HANUMANTHAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order passed by our brother Justice murlidher rao in writ petition No. 14657 of 1989 on 3-5-1990. ( 2 ) 'via tuta, via inua'. Opt repeated path is good path is an old saying. By adopting this procedure we eould have easily disposed of the matter without straining ourselves unduly. But having regard to the importance of the case coupled with the facts that laxity in arguments had led to incorrect position of law. We strove our best to dwell deeply and explore the proper law to be applied. It may be sheer accident that in a case relating to mining lease, we had ourselves to do a bit of mining arid exploration. With this prefatory note, we set out the matrix of facts. ( 3 ) THE respondent herein filed an application on 4-7-1980 requesting the appellants to grant quarry lease in respect of pink granite in survey nos. 20 and 21 of kudagali village of kanakapura taluk measuring about 300 acres. On receipt of the said application the respondent was asked to appear before the competent authority on 18-9-1980. As no action was taken on the basis of the application dated 4-7-1980 within 3 months in view of Rule 9 (2) of the Karnataka minor minerals concession rules, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the rules) the respondent believed that his application was deemed to have been rejected, because Rule 9 of the rules reads as follows:"9. Grant of quarrying lease. (1) on receipt of an application under Rule 4 the competent officer, on making such enquiries as he deems fit, may sanction the gram of quarrying lease to the applicant or refuse to sanction it; (2) when a quarrying lease is granted under sub-rule (1) the formal lease shall be executed within three months of the order sanctioning the lease or within such further period as the competent officer may allow in this behalf and if no such lease is executed within the aforesaid period, the order sanctioning the lease shall be deemed to have been revoked. (3) the competent officer shall forward to the controlling officer one copy of the quarrying lease as soon as the lease is executed. "hence, he preferred a revision petition before the controlling officer under Rule 61 of the rules. (3) the competent officer shall forward to the controlling officer one copy of the quarrying lease as soon as the lease is executed. "hence, he preferred a revision petition before the controlling officer under Rule 61 of the rules. On 19-12-1980 the said revision petition was allowed directing the appellants to consider his application for lease. On 4-12-1980 the tahsildar, kanakapura, issued 'no objection certificate' to grant quarry lease as requested by the respondent. On 6-1-1981 a notification in qls / 491 / mtj / 1080 - 81 / 9115 was is- sued by appellants granting an area of 100 acres for quarrying. The said notification was produced as Annexure-A to the writ petition. Among many conditions mentioned in the said notification, 2 conditions, viz. , conditions nos. (d) and (i), read as follows:" the grant of the above lease is subject to the terms and conditions mentioned hereunder. (a ). . . . (b ). . . . (c ). . . . (d) the quarrying lease shall be subject to the Provisions of rules in chapter ii of the k. m. a. rules, 1969; (e) (h) (g) (h) (i) the area mentioned above is subject to verification after actual survey and demarcation. (j ). . On 6-6-1981, a corrigendum was issued by appellant-1 as per Annexure-B lo the writ petition informing that the area sanctioned earlier under the notification dated 6-1-1981 should be read as per revised sketch enclosed lo the corrigendum. On 3-7-1981 a report was sent by the senior geologist to appellant-2 informing that the respondent at the time of survey and demarcation desired to have an area of 50 acres/hccts. Only. The said report dated 3-7-1981 is extracted hereunder: government ok Karnataka office of the senior geologist, department of mines and geology, "bangalore division", No. 12, 'amara', 13th cross, 1 hh main, malleswaram, Bangalore-3. Dated: 3-7-1981. To the deputy director, plans, department of mines and geology, Bangalore-1. Sub. : application dated 4-7- 1980 from sri. s. a. rashecd for a quarry lease for pink granite over an area of 300 acres/hects. In s. No. As per sketch of kudagali village, kanakapura taluk. Bangalore district for a period of 10 years. Rcf. : h. o. notification No. Ols / 401 / tnn / 1980 - 81 / 9009, dated 6-1-1981. s. a. rashecd for a quarry lease for pink granite over an area of 300 acres/hects. In s. No. As per sketch of kudagali village, kanakapura taluk. Bangalore district for a period of 10 years. Rcf. : h. o. notification No. Ols / 401 / tnn / 1980 - 81 / 9009, dated 6-1-1981. In the notification under reference, the applicant was sanctioned a quarrying lease for pink granite over an extent of 100 acres/hects. In h. s. No. 20 of kudagali village, kanakapura taluk, Bangalore district. The grantee, at the time of survey and demarcation desired to have an area over an extent of 50 acres / hccts. Only. The area so desired is well within the area notified/applied and was duly demarcated on ground. The relevant survey and demarcation report along with the sketch and consent letter is enclosed herewith. The area so demarcated may pleas be conceeded and necessary corrigendum may be issued. The cost on survey and demarcation is Rs. 40/ -. Yours faithfully, sd/- senior geologist. Copy to Sri g. a. rasheed, No. 360, p. p. block, bannimantapa extension, Mysore district for information with a request to approach the deputy director, plans, department of mines and geology, Bangalore-1 for execution of the lease. Sd/- senior geologist. "on 21-7-1981, the respondent submitted a representation as per Annexure-D to the writ petition to appellate-1 requesting that the lease may be executed and also mentioning that the sketch enclosed to the notification did not disclose the entire land requested by him. As no action was taken on his representation dated 21-7-1981, he thought that in view of Rule 9 (2) of the rules his representation deemed to have been rejected. Thereafter he presented another revision petition on 26-7-1981 requesting to extend the period to execute the lease deed. There was no action taken, he presented the writ petition before this court in the middle of 1989 for the following reliefs:" wherefore it is prayed that this Hon'ble court may be pleased to: (i) issue a writ or mandamus or any other appropriate writ or direction as deemed fit, directing the respondents to execute the lease deed in favour of the petitioner, pursuant to grant of lease as per annexures "a" and "b" in the interest of justice. (ii) issue such other appropriate writ or direction as deemed fit under the circumstances of the case in the interest of justice. "earlier to these proceedings, Rule 3-a of the rules in respect of black granite came to be amended. It reads thus:"3-A. A lease of quarries in respect of black granite to government corporation, etc. (1) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these rules, no lease for quarrying black granite shall be granted to private persons. (2) the state government themselves may engage in quarrying black granite or grant leases for quarrying black granite in favour of any corporation wholly owned by the state government: provided that in respect of any land belonging to any private person, the consent of such person shall be obtained for such quarrying or granting of lease. "this was "further amended