G. R. BHATTACHARJEE,J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under section 19 (l) (a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is directed against the order of a learned Single Judge of this Court passed on a contempt application in CO. No. 4076 of 1990 wherein the learned Judge held the appellant guilty of contempt and directed him to purge the contempt by making redelivery of possession of the concerned property by a certain date. It was also indicated by the learned Judge that in the event of his failure to comply. with the order the court might be under a painful duty to confine the contemner in civil prison. It is indeed a case of civil contempt. ( 2 ) A preliminary objection has been taken on behalf of the respondents that the appeal is not maintainable on the ground that the impugned order does not impose any punishment for contempt and no appeal lies under the said section 19 against any order passed in any proceeding for contempt except against an order of punishment imposed upon a contemner in terms of section 12 of the Act! Here let us look to the historical background of the contempt jurisdiction exercised by the High Court. Article 215 of the Constitution of India provides that every High Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. Neither the said Article 215 nor any other Article of the Constitution defines what a court of record is nor -delineates what is meant by "all the power of such a court" except making an inclusive reference to the power to punish for contempt of itself out' of the multidimensional powers capsulized within the contours of the expression "all the powers of such a court". As a matter of historical fact the High Court being a superior court has always enjoyed the status of a court of record and has exercised the powers of such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself. It is not difficult to see that Article 215 recognizes the existent powers of the High Court as a court of record rather than creates or confers such power. It is not difficult to see that Article 215 recognizes the existent powers of the High Court as a court of record rather than creates or confers such power. In this connection, we may also refer to the following observations of a Division Bench of this Court in S. K. Gupta v. B. K. Sen, AIR 1959 Cal 106 :"the jurisdiction to punish for its own contempt which this court exercises as a Court of Record is not derived from any statute but arises out of the very fact that it is a Court of Record and that in the case of such a court jurisdiction to punish for its own contempt is an essential auxiliary to the administration of justice". ( 3 ) THE law of contempt has developed as a part of the Common Law. The power to deal with contempt has been treated as an inherent power of a Court of Record. There are decisions of English Courts from early times where the courts assumed jurisdiction in taking committal proceedings against persons who were guilty of publishing scandalous matter in respect of the court itself. The power summarily to commit for contempt is considered necessary for the proper administration of justice (see Brahma Prakash v. State of U. P. , AIR 1954 SC 10 : 1954 Cr. W 238 ). Generally speaking contempt is not regarded as an ordinary offence. Sovereignty of the State is a two dimensional concept. The foreign aspect of this dimension relates to the territorial and political sovereignty of the State which is protected mainly by the armed forces. On the other hand the domestic aspect of this dimension relates to maintenance of law and order within the boundaries of the State. Making of law for the governance of the subjects defining their rights, duties and liabilities inter se as well as vis-a-vis the State itself and the enforcement thereof are acts of the State falling within its sovereignty jurisdiction. The court functioning as the arbiter of legal wrangles and penal awards acts as sentinel of the domestic sovereignty of the State. Without Court which is the adjudication machinery of the State, the administration of law and justice would have been in utter chaos and quandary leading to counter-productive sequels threatening to de-stabilise or attenuate the attributes of domestic sovereignty. The court functioning as the arbiter of legal wrangles and penal awards acts as sentinel of the domestic sovereignty of the State. Without Court which is the adjudication machinery of the State, the administration of law and justice would have been in utter chaos and quandary leading to counter-productive sequels threatening to de-stabilise or attenuate the attributes of domestic sovereignty. Contumacious attack on court, therefore signifies disrespect to the sovereignty of the State, and there lies the historical justification for the assumption of special jurisdiction by superior courts as courts of record to deal with contempts by adopting summary procedure in exercise of their inherent power. The exercise of contempt jurisdiction by court is an exercise of its inherent power flowing from the sovereignty jurisdiction of the State of which it is a functional constituent existing for public good. Truly speaking, the contempt jurisdiction of the court is the confluence of the twin streams of judicial care, namely, the Court's concern for public good and its responsibility to uphold the constitutional sovereignty of the State. ( 4 ) ARTICLE 215 of the Constitution does not define or enumerate all the powers which the High Court enjoys as a court of