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Allahabad High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 527 (ALL)

Deonath Singh Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh

1991-04-02

R.A.SHARMA

body1991
ORDER R.A. Sharma, J. - Petitioner joined Industrial Training Institute (hereinafter referred to as the Institute) as a peon and at that time his date of birth was recorded as 25-10-1930 in his service record. It appears that the petitioner made an application some time in 1988 for correcting the date of birth in his service record from 25-10-1930 to 25-10-1936. This application was allowed by the Principal of the Institute. However, by another order dated 22-2-1990 the Principal has recalled his earlier order and restored the original date of birth (25-10-1930) in the service record of the petitioner. It is against this order that the present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Principal has no jurisdiction to recall his order, passed earlier without giving any reasonable opportunity of being heard, and the interpretation placed on the Government Rules/Notification, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure VIII to the writ petition, by the Principal is absolutely unjustified, because clerical error can always be corrected. 3. Annexure VIII of the writ petition is copy of the Rules known as U.P. Recruitment to Services (Determination of Date of Birth) Rules, 1974, framed by the Government of U.P. for determination of date of birth of an employee. Rule 2 of the aforesaid Rules lays down that the date of birth of an employee recorded in the High School certificate or the certificate of equivalent examination at the time of his entry into service or where the employee has not passed such an examination or has passed the said examination after joining the service, the date of birth or age recorded in the service book at the time of entry into service shall be deemed to be the correct date of birth or age for all purposes relating to superannuation, premature retirement etc. Rule further provides that no application or representation shall be entertained for correction of such a date of birth in any circumstances whatsoever. 4. It is not disputed that the petitioner does not have High School certificate and his date of birth recorded in the service record at the time of entering into service of the Institute is 25-10-1930. Rule further provides that no application or representation shall be entertained for correction of such a date of birth in any circumstances whatsoever. 4. It is not disputed that the petitioner does not have High School certificate and his date of birth recorded in the service record at the time of entering into service of the Institute is 25-10-1930. This date according to the aforesaid Rule shall be deemed to be the correct date of birth and no representation or application for its change can be entertained. Principal was justified in recalling his earlier order by the impugned order. 5. Presuming the impugned order has been passed without giving an opportunity of being heard to the petitioner, it is not a case where this Court should interfere. Where on the indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible, this Court is not bound to issue a writ so as to compel observance of natural justice. because such an act would be an exercise in futility. In this connection reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of S.L Kapoor v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 , wherein it has been laid down as follows (at p. 147) : "As we said earlier where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the Court may not issue its writ to compel the observation of natural justice, not because it is not necessary to observe natural justice but because Courts do not issue futile writs." 6. Even if the impugned order is quashed and the case is remanded for deciding afresh, the result would remain the same as the Principal had to pass the same order recalling his earlier order as he had no jurisdiction to change the date of birth in view of the prohibition contained in Rule 2. The impugned order, as such, cannot be set aside even if the petitioner has not been heard before passing the impugned order. 7. Regarding the second plea, of the learned counsel, it may be mentioned that the Principal by his earlier order has not made any correction of clerical nature. What in fact he has done is to change the date of birth from 25-10-1930 to 25-10-1936. 7. Regarding the second plea, of the learned counsel, it may be mentioned that the Principal by his earlier order has not made any correction of clerical nature. What in fact he has done is to change the date of birth from 25-10-1930 to 25-10-1936. It was a substantive order, which could not have been passed by him in view of the bar created by Rule 2 of the Rules, 1974 mentioned above. 8. For the reasons given above, the writ petition is dismissed.