JUDGMENT - HALBE A.A., J.:—This order would dispose of all these criminal applications as they arise out of the same set of facts. The common grievance in all these applications is that the trial Court did not impose the minimum prescribed sentence of imprisonment and hence the delay in presentation of revisions should be condoned and that the revisions should be heard on the point of sentence only as the convictions are based on the plea of guilt of the respondent. 2. Criminal Application No. 825/1991 is filed in Criminal Revision Application No. 243/1990 by the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Nanded against the conviction of the respondent for offences punishable under sections 276-C and 277 of the Income Tax Act wherein on the plea of guilt, the respondent was convicted for the above offences and sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-. In Criminal Application No. 826/1991 filed in Criminal Revision Application No. 244/1990, the grievance of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Nanded is that although the respondent was convicted for the above offences and sentenced to Simple Imprisonment and fine of Rs. 750/-, the sentence was not proper inasmuch as under the above provision, there is a prescribed minimum period of imprisonment. The same grievance is made in Criminal Application No. 827/1991 filed in Criminal Revision Application No. 245/1990. All the above applications have been filed for condonation of delay of about five months and the common ground that has been canvassed in all these applications is that the office of the petitioner-Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax got the trace of the conviction very late in all the matters and that thereafter the office took steps expeditiously and filed the revision applications on 27-12-1990. 3. Few facts deserve to be noted in all the cases. The respondent is common in all the applications and it seems that in various years, he filed returns about income which were patently false. He had concealed his income and that is why he was prosecuted for the above offences. In Criminal Revision Application No. 243/1990, there was evasion of tax of Rs. 11,871/- and in Criminal Revision Application No. 244/1990 there was evasion of Rs. 6,026/- and in Criminal Revision Application No. 245/1990, there was evasion of Rs. 3,189/-, It seems that the concerned authorities had imposed penalty in all these matters. In Criminal Revision Application No. 243/1990, there was evasion of tax of Rs. 11,871/- and in Criminal Revision Application No. 244/1990 there was evasion of Rs. 6,026/- and in Criminal Revision Application No. 245/1990, there was evasion of Rs. 3,189/-, It seems that the concerned authorities had imposed penalty in all these matters. However it is not in doubt that the respondent paid all the penalty amount. He was prosecuted for the above offences under sections 276-C and 277 of the Income Tax Act and on the plea of guilt, respondent was sentenced to suffer Simple Imprisonment till rising of the Court and to pay fine of Rs. 750/- on each count in Criminal Revision Applications Nos. 243/1990 and 245/1990 and Rs. 1000/- on each count in Criminal Revision Application No. 244/1990. 4. The other undisputed facts are that the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate delivered the judgment in all these cases on 25-4-1990. The limitation under Article 131 of the Limitation Act being 90 days expired on 24-7-1990. It seems that the Department of Income Tax applied for certified copies of the order on 29-10-1990 and the report shows that the copies were delivered on the same day. However the revision applications before this Court were actually filed on 27-12-1990. Obviously, therefore, there was on record delay of about five months. 5. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that the question of limitation should be construed liberally in view of the catena of the decisions delivered by the Supreme Court as also by this Court and that the delay in these cases should be condoned. Here is a question about minimum imprisonment which the Court is bound to impose. The trial Court was pleased to let off the respondent in all cases by imposing imprisonment till rising of the Court. Where the public good is involved, the will of the Parliament must be given effect and the offender must be brought to book by imposing an appropriate sentence of imprisonment. Such questions, therefore, cannot be by-passed only on the technical ground of limitation. He has squarely relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1353 in the case of (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Such questions, therefore, cannot be by-passed only on the technical ground of limitation. He has squarely relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1353 in the case of (Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji others)1, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 897 in the case of (C. Ramegowda v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer)2, 1986 Mh.L.J. 483 in the case of (State Bank of India v. Javed Textiles)3. The learned Advocate for the respondent-accused has also relied on the same rulings but has added one more ruling being A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 733 in the case of (Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujarat)4. 6. The learned Advocate for the respondent has contended that this is a case of negligence on the part of the Department which if condoned, would land the respondent in higher punishment namely the imprisonment; that as a matter of fact, the trial Court, on proper appreciation of facts and law, was pleased to take the liberal view. According to him, there is a sort of vested right which has accrued in favour of the respondent-accused which now cannot be liquidated by condoning the delay. He has lastly contended that while construing the provisions relating to limitation under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court must be satisfied that there is sufficient cause to condone the delay. Ultimately the discretion is left with this Court as suggested in A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 361 in the case of (Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd)5. 