record. It only mentions specifically about the power of the High Court to punish for contempt of itself while it recognises that there are also other powers available to the High Court as a court of record. Some of the incidents of a court of record are that it has, the power to determine questions about its own jurisdiction and it has also the inherent power to punish for its contempt summarily by adopting its own procedure provided the procedure is fair. It will thus be seen that the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court is not confined only to award of punishment for contempt of itself, A three Judge Bench of Supreme Court in Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh, AIR 1954 SC 186 : 1954 SCR 454 has held that the power of a High Court to institute proceedings for contempt and punish where necessary is a special jurisdiction which is inherent in all courts of record. It is thus evident that the power to initiate or institute a proceeding for contempt is also a power which the High Court exercises as its inherent power as a court of record and such power is also therefore envisaged in Article 215 as much as the power to punish for contempt of itself. In other words the power to institute a proceeding for contempt also seems to be within, and not outside, the sweep of Article 215. ( 5 ) APART from Article 215 there is another omnibus provision engrafted in Article 215 of the Constitution which also may have something to do with the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court, Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and to the provisions of any law that may be made by a competent legislature, Article 225 protects the existing jurisdiction of the High Court as it possessed immediately before the commencement of the Constitution in relation to the administration of justice in the court. The contempt jurisdiction as exercised by the High Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution also apparently seems to be covered by the ambit of the omnibus Article 225 in which case this jurisdiction will be 'subject to the provisions of any law that may be made by a competent legislature. A question may still arise whether the omnibus provision of Article 225 will apply to the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court so as to expose it to the possibility of being curtailed to any extent by ordinary legislation in future, when there is a specific provision dealing with the matter in Article 215. The constitutional guarantee regarding the powers of the High Court inherent in it as a court of record, as contained in Article 215, is rather absolute in term and is not subject to any ordinary legislation, irrespective of the question whether this constitutional guarantee comes by way of recognition or by way of pant of contempt jurisdiction. The Contempt of Courts Act. , 1971 which is a piece of post-Constitution legislation declares in its preamble the object of the enactment as 'to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempts of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto'. The Contempt of Courts Act. , 1971 which is a piece of post-Constitution legislation declares in its preamble the object of the enactment as 'to define and limit the powers of certain courts in punishing contempts of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto'. A question is likely to crop up as to whether an ordinary legislation like the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 can limit the powers of High Court in punishing contempts of court as it purports to do in derogation of the provisions of Article 21. 5 of the Constitution and whether such enactment or so much of it as may, if at all, purport to limit the jurisdiction of the High Court guaranteed by Article 215 is ultra vires. However these questions not having been raised before us by any of the parties we do not propose to embark upon any consideration of the same. ( 6 ) INCIDENTALLY it may be pointed out hero that the High Court's power to punish for contempt of subordinate courts has not been specifically mentioned in Article 215 although the power to punish for contempt of itself has been mentioned. It appears that earlier there was some doubt as to whether the summary jurisdiction of the High Court also extended to punish for contempt of court subordinate to it and in order to resolve and clarify this doubt, the Contempt of Courts Act 1926 expressly gave that power to the High Court. That power also finds place in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Therefore, in interpreting the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 it may be necessary to keep in view this facet of the powers of the High Court that it also exercises summary jurisdiction to punish for contempt of courts subordinate to it although Article 215 of the Constitution only specifically mentions of the High Court's power to punish for contempt of itself and does not expressly or specifically mention of its power to punish for contempt of subordinate courts. Any interpretation of section, 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to the effect that the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt is confined only to cases where punishment is imposed in exercise of the power to punish for contempt (of itself) as expressly mentioned in Article 215 of the Constitution, may lead to the conclusion that no appeal lies where punishment is imposed by the High Court for contempt of a subordinate