Judgment S.B.Sinha, J. 1. The petitioner originally in this writ application prayed for issuance of an appropriate writ for quashing an order dated July 11, 1990 as contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application and also for quashing the disciplinary proceedings initiated against him. 2. Subsequently, however, an application for amendment of the writ application was filed whereby the petitioner brought on records certain subsequent events culminating in passing of an order of punishment dated September 23, 1991 as contained in Annexure-11 thereto whereby the petitioner was reverted back to E-5 grade from E-6 grade. 3. The fact of the matter lies in a very narrow compass. 4. According to the petitioner, in the years 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85 the then General Manager of the concerned colliery where he had been working as Personal Manager in E-5 grade and who was his immediate controlling officer entered very good in his confidential rolls, but the Director of Personnel altered the same to Good 5. According to the petitioner, in view of the aforementioned alteration in the entries in his confidential report, he was not promoted from the grade E-5 to E-6 to which he was otherwise entitled to. 6. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner being CWC No. 1878 of 1986 (R) and by an order dated February 12, 1988, a Division Bench of this Court directed the respondent to consider his case for promotion keeping in view the original entries in the service book of the petitioner as very good for the purpose of his promotion to the post of grade E-6. 7. The respondents filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India against the aforementioned order which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 1525 of 1988. 8. By an order dated March 27, 1990 the said appeal was dismissed. The petitioner was thereafter promoted to the post of Grade E-6 with effect from December 19, 1985. The petitioner, however, was not given any arrears pay. 9. It appears that another writ petition was filed by the petitioner being CWJC No. 857 of 1991 (R) and by an order dated July 24, 1991, this Court directed:- "The respondents are, therefore, directed to consider the case of the petitioner with regard to his claim of difference of salary between the grade E-5 to E-6 from the date of his promotion, i.e. December 19, 1985. Appropriate order to this effect shall be passed by the respondents concerned within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order." The contention of the petitioner is that said order of this Court is yet to be complied with. 10 On or about April 22, 1987 a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner for the following misconduct:- (i) Acting beyond power and sufficient reasons. (ii) Misuse of official position. (iii) Acting against the interest of the company. 11. The petitioner filed his show cause to the said charge-sheet on June 3, 1987 (Annexure-5), 12. According to the petitioner, the said inquiry was not completed for a long time and by an order dated July 11, 1990 the respondent No. 4 had been promoted to the post of E-7 grade. This writ application was filed at that stage. 13. By an order dated March 6, 1991, this Court directed that the final order in the departmental proceedings must be passed within two months. By another order dated May 8, 1991 a Division Bench of this Court passed the following order:- "The petitioner shall be given ad hoc promotion but that would abide by the result of the disciplinary enquiry and the result of this writ petition. Let it be recorded that after disciplinary enquiry is completed, it would be open to the appropriate authority to pass appropriate order irrespective of such ad hoc promotion. It is made clear that this order is merely for ad hoc promotion in view of the non-compliance of the order of this Court dated March 6, 1991 and this would not prejudice the rights and contentions of the parties and shall not confer any right on the petitioner as such. The order directing ad hoc promotion of the petitioner is to be complied by the authorities concerned within ten days from the date of communication of this order." Pursuant to the aforementioned directions, by an order dated May 17, 1991 (Annex ure-10), the petitioner was promoted on an ad hoc basis to E-7 grade. Thereafter, an application was filed on behalf of the respondents to allow them some more tune to complete the departmental proceedings and by an order dated September 3, 1991, a Division Bench of this Court directed as follows :- "Heard. Thereafter, an application was filed on behalf of the respondents to allow them some more tune to complete the departmental proceedings and by an order dated September 3, 1991, a Division Bench of this Court directed as follows :- "Heard. If no final order is passed by the disciplinary authority by September 24, 1991 the petitioner shall be deemed to have been confirmed in the post to which he has been promoted in compliance of the order of this Court passed on May 8, 1991." 