7. It is indeed true that the Supreme Court, while considering the question of limitation in relation to the land acquisition matters, was impressed by the argument that there is a collective good of the public involved in the matters of compensation. If the Courts below took unreasonable view in awarding the compensation, the question of limitation making grievance against those awards would certainly pale into insignificance. The larger good of the public cannot be overlooked or ignored simply on the touchstone of limitation. However at the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that the facts of each case have weighed the mind of the Court and the Court has not been able to frame all purpose formula to consider the questions of limitation. In A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1353 in the case of Collector v. Mst. However at the same time, it cannot be lost sight of that the facts of each case have weighed the mind of the Court and the Court has not been able to frame all purpose formula to consider the questions of limitation. In A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1353 in the case of Collector v. Mst. Katiji, the facts were very peculiar inasmuch as the Court was pleased to raise the compensation by 800% namely from Rs. 1000/- per canal to Rs. 8000/- per canal. In that case, the delay was of about 4 days and the Court felt that although the doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even handed manner, there is no warrant for according a step motherly treatment when the State is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In fact on account of an impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file pushing and passing on the buck ethos, delay on part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In any event, the State which represents the collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant non grata status. So also the approach of the Courts must be to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to the approach which scuttles a decision on merits. The Court was pleased to enunciate about this proposition in view of peculiar facts which justify the condonation of delay. 8. In A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 897 in the case of G. Ramegowda, the Court was pleased to view the matter on the same lines. That matter also related to the compensation. The compensation was raised from Rs. 58,000/- per acre to Rs. 1,45,200/- per acre. There the delay was fairly long but the Court observed that in litigations to which Government is a party, there is some aspect which perhaps cannot be ignored. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of the Government are collective and institutional and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. If appeals brought by Government are lost for such defaults, no person is individually affected; but what, in the ultimate analysis, suffers is public interest. The decisions of the Government are collective and institutional and do not share the characteristics of decisions of private individuals. However the Court highlighted in following words— “If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bona fides on the part of the party or its Counsel, there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time barred appeal.” According to the Court, although sufficient cause under section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, the question of negligence can not be side-lined. 9. In 1986 Mh.L.J. 483 in the case of State Bank of India, the Court was pleased to observe that public institutions like Bank should not be treated on par with private individuals and institutions. The Court observed that the public institutions should not be hamstrung by any period of limitation, because the Court felt that if the limitation is insisted upon, the unscrupulous persons may make a regular business out of deliberate delay in taking appropriate legal proceedings against the debtors. 10. The underlying idea in all these cases is that in the matters of Government, public institutions etc. the Court must take liberal view on the point of limitation firstly because the public and collective good is involved and secondly because the public institutions have infirmities of cumbersome bureaucratic approach. 11. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that in this case, there is full justification to condone the delay. The Department did not know about the decision. As soon as the Department came to know about it, the Assistant Commissioner moved the Commissioner of Income Tax at Nasik and obtained the consent and immediately thereafter, steps were taken to file the proceedings. He has contended that tax evasion is a serious matter. Offenders of those offences cannot be let off liberally. 12. Now in the first instance, it will have to be observed that in the matters of civil litigation, the approach of the Courts has been found to be liberal inasmuch as the liberty of the individual is not involved but collective good is uppermost. However civil litigation cannot be equated with criminal litigation. 