court and not for "contempt of itself' because what Article 215 expressly says is 'contempt of itself' and not contempt of subordinate courts. ( 7 ) LET us now examine whether the impugned order is appealable under section 19 (1) (a) of the Act although no punishment for contempt has been imposed on anybody by the said order. ( 8 ) SECTION 2 (a) of the Act defines that contempt of Court means Civil Contempt or Criminal Contempt. Section 2 (b) defines 'civil Contempt' as willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. Criminal Contempt has been defined in section 2 (c) of the Act. Section 19 (1) of the Act which makes provisions for appeals runs thus :"19 (1 ). An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt; (a) Where the order or decision is that of a single Judge to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the court ; (b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court ; provided that where the order ,or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. " ( 9 ) IT has been argued on behalf of the respondents that under section 39, right of appeal is confined only to 'order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt'. Reference has also been made to section 12 of the Act, the portion of which as is relevant for our present purpose is re-produced below :"12 (1 ). Reference has also been made to section 12 of the Act, the portion of which as is relevant for our present purpose is re-produced below :"12 (1 ). Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with he which may extend to two thousand 'rupees, or with both ; provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the court. Explanation-An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the, time being in force, no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1) for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit. " ( 10 ) IT has been argued on behalf of the respondents that the expression 'order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt' as used in section 19 ( 1) refers to the imposition of any of the punishments prescribed for contempt in section 12 and the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt is confined to the passing of an order of punishment under section 12 of the Act. The Court, it has been argued, does not exercise the jurisdiction to punish for contempt where no punishment is imposed and consequently any order which does not impose any punishment, although passed in a proceeding for contempt is not appealable under section 19 (1 ). The Court, it has been argued, does not exercise the jurisdiction to punish for contempt where no punishment is imposed and consequently any order which does not impose any punishment, although passed in a proceeding for contempt is not appealable under section 19 (1 ). In this connection, it may however be noticed that section 19 (1) does not say that an appeal lies only against punishment for contempt but uses rather a wider expression that an appeal lies from any order or decision passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The expression 'any order or decision' in this connection purports to connote prima facie a variety of orders or decisions that may be passed by the court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Regarding the import of the expression 'any order or decision' it has been argued that the same relates only to any of the modes of punishment as referred to in section 12 and to nothing else. It has been further argued that the word 'order' as referred to in section 19 connotes an order of fine or imprisonment that may be imposed by way of punishment under section 12 (1) whereas the word 'decision' refers to reasoning that may be recorded by the court for considering in any particular case of civil contempt as to why a line will not meet the ends of justice and why a sentence of imprisonment is necessary as envisaged in section 12 ( 3 ). It has further been argued that the word 'or' in the expression 'any order or decision' is conjunctive and not disjunctive so that the expression 'any order or decision' may be read as 'any order and decision' so as to cover a case falling within the ambit of section 12 (3) where the court considers it necessary to impose punishment under section 12 (3) in a case of civil contempt. The interpretation thus sought to be given in respect of the expression 'any order or decision' seems to be too artificial and is not warranted nor does it seem to be supported by any sound logic. The interpretation thus sought to be given in respect of the expression 'any order or decision' seems to be too artificial and is not warranted nor does it seem to be supported by any sound logic. That the expression 'order or decision' in sub-section (1) of section 19 also includes something other than punishment will appear from a reading of sub-section (2) (a) of section 19 which provides that pending any appeal the appellate court may order that "the execution of the punishment or order appeal against be suspended". If no other order except punishment would have been appealable, there would have been no necessity of using the words 'or order' in the expression quote the execution of the punishment or order appealed against' as used in sub-section (2) (a) of section 19. ( 11 ) IN this connection, we may also refer to the provisions of section 14 which lays down the procedure for dealing with contempt committed in the face of the court. Under the said section a person who is alleged or who appears to