with effect from 2-7-1981 making it applicable to pink granite also. The appellants who were the respondents in the writ petition filed their objections objecting to allow the writ petition on the following grounds: a) that the writ petition was highly belated; b) in view of Rule 3-a there is a total ban to grant lease in respect of pink granite to private persons; (c) within 3 months from the date of grant no lease deed was executed and, therefore, the grant was deemed to have been revoked, the relevant paras of the slatemcnt of objections are 2, 4, 5 and 6 which are extracted hereundcr: " the writ pelition is liable to be dismissed for inordinate delay and laches in approaching this honourable court. There is no convincing explanation by the petitioner in explaining the delay. On this ground alone, the writ petition is liable to be rejected. Even in the notification dated 6-1-1981, the petitioner was granted quarrying lease of 100 acres and has not acted in terms of that notification. Therefore, he is not entitled for any relief by this hon'blc court. The petitioner cannot refer the judgment in writ petition No. 29210 of 1981. The principles staled in that writ petition cannot be extended to the petitioner in view of subsequent development in the case. In the mean lime, the minor mineral concession rules were amended by notification dated 23-6-1981. Thereby, Rule 3 (a) was further amended by adding pink granite also. Therefore, there is total prohibition for quarrying of pink granite in favour of private persons. In the mean lime, the minor mineral concession rules were amended by notification dated 23-6-1981. Thereby, Rule 3 (a) was further amended by adding pink granite also. Therefore, there is total prohibition for quarrying of pink granite in favour of private persons. Therefore, the petitioner was not entitled to execute the lease deed. However, the petitioner has also not made any demand there after. He has kept quiet all along and has filed this writ petition after a lapse of nearly 8 years from 1981. The petitioner is not entitled for the reliefs as there is prohibition under the amended Rule 3 (a) of the kmmc rules and this amendment was upheld by this honourable court as reported in 1981 (2) kar. L. j. 595 and the honourable Supreme Court in civil appeal No. 3130 of 1985 and further the similar rules of tamil nadu stale have also been upheld by the Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1981 Supreme Court 711. Since the petitioner has not challenged the Provisions of the amended rules, he cannot be given any relief in this writ petition and he also cannot be treated as existing lease holder. The petitioner has not made any representation on 21-7-1981. The petitioner has not executed the lease deed within 3 months from the date of the notification dated 6-1-1981. The Annexure-A is deemed to have been revoked and he cannot execute the lease deed now after a lapse of 8 years. Further the amended Rule 3 (a) also prohibits the lease of pink granite to private persons. However, the learned single judge without taking into consideration. (i) the prohibition imposed by way of amendment to Rule 3-a of the rules to grant lease in favour of private persons; ii) the inordinate delay in filing the writ petition; iii) Rule 9 (2} of the rules allowed the writ petition. However, the learned single judge without taking into consideration. (i) the prohibition imposed by way of amendment to Rule 3-a of the rules to grant lease in favour of private persons; ii) the inordinate delay in filing the writ petition; iii) Rule 9 (2} of the rules allowed the writ petition. The learned single judge placed reliance on the earlier decision of this court in writ petition No. 29210 of 1981 decided on 4-7-1983 (m/s. Oriental select granites (?) Limited v the state of kamataka and others) wherein a division bench of the court had held thus:" the contention of the petitioner, however, is that the order regarding grant of lease having been passed on the 8th of june, 1981 long before Rule 3-a was amended, the said amendment not having been given retrospective effect, the petitioner is entitled to secure the lease deed in accordance with the order of grant made before the amendment came into force. Such a contention found favour with the learned single judge in writ pelilion No. 11643 of 1979, which is clear from the order made in civil petition No. 272 of 1980 decided on the 10th of november, 1980 by Justice swami. The learned single judge has taken the view that amended Rule 3-a not having been given retrospective effect, if there is an order for grant made prior to such amendment, the grantee is entitled to secure the execution of the lease deed from the concerned authorities. The decision of the learned single judge virtually stands affirmed as an appeal preferred against the said decision, namely, writ appeal No. 430 of 1983, was dismissed at the stage of admission. It is, therefore, clear that the view taken by the learned single judge stands affirmed by a division bench decision of this court in writ appeal No. 430 of 1983. "the learned single judge also placed reliance on some more decisions of this court, viz. , writ petition No. 17865 of 1984; writ appeal No. 1255 of 1986 connected with writ appeal No. 945 of 1986 and thus came to the conclusion that Rule 3-a which came into force on 2-7-1981 had no effect to the lease earlier granted. Accordingly, he allowed the writ petition and directed the appellants to execute the lease deed in favour of the respondent for 300 acres in survey nos. Accordingly, he allowed the writ petition and directed the appellants to execute the lease deed in favour of the respondent for 300 acres in survey nos. 20 and 21 of kudagali village for quarrying granites fixing the time for compliance 4 weeks. ( 4 ) AGGRIEVED by the said Order, the appellants preferred this writ appeal. The grounds of attack to the order of the learned single judge are : (i) the learned single judge erred in not taking into consideration Rule 9 (2) of the rules; (ii) at the time of pendency of the writ petition the amended Rule 3-a was in force which, in fact, had prohibited lease of quarry in respect of black granite and pink granite to private persons; (iii) in the absence of reasonable explanation for the delay in approaching this court, i. e. , 8 years, the learned single judge should not have entertained the writ petition; (iv) the subsequent amendment to Rule 3-a of the rules which came into force with effect from 22-5-1990. It reads thus:"2. Substitution of Rule 3-a.