14. By reason of the impugned order dated September 23, 1991 (Annexure-11), the petitioner was reverted from the post grade E-6 to E-5. The petitioner has, by an application for amendment to the writ petition, challenged the legality of the said order also. 15. In this case, a counter-affidavit was filed before this writ application was admitted to hearing. 16. A supplementary counter-affidavit has been filed by the respondent controverting the allegations made in the application for amendment of the writ petition filed on October 4, 1991. According to the respondents, the disciplinary proceedings could not be completed for various reasons including the dilatory tactics adopted by the petitioner and the other delinquent employees. 17. Mr. A.K. Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, firstly submitted that as the petitioner had been exonerated of all the charges by the inquiry officer, the disciplinary authority was bound to meet his reasonings, in his order of disagreement and as the same has not been done, the impugned order (Annexure-11) cannot be sustained. 18. It was further submitted that the disciplinary authority prior to passing of the impugned order as contained in Annexure-11, was bound to hear the petitioner, give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and was also bound to issue second show-cause notice to him. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision in Sri Kumar Jha V/s. Bihar State Electricity Board, reported in 1190 BLT 101, in the Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation V/s. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, reported in 1980-I-LLJ-222, in Union of India V/s. Mohd. Ramzan Khan reported in 1991-I-LLJ-29, in Govind Setty. T. V/s. Government of Karnataka, reported in 1979 (1) SLR 686 and in Brij Nandan Kansal V/s. State of U.P., reported in 1988 Supp. SCC 761. 19. Ramzan Khan reported in 1991-I-LLJ-29, in Govind Setty. T. V/s. Government of Karnataka, reported in 1979 (1) SLR 686 and in Brij Nandan Kansal V/s. State of U.P., reported in 1988 Supp. SCC 761. 19. It was also contended that the promotion of the petitioner to E-7 grade could not have been withheld only because a departmental proceeding was pending. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in New Bank of India V/s. N.P. Sehgal, 1991 1 LLJ 570. 20. It was lastly submitted that in any event as the petitioner was promoted by an order dated August 2, 1990 (Annxure-3) with effect from December 19, 1985, no charge-sheet could have been issued as against the petitioner in the year 1987 inasmuch as by promoting the petitioner with retrospective effect, his past bad records must be deemed to have been wiped off. 21. Mr. N.K. Prasad, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 and 3, on the other hand, submitted that the disciplinary authority is entitled to differ with the findings of the inquiry officer after recording his reasons therefor and as in this case, the reasons have been recorded by disciplinary authority in its order dated September 23, 1991 (Annexure-11), the same cannot be said to be bad in law. The learned counsel, in this connection, has relied upon a decision of mine in Arun Narain Singh V/s. Union of India, reported in 1990 BLJ 119 . 22. It was further submitted that even if it be held that the said order dated September 23, 1991 is not sustainable in law, the petitioner should have preferred an appeal as contemplated under Rule 36 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as the rules). 23. It was further submitted that as in the instant case, the procedures for conducting a departmental proceeding have been laid down in the said rules which do not contemplate a second opportunity of being heard to be given to the delinquent officer by the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings of the inquiry officer and as the said rules also do not contemplate of giving of a second show-cause notice, the question of violation of principles of natural justice does not arise. 24. 24. The learned counsel further drew my attention to Paragraphs 7 to 9 of the counter-affidavit for the purpose of showing as to how a delay occurred in completion of the departmental proceedings. 25. According to the learned counsel, as the reasons for not promoting the petitioner to grade E-6 were different and he was immediately promoted after the judgment of the Supreme Court with retrospective effect, it cannot be said that the petitioner has made out any case of bias. 26. It was further submitted that as ad hoc promotion was granted to the petitioner pursuant to the order of this Court and subject to the result of the disciplinary proceeding, the petitioner has rightly been reverted to E-5 grade, as at all material times, he had been holding the substantive rank of E-6 grade. 