S. RAJENDRA BABU, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner is a stage carriage operator on the route Bangalore-dharmapuri covered by a permit granted in 1966. The route in question being an inter-state route, the petitioner obtained counter signature to the same from the State of Tamil Nadu in terms of an inter-state agreement. The petitioner claims to have secured renewals of the permit from time to time. When it was due to expire on 22-3-1980, the petitioner made an application for renewal as provided under Section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. That application was notified in the gazette on 16-11-1979. The 4th respondent in the petition (who is the petitioner in W. P. No. 23597/1990) made an application for grant of fresh permit on the route. The state transport authority (S. T. A) renewed the permit for a period of 3 years. Against that resolution, an appeal was preferred to the tribunal-respondent No. 1 both by the petitioner as well as by the respondent No. 4. The petitioner was aggrieved to the extent of limiting the period of renewal to 3 years and not for 5 years, while the 4th respondent was aggrieved by the rejection of his application. The tribunal confirmed the renewal and increased the period thereof from 3 to 5 years and the appeal of the 4th respondent was dismissed by a common order. That order was challenged in W. P. No. 21867/1982 before this court. The order made by the tribunal was stayed by this court granting renewal from 3 to 5 years. Inasmuch as the renewal was due to expire on 22-3-1983, the petitioner made another application for renewal of the permit which was granted for a period of 5 years from 22-3-1983 by a resolution dated: 27/28-1-1983 in subject No. 48/1983. The renewal granted was set aside by an order made by this court on 18-3-1983 and the matter was remitted to the S. T. A. to evaluate the comparative merits of the petitioner and the 4th respondent before granting the permit and thereafter to select a suitable person. The S. T. A. , in its meeting held on 3/4-10-1983 and 29-10-1983, heard the matter afresh and reserved the matter for orders. When the matter stood thus, writ appeals were preferred in w. a. Nos. The S. T. A. , in its meeting held on 3/4-10-1983 and 29-10-1983, heard the matter afresh and reserved the matter for orders. When the matter stood thus, writ appeals were preferred in w. a. Nos. 496 and 497/1983 against the order made by the learned single judge and pending disposal of the appeals, the order of the learned single judge was stayed by the division bench. The division bench, by an order dated 9-11-1987, dismissed the appeals holding that the application of the 4th respondent and that of the petitioner must be considered together. The matter was carried to the Supreme Court by way of special leave petition which was ultimately dismissed. So, the effective order that had to be considered by the S. T. A. (respondent No. 2) is that; the application filed by the petitioner for renewal of permit No. 6/66 had to be considered along with the application of respondent No. 4, who, by virtue of Section 58 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was also entitled to be considered as a rival applicant. Inasmuch as the applications filed for renewal in the year 1979 and 1987 were not taken into consideration, the petitioner claims to have obtained three temporary permits as provided under Section 62 (d) of the Motor Vehicles Act and he has been operating the same till 19-6-1990. ( 2 ) WHEN the matters were pending before the S. T. A. , Karnataka state road transport corporation (K. S. R. T. C.) also made an application for grant of fresh permit on the very route after the publication of the petitioner's application in the gazette. In the meanwhile, the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 came to be repealed and the same was replaced by act 59/1988, i. e. , Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 which came into force from 1st june, 1989. Several drastic changes have been effected in the matter of grant of renewal of stage carriage permits in the new act the 4th respondent, considering the fact that the new act had relaxed the condition for renewal or grant of permits, filed a writ petition before this court in W. P. No. 19582/1989. Several drastic changes have been effected in the matter of grant of renewal of stage carriage permits in the new act the 4th respondent, considering the fact that the new act had relaxed the condition for renewal or grant of permits, filed a writ petition before this court in W. P. No. 19582/1989. This court, by an order dated 30-10-1989 held that the S. T. A. should apply the Provisions of the new act in disposing of the applications of the petitioner, 4th respondent and that of the K. S. R. T. C. the S. T. A. clubbed all the three applications and passed, a resolution granting the permit to K. S. R. T. C. against that resolution, revision petitions were preferred to the K. S. T. at. By the petitioner as well as by the 4th respondent. The tribunal considered the matter and passed an order holding that the rejection of the applications of the petitioner and 4lh respondent is valid and grant of permit to K. S. R. T. C. was in order and dismissed the revision petitions and the appeals. Aggrieved by this Order, two sets of petitions have been