- for Rule 3-a of the Karnataka minor minerals concession rules, 1969, the following Rule shall be substituted, namely: 3-a. Lease of quarries in respect of black and pink granite, etc. (1) notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in these rules, no lease for quarrying black, pink, red, green, yellow or multi-coloured granite shall be granted or renewed : (i) in the case of land belonging to government, except in favour of persons who require them for the existing granite cutting and polishing industry situated in the state of Karnataka or who have a distinct industrial programme for utilisation of the said minor mineral in a cutting and polishing unit within the state of karnataka; (ii) in the case of land belonging to private persons, except in favour of persons who require them for their existing granite cutting and polishing industry situated in the state of Karnataka or who intend to set up industry for cutting raw granite blocks or who have distinct industrial programme for utilisation of the said minor miner in a cutting and polishing unit within the state of karnataka. (2) in the case of areas required for state exploitation, the government themselves may engage in quarrying black, pink, red, green, yellow or multi-coloured granite or grant lease for quarrying of the said mineral in favour of any corporation or undertaking wholly owned by the state or central government. (3) every application for grant or renewal of a lease under this Rule shall be made in form-a to the director of mines and geology and shall be accompanied by a security deposit in the form of a demand draft for a sum calculated at the rate of rupees 1,000 per acre and an application fee of rupees 500 in the form of a demand draft. (4) the director of mines and geology shall scrutinise all the applications received and with his remarks submit: (i) in the case of lease in respect of land belonging to private persons, to the government; and (ii) in the case of lease in respect of land belonging to government, to the committee consisting of commissioner for industrial development and director of industries and commerce, director of mines and geology and deputy secretary to government, commerce and industries department, in-charge of mines, who shall also be the convenor of the committee, (5) the committee shall, on receipt of applications from the director of mines and geology consider them and having regard inter alia, to the Provisions of sub-rule (7), requirement of each applicant depending on the processing facility, if any, in the unit, nature of the industry and the guidelines, if any, issued by the government from time to time, make recommendations to the government. (6) the government shall be the authority competent to grant or renew lease under this rule. (7) selection from amongst the applicants shall normally be made in the following order of preference, namely :- (i) a corporation or undertaking owned or controlled by the state or central government; (ii) persons who have already established granite cutting and polishing unit in the state of karnataka; (iii) persons who have a distinct industrial programme for utilisation of the minor mineral in a cutting and polishing unit within the slate of Karnataka, for the purpose of 100 per cent export; (iv) persons who have a distinct industrial programme for utilization of the minor mineral in a cutting and polishing unit within the state of karnataka. " (8) in the case of applicants who require the minor mineral for their proposed industry, they shall sct up industry in accordance with their industrial programme within a period of twelve months from the date of execution of lease deed; on setting up of industry the lessee shall inform the fact in writing to the government failing which the lease shall be deemed to have been revoked on the expiry of the said period of twelve months. Where the lessee is unable to scl up industry within a said period for reasons beyond his control he may submit before the expiry of said period an application to the government explaining the reasons for the same together with an affidavit and on receipt of such application, the government may on being satisfied that such failure in setting up the industry was due to reasons beyond the control of lessee, revive the lease from such prospective or retrospective dale as it thinks fit but not earlier than the date of lapse of lease. (9) the lessee who is granted with lease or whose lease is renewed under this Rule for using the mineral in his proposed industry shall not commence quarrying operations before the setting up of industry and without obtaining a certificate from the government for commencing quarrying operations. (10) application for grant or renewal of lease shall be disposed of, (i) in the case of an existing industry, within a period of 90 days; (ii) in other cases, within a period of six months; from the date of receipt of applications, failing which the applications shall be deemed to have been rejected. (11) no lease shall be granted or renewed under this Rule for an area exceeding ten hectares in respect of black or green granite, and twenty hectares in respect of pink, red, yellow or multi-coloured granite. (12) no lease under this rule shall be granted for a period exceeding ten years : provided that the lease may be renewed for one more period not exceeding ten years, if the government is satisfied that such renewal is in the interest of mineral development. (13) in the case of a lease in respect of any land belonging to private persons the consent of such persons shall be obtained before making the application. (13) in the case of a lease in respect of any land belonging to private persons the consent of such persons shall be obtained before making the application. (14) before removing or transporting any minor mineral under this Rule, the lessee shall obtain a permit from the director of mines and geology or an officer authorised by him. "for these reasons, the learned Advocate general submits that the writ appeal be allowed and the order of the learned single judge be set aside. ( 5 ) ANSWERING these points, the learned counsel for the respondent, submits that, - (i) the earlier Rule 3-a or the same substituted by the amendment Rule with effect from 22-5-1990 has no application to the case of the respondent, as the said Rule was stayed ; (ii) the scope of Rule 3-a which in fact was explained by this court and also by the Supreme Court in various decisions holding that where lease was granted earlier and lease deed was not executed, Rule 3-a has no application, because Rule 3-a is only prospective and not retrospective; (iii) when lease was granted, execution of lease deed is only a formality; (iv) on the basis of the subsequent applications and the subsequent mistake pointed out, the concerned authorities were satisfied that the lease that was granted to the respondent was not for an area of 50 acres but for an area of 300 acres and, therefore, at the request of the respondent a corrigendum was issued as per anncxure-b to the writ petition; (v) by virtue of the notifications at annexures-a and b the respondent was made to spend huge amount and as such the appellants are estopped from contending that the respondent is entitled to only 50 acres and not 300 acres merely because Rule 3-a prior to substitution was in force; (vi) earlier Rule 3-a had no application to the lease prior coming to effect the said rule. In support of these contentions, the learned counsel for the respondent, relied upon some of the orders of the Supreme Court and also of this court. To cite a few, they are mentioned below: (a) writ petition No. 29210 of 1981 decided on 4-7-1983 (mis. Oriental select granites (p) ltd. V state of kamataka and others), wherein this court observed as extracted above. To cite a few, they are mentioned below: (a) writ petition No. 29210 of 1981 decided on 4-7-1983 (mis. Oriental select granites (p) ltd. V state of kamataka and others), wherein this court observed as extracted above. (b) decision of a division bench of this court in writ appeal No. 1255 of 1986 connected with writ appeal No. 945 of 1986 decided on 28-9-1988 (the director, department of mines and geology, Bangalore and others v M/s. Maheshwari enterprises and another ). (c) decision of this court in writ petition No. 13358 of 1987 decided on 14- 10-1987 (k. s. jithendraiaswamy v deputy director of mines and geology and another ). (d) decision of a division bench of this court in writ appeal No. 1342 of 1986 decided on 22-7-1986 (the director of mines and geology v M/s. Muddeereswara mining industries ). (e) decision of a division bench of this court in writ appeal nos. 880, 899 and 973 of 1984 decided on 22-8-1984 (the state ofkamataka and others v M/s. Muddeereswara mining industries and another ). (f) decision of a division bench of this court in writ appeal No. 2928 of 1986 decided on 25-6-1990 (tejesh minerals enterprises v the state of Karnataka and others ). G) decision of the Supreme Court ins. l. p. No. 10931 of 1989 decided on 22-4-1991 (the director of mines and geology and another v Sri neelakanta sharanappa arsanur) wherein the Supreme Court held as follows :" Rule 3-a was promulgated on 3rd july, 1981 which prohibited grant of mining lease to private individuals in respect of black and pink granite as the same was reserved for state exploitation. But before the Rule was promulgated the respondent was granted lease on 18-5-1981 under the notification published in the gazette. Since the order granting mining lease was passed prior to the promulgation of Rule 3-a, the respondent was entitled to a mining lease. Once an order granting mining lease is issued right accrues in favour of the grantee and the execution of formal lease is only in compliance with legal requirement to make the grant legally enforceable, as was held by this court in gujarat pottery works v b. p. sood controller of mining leases for India and others, 1967 (1) scr 695 . In this view the high court rightly directed the petitioners for executing the lease deed pursuant to the order granting leased dated 18-5-1981. The respondent has been carrying on the mining operations during all this period and the lease will expire within three years. Having regard to these facts and circumstances we find no merit in the petition and it is, accordingly, dismissed. "apart from contending that earlier Rule 3-a had no effect on the lease made in favour of the respondent, in support of another contention a division bench of this court had taken a view that one division bench of this court is bound by the decision of another division bench of this court. Reliance was placed on the following decision, viz. , the decision of the Supreme Court in union of India and another v raghubir singh (dead) by l. Rs. , etc. , 1989 (2) SCC 754 . Regarding the proposition that, when a bench disagrees with another bench of coordinate jurisdiction of the same high court, it must refer the matter to a larger bench, the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in sundarjas kanyalal bhatija and others v collector, thane, Maharashtra and others, 1989 (3) SCC 396 . The relevant discussion is at paras 22 and 23 which read as under:" in our system of judicial review which is a part of our constitutional scheme, it is the duty of judges of superior courts and tribunals to make the law more predictable. The question of law directly arising in the case should not be dealt with apologetic approaches. The taw must be made more effective as a guide to behaviour. It must be determined with reasons which carry convictions within the courts, profession and public. Otherwise, the lawyers would be in a predicament and would not know how to advise their clients. Subordinate courts would find themselves in an embarrassing position to choose between the conflicting opinions. The general public would be in dilemma to obey or not to obey such law and it ultimately falls into disrepute. The tendency of some judges "who win the game by sweeping all the chessmen off the table" is to be deprecated. It is needless to state that the judgment of superior courts and tribunals must be written only after deep travail and positive vein. The tendency of some judges "who win the game by sweeping all the chessmen off the table" is to be deprecated. It is needless to state that the judgment of superior courts and tribunals must be written only after deep travail and positive vein. One should never let a decision go until he is absolutely sure it is right. The law must be made clear, certain and consistent. But certitude is not the test of certainty and consistency docs not mean that there should be no word of new content. The principle of law may develop side by side with new content but not with inconsistencies. There could be waxing and waning the principle depending upon the pragmatic needs and moral yearnings. Such development of law particularly, is inevitable in our developing country. " ( 6 ) IN order to appreciate the rival contentions of both sides, it is proper to bearin mind the effect of earlier Rule 3-a, subsequent Rule 3-a, Rule 9 (2) and some of the conditions prescribed in form e which has to be executed in view of Rule 20 of the rules. ( 7 ) NOW the points for consideration arc : (1) whether the transaction in question attracts promissory estoppel against the government? (2) whether this court can issue a writ of mandamus directing the government to do an act which is prohibited under law? (3) is it proper for this court to entertain a writ petition filed with inordinate delay? (4) whether a division bench can differ from the view taken by another division bench or make a reference to a larger bench? ( 8 ) REGARDING the first point, it is proper to cite the following authorities : (i) central london property trust ltd. V high trees house ltd. , 1956 (1) aer 256, wherein it was held thus: " in each case the court held the promise to be binding on the party making it, even though under the old common law it might be said to be difficult to find any consideration for it. The courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for breach of such promises, but they have refused to allow the party making them to act inconsistently with them. It is in that sense, and in that sense only, that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The courts have not gone so far as to give a cause of action in damages for breach of such promises, but they have refused to allow the party making them to act inconsistently with them. It is in that sense, and in that sense only, that such a promise gives rise to an estoppel. The cases arc a natural result of the fusion of law and equity; for the cases of hughes v metropolitan ry. Co. , (7) (1877) (2 app. Cas. 439), birmingham and district land co. V london and north western ry. Co. , (8) (1888) (40 ch. D. 268) and salisbury v gilmore, (9) [1942 (1) all. E. r. 457], show that a party will not be allowed in equity to go back on such a promise. The time has now come for the validity of such a promise to be recognised. " (ii) union of India and others v mis. Fndo-afghan agencies ltd. , 1968 (2) scr 366 . The Supreme Court held thus :" the government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex-parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation had arisen. (1) whether the schemes for implementing the import trade policy are merely executive or administrative instructions, or are legislative directions as well, depends not on their form, or the method of publication or the source of their authority, but it is their substance that determines their true character. It cannot be assumed merely because the policy is general in terms and deals with the grant of licences for import of goods and related matters, that it is statutory in character. But even if it is only executive or administrative in character, courts have power in appropriate cases to compel