27. It was further submitted that as the petitioner was charge-sheeted in the year 1987, the question of wiping out of his past conduct does not arise only because he was promoted to E-6 grade by an order dated August 2, 1990 with effect from December 19, 1985 particularly in view of the fact that no charges were pending as against him in 1985. 28. The learned counsel further submitted that no illegality has been committed by the respondents in withholding the promotion of the petitioner pending departmental proceedings and in support of the said contention, the learned counsel has relied upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India V/s. K. V. Jankiraman, 1991 2 LLJ 570 . 29. From what has been noticed hereinbefore, it is absolutely clear that there is no dispute with regard to the basic facts. 30. It is admitted that the terms and conditions of the services of the petitioner are governed by the said rules. Chapter III of the said rules provides for the matters relating to the discipline of the employees. Sub-clause (c) of Sub-rule (i) of Rule 27.1 provides that withholding of promotion would be a minor penalty. Clause (a) of Sub-rule (ii) of the aforementioned rule provides that reduction to a lower grade or post or stage in a time scale would be a major penalty. Rule 29 provides for the procedures for imposition of major penalties as specified in Rule 27. Clause (a) of Sub-rule (ii) of the aforementioned rule provides that reduction to a lower grade or post or stage in a time scale would be a major penalty. Rule 29 provides for the procedures for imposition of major penalties as specified in Rule 27. Rule 29.4 provides that if a written statement I is not received from the employee within the time specified, an ex parte inquiry may be held by the disciplinary authority. Rule 29.8 provides that if upon receipt of a notice the delinquent does not plead guilty, the inquiry authority shall adjourn the case to a later date not exceeding 30 days. Rule 29.19 provides as to the manner in which the inquiry report shall be prepared and forwarded to the disciplinary authority. Rule 30 of the said rules which is relevant for the purpose of this case reads as follows: - Action on the inquiry report.- The Disciplinary Authority, if it is not itself the Inquiring Authority may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, remit the case to the inquiring authority for fresh or further inquiry and report and the Inquiring Authority shall thereupon proceed to hold the further inquiry according to the provisions of Rule 29.3 as far as may be." 31. From a perusal of the inquiry report as contained in Annexure-12 to the writ application, it appears that several inquiry officers were appointed but, for one reason or another, they did not complete the inquiry. The inquiry officer in his report (Annexure-12) reported that Sri A.K. Gulati, Ex-G.M., Argade was examined on August 30, 1989 but it was not signed by Sri K. Prasad. The inquiry officer put his signature on the deposition of Sri Gulati on July 10, 1991 and when the file was placed before Sri. K. Prasad on July 19, 1991,he made an endorsement stating that he could not remember as to what was deposed by Sri Gulati after a period of two years and, he, therefore did not confirm from the said proceedings. Similarly, the records of proceedings held on May 20, 1991 was not signed by the petitioner as according to him in view of the fact that Sri. K.E.R. Thomas had no longer been in companys roll and hence the same was null and void. The inquiry officer, therefore, did not take into consideration the depositions of those two witnesses. 32. Similarly, the records of proceedings held on May 20, 1991 was not signed by the petitioner as according to him in view of the fact that Sri. K.E.R. Thomas had no longer been in companys roll and hence the same was null and void. The inquiry officer, therefore, did not take into consideration the depositions of those two witnesses. 32. From the inquiry report, it appears that besides the aforementioned two witnesses, the management examined four other witnesses. The petitioner examined on his behalf six witnesses and Sri S.P. Singh who was also charge-sheeted along with the petitioner examined four witnesses. The inquiry officer took into consideration the statements of allegations made as against the petitioner, case of the disciplinary authority, the defences of the delinquent officers and the other documents. The inquiry officer, in view of the deposition of the project officer, came to the conclusion that as there had been pressure from all sides to complete the service sheets of the employees as also from the Secretary of RCMS Union. He inter alia held that as there is nothing to show that the cases of review of age of the workers in question were an exception to the general practice. 