have been guilty of contempt committed in the presence or hearing of the court may be detained in custody pending the hearing on the charge of contempt brought against him. Pending determination of the charge the Court is however required to release the contemner on bail under sub-section (4) of section 14 if a bond for such sum of money as the court thinks sufficient is executed with or without sureties or the court may even discharge the contemner, pending the determination of the charge, on his executing a bond without sureties for his attendance, instead of taking bail from him. Now, if the scope of appeal under section 19 is restricted only to punishment imposed under section 12 and to nothing else, then a person who in a given case might have been refused bail under sub-section (4) of section 14 would have no right of appeal against such refusal of bail pending the determination of charge of contempt. The consequence and effect of detention in custody pending determination of charge committing contempt in the face of the court, is virtually the same as the punishment itself and may be even more onerous than a punishment by way of fine alone. The consequence and effect of detention in custody pending determination of charge committing contempt in the face of the court, is virtually the same as the punishment itself and may be even more onerous than a punishment by way of fine alone. To deprive the alleged contemner of the right of appeal even where bail is refused or a bond of excessive sum of money, in a hypothetical case, is demanded for his release on bail will, in our opinion, defeat to a large extent the very purpose, of making provision for appeal to give relief in appropriate cases. It is needless to mention that detention in custody under section 14 pending determination of the charge is not a punishment envisaged under section 12, because such detention is made under section 14 and not under section 12 and also because the pre-requisite of a punishment is the judicial determination of guilt on hearing whereas detention in custody pending determination of charge is a stage anterior to such judicial determination of the charge. There is therefore no scope for argument that detention in custody pending determination of charge is also a form of punishment under section 12 and is therefore appealable under section 19. If it is appealable, as indeed it is, it is so not because it is a punishment which it cannot be, but because it is the consequence of an order (of detention) passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish. An order of attachment of property of the contemner passed under section 17 where the court is satisfied that a person charged under section 15 is likely to abscond or to keep out of the way to avoid service of notice, is also not an order of punishment within the meaning of section 12, bun is fraught with severe consequence. To hold that section 19 is attracted only where any punishment in terms of section 12 is imposed is to deprive appeal against an order of attachment under section 17. To hold that section 19 is attracted only where any punishment in terms of section 12 is imposed is to deprive appeal against an order of attachment under section 17. ( 12 ) WE thus find that there are sufficient and persuasive indications in the provisions of the Act itself for coming to the conclusion that the ends of justice may be defeated in a good number of cases if the words and expressions used in section 19 are not given their natural meanings and if words like 'or order' occurring in the expression 'execution of the punishment or order appealed against' are treated as redundant and surplusage contrary to the established principle of interpretation that no word or expression used 'by the legislature should be taken as redundant or surplusage. To give a restricted meaning to the provisions of section 19 as desired by the respondents will be tantamount to deleting certain words and expressions used by the legislature in section 19 which, we are afraid, cannot be done. ( 13 ) HERE we may look to certain aspects of the law of contempt prevailing before the advent of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In Saibal Kr, Gupta v. B. K. Sen, AIR 1959, Cal. 106 it was observed thus :"it is well settled that the contempt of court may be of two kinds, civil contempt and criminal contempt. When an order made for the benefit of a party is disregarded or violated and the court enforces the order by punishing the delinquent for contempt, it is said that such proceeding is a form of execution and the contempt concerned is of a civil nature. When however, the contempt consists in offering an affront to the court or interfering or tending to interfere with the administration of justice, there is a public wrong and the contempt committed in such form is said to be a criminal contempt. "in re. S. Govind Swaminathan AIR 1955, Mad. When however, the contempt consists in offering an affront to the court or interfering or tending to interfere with the administration of justice, there is a public wrong and the contempt committed in such form is said to be a criminal contempt. "in re. S. Govind Swaminathan AIR 1955, Mad. 121, it has been observed thus :"contempts have been classified into two categories which might broadly be designated civil and criminal contempts, the former comprising those cases where the power of the court is invoked and exercised to enforce obedience to orders of courts and the latter where the act of the