performance of the obligations imposed by the schemes upon the departmental authorities. But even if it is only executive or administrative in character, courts have power in appropriate cases to compel performance of the obligations imposed by the schemes upon the departmental authorities. (2) the textile commissioner was not the sole judge of the quantum of import licence to be granted to an exporter and courts are competent in appropriate cases to grant relief, if contrary to the scheme, the government and its officers at their mere whim ignore the promises made by the government and arbitrarily decline to grant the promised import licence to an exporter who has acted to his prejudice relying upon the representation. Where a person has acted upon representations made in an export promotion scheme that import licence upto the value of the goods exported will be issued, and had exported goods, his claim for the import licence for the maximum value permissible by the scheme cannot be arbitrarily rejected. In such a case reduction in the amount of import certificate may be justified on the ground of misconduct of the exporter in relation to the goods exported or on special considerations such as difficult foreign exchange position, or other mailers having a bearing on the general interests of the state. But, where, as in the present case, the scheme provided for the grant of import entitlement of the value and not upto the value, of the goods exported, the textile commissioner should in the ordinary course, grant import certificate for the full value of the goods exported: he may reduce that amount only after the enquiry contemplated by clause 10 of the scheme, that is, enquiry made after giving an opportunity to the respondents and held in a manner consistent with the rules of natural Justice and the basis concepts of Justice and fair-play, (3) executive necessity, if any, does nut release the government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to their detriment especially when the representation in the scheme was not subject to any implied term that the government will not be bound to grant the import certificate for the full value of the goods exported if they deem it inexpedient. (4) the respondents were not seeking to enforce any contractual right: they are seeking to enforce compliance with the obligation which is laid upon the textile commissioner by the terms of the scheme. (4) the respondents were not seeking to enforce any contractual right: they are seeking to enforce compliance with the obligation which is laid upon the textile commissioner by the terms of the scheme. The claim of the respondents was founded upon the equity which arose in their favour as a result of the representation made on behalf of the government in the export promotion scheme, and the action taken by the respondents acting upon the representation. Even though the case did not fall within the terms of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, it was still open to a party who had acted on a representation made by the government to claim that the government should be bound to carry out the promise made by it, though not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by the constitution. " (iii) M/s. Motilal padampat sugar mills co. Ltd. V the state of Uttar Pradesh and others, AIR 1979 SC 621 , wherein the Supreme Court held thus :" doctrine of promissory estoppel has been variously called 'promissory estoppel', 'requisite estoppel', 'quasi estoppel' and 'new estoppel', it is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice and though commonly named 'promissory estoppel', it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The true principle of promissory estoppel seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parlies or not. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. The doctrine of promissory estoppel need not be inhibited by the same limitation as estoppel in the strict sense of the term. It is an equitable principle evolved by the courts for doing Justice and there is no reason why it should be given only a limited application by way of defence. There is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity, it is not necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promisee, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. But if by detriment we mean injustice lo the promisee which would result if the promisor were to recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by acting on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise. If this is the kind of detriment contemplated, it would necessarily be present in every case of promissory estoppel, because it is on account of such detriment which the promisee would suffer if the promisor were to act differently from his promise, that the court would consider it inequitable to allow the promisor to go back upon his promise. In India not only has the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognized as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. Where the government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by article 299 of the constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the Rule of law, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law. Every one is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and Rule of law that the government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned; the former is equally bound as the latter. The government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the Rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee would alter his position relying upon it. But if the government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it why the government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual. But since the doctrine of promissoiy estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the government. If it can be shown by the government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the government to the promise made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would be held bound by the promise made by it. When the government is able to show that in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the government were required to carry out the promise, the could would have to balance the public interest in the government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the government and determine which way the equity lies. Ii would not be enough for the government just to say that public interest requires that the government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the government were required to honour it. The government cannot claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency, nor can the government claim to be the sole judge of its liability and repudiate it on an ex-pane appraisement of the circumstances. If the government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the court what are the subsequent events on account of which the government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the government from the liability; the government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the government from the liability; the government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. It is only if the court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the government , that overriding public interest requires that the government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the court would refuse to enforce the promise against the government. The court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the government, for it is the court which has to decide and not the government whether the government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the Rule of law. The burden would he upon the government to show that the public interest in the government acting otherwise than in accordance with the promise is so over whe lming that it would be inequitable to hold the government bound by the promise and the court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the government to resile from the promise 'on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position' provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable. Where the government owes a duly to the public to act in a particular manner - and here obviously duty means a course of conduct enjoined by law - the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for preventing the government from acting in discharge of its duty under the law. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. It may also be noted that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the government or even a private parly to do an act prohibited by law. There can also be no promissory estoppel againsl the exercise of legislative power. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be applied in teeth of an obligation or liability imposed by law. It may also be noted that promissory estoppel cannot be invoked to compel the government or even a private parly to do an act prohibited by law. There can also be no promissory estoppel againsl the exercise of legislative power. The legislature can never be precluded from exercising its legislative function by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Case law discussed, (1956)1 all. Er 256 and AIR 1968 SC 718 , rel. On. " (iv) lakshmidevi. D. s. v state of kamataka and others, 1981 (2) kar. L. j. 595, wherein this court has held thus :"rule 3-a of kamataka minor minerals concession rules, 1969 made on 5-9-1979 prohibiting lease for quarrying black granite to private person is not ultra vires. Air 1981 SC 711 , rel. On. The principles of promissory estoppel cannot operate in derogation of Rule 3-a. Hence earlier applications made before 5-9-1979 are subject lo Rule 3-a. A renewal stands on the same fooling as an application for a fresh grant and cannot be granted after the Rule came into force. A challenge lo law and administralivc action under the law are not on the same footing as there is a marked distinction between the two. A case of uneven administration of Rule 3-a, offending article 14, Constitution is not made out unless the government and other authorities are shown to have intentionally and systematically administered the same. The government have come forward to rectify the isolated mistakes committed. An illegal order cannot by itself be a ground to hold that petitioners had been picked up for hostile and discriminatory treatment. "from the principles laid down in the above authorities, it is clear that no promissory estoppel could compel the government lo do an act prohibited by law. Similar view has been taken by the supreme courl in AIR 1981 SC 711 . Apart from these, the conduct of the respondent also docs not inspire confidence that he had not waived his request for lease over an area of 300 acres. Similar view has been taken by the supreme courl in AIR 1981 SC 711 . Apart from these, the conduct of the respondent also docs not inspire confidence that he had not waived his request for lease over an area of 300 acres. From (he information gathered it is clear that, though he had initially applied for the grant of lease over an area of 300 acres, he was satisfied with an area of 50 acres and to that extent a sketch was prepared and the area was demarcated as identified by him. The respondent cannol make his claim on the basis of annexure-b, viz. , the corrigendum dated 6-6-1981, which in fact was issued under suspicious circumstances, because there is nothing to show that prior to 6-6-1981 the respondent had requested the appellants to correct the mistake regarding the area of lease. ( 9 ) SECONDLY, the respondent cannot assert that he is entitled for lease of 300 acreson the basis of annexures-a and b to the writ petition in view of Rule 9 (2) of the rules. When Rule 9 (2) of the rules says that, if the lease deed is not executed within 3 months from the date of grant, it is deemed to have been revoked and the proper thing for him to do is to make fresh application instead of filing a revision petition. Now, after waiting for 8 years the respondent approached this court for a writ of mandamus by which lime the lease period itself has almost come to an end. ( 10 ) ONE more instance which was brought to the notice of this court is that the respondent entered into partnership with others under the partnership deed dated 14-8-1981 wherein it is mentioned that he obtained lease only for an area of 50 acres in survey nos. 20 and 21 of kutagalli village. Bui, that may not be very relevant, however, some of the conditions in the notification dated 6-1-1981 (annexure-a to the writ petition), viz. , conditions (d) and (i), also speak about the limited power conferred on the respondent retaining the power of cancellation with the appellants. ( 11 ) REGARDING the second point whether this court can issue a writ directing the government to do an act which is prohibited by law, the answer is 'cannot'. , conditions (d) and (i), also speak about the limited power conferred on the respondent retaining the power of cancellation with the appellants. ( 11 ) REGARDING the second point whether this court can issue a writ directing the government to do an act which is prohibited by law, the answer is 'cannot'. This position has been clear in view of the reasoning given in the following authorities: (a)a. n. sinha v m. c mukherjee, AIR 1956 Calcutta 146, wherein it was held thus:" the period for which the licence was asked for has since expired. It appears that on 6-6-1955 the petitioner had been given liberty to show his circus at rampurhat for the period from 7-6-1955 to 30-6-l968 but he has not been granted license with regard to nalhati. So far as the actual application is concerned which is the subject matter of this Rule, the period having expired, I can not make any order because such order will be infructuous. "b) mis. Narinder chand hem RAJ and others v lt. Governor, administrator, union territory, h. p. and others, AIR 1971 SC 2399 , wherein the Supreme Court held thus :" simla was a part of punjab till reorganisation of punjab in 1966. Simla and two other districts of the former State of Punjab were added on to the union territory of Himachal Pradesh under the punjab reorganisation Act, 1966. Under the Provisions of that Act, the laws in force, immediately before the appointed day namely October 1, 1966, in those districts were to continue in operation till the appropriate legislature or competent authority altered the same. One of the laws that was in force in those areas is the punjab general Sales Tax Act, 1948. Section 6 (1) of that act provides : ' no tax shall be payable on the sale of goods specified in the first column of schedule b subject to the conditions and exceptions, if any, set out in the corresponding entry in the second column thereof and no dealer shall charge sales tax on the sale of goods which are declared tax free under this section. ' till August 31, 1966, Indian made