33. In relation to the allegations made as against the petitioner, the inquiry officer upon consideration of the evidences on records held as follows:- "It is alleged that Sri K. Prasad himself took the decision to review the age of these workers and sent the cases to the Area Level Age Review Committee without the approval of the G.M. There is no order or instruction in writing that such cases are to be referred to the Age Review Committee only with the approval of the G.M. Further, as Sri Prasad was made responsible for completion of the service sheets before a certain date, for the expeditious disposal he might have found it expedient to send the cases like that. But the fact is that the G.M. was aware of the progress in the matter. Furthermore, he was represented in the Committee by his nominee who acted as its Chairman. The presenting officer could not establish that only in these four cases, the Personnel Manager did not take the approval of the G.M. It is stated that during that period more than 300 cases had been decided. Furthermore, he was represented in the Committee by his nominee who acted as its Chairman. The presenting officer could not establish that only in these four cases, the Personnel Manager did not take the approval of the G.M. It is stated that during that period more than 300 cases had been decided. It is to be concluded that the normal method was for the Personnel Manager to send to the Age Review Committee the cases received by him from the Project, forwarded by the Personnel Officer of Project Officer. And Sri Prasad acted in conformity with the prevalent method and practice. No special treatment was given to these four cases. It is alleged that Sri Prasad directed Sri S.P. Singh to re-fix the age after the review of the Age Review Committee. For this also Sri Prasad did not take the approval of the G.M. Sri Prasad did direct the Sri. P.O. Gidi A to correct the age of the workers in question as per the decision of the Age Review Committee. The accused officers contention is that there was no necessity to take the approval of the G.M. There was no instruction to do so. On the contrary, the implementation instruction is very clear that the decision of the Age Review Committee will be binding and final. One copy of the Age Fixation Report is given to the employee concerned during the meeting of the Age Review Committee itself. Further, in the Age Review Committee the G.M. is represented by his nominee who is a party to the decision. Thus, once a decision is taken by the Age Review Committee its implementation is a routine matter." He further held the charge against the petitioner that he acted in haste is not borne out from the records of the case. He also held that reduction of age of four workmen caused by the Age Review Committee cannot be termed as undue benefit and gain to the workers and loss to the company. He further found that the charge of collusion by and between Sri. S.P. Singh and K. Prasad could not be established by the management. He, therefore, gave his findings:- "Charge (i) Acting beyond powers and sufficient reasons. Finding: Charge not established beyond doubt. Charge (ii) Misuse of official position. Finding: Charge not established. Charge (iii) Acting against the benefit of the Company. Finding: Charge not established." 34. S.P. Singh and K. Prasad could not be established by the management. He, therefore, gave his findings:- "Charge (i) Acting beyond powers and sufficient reasons. Finding: Charge not established beyond doubt. Charge (ii) Misuse of official position. Finding: Charge not established. Charge (iii) Acting against the benefit of the Company. Finding: Charge not established." 34. The disciplinary authority, however, in his order dated September 23, 1991 as contained in Annexure-11 to the writ application while differing with the findings of the inquiry officer recorded as follows: - "Regarding the first charge, i.e. acting beyond powers and sufficient reasons, the finding of the Inquiring Authority that the charge is not established beyond doubt is not acceptable. The standard of proof in departmental proceedings is based on preponderance of probability and not necessarily proof beyond reasonable doubt. This principle was not applied by the Inquiring Authority while evaluating the evidence produced in the departmental proceedings. Further, the evidence of Sri Jawahar Lal, then General Manager (Personnel), Sri K.Y. Kelkar formerly General Manager, Argada Area, Sri. A.K. Tripathy, then Project Officer, Gidi-A and Sri D. Modi, then Staff Officer (Mining) in support of this charge was not considered by the Inquiring Authority objectively. The evidence recorded during the departmental proceedings clearly establishes that the operative part of implementation instruction