Judgment : 1. The petitioner in both these writ petitions is one Perarivalan and he has filed these writ petitions for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus for directing the respondent to produce the body of the petitioner before this Court and to set him at liberty. 2. The admitted facts are, that in respect of the occurrence on 21.5.1991 at Sriperumbudur relating to the assassination of the former Prime Minister Sri Rajiv Gandhi and others, a case in Crl.No.329 of 1991 of Sriperumbudur Police Station was registered on 22.5.1991 under Secs.302, 307 and 326, I.P.C. read with Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. Subsequently, the case was taken up for further investigation on 24.5.1991 by S.P.E./C.B.I./S.C.B., Madras which registered Crl.R.C.No.9/S/91 under the same sections of law. On 31.5.1991 further sections of law were included in the F.I.R. viz., Sec.120-B, I.P.C., and Sec.3 of the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, hereinafter called the Act. During the course of investigation the petitioner was taken into custody and was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Cherigai-Anna District at Chengalpattu on 19.6.1991 and on the same day the Magistrate remanded the petitioner to judicial custody till 3.7.1991. 3. Mr.S.Doraisami, learned counsel for the petitioner in the first place contended that on 19.6.1991 the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu has ordered remand of the petitioner to judicial custody upto 3.7.1991; the petitioner ought to have been set at liberty on 3.7.1991. Any custody beyond 3.7.1991 is illegal custody and, therefore, the petitioner is entitled to be set at liberty. There is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner was produced before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu on 19.6.1991 and the Magistrate remanded the petitioner to judicial custody for 15 days from 19.6.1991. On the sameday, the respondent filed an application before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu under Sec.167, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, read with Sec.20(4)(b) of the Act, praying for police custody of the petitioner for a period of 30 days. The Magistrate after perusing the records and the affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, S.P.E./C.B.L, Madras, after recording the sworn statement of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, S.P.E., and after satisfying himself that the petitioner should be remanded to police custody remanded the petitioner to police custody for 30 days i.e., till 18.7.1991. The Magistrate after perusing the records and the affidavit filed by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, S.P.E./C.B.L, Madras, after recording the sworn statement of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, S.P.E., and after satisfying himself that the petitioner should be remanded to police custody remanded the petitioner to police custody for 30 days i.e., till 18.7.1991. It is also represented that on 18.7.1991 the designated Court has extended the police custody of the petitioner for another 30 days. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner is kept under illegal custody by the respondent from 3.7.1991. 4. The second contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that when the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu on 19.6.1991 passed an order remanding the petitioner to judicial custody for 15 days, the Magistrate on the same day before the expiry of the said period of 15 days cannot pass another order for police custody of the petitioner for 30 days and, therefore, the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu directing police custody of the petitioner is invalid and consequently the police custody of the petitioner is illegal. We are unable to accept this contention of the petitioner also. The original F.I.R. in Crl.R.C.No.9/S/91 S.C.B./C.B.I/S.P.E./Madras, was registered on 24.5.1991 under Secs.302, 307 and 326, I.P.C., and Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosives Substances Act on the basis of the F.I.R. registered in Sriperumbudur Police Station in Cr.No.329 of 1991 on 22.5.1991. The materials on record disclose that during the course of investigation by the C.B.I./S.P.E, evidence has been collected, which disclosed the commission of offences punishable under Sec.l20-B, I.P;C, and Sec.3 of the Act. Hence the offences under these sections of law were incorporated in the F.I.R. and the same was duly intimated to the Chief Judicial Magistrates Court, Chengalpattu on 31.5.1991. The evidence collected during the course of further investigation in this case led to disclosure of commission of offences punishable under Secs.4 and 5 of the Act. Consequently, the offences under Secs.4 and 5 of the Act were also incorporated in the F.I.R. and the same was also intimated to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, at Chengalpattu on 10.7.1991. Consequently, the offences under Secs.4 and 5 of the Act were also incorporated in the F.I.R. and the same was also intimated to the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, at Chengalpattu on 10.7.1991. Sec.20(4) of the Act reads as follows: “Sec. 167 of the Code shall apply in relation to a case involving an offence punishable under this Act or any rule made thereunder subject to the modifications that (a) the reference in Sub-sec(1) thereof to ‘judicial Magistrate’ shall be construed as a reference to ‘Judicial Magistrate’ or Executive Magistrate or Special Executive Magistrate”; (b) the reference in Sub-sec(2) thereof to “fifteen days”, “ninety days” and ‘sixty days” wherever they occur, shall be construed as references to “sixty days” “oneyear” and “oneyear” respectively.” As already pointed out, on 19.6.1991 the petitioner was remanded to judicial custody for 15 days. On the same day the respondent filed separate application under Sec.167, Crl.P.C, read with Sec.20(4) (b) of the Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu praying for police custody of the petitioner for 30 days. By virtue of the powers conferred by Sec.20(4) of the Act, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, ordered police custody of the petitioner for 30 days. Therefore, there is no illegality in the order dated 19.6.1991 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu, granting police custody of the petitioner even before the expiry of the period of the judicial custody. 