M. W. DEO, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the order of IInd Additional Judge to the court of District Judge, Indore setting aside temporary injunction granted by the trial court despite refusing to consider the question on merits. ( 2 ) THE relevant facts may be briefly stated thus : The petitioners No. 1 and 2 are owners of Plots No. 238 and 239 situated at Lok Manya Nagar, Indore, flanking the disputed open plot of land over which there is a public road, drainage line of the houses of petitioners and a common man whole of the sewage line. The respondent No. 1 wants to convert this open plot of land into residential plot and sell it. ( 3 ) THE petitioners filed a Civil Suit for declaration and permanent injunction based on their rights of easements over the disputed open plot of land. ( 4 ) THE petitioners moved an application under Order XXXIX, Rule 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short 'the Code') and obtained a temporary injunction (Annexure- 'p-8' to the petition) in the trial court restraining the respondents from changing the user of the plot pendente lite. ( 5 ) IT is to be noted that the respondent No. 1 had filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11 (d) of the Code before the trial court contending that the suit was barred under Section 64 read with Section 82 of the M. P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (for short 'the'act') and, therefore, the plaint be rejected. The contention was disallowed by the trial court. ( 6 ) THE respondent No. 1 took an appeal against this order granting temporary injunction. The appellate court by the impugned order (Annexure 'p-9' to the petition) first answered the question under Order VII, Rule 11 (d) of the Code holding that the suit was not maintainable in view of Section 64 of the Act and then refused to consider the question of temporary injunction and yet set aside the same. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner rightly attacks the view in the impugned order (Annexure'p-9') that Section 64 of the Act is wide enough to include the question of easementary rights of the petitioners. The relevant portion of Section 64 of the Act is extracted below :"64. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner rightly attacks the view in the impugned order (Annexure'p-9') that Section 64 of the Act is wide enough to include the question of easementary rights of the petitioners. The relevant portion of Section 64 of the Act is extracted below :"64. Dispute, (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any dispute touching the constitution, management or business of a society or the liquidation of a society shall be referred to the Registrar by any of the parties to the dispute if the parties there are among the following: (2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a dispute shall include : (i) A question regarding rights etc. , including tenancy rights between a housing society and its members, and"a plain reading of this section makes it clear that Section 64 ibid does not encompass by any stretch of imagination, a dispute about easementary rights of the petitioners vis-a-vis their house as owners of dominant heritage. The language and words of Section 64 (1) ibid clearly express the scope and nature of dispute as touching the constitution, management, business or liquidation of a society. Under sub-section 64 (2) (iv) of the Act, the dispute may also include tenancy rights between a housing society and its tenants or members. The learned Judge while passing the impugned order, clearly misread Section 64 so as to include a dispute about easementary rights claimed by the petitioners in the suit in support of their prayer for giant of temporary injunction. It is precisely on account of this misreading that he arrived at a conclusion which Section 64 ibid cannot bear. ( 8 ) REFERENCE to decision in Madhavrao Kulkarni (Misc. Petition No. 1543 of 1991) was wholly misplaced as the subject-matter in that case was about cancellation of allotment of a plot in favour of a person. Such a subject was held to be squarely within the meaning of Section 64 and rightly so. ( 9 ) ONCE it is held that the dispute in the present suit related to easementary rights claimed by the petitioners and as such the dispute did not fall within the scope and ambit of Section 64 ibid. It follows that the appellate court was bound to consider and decide the question of grant of temporary injunction. ( 9 ) ONCE it is held that the dispute in the present suit related to easementary rights claimed by the petitioners and as such the dispute did not fall within the scope and ambit of Section 64 ibid. It follows that the appellate court was bound to consider and decide the question of grant of temporary injunction. But the learned Judge while passing the impugned order (Annexure 'p-9') abdicated his jurisdiction in refusing to consider this question of grant of temporary injunction particularly when temporary injunction pendente lite was already granted by trial court. Reference may be made to the case of Preetpal Singh, 1988 JLJ 549, wherein it was observed that even assuming that the court has no jurisdiction, the court has power to grant temporary injunction. Similar view was expressed in the case of Shambhudayal, 1986 JLJ 217 . ( 10 ) THE result is that the learned IInd Additional Judge to the court of District Judge, Indore, demonstrably refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law in refusing to consider the question of grant of temporary injunction and yet acted arbitrarily in setting it aside, requiring this court to act in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 11 ) CONSEQUENTLY, the petition is allowed. The impugned order (Annexure-'p-9') is set aside and the temporary injunction pendente lite granted by the learned trial court is restored. It is, however, expected of the trial court that in view of the nature of the Us, it shall dispose of Civil suit expeditiously. In the circumstances of the case, parties shall bear costs as incurred. Petition allowed. .