No. 37 of the JBCCI means that as a general rule, the recorded age will not be reopened for review unless there is a glaring and apparent entry in the record requiring such review; that Sri K. Prasad, then Personnel Manager, was not authorised to take decision on his own in this respect; that the cases of the age review of four workers of Gidi-A Colliery, viz. S/Shri Nagina Prasad, Bhola Mochi, Chamru and R.K. Karmakar, were referred to the Age Review Committee by Shri K. Prasad without obtaining approval of Area General Manager, that after review of age by the said Committee, of which Sri K. Prasad himself was also a member, approval of the Area General Manager on the decision of the Committee was not taken by Sri K. Prasad and that Sri K. Prasad conveyed the decision to Sri S.P. Singh, Senior Personnel Officer, Gidi-A for entry in the Service Sheets; that Sri K. Prasad acted beyond his jurisdiction and without authorisation; and that sufficient reasons for doing so were not adduced by Sri K. Prasad. Therefore, the first change is fully established and Sri K. Prasad is guilty of the same. Regarding the second and the third charges, i.e. misuse of official position and acting against the interest of the Company, the finding of the Inquiry Authority that these charges are not established is also not acceptable. Since the first charge is already proved, it is clear that the provisions of Implementation Instruction No. 37 have been violated by Sri K. Prasad by misusing his official position. It has also been proved that Sri Prasad had acted against the interest of the Company because the consequences of the age review in this case is that the concerned four employees who ought to have retired much earlier were allowed to continue in service for nearly another eight-eleven years even when they ceased to remain suitable for employment. This conclusion is further established from the facts that in all the four cases of age review, against the items relating to Medical examination, it has been recorded as that hair was mostly white or mixed, teeth few broken and skin taxed. On the basis of such medical examination, the case of four employees were serious irregularity when the service sheets of four employees containing authenticated age are examined. In the case of one employee, viz. Shri R.K. Karmakar, the same age is recorded in his CMPF Form-A Declaration as in the Service Sheet". 35. On the basis of the aforementioned findings alone, the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that the charges against the petitioner have been proved. 36. It may be mentioned that the inquiry officer laid emphasis on the fact that the entire action of placing the cases of the concerned miners before the Age Review Committee was done at the instance of the General Manager and in fact his nominee was chairing the said committee, of which the petitioner was only a member. 37. 36. It may be mentioned that the inquiry officer laid emphasis on the fact that the entire action of placing the cases of the concerned miners before the Age Review Committee was done at the instance of the General Manager and in fact his nominee was chairing the said committee, of which the petitioner was only a member. 37. In Arun Narain Singh V/s. Union of India reported in 1990 (1) BLJ 119 , (supra) I have held as follows: - "It is now well-settled that a disciplinary authority has the jurisdiction to differ with the findings of the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority may upon examination of the evidences on record come to his independent finding that despite finding of not guilty arrived at by the inquiry Officer, the delinquent officer is guilty of the charges levelled as against him." 38. In Nand Lal Ram V/s. State of Bihar, reported in 1991 (2) BLJ 19 at page 23 it has been stated: "The disciplinary authority did not agree with the report of the conducting officer and passed order for dismissal. It is well known that the disciplinary authority is not bound by the opinion of the enquiring officer in a departmental proceeding. It is upto the disciplinary authority either to agree with those findings or to take a contrary view. Reference in this connection may be made to the case of Railway Board, New Delhi and Anr. V/s. Niranjan Singh 1969-II-LLJ-743, Tara Chand Khat V/s. Municipal Corporation Delhi, 1977-I-LLJ-331 (SC) and Shyam Bihari Singh V/s. The Chairman, State Bank of India and Ors. 1985 PLJR 185. From bare reference to the aforesaid decision, it would appear that the disciplinary authority is not bound by the opinion of the inquiring officer in a departmental proceeding. Therefore, it cannot be urged that the disciplinary authority could not have come to his independent conclusion on the basis of the materials on the record." 39. In terms of Rule 30. 