filed. ( 3 ) SO far as the grant of permit in favour of the K. S. R. T. C. is concerned, the petitioner and the 4th respondent attack the same in one voice. In the matter of preference amongst themselves, it is contended by the petitioner that he is entitled to grant of permit under the inter-state agreement by reason of renewal of an old permit and the 4th respondent is not entitled to replace him. It is the contention of the 4th respondent that the petitioner is nol entitled to such a benefit, but it is he who is entitled to the same. Various other contentions have been advanced on behalf of both the parties and I shall advert to the same at the appropriate stages. It is the contention of the 4th respondent that the petitioner is nol entitled to such a benefit, but it is he who is entitled to the same. Various other contentions have been advanced on behalf of both the parties and I shall advert to the same at the appropriate stages. ( 4 ) SRI vasudcva rcddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, urged that in the normal course when the petitioner had held the permit, the same should have been renewed as and when the period expired and application for renewal had been made; even though, as provided under the relevant Provisions of the old Act, it was permissible to consider any fresh application also along with the application for renewal, unless there arc strong reasons, the existing operator should be preferred; in so far as that right is concerned, the same is saved under Section 217 of the new act and therefore, respondent No. 4 is not entitled to any relief not the K. S. R. T. C. could have been granted the permit; if at all, the 4th respondent and the K. S. R. T. C. are to be granted permits, it is to be only under the new act irrespective of the renewal made to the petitioner. If the petitioner has given an application for renewal, that has no bearing at all in the matter of granting of new permits to others and that aspect has not been examined by any of the authorities. It is submitted that the petitioner was entitled to renewal as a matter ofcourse because under the new Act, conditions for renewal is relaxed and his application was pending consideration, and he had a right to be considered for renewal. When the procedure in regard to the same has been altered and a new procedure had been prescribed with stringent conditions for renewal of the same, the authorities could have examined the matter from that angle and granted the permit to the petiiioner. ( 5 ) COUNTERING these arguments, Sri Rangaswamy contended that renewal application will have to be equated to an application for permit. If done so, the petiiioncr did not have any accrued right, which was saved under Section 217 of the m. v. Act, 1988. A mere right to consider an application is not an accrued right which is saved under the repealed law. If done so, the petiiioncr did not have any accrued right, which was saved under Section 217 of the m. v. Act, 1988. A mere right to consider an application is not an accrued right which is saved under the repealed law. He also submitted that the petitioner had made an application on 6-10-1979 for renewal of a permit for a period of 5 years from 22-3-1983 and thereafter he has not made any further application and therefore the renewal could not be extended beyond the period of the original permit itself and hence renewal for two stages could not be granted by one order and there fore, it was submitted, that the petitioner did not stand in any different position from that of the others and when he did not have the benefit of renewal earlier, his application should also have been considered along with that of the others under the new act. It is submitted that when this court set aside the grant of renewal and remitted the matter for fresh consideration and to consider all applications together and when the petitioner had not renewed his permit, there was no permit in force as on the date when the new act came into force and submitted that the new law cannot be applied to an anterior period. It is further contended that retrospective effect to an enactment cannot be given not the effect of that can be extended beyond what is prescribed in the act. When the renewal of the first application is not granted, there was nothing to be renewed thereafter on the application filed on 15-11-1987 for the period between 23-3-1988 to 1993. In the circumstances, it is contended that the application for renewal itself had become infructuous. ( 6 ) ELABORATING this aspect of the matter, it was submitted on behalf of the 4th respondent that the application of the petitioner for renewal of the permit was for a period of 5 years from 22-3-1983 and that period having expired by the time matter was taken up for consideration, there was nothing to be renewed, ( 7 ) IN the circumstances, the first question that arises for consideration in the caseis - whether the petitioner's application for renewal of stage carriage permit survived for consideration? On this aspect of the matter, the tribunal stated that the permit had no doubt been renewed for a period of 5 years from 23-3-1983 to 22-3-1988 and his application for renewal was pending consideration. The resolution passed by the authority renewing the permit for the year 1982-83 came to be set aside by an appellate court and therefore, in the eye of