foreign liquor was in schedule b. But on that date the government of punjab in exercise of its powers conferred under proviso to Section 5 deleted Indian made foreign liquor was in schedule b. But on that date the government of punjab in exercise of its powers conferred under proviso to Section 5 deleted Indian made foreign liquor from schedule b and included the same in schedule a to that act. Thus the sale of the said liquor became exigible to sales tax. This was the law in force in punjab when reorganisation took place. Hence simla and other areas which were formerly parts of the state of undivided punjab continued to be governed by that law even after reorganisation which were formerly parts of the state of undivided punjab continued to be governed by that law even after reorganisation. Our attention has not been drawn to any provision in that act empowering the government to exempt any assessee from payment of tax. Therefore it is clear that the appellant was liable to pay the tax imposed under the law. What the appellant really wants is a mandate from the court to the competent authority to delete the concerned entry from schedule a and included the same in schedule b. We shall not go into the question whether the government of Himachal Pradesh on its own authority was competent to make the alteration in question of not. We shall assume for our present purpose that it had such a power. The power to impose a lax is undoubtedly a legislative power. That power can be exercised by the legislature directly or subject to certain conditions, the legislature may delegate that power to some other authority. But the exercise of that power, whether by the legislature or by its delegate is an exercise of a legislative power. The fact that the power was delegated to the executive does not convert that power into an executive or administrative power. No court can issue a mandate lo legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly no court can direct a subordinate legislalive body to enact or not to enact a law which it may be competent to enact. The relief as framed by the appellant in his writ petition docs nol bring out the real issue catling for determination. No court can issue a mandate lo legislature to enact a particular law. Similarly no court can direct a subordinate legislalive body to enact or not to enact a law which it may be competent to enact. The relief as framed by the appellant in his writ petition docs nol bring out the real issue catling for determination. In reality he wants this court to direct the government to delete the entry in question from schedule a and include the same in schedule b. Article 265 of the Constitution lays down that no tax can be levied and collected except by authority of law. Hence the levy of a tax can only be done by the authority of law and nol by any executive order. Unless the executive is specifically empowered by law to give any exemption, it cannot say that it will not enforce the law as against a particular person. No court can give a direction to a government to refrain from enforcing a provision of law. Under these circumstances, we must hold that the relief asked for by the appellant cannot be granted. "apart from the above 2 decisions, it is also proper to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in M/s. Gujarat pottery works private ltd. V b. p. sood and others, AIR 1967 SC 964 which was relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is, in fact, on fact the law laid down is not in favour of the respondent for the reasons given in paras 11, 36 and 37 of the said decision. The paras read as follows :" we are, therefore, of opinion that the lease in favour of jagmal was really granted in December 1939 and that the execution of the lease in november, 1951 was only to give a formal shape to the lease granted much earlier. The lease in suit, therefore, is a lease which comes within the expression 'existing mining lease' within Rule 2 (c) of the 1956 rules. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the agreement dated December 2, 1939 is not a lease and cannot be modified. We are unable to accept this contention. 'the document, though in form an agreement to lease, finally ascertained in terms of the lease, gave the lessee right to exclusive possession immediately and operated as a present demise. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the agreement dated December 2, 1939 is not a lease and cannot be modified. We are unable to accept this contention. 'the document, though in form an agreement to lease, finally ascertained in terms of the lease, gave the lessee right to exclusive possession immediately and operated as a present demise. Counsel submitted that in view of the instrument of lease dated November 3, 1951, there was an implied surrender of the lease, if any, created by the document dated December 2,1939. There is no force in this contention. The lease dated November 3,1951 was not granted in accordance with the rules made under the mines and minerals (regulation and development Act, 1948 and by Section 4 (2) of that act was void and of no effect. The lease dated December 2,1939 is the only subsisting lease and could properly be modified by the controller. The lease was for excavating white clay. In order to bring it in conformity with the act and the rules, its period could be cut down to 20 years from December 2,1939. Actually, the controller cut down the period to 25 years from December 2,1939. The appellant can have no just grievance against this order. " ( 12 ) REGARDING the third point for our consideration touching the delay, we are of the opinion that, even assuming that initially the respondent had some points in his favour, this court and the Supreme Court time and again deprecated entertaining such writ petitions, as the same would confer a benefit on a person who in fact had lost such benefit because of his negligence on the one hand and on the other it may upset the rights of third parties in whose favour some rights have already settled. The authorities are: (a) amrit lal berry v collector of central excise central revenue and others, AIR 1975 SC 538 , wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:" a number of promotions having taken place between 1959 and the filing of the petition in 1971, those who were so promoted and had been satisfactorily discharging, for considerable periods before the filing of the petition, their duties in a higher grade would acquire new claims and qualifications, by lapse of time and due discharge of their new functions so that they could not, unless relief had been sought speedily against their allegedly illegal confirmations and promotions, be equitably equated with the petitioner. The inequality in the equitable balance brought into being by a petitioner's own laches and acquiescence cannot be overlooked when considering a claim to enforce the fundamental right to equal treatment. To treat unequals equally would also violate that right. Although, it may not be possible for the state or its agents to plead an estoppel against a claim to the fundamental right to equal treatment, yet, if a petitioner has been so remiss or negligent as to approach the court for relief after an inordinate and un-cxplaincd delay, he ccntainly jeopardises his claim as it may become inequitable, with circumstances altered by lapse of time and other facts, to enforce a fundamental right to the detriment of similar claims of innocent third persons. What was being really