contemner is calculated to interfere with the course of justice including libels or insults to judges and publications prejudicing the fair conduct of proceeding in court. In regard to 'civil' contempts courts have held that being civil in their nature appeals lie from orders passed in such cases and the decision of this court reported in Venkatalingam v. Mrutyanjayadu ( AIR 1943 Mad. 541 ) is an instance in point. " ( 14 ) CIVIL contempts have been regarded as remedial (Jekar v. State, AIR 1952 Nag 130 : 1952 Cr. LJ 749 ). A proceeding for civil contempt has been regarded as a form of execution and enforcement of the order alleged to have been violated to the detriment of a private party. In the circumstances, appeal at the instance of the aggrieved party, be he the contemner or the petitioner alleging contempt, against orders that may be passed in a proceeding for civil contempt is not only logical and consistent with the idea of the civil contempt being remedial in nature and a form of execution for enforcement of the court's order, for the benefit of a party but is also compatible with the tenor of treatment of such proceedings in the matter of appeals by courts in the history of judicial approach to the same. Since, however, no appeal was permissible as a matter of general right in case of criminal contempt the Sanyal Committee in its report dated the 28th February, 1963 to the Government of India recommended for making provisions for an appeal as of right from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and in pursuance 'of such recommendation sub-section (1) of section 19 was introduced in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It may be noticed that although the Act distinctly defines civil contempt and criminal contempt and also makes separate prod visions in section 15 as to how the Court can take cognizance of criminal contempt debarring a private party from making any motion for criminal contempt unless he has obtained the written consent of the Advocate-General in the matter while leaving the right of a private party to move the court for civil contempt unaffected and although the Act also makes specific provisions in section 14 for dealing with contempt committed in the face of the court, yet there is a common provision made in section 19 regarding appeal in connection with all sorts of contempt matter, be it civil, criminal or in the face of the court or contempt of a subordinate court. Therefore section 19 will have to be interpretated in a manner which serves the common purpose of appeal from whatever channel the subject matter of appeal may flow in. We must bear this in mind while interpreting' section 19 the language of which is commonly applicable to all cases of appeals whether arising from civil contempt, criminal contempt or contempt in the face of the court or contempt of a sub-ordinate court. We may here reiterate in the above background that by attributing any unduly restricted meaning to the words and expressions used in section 19 we may usher in discriminatory results which are not warranted by the patent and defined sweep of the provisions of section 19. We may here reiterate in the above background that by attributing any unduly restricted meaning to the words and expressions used in section 19 we may usher in discriminatory results which are not warranted by the patent and defined sweep of the provisions of section 19. That in recent times the line of distinction is becoming thinner in the matter of approach towards civil contempt and criminal contempt has been discussed very impressively by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Kuldip Rastogi v. Vishva Nath, AIR 1979 Delhi 202 and we reproduce a small portion thereof which runs thus :"in a book on the law of Contempt by Borrie and Lowe (1973 ed.) there is an interesting and useful discussion between civil and criminal contempt at page 369. The conclusion at page 374 is that the law" of civil contempt has been assimilated with that of criminal contempt, and there now exists very few distinctions between the two. " ( 15 ) THERE are also certain decisions of the apex court which demand attention in this connection. In Baradakanta v. Chief Justice Goti Krisnha Mishra ( AIR 1974 SC 2255 ) the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In that case Baradakanta moved the High Court of Orissa for initiating proceeding for contempt against the Chief Justice and other Judges in their personal capacity. The motion was heard by a Full Bench of three Judges and the Bench held that in its opinion there was no contempt of court committed by the Chief, Justice and the other Judges and in any event, by reason of section 15 sub-section (1) Baradakanta was not entitled to move the High Court for taking action in contempt since he had not obtained consent in writing of the Advocate-General and the Bench accordingly declined to take any action on his motion. Baradakanta then filed an appeal purportingly under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 before the Supreme Court. Baradakanta then filed an appeal purportingly under section 19 (1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 before the Supreme Court. But after a critical analysis the Supreme Court has held at page-2260 that where the court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision would not therefore fall within the opening words of section 19 sub-section (1) and no appeal would lie against it as of right under that provision. We thus find that in the