JUDGMENT 1. - Being aggrieved against the order of the respondents dated April 27, 1991 declining to accept the bid of the petitioner company in an auction sale, this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by the petitioner company. 2. On March 26, 1991 a plot measuring 2035 sq. mts. situated in Vidyadhar Nagar was auctioned by Jaipur Development Authority as per the auction notice Annexure-2. The auction was carried out as per the terms and conditions of auction of the Dispensary/Nursing Home sites, Annexure-1. Conditions No. 5 and 6 of Annexure-1 are relevant which are as follows: "5. The bid shall be subject to the approval of the J.D.C. who reserve the right to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason thereof. 6. On acceptance of the bid, the successful bidder will be informed of such acceptance in writing and will be required to deposit the balance amount of the bid i.e. 85% of the bid amount within 30 days from the date of issue of the information of acceptance of bid." The case of the petitioner company is that it was the highest bidder in the auction proceedings and his highest bid was at the rate of Rs. 1,001/- per sq. mt.It is also stated that the petitioner had deposited 15% of the auction amount on the date of auction itself. 3. However, the bid given by the petitioner company was not approved by Jaipur Development Authority and the amount deposited by the petitioner company was returned through Annexure-7. The order of non-acceptance of the bid, communicated to the petitioner is Annexure-6 on the record. 4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that after having deposited 15% of the bid amount the petitioner company became the purchaser of the said plot, as it complied with all the formalities and was also willing to deposit the balance amount of the bid. It was also contended by the learned counsel that the bid given by the petitioner company was not inadequate. It was also pointed out that Vidyadhar Nagar Yojna is still to develop while the bid of plot in Malviya Nagar, which is more developed in comparison to Vidyadhar Nagar, had fetched Rs. 971/- per sq. Mt. It was also contended by the learned counsel that the bid given by the petitioner company was not inadequate. It was also pointed out that Vidyadhar Nagar Yojna is still to develop while the bid of plot in Malviya Nagar, which is more developed in comparison to Vidyadhar Nagar, had fetched Rs. 971/- per sq. Mt. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the JDA is bound to sell the plot in question to the petitioner company as it was the highest bidder. 5. I have considered the above arguments made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and in my view, they have no merit at all. In an auction sale, whether the auction is complete at the fall of the hammer or otherwise, depends upon the terms and conditions of the auction under which it was carried on. A bid in public auction is an offer and till it is accepted, it may be retracted. In the instant case as per condition No. 5 of the terms and conditions of the auction sale (Annexure-1) makes it clear that the bid was subject to the approval of JDA Commissioner who reserves the right to accept or reject any bid without assigning any reason thereof. There is no dispute that the JDA Commissioner has not approved the bid given by the petitioner and rejected the same. Thus, there was no concluded contract and if the bid given by the petitioner was not accepted as per the terms and conditions of the auction sale, no right accrues to the petitioner. 6. In this connection a reference may be made in M/s. Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries v. L.J. Johnson and others, AIR 1958 SC 289 , in which this question was considered as to when the contract is concluded in case of an auction sale. In the above case sale was made by auction as provided under Section 20 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. A similar argument was made, that the sale was complete as soon as respondents No. 4 and 5 were declared the highest bidder at the auction and thereupon the property stood transferred to them. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "We are unable to agree that because the section permits a sale by auction, whenever there is an auction the sale must be deemed to be complete. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under: "We are unable to agree that because the section permits a sale by auction, whenever there is an auction the sale must be deemed to be complete. Whether there is a transfer or not depends on the conditions of the auction and these have to be examined to find out when a transfer of the property auctioned takes place." In Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui and others, AIR SC 1242 the facts are like this. The auction to exploit bamboo coup known as "Bantha Bamboo Coup', an auction was held in the office of the Divisional Forest Officer on August 7, 1970. The appellant was the highest bidder and it was accepted by the Divisional Forest Officer. The security amount was also deposited and he also executed an agreement. The Divisional Forest Officer reported about the auction sale to the Conservator of Forests by his letter dated August 25, 1970. As the price for which the coup was provisionally settled exceeded Rs. 50,000/-, the Conservator of Forests forwarded the papers regarding the auction sale to the Deputy Secretary to Government of Bihar, Forest Department, for confirmation of the acceptance by the Government. Since the provisional settlement was made for an amount less than the reserve price, the matter was referred to the Finance Department. The appellant also expressed his willingness to take the settlement at the. reserve price of Rs. 95,000/, The Minister of Forest, by his proceedings dated November 27, 1970 directed that the coup may be settled with the highest bidder, namely, the appellant at the reserve price and a telegram was sent by the Government to the Conservator of Forests, Hazaribagh Circle on November 28, 1970 with a copy of the same to the Conservator of Forest, Bihar, confirming the auction sale of the appellant at the reserve price of Rs. 95,000/-. Thereafter, one Mohd. Yakub made a petition before the Government of Bihar, offering to take the settlement of the coup in question for Rs. 1,01,125/-. Hence, a telegram was sent by the Government on December 5, 1970, to the Divisional Forest Officer, directing him not to take any action on the basis of the telegram dated November 28, 1970 sent to him in pursuance of the proceedings of the Government dated November 27, 1970. 