sought by the petitioner was the setting aside of a number of confirmations and promotions which had taken place long before the writ petitions were filed without even making necessary assertions to indicate precisely the occasions on which allegedly illegal confirmations and promotions took place and of which person or persons exactly on each occasion. At lease those who had been promoted could, after a lapse of a number of years to their new posts, be regarded equitably as persons in a new and separate class. The petition is also liable to be dismissed on the ground that the equitable rights of a number of other government servants had come into existence by the laches and acquicsccnces of the petitioner. Further, merely by filing repealed or delayed representations, a petitioner cannot get over the obstacles which delay in approaching the court creates because equitable rights of others have arisen. Further, merely by filing repealed or delayed representations, a petitioner cannot get over the obstacles which delay in approaching the court creates because equitable rights of others have arisen. " (b) hari singh and others v slate of U. P. and others, AIR 1984 SC 1020 : (1984)2 SCC 624 , wherein this is what the Supreme Court held : " at the outset we are of the view that the writ petition filed in july, 1982 questioning the notification issued in january, 1980, after a delay of nearly two and a half years is liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches only. " (c) abhinavodhanda vidya sankarabharati v poonupati ranwyogi reddy and others, AIR 1986 SC 1511 . In this decision, the Supreme Court has held thus :" the writ petition was not maintainable. It was open to the ryots to have gone up in appeal themselves but they did not choose to do so and they submitted to the order of the assistant settlement officer and therefore the order became final in so far as they were concerned. In the appeal filed by the state, the tribunal had only confirmed the order of ihe assistant settlement officer and the ryots were not worse off by the order of the tribunal. Non-service of notice on the ryots did not result in any prejudice to the ryots. In any ease, they could have filed an application for setting aside the order of the assistant settlemenl officer on showing sufficient cuuse for their non- appearance. But that too was not done by the ryots. It was only after a lapse of about 4 1/2 years that they chose to file a writ petition in the high court on the technical pica that no notice had been served in the appeal filed by the state. The writ petition would be liable to be dismissed. " (d) state of m. p. and orhers v nandlal jaiswal and others, AIR 1987 SC 251 . While dealing with delay, the Supreme Court held as follows :" now, it is well settled that the power of the high court to issue an appropriate writ under article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the high court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the high court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this Rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The high court docs not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jui isdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices. The rights of third parties may intervene and if the writ jurisdiction is exercised on a writ petition filed after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect, of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. When the writ jurisdiction of the high courl is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meanwhile is an important factor which always weights with the high courl in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. " ( 13 ) THE last point for consideration is whether a division bench can differ from the view taken by another division bench or make a reference to a larger bench. It is true, the Supreme Court in raghubir singh's case, 1989 (2) SCC 754 , cited (supra), took a view that the division bench of a high court is bound by the decision of another division bench of the same court, further, in sundarjas kanyalul bhatija's case, 1989 (3) SCC 396 (cited supra), the Supreme Court held that when a division bench disagrees with another division bench of the same high court, it must refer the matter to a larger bench. ( 14 ) THE learned Advocate general, who argued in this case for the appellants, in fact agreed with the above principles. So also, we are bound by the said principle. But, what we have to see is whether on fact it can be said that the decisions rendered by this court earlier and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent are applicable to the case on hand and also to see whether some of the points urged in this writ appeal were in fact brought before the division bench of this court while dealing with the earlier writ appeals or writ petitions. The answer is that except bringing to the notice of this court the effect of Rule 3-a at no time either in oriental's case or muddeereswara's case was brought to the notice of the court the effect of Rule 9 (2) of the rules including the scope of issuing a mandamus directing the state to do an act which is prohibited under law as was existing in the case on hand at the time when the writ petition was allowed and a direction was given. Hence, it is to be said that the rulings of this court which in fact affirmed by the Supreme Court and relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent are on facts distinguishable and the points that were urged in this appeal were not urged therein. Thus, the observation or direction made in the said decisions are not applicable to the case on hand. ( 15 ) IT was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent that, when agrant was made, it concludes the contract and execution of lease deed is a mere formality. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in s. l. p. No. 10931 of 1985, dated 22-4-1991 wherein their lordships placed reliance on the decision in gujarat pottery works' case, 1967 (1) scr 695 . The observations made in that case on facts are distinguishable. ( 16 ) UNDER the rules, Rule 20 specifically mentions what are the conditions to be incorporated in the lease deed. Unless those conditions are fulfilled, it cannot be said that the lease is concluded. In view of Rule 20, execution of the lease deed is a mandatory one. As otherwise, mere issuing a notification granting lease in favour of a person will not confer on him any legal right. To say otherwise, under the scheme of the rules the contract of quarrying lease can be said as concluded only when the lease deed is executed and not otherwise. ( 17 ) IN view of the legal position explained above, it is to be said that all the content ionsraised by the respondent in respect of the order of the learned single judge deserve to be held as untenable. ( 17 ) IN view of the legal position explained above, it is to be said that all the content ionsraised by the respondent in respect of the order of the learned single judge deserve to be held as untenable. ( 18 ) FOR the above reasons, the stand taken by the learned single judge in writ petition No. 14657 of 1989 is to be said as incorrect. ( 19 ) ACCORDINGLY, this writ appeal is allowed and the order of the learned single judge including the direction issued to the appellant to execute the lease deed in favour of the respondent is set aside. Consequently, the writ petition itself is dismissed, with costs of Rs. 1,000/ -. --- *** --- .