12. Now in the first instance, it will have to be observed that in the matters of civil litigation, the approach of the Courts has been found to be liberal inasmuch as the liberty of the individual is not involved but collective good is uppermost. However civil litigation cannot be equated with criminal litigation. Civil litigation is governed by the principles of preponderance of probabilities while in criminal matters, the guiding principle is the principle of reasonable doubt. Obviously, therefore, the basic approach in both types of litigations is altogether different. In the result, in the matters of civil litigation, the parties suffer pecuniary or property loss but in case of criminal matters, the party suffers incarceration and imprisonment. Integrally connected with this is the question of liberty of individual. If the liberty of individual is likely to be jeopardized on account of negligence of the prosecuting agency, the prosecuting agency cannot be heard in defence to say that the delay has been caused on grounds which can be adequately explained. The recent judicial trends are that prosecutions are quashed when there is undue delay in presentation of charges before the Courts. Hence while considering the question of limitation in the matters of criminal cases, the Courts will have to strictly view the question of limitation and shall have to examine as to whether there was total failure of justice in the matter. If it is prima facie shown that there is total failure of justice, then alone this Court would be at liberty to ignore the period of limitation and remedy the failure of justice. 13. In case of unwarranted acquittal, the Court can say that there was failure of justice and can ignore question of limitation. But when the question of jurisdiction of Court is involved and the same has not been agitated in criminal case, the Courts have taken a view that there is no failure of justice. Similarly if the question of sentence is involved and if there is breach in that behalf, the Courts are not inclined to view such failure as failure of justice. 14. Now in these cases, the facts themselves are self eloquent. It is admitted in all these applications that the judgment was delivered on 25-4-1990. The limitation as indicated, expired on 24-7-1990. 14. Now in these cases, the facts themselves are self eloquent. It is admitted in all these applications that the judgment was delivered on 25-4-1990. The limitation as indicated, expired on 24-7-1990. Before the limitation expired, it is admitted in the delay condonation applications that the petitioner came to know about the judgment in June, 1990. Surprisingly enough, no steps were taken immediately to obtain the copy of the order. Again it cannot lie in the mouth of the petitioner to say that for the first time, they came to know about the judgment in the month of June when as a matter of fact, the cases were decided towards the end of April, 1990. It is not the say of the petitioner that they were not defended by the appropriate Prosecutor before the Chief Judicial Magistrate. There is no submission in that behalf and hence the averment that the Assistant Commissioner came to know about the judgment as late as in June, 1990 cannot be swallowed. 15. However even if that fact is taken to be true, no reason is explained as to why the process of filing application for copy was delayed right upto October, 1990. A faint attempt has been made to show that the Commissioner of Income Tax had to consent. I am afraid that the period spent in obtaining the consent cannot be deducted from the period of limitation and such is the view expressed by the Nagpur Court in (A.I.R. 1940 Nagpur 259)6, wherein it is observed that the time spent in praying to move the District Magistrate to prefer an appeal against the acquittal would not be deducted. 16. Extending the same analogy here, it can be certainly observed that the time taken by Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax in obtaining the consent of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Nasik cannot be deducted. It would be also seen that in spite of the admission on the part of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax that the judgment came to his knowledge in June, 1990, the applications for obtaining copies were filed on 29-10-1990 and copies are shown to have been delivered on the same day. Revision applications were however filed on 27-12-1990. This delay is also not explained by the petitioner. The Assistant Commissioner has tried to justify this delay by stating that the copies were obtained on 30th October. Revision applications were however filed on 27-12-1990. This delay is also not explained by the petitioner. The Assistant Commissioner has tried to justify this delay by stating that the copies were obtained on 30th October. 1990 and within his knowledge the appeal to the High Court could be filed before 20-12-1990. This is a totally erroneous view about limitation. Such ignorance of law cannot be countenanced. The dates would clearly indicate that there has been an inexcusable delay on the part of the petitioner to file the revision applications. 17. In A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 733 in the case of Ajit Singh Thakur v. The State of Gujarat, the Supreme Court, while dealing with the question of delay in criminal trials, has been pleased to observe that sufficient cause should be referable to the period prior to the expiry of limitation but not thereafter. It would be seen here that although the Income Tax Department came to know about the judgment in the month of June, no steps were promptly taken to obtain the copies and to file the petitions in the month of July, 1990 subject to the period spent in obtaining the copies. This having not been done, there is no reason to condone the delay when the delay is of about five months. 18. It would be obvious that in the event of the revision being admitted, the respondent would be exposed to higher punishment of imprisonment prescribed under the above section. As indicated above, the prosecuting agency cannot be allowed to take advantage of its own negligence. 19. For all these reasons, I see no merit in any of the condonation applications which are hereby dismissed. Parties are however left to bear their own costs. Applications dismissed. -----