law, subsequent renewal was also invalid and in such circumstances, if any order is passed renewing the permit, it dates back to the year 1980 and the maximum period allowed under the act is 5 years. Therefore, under any circumstance the petitioner had lost his right of renewal as this right is not protected under the act. In this context, the tribunal relied upon a decision of the Madhya Pradesh high court in AIR 1990 MP 300 , mis. Shivchand amolakchand, bus operator, shivpuri v State transport appellate tribunal, gwalior and others. ( 8 ) THE tribunal further held that the application filed by the petitioner for renewal did not survive for consideration as the period for which he had sought for renewal had already expired by the time the new act came into force and there was nothing that could be saved under the new act and in view of Section 217, and the petitioner's application could not have been renewed at all. Countering this view, the learned counsel for the petitioner referred to a decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1957 SC 489 , v. c. k. bus service Ltd v r. t. a. , coimbatore, and submitted that a reading of the relevant Provisions of the m. v. act and the rules thereunder in force during the relevant period leads to the conclusion that a renewal is a continuation of the permit previously granted. The fact that the renewal is not a matter of course or that it is open to the authorities to impose fresh conditions at the time of renewal, does not make it fresh when permit is in fact renewed, or alter its character as a renewal. The fact that the renewal is not a matter of course or that it is open to the authorities to impose fresh conditions at the time of renewal, does not make it fresh when permit is in fact renewed, or alter its character as a renewal. However, this proposition was sought to be distinguished by the learned counsel for the 4th respondent on the basis that the question that arose for consideration in that case was the effect of the renewal in which the original permit itself had been set aside and in that context, the concept of renewal was explained and therefore, the observations in that case must be confined to a case where the grant of a permit is set aside by higher authority, the renewal also stands automatically set aside and does not continue to subsist and submitted that a decision is an authority what it decides and not what follows from such a decision. Therefore, it becomes necessary to deal with as to what is the procedure to be followed for the purpose of renewal and what is the effect of grant of a renewal. ( 9 ) THE act prevalent during the relevant period was the Motor Vehicles Act,1939 and Section 58 provided for renewals and it reads as follows: "58 (1) (a ). A stage carriage permit or a contract carriage permit other than a temporary permit issued under Section 62 shall be effective without renewal for such period, not less than three years and not more than five years, as the regional transport authority may specify in the permit. (b) a private carrier's permit or a public carrier's permit other than a temporary permit issued under Section 62 shall be effective without renewal for a period of five years. (2) a permit may be renewed on an application made and disposed of as if it were an application for a permit: provided that the application for the renewal of a permit shall be made, (a) in the case of a stage carriage permit or a public carrier's permit not less than one hundred and twenty days before the date of its expiry; and (b) in any other case, not less than sixty days before the date of its expiry: provided further that, other conditions being equal, an application for renewal shall be given preference over new applications of permits. Explaining the scope of these Provisions, while stating that there was force in the contention that the expression 'renewal' should not necessarily mean or lead to the inference that it was the original permit that was being continued and each time when the renewal was made fresh conditions were imposed and therefore, earlier cancellation of the permit was of no effect. On this aspect of the matter, the Supreme Court stated that though there may be force in this contention, if the Provisions are read in the context of other Provisions bearing on this question and reviewed as a whole, it became clear that the intention of the legislature was to treat the renewal as continuation of the previous permit. By explaining the scope of Section 58 (1) it was stated that a permit shall be effective for a period specified therein, but being qualified by the expression "without renewal" meant that the effective period is not the original period specified but the period upto which the renewal was granted which indicated that the life of renewed permit is one and continuous. In order to further fortify their view, their lordships referred to the rules prevalent in the state of Madras. ( 10 ) IT was very seriously submitted before me that in the absence of similar rules,i should not place any reliance on these observations of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court while explaining the scope of Section 58 clearly enunciated that though normal renewal amounts to issue or consideration of a fresh permit, but on the language of Section 58 of m. v. Act, 1939 that permit is restricted for the