1,01,125/-. Hence, a telegram was sent by the Government on December 5, 1970, to the Divisional Forest Officer, directing him not to take any action on the basis of the telegram dated November 28, 1970 sent to him in pursuance of the proceedings of the Government dated November 27, 1970. That telegram was received by the Divisional Forest Officer on December 10, 1970 and he by his letter dated December 10, 1970 informed the Government that the previous telegram dated November 20, 1970, was not received by him and so its content was not communicated to the appellant. The whole matter was thereafter placed before the Minister of Forest and the Minister by his proceedings dated December 13, 1970, cancelled the settlement of the coup with the appellant and settled the same with respondent No. 6 for Rs. 1,01,125/-. 7. The contention of the appellant in the writ petition was that there was a concluded contract when the bid of the appellant was accepted by the Divisional Forest Officer though that was subject to confirmation by the Government and that when the Government confirmed the acceptance by its proceedings dated November 27, 1970, it was no longer within the power of Government to make the settlement of the coup upon the 6th Respondent by its proceedings dated December 13, 1970. The special conditions of the auction has been detailed out in pars No. 5 of the judgment which is reproduced as under: "The special condition in the tender notice makes it clear that the Divisional Forest Officer has the right to accept a bid of less than Rs. 5,000/-, that acceptance of a bid of more than Rs. The special conditions of the auction has been detailed out in pars No. 5 of the judgment which is reproduced as under: "The special condition in the tender notice makes it clear that the Divisional Forest Officer has the right to accept a bid of less than Rs. 5,000/-, that acceptance of a bid of more than Rs. 5,000/- by him is subject to confirmation by the Chief Conservator of Forests and the Forest Department of the Bihar Government, that an auction sale for an amount of more than Rupees 5,000/- would not be recognised until it is confirmed by the competent authority, and that a bid made in auction and which has been provisionally accepted by the Divisional Forest Officer shall be binding on the bidder for two months from the date of auction or till the date of rejection by the competent authority, whichever is earlier." In para No. 7 of the judgment their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered as under: "The question whether by an acceptance which is conditional upon the occurrence of future event a contract will become concluded was considered by Williston and this is what he says (Williston on Contracts Vol. 1, 3rd Edn. Section 77A): "A nice distinction may be taken here between (1) a so-called acceptance by which the acceptor agrees to become immediately bound on a condition not named in the offer, and (2) an acceptance which adopts unequivocal the terms of the offer but states that it will not be effective untill a certain contingency happen or fails to happen. In the first case there is a counter-offer and rejection of the original offer; in the second case there is no counter-offer, since there is no assent to enter into an immediate bargain. There is, so to speak, an acceptance in escrow, which is not to take effect until the future. In the meantime, of course, neither party is bound and either may withdraw. Moreover if the time at which the acceptance was to become effectual is unreasonably remote, the offer may lapse before the acceptance becomes effective. But if neither party withdraws and the delay is not unreasonable a contract will arise when the contingency happens or stipulated event occurs." Their Lordships then observed as under: "....The appellant's bid was for Rs. 92,001/-. Moreover if the time at which the acceptance was to become effectual is unreasonably remote, the offer may lapse before the acceptance becomes effective. But if neither party withdraws and the delay is not unreasonable a contract will arise when the contingency happens or stipulated event occurs." Their Lordships then observed as under: "....The appellant's bid was for Rs. 92,001/-. The acceptance of the bid by the Divisional Forest Officer was, therefore, subject to confirmation by Government. The proceedings of the Minister dated November 27, 1970, would show that he did not confirm the acceptance of the offer by the Divisional Forest Officer. What the Minister did was not to confirm the acceptance made by the Divisional Forest Officer, but to accept the offer made by the appellant in his communication dated October 26, 1970, that he would take the coup for the reserved price of Rs. 95,000/-. There was, therefore, no confirmation of the acceptance of the bid to take the coup in settlement for the amount of Rs. 92,001/-. If the offer that was accepted was the offer contained in the communication of the appellant dated October 26, 1970, we do not think that there was any communication of the acceptance of that offer to the appellant. The telegrame sent to the Conservator of Forest, Hazaribagh, by the Government on November 28, 1970, cannot be considered as a communication of the acceptance of that offer to the appellant. The acceptance of the offer was not even put in the course of transmission to the appellant; and so even assuming that an acceptance need not come to the knowledge of the offerer, the appellant cannot contend that there was a concluded contract on the basis of his offer contained in his communication dated October 26, 1970, as the acceptance of that offer was not put in the course of transmission. Quite apart from that, the appellant himself revoked the offer made by him on October 26, 1970, by his letter dated November 3, 1970, in which he stated that the coup may be settled upon him in the auction. