ORDER "M.F. Saldanha, J. - The State of Maharashtra has assailed the correctness and validity of the order dated 25.6.1991 passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 10th Court, Andheri, Bombay, in Criminal Case No. 1639/P/88. The trial Court, by this. order, has discharged the accused under section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It is relevant to mention that the Police had filed a charge-sheet with regard to the offences punishable under sections 420, 467 and 468 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code before the trial Court against the two Accused. 2. Though these are offences of some seriousness, it appears from the order passed by the learned Magistrate that he has been swayed by an application filed by the Complainant dated 22.1.1991 before the trial Court which apparently is to the effect that the dispute between the parties had been settled. The law on the point is quite unambiguous and it would normally not have been permissible for the trial Court, particularly in offences relating to forgery of valuable security, to have permitted such an application to be looked at. After the order of discharge was passed and the proceeding came to this Court, the parties appeared before me and the proceeding has been argued at some length on more than one date of hearing. Mr. Lambay, the learned A.P.P., brought it to my notice that after the accused had been discharged that a notice came to be addressed to the Investigating Officer by one of the accused making serious allegations against the Officer. At the hearing, Mr. Pandya, learned advocate representing the accused, informed me that according to the accused the Investigating Officer is guilty of having harassed the accused and he stated that it was for this purpose that the notice was addressed by him. He further informed me that one of the accused is a Government employee and that, as a result of this prosecution, he has had to face certain difficulties at his employment level. On an overall view of the case, I was initially inclined to conclude the proceeding at this stage itself because I did not consider it essential to re open the entire matter if such a procedure was possible. However, Mr. On an overall view of the case, I was initially inclined to conclude the proceeding at this stage itself because I did not consider it essential to re open the entire matter if such a procedure was possible. However, Mr. Pandya has insisted on arguing the matter on merits which he is fully entitled to do, but he was also insistent that, the suggestion put forward by this Court that the entire dispute should be concluded at this level was not acceptable to his clients. It is principally on the basis of this attitude that it has become necessary to decide the matter strictly on the basis of the record, even though as a result of such strict application of the law, it will involve a resurrection of the trial and considerable use of a judicial time. 3. Mr. Lambay, the learned A.P.P., has submitted that the order of the learned Magistrate is incorrect and the argument advanced by him is to the effect that since a prima facie offence is made out, for which purpose he relies on the handwriting expert's opinion, that it was not open to the learned Magistrate while dealing with a non-compoundable case to have discharged the accused. As against this, Mr. Pandya has pointed out to me from the record of the case that the entire proceeding has emanated from the complainant who had alleged that an offence had taken place. He states that the complainant has categorically admitted more than once on affidavit that he has no subsisting dispute and, consequently, that he does not desire that the matter be proceeded with. Though, normally, a Court would not insist on an unwilling litigant carrying on with the litigation, one needs to take a proper view of the public interest angle because if such a procedure were at all to be sanctioned, it would create a dangerous precedent in so far as even in offences of considerable seriousness it would be open to the accused person to compromise the matter with the complainant and thereafter to request the Court to discharge the accused on the ground that the complainant has made up with him. To my mind, such a procedure is against the public interest and, therefore, ought not to be accepted. To my mind, such a procedure is against the public interest and, therefore, ought not to be accepted. To this extent, the learned trial Magistrate also ought not to have acted on the application filed by the complainant because this is a case where the charge-sheet has been put up by the State which is the prosecuting authority and the private complainant in such a case has no jurisdiction to move the Court for a discharge. 4. Mr. Pandya relied on a decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Rajeshwar Prasad v. State1, which related to a situation where an accused had been discharged by a Magistrate who had upheld a plea of alibi. The Patna High Court observed that in dealing with such orders the High Court should not lightly interfere with the same, particularly where the material has been carefully evaluated by the trial Court. The situation before me is entirely different and the case that has been cited has absolutely no relevance to the present proceeding. Mr. Pandya has also placed reliance on an application filed by his client to the Hon.'ble Chief Justice wherein he has pointed out that his client is being harassed and the proceedings are being dragged on for an abnormally long time. He submits on the face of this application that the trial Court has not hurriedly disposed of the application, but that the learned trial Magistrate heard the parties completely, that he has heard the say of the learned A.P.P. and that the submission made before me by the learned A.P.P. to the effect that the Accused has been discharged hurriedly is an, incorrect statement. Mr. Pandya is justified as far as this aspect of the submission is concerned because I find from the record that the learned trial Magistrate did take his time before passing the order. The ground on which I propose to set it aside is not that it was hurriedly passed, but principally. because it was an order that was against public policy and also that it was an order that is not permissible within the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Magistrate indicates that there is some reference to an order passed by the Lok Ayukta. because it was an order that was against public policy and also that it was an order that is not permissible within the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A perusal of the order passed by the learned Magistrate indicates that there is some reference to an order passed by the Lok Ayukta. It appears that one of the Accused, who claims to be a social worker, is in the habit of addressing complaints to various authorities and that in the year 1988, he had addressed a complaint to the Lok Ayukta. The Lok Ayukta appears to have made certain observations which cannot, under any circumstances, be referred to in the course of a criminal trial. The Court before whom these proceedings are decided will take note of this fact. The learned A.P.P. has also pointed out to me that at the time when the proceedings were before the Lok Ayukta that the handwriting expert's opinion was not received and that the record before the Lok Ayukta was incomplete. He submits that had this opinion been considered, there would have been no scope whatsoever for the observations which the Lok Ayukta has made in that order. I am not required to take cognizance of the order passed by the Lok Ayukta but suffice it to say that the entire matter is now before the trial Court and the Presiding Authority of that Court will hear both parties and will pass orders according to law and it is these orders that shall prevail with regard to the facts of the case and not any other orders or observations made by the Lok Ayukta on the basis of the complaint in 1988. 5. In this view of the matter, the Criminal Revision Application filed by the State succeeds. The order of the learned trial Magistrate dated 25.6.1991 is set aside. The rule is accordingly made absolute. Crl. Application No. 2511 of 1991. 6. By this Application, the State of Maharashtra has prayed that the proceedings which were filed before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 10th Court, Andheri, Bombay, be transferred to any other Court. The order of the learned trial Magistrate dated 25.6.1991 is set aside. The rule is accordingly made absolute. Crl. Application No. 2511 of 1991. 6. By this Application, the State of Maharashtra has prayed that the proceedings which were filed before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 10th Court, Andheri, Bombay, be transferred to any other Court. No allegations of any type have been made except the limited submission which is to the effect that since the concerned Magistrate has already taken a particular view with regard to this case that it is in the interest of justice that any other Magistrate should be directed to hear this case. 7. Mr. Pandya, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondents-Accused, has opposed this Application principally on the ground that it has been made at a belated stage. He further submitted that there is no warrant whatsoever for the transfer of the proceedings in so far as no case for a transfer has been made out. The limited issue before me is the question as to whether after the order passed by the learned Magistrate has been set aside by this Court it would be appropriate for the same Magistrate to be directed to hear the matter on merits. It is perfectly legitimate for an application to be made in these circumstances where a Court has expressed a particular view that the trial be placed before some other Presiding Judge. In this view of the matter, I am inclined to allow the Application filed by the State. The learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate shall hear both the parties and shall accordingly assign this case to any other learned Magistrate than Shri S.L. Jondhale, who is the learned Magistrate who has passed orders dated 25.6.1991. The rule is accordingly made absolute and this application is disposed of. Revision allowed. 1. A.I.R. 1953 Pat. 46.