period for which the permit was valid and if renewal is granted, it was continuation of that period and that is the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court. It is therefore unnecessary to refer to the rules to which reference is made only for the purpose of placing the matter beyond doubt. In this view of the matter, I think (he contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the renewal of a permit is one which is a continuation of the original permit granted on the language of Section 58, will have to be accepted. In this view of the matter, I think (he contention advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the renewal of a permit is one which is a continuation of the original permit granted on the language of Section 58, will have to be accepted. ( 11 ) THE petitioner had made applications for different periods and when those applications were still pending consideration, if various events have happened such as introduction of the new Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and repealing of earlier m. v. Act, and the petitioner had a right to seek for renewal of his earlier permit granted, it cannot be said that it is not a right saved under the act. Much argument was spent on the concept of what is a right accrued and what has been saved under the act is only a right accrued and a mere right to consider an application for renewal is not a right accrued and several decisions were referred to in this context in India and abroad. Section 217 of 1988 act in terms refers to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act which saves a right in respect of a legal proceeding pending consideration. When the petitioner had made relevant applications for renewal of permits and those applications were pending consideration, it cannot be said that the petitioner is responsible for the delay in renewal. He had done his part of the duty. But for various reasons matter could not be disposed of by the authorities either granting or refusing the same. Further, the superior courts or authority intervened in the matter and remitted the matter for fresh consideration. Those aspects should not deprive the rights of the party, if any, of consideration of the same, if the petitioner had such a right of renewal, though subject to several conditions, the same cannot be deprived. Hence, the view taken by the tribunal that the application filed by the petitioner does not survive for consideration does not stand to reason. ( 12 ) THE next question that arsises for consideration is as to the manner in which the application filed by each of the parties has to be dealt with. So far as the other applicants are concerned, who are respondents in this case, they filed applications with a mere hope of getting a permit. ( 12 ) THE next question that arsises for consideration is as to the manner in which the application filed by each of the parties has to be dealt with. So far as the other applicants are concerned, who are respondents in this case, they filed applications with a mere hope of getting a permit. Therefore, on the advent of the new Act, their applications will have to be considered under the new act and this position is made clear by a writ petition filed before this court and the orders made thereon directing the authorities to consider the application filed by the 4th respondent under the new act therefore, there is not much difficulty in considering the application filed by the petitioner and the respondents and they had to be considered under the new act. ( 13 ) SO far as the right of renewal is concerned, it is a valuable right and that issaved under the new act. Therefore, the question that arises for consideration now is as to the procedure by which the authorities will have to consider such applications. The appropriate course would be to follow the procedure prescribed under the old act itself because Section 6 of the General Clauses Act provides that "repeal of any act will not affect any notification, legal proceedings, remedy in respect of any right, privilege, obligation kept alive under the new act". Therefore, the tribunal will have to consider whether the petitioner was entitled to the renewal under the old act because the permit had been granted under the old act and the right of renewal was saved under the m. v. Act, 1988. If the petitioner was entitled to renewal under the old Act, it is open to the petitioner to continue his permit. The matter was not considered from that angle at all. Therefore, the order of the tribunal will have to be set aside and remitted to it for fresh consideration in accordance with law and in the light of the order made above. Writ petition No. 1747/1991 is allowed. ( 14 ) NO separate orders are necessary in writ petition No. 23597/1990 as I have setaside the order impugned in this petition in the other writ petition disposed off now and the application of this petitioner also will have to be considered in accordance with law and in the light of the order made above. ( 14 ) NO separate orders are necessary in writ petition No. 23597/1990 as I have setaside the order impugned in this petition in the other writ petition disposed off now and the application of this petitioner also will have to be considered in accordance with law and in the light of the order made above. Rule made absolute accordingly. --- *** --- .