable as such relief was refused keeping in view the nature of writ granted in that case by the High Court and the benefit of which was sought by others similarly situated. The High Court in that case had granted relief of two years salary only to those from whom actual work was taken on the post even after fifty eight years of their age, on the basis of an order of stay passed by the Court. [See the High Court order quoted in the case of Nand Kishore Nayak (supra) ]. In our opinion, however, the observations reproduced by us in the case of Nand Kishore Nayak (supra) show that the Supreme Court has treated differently the cases of such employees who claim benefit of the judgment rendered in some other similar Cases. The Supreme Court granted only partial relief in the shape of terminal benefits to such retired employees. To the present case, the ratio of the above Supreme Court judgment can be applied as a fair and just basis to grant relief to the petitioners who are claiming benefit of the judgment in the case of S.P. Dubey (supra) after several years of their retirement. Here, their services are non-pensionable. The only terminal benefits available to them are Provident Fund, gratuity and leave encashment. Here, their services are non-pensionable. The only terminal benefits available to them are Provident Fund, gratuity and leave encashment. The Corporation has very clearly expressed its willingness to share that much financial burden as a just gesture on their part. The petitioners for additional reasons are not entitled to two years salary for the idle period. Neither did they discharge any work during that period nor approached this Court before attaining sixty years of age to show their willingness to serve. The Corporation is right in submitting that it cannot without due investigation find out whether or not they were gainfully employed during the relevant periods of two years. It is really impracticable for the Corporation to make a roving factual survey after several years of retirement of the petitioners and to ascertain whether and where the employees were employed gainfully during the relevant period of two years in each individual case. Their affidavits, even without a counter affidavit by the Corporation, cannot be accepted as true to grant the reliefs in their favour. The Supreme Court in the case of Nand Kishore Nayak (supra) also negatived similar relief of salary for idle period in case of such employees who sought benefit of Judgment-in a case of another employee. The relief of arrears of salary claimed by the petitioners for two years idle period is, therefore, rejected. 15. Consequently, the petitions only partly succeed. It is directed that the respondent Corporation shall extend the benefit of the judgment in the case of S.P. Dubey (supra) to the petitioners and treat them as continuing in service up to the age of sixty years by adding two years to their service. They shall be paid their all post retirement benefits towards Provident Fund Contribution, gratuity and leave encashment as per rules. The monetary benefits in each individual case be worked out and paid within a reasonable period of three months. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.