5. Thirdly Mr.S.Doraisami, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the respondent cannot invoke Secs.3, 4 and 5 of the Act and register a case under those sections also because the incident that took place on the date of occurrence is not a terrorists act intended to overawe the Government and that the materals on record are not sufficient to charge the pel itioner under Secs.3 to 5 of the Act. The learned counsel further contended that the Act can be invoked only when the law enforcing machinery fails and there is no material in this case to show that law enforcing machinery has failed. In support of his third contention the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions in Dilavar Hussain v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 56, State of Maharashtra v. Anan Chintaman Dighe, (1990)1 S.C.C. 397 and Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 922. In support of his third contention the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the decisions in Dilavar Hussain v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 56, State of Maharashtra v. Anan Chintaman Dighe, (1990)1 S.C.C. 397 and Usmanbhai v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 922. The above contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not warranted by the language of Sec.3(1) of the Act which reads as follows: “Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror in the people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or thing by using bombs, dynamte or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or firearms or other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to cause or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or damages to, or destruction of, property or disruption of any supplies or services essential to the life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act, commits a terrorist act.” Sec.3(1) is not confined only to a terrorist act intended to overawe the Government. Sec.3(1) also covers an act of a person who with an intent to strike terror in the people or any section of the people, uses bombs, dynamites or other explosive substances etc., in such manner as to cause or is likely to cause death of, or injuries to any person or persons etc. As already pointed out, inasmuch as the evidence collected in this case by the respondent during the course of investigation disclosed the commission of offences under Secs.3, 4 and 5 of the Act also, the said sections were also incorporated in the F.I.R. for the purpose of further investigation and the same was also duly intimated to the Chief Judicial Magistrates Court, Chengalpattu. Further in the application dated 19.6.1991 submitted by the respondent requesting the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu to remand the petitioner and another to judicial custody, it is specifically stated as follows: “A case in R.C.No.9/S/91/S.P.E., Madras, under Secs.302, 307, 326, I.P.C. and Secs.3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act was registered on 24.5.1991 against unknown persons and the original F.I.R. was submitted to the Hon’ble Court. On 31.5.1991 based on further evidence collected, the offences punishable under Sec.120-B, I.P.C. and Sec.3 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, were also incorporated and the same was duly informed to this Hon’ble Court.” It is further stated in the remand report that the petitioner and another were found to be active coconspirators with other accused viz., A-1 to A-4 and others in the commission of the offence alleged against them. Admittedly in the present case several innocent persons including former Prime Minister Shri Rajiv Gandhi were killed and several other innocent persons were injured. In Niranjah Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja Niranjah Singh Karam Singh Punjabi v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja , 1990 Crl.L.J. 1869 the Supreme Court while holding that offences committed with intention to eliminate rivals to establish supremacy in the under world do not constitute Terrorist Act observed as follows: “It would have been a different matter if to strike terror some innocent persons were killed. In that case the intention would be to strike terror and the killings would be to achieve the objective.” The principles laid down in the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner will not in any way support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent cannot invoke Secs.3, 4 and 5 of the Act cannot be countenanced. This viewof ours is fortified by the two decisions of the Supreme Court in Kathula v. State of Andhra Pradesh, “1991”1 Scale 838and Erram Santosh Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, “1991”1 Scale 846. 6. In view of the above discussion of ours, it has to be held that the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu dated 19.6.1991 remanding the petitioner to police custody is legal and proper and the custody arising out of that order cannot be held as illegal custody. 6. In view of the above discussion of ours, it has to be held that the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chengalpattu dated 19.6.1991 remanding the petitioner to police custody is legal and proper and the custody arising out of that order cannot be held as illegal custody. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief in these writ petitions and they are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the writ petitions are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.