said decision the Supreme Court held the appeal not maintainable because in its view the High Court in refusing to initiate proceeding for contempt prayed for by Baradakanta, did not do anything in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In arriving at the conclusion the Supreme Court also had to examine as to when the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences. because it is only when an order or decision is passed by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt the question of the appealability of such order or decision arises. The Supreme Court on analysing the relevant factors came to the clear and unambiguous conclusion of law at page-2260 that the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. This is a pronouncement of law by the Supreme Court on the point as to when the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences which is the major, premise in regard to any question whether an appeal under section 19 is maintainable, the minor premise in the particular case before the Supreme Court being whether the impugned order refusing to initiate proceeding for contempt would come within the purview of the provisions of section 19. It may be mentioned here that the said decision of the Supreme Court is a decision of a three Judge Bench. It may be mentioned here that the said decision of the Supreme Court is a decision of a three Judge Bench. ( 16 ) IN Baradakanta v. Orissa High Court, AIR 1976 SC 1206 , it has been observed that only those orders or decisions in which some point in decided or finding is given in the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to punish for contempt, are appealable under section 19, but the order under consideration in the said case was not such an order or decision, it being an interlocutory order pertaining purely to the procedure of the court and all that the order in question said was that all the points arising in the case, including the one of maintainability of the proceeding would be heard together. So this decision of the Supreme Court like its earlier decision in 1974 Supreme Court 2255 (supra) does not say that except punishment no other order or decision is appealable under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act,' 1971. On the other hand, it formulates the proposition that only those orders or decisions in which some point is decided or finding is given in the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to punish for contempt are appealable. The distinction between the two Baradakanta cases, it may be noticed, is that in the former one, namely, the one reported in AIR 1974, the appeal was preferred against an order refusing to initiate contempt proceeding while in the later case, namely, the case reported in AIR 1976, the appeal was preferred against an order passed subsequent to the initiation of the contempt proceeding. In the former case the appeal was held not maintainable on the ground that the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of the contempt proceeding and not earlier and in the later case an order which was passed after the initiation of the contempt proceeding but in which no point was decided or tiding was given in the exercise of such jurisdiction was found not appealable, the impugned order in that case being an interlocutory order pertaining purely to the procedure of the Court. ( 17 ) IN Purshatam Dass v. B. B. Dhillon AIR 1978 SC 1014 , it has been held that mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by issuance of the notice under section 17 on prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question and hence an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemner and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right under section 19. It appears, in that case, after the contempt proceeding was initiated under section 15 and a notice was issued to the contemner under section 17 to show-cause as to why he should not be punished under section 15, the contemner preferred an appeal under section 19 (1) and in that connection the Supreme Court held that mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by issuance of notice under section 17 does not decide any question and therefore cannot be appealed against under section 19: In that connection, the Supreme Court also observed that it may be a different matter if the order does decide some dispute raised before it by the contemner asking it to drop the proceeding on one ground or the other, but unless and until there is some order or decision of the High Court adjudicating upon any matter raised before it. by the parties, affecting their rights the mere order issuing the notice is not appealable. by the parties, affecting their rights the mere order issuing the notice is not appealable. The said decision in AIR 1978 SC 1014 laying down that an order initiating proceeding for contempt by a notice issued under section 17 of the Act is not appealable under section 19 was endorsed again by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mario Cabrale Sa, AIR 1982 SC 691 ( 18 ) THE position that emerges in the matter in view of the different decisions of the Supreme Court upto 1982 may be summarised thus : (1) The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference and therefore where the court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt and is therefore not appealable under section 19 ( 1) of the Act ( AIR 1974 SC 2255 ). (2) An order saying that all points arising, in the case, including