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there was no concluded contract between the appellant and the Government." 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly placed reliance on Surender Singh v. Central Government and others, (1986) 4 SCC 667 . We are, therefore, of the opinion that there was no concluded contract between the appellant and the Government." 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has strongly placed reliance on Surender Singh v. Central Government and others, (1986) 4 SCC 667 . On the basis of this authority, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that before refusing/declining the acceptance of the highest bid given by the petitioner company, the JDA Commissioner should have given an opportunity of hearing. I have gone through the entire judgment and in my view it does not support this contention urged by the learned counsel. Paragraph 13 may be reproduced in this connection: "The High Court has further held that Shri Rajni Kant had acted in violation of principles of natural justice in passing orders in appellant's favour as no notice or opportunity of hearing was afforded to respondents Sohan Lai and Sunder Lal. There is no dispute that after cancellation of the auction sale held in appellant's favour, the property in dispute was again put to auction sale on January 17, 1969 and at that auction sale Sohan Lal and Sunder Lal respondents were the highest bidders. Their bid was provisionally accepted and in pursuance thereof they deposited ⅕th of the auction sale amount. If the Central Government or any other authority exercising power under Section 33 of the Act were to set aside the order cancelling the auction sale held in appellant's favour and if he was permitted to deposit the remaining amount of the purchase money the property would be transferred to him and in that event Sohan Lal and Sunder Lal who had also made the highest bid and made the initial deposit would suffer prejudice as they would not be entitled to the property in dispute. In these circumstances the respondents were interested in supporting the order of cancellation of the auction sale made in appellant's favour and they had sufficient interest in proceedings taken under Section 33 of the Act. We therefore, agree with the High Court. In these circumstances the respondents were interested in supporting the order of cancellation of the auction sale made in appellant's favour and they had sufficient interest in proceedings taken under Section 33 of the Act. We therefore, agree with the High Court. that in all fairness, respondents should have been afforded opportunity of hearing while exercising power under Section 33 of the Act." It may also be stated that in the aforesaid judgment, the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bombay Salt and Chemical Industries v. Johnson (supra) has been considered and the same has been distinguished as under: "We have considered the said decision, wherein this Court has taken the view that the highest bidder at an auction sale does not get any right or interest in the property till the auction sale is approved, confirmed and the sale deed is executed in his favour. The respondents even though they were the highest bidders at the subsequent auction sale do not have any right or interest in the 'property' in dispute. The question is however not whether they have any 'right or interest' in the property but whether they would be prejudicially affected. They would certainly be affected, adversely if the appellant .get relief in proceedings under Section 33 of the Act in respect of the said property. Respondents have been in possession of the property since long and furthermore on the basis of their highest bid made at the subsequent sale they have sufficient interest in the matter to contest the appellant's petition made under Section 33 of the Act." 9. The above observation of the Apex Court further makes it clear that when there is a pure and simple case of auction sale, the highest bidder does not get any right or interest in the property auctioned till the auction sale is approved as per the conditions of the auction sale. The learned counsel has also placed reliance on Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K. Ratna and others, (1986) 4 SCC 537 This judgment has also no relevance and has no application on a case of auction sale. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner then made a half hearted argument that the auction has been cancelled on the mis-representation made to JDA by certain Doctors. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner then made a half hearted argument that the auction has been cancelled on the mis-representation made to JDA by certain Doctors. There is no averment in the writ petition that the JDA Commissioner had any bias against the petitioner as such, this averment is absolutely irrelevant to create any right in favour of the petitioner or to hold that the contract was a concluded one. 11. As already stated above, in an auction sale, the rights of the parties are determined as per the terms and conditions of the auction sale. If the auction is subject to confirmation/acceptance, then the contract is not concluded till the same is accepted/confirmed by the competent authority and prior to it no right accrues in favour of the auction bidder. No other point has been raised before me. 12. Consequently, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is hereby dismissed.Writ Petition Dismissed. *******