1 of the said rules, the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings of the inquiry officer is not only required to record his reasons but also required to record its own findings on such charge if the evidences on record are sufficient for the purpose. In terms of Rule 30. 1 of the said rules, the disciplinary authority while disagreeing with the findings of the inquiry officer is not only required to record his reasons but also required to record its own findings on such charge if the evidences on record are sufficient for the purpose. He apparently, did not analyse as to how there exist sufficient evidences on record for arriving at a finding that the petitioner was guilty of the charges. He further merely referred to the evidences of four witnesses for the purpose of making comments that their evidences were not considered by the inquiring officer objectively but in his own order he did not analyse the evidences of the said officers also for the purpose of coming to the conclusion as to how and in what manner the charges as against the petitioner can be said to have been proved by them. 40. It is true, as has been observed by the disciplinary authority, that in a departmental proceeding, charges are not required to be proved beyond doubt, but the same are required to be considered on the basis of preponderance of probabilities; but he himself failed to analyse the evidences for the purpose of coming to the conclusion as to whether sufficient evidences exist on record to show that the petitioner was guilty of the charges levelled against him. 41. It is also true, as has been contended by Mr. N.K. Prasad, that the said rules provide for preferring of an appeal by the employee who is aggrieved by the order passed by the disciplinary authority. 42. However, it is well settled that existence of an alternative remedy itself may not be held to be sufficient to refuse to exercise this Courts jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 43. In this case, the petitioner had already approached this Court before the impugned order dated September 23, 1991 (Annexure-11) was passed. 44. This writ petition had been admitted and the matter had been heard on merits. It will be, therefore, in my opinion, not proper for this Court to ask the petitioner to seek alternative remedy by filing an appeal at this stage. 45. In this view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 46. 44. This writ petition had been admitted and the matter had been heard on merits. It will be, therefore, in my opinion, not proper for this Court to ask the petitioner to seek alternative remedy by filing an appeal at this stage. 45. In this view of the matter, the impugned order cannot be sustained. 46. In view of my findings aforementioned, in my opinion, it is not necessary to deal with the other contentions raised at the Bar. 47. The question, which now arises for consideration, is to what relief the petitioner is entitled to in this writ application. 48. There cannot be any doubt that the petitioner was promoted to the grade E-7 on an ad hoc basis in terms of the order of this Court. The said order was subject to the final result of the disciplinary proceedings/result of the writ application, 49. As the order passed by the disciplinary authority is being set aside, the petitioner would be deemed to have been holding the rank of E-7 grade on an ad hoc basis till a final decision is taken by the disciplinary authority. However, I may observe that the disciplinary authority may consider the desirability of not proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings any further in view of the fact that the petitioner is to superannuate on December 31, 1991. If the disciplinary proceeding is kept alive, the services of the petitioner cannot be dispensed with and an appropriate order in that regard has to be passed. 50. However, the question as to whether the petitioner was fit to be promoted to the post E-7 grade is yet to be considered by the departmental promotion committee. In terms of the rules, the post of E-7 grade being selection post, the suitability of the petitioner to hold the said post must be judged by the departmental promotion committee. 51. In the event, therefore, the disciplinary authority in his considered opinion, thinks fit not to proceed any further in the matter of disciplinary proceeding as against the petitioner, the departmental promotion committee may consider as to whether the petitioner was entitled to be promoted in E-7 grade and with effect from what date, keeping in view the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India V/s. K.V. Jankiraman, 1991 2 LLJ 570 (supra) 52. I hope and trust that the respondents shall act promptly in this regard and shall pass necessary order as early as possible. 53. In the result, this application is disposed of with the aforementioned observations and directions. 54. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.