ORDER: This application under Article 227 of the Constitution is directed against the judgment dated 17.286 passed by the District Judge, Burdwan in Misc. Appeal no. 98 of 1982 arising out of an order dated 17th June, 1982 passed by the Estate Officer, Steel Authority of India Ltd., Durgapur Steel Plant, in case No. Estate. S. 1/09/23/81. 2. Shorn of details, the petitioner's case is that the petitioner has been carrying on an agency business within Durgapur in the District Of Burdwan from shop no. 38 situated at Steel Market of the Durgapur Steel Township. It is the petitioner's case that the said shop has been allotted in favour of the petitioner by the Steel Authority of India Ltd. the respondents herein. 3. It appears that at the instance of the respondents, the aforesaid proceeding was initiated by the Estate Officer, Steel Authority of India Ltd. The allotment of the aforesaid shop was cancelled and the petitioner's occupation was declared unauthorised by the respondent. It appears that the petitioner entered appearance in the said proceeding but ultimately no one was present on behalf of the petitioner when the matter was taken up for consideration by the Estate Officer on 17th June, 1982. It appears that The matter was heard ex-parte on the said date and by his order dated 17th June 1982 the Estate Officer came to the conclusion, that since the petitioner has failed to present its case and there being nothing to the contrary to the case made out by the company, he was fully satisfied that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of the public premises in question namely, Shop room no. 38 within the Steel market of Durgapur Steel Township. Accordingly, in exercise of the powers conferred upon him under s. 5(1) of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the "said Act"), read with the amending Act of 1980, the Estate Officer directed the petitioner herein should vacate the shop in question within fifteen days from the date of publication of the order, failing which, the petitioner or any other person/persons found to be in possession of the said shop room would be evicted therefrom by use of such force as was deemed necessary. The Estate Officer directed that the orders under s.5(1) of the Act in the prescribed form should issue accordingly. 4. The Estate Officer directed that the orders under s.5(1) of the Act in the prescribed form should issue accordingly. 4. It appears that against the said order the petitioner filed an application for recalling the order and for hearing the matter on merits, but such prayer was refused by the Estate Officer. Ultimately the petitioner preferred an appeal against the said order of 17th June, 1982 before the District Judge, Burdwan in accordance with the provisions of s. 9 of the aforesaid Act. The said appeal was .registered as Misc. Appeal no. 98 of 1982 and was dismissed by the District Judge, Burdwan on 171h February, 1986. The said judgment of the District Judge, Burdwan is the subject matter of this application under Article 227 of the Constitution. 5. Mr. Ashok Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, submits that the learned District Judge, Burdwan exercised his jurisdiction erroneously in dismissing the appeal on the ground that the appeal had been filed prematurely. Mr. Banerjee submitted that the learned District Judge was wrong in holding that the order of eviction under s. 5(1) of the aforesaid Act was dated 30.682, and that the appeal preferred on 29th June, 1982 was, therefore, premature. Mr. Banerjee also submitted that the learned District Judge, was wrong in holding that the right of appeal would arise after communication of the order under s. 5(1) of the aforesaid Act was made. According to Mr. Banerjee, the order passed by the Estate Officer on 17th June, 1982 was itself an order under s. 5 of the aforesaid Act and hence appealable under s. 9 thereof. Another branch of submission made by Mr. Banerjee was that as will be evident from the impugned judgment itself, notice under s. 4 of the aforesaid Act had not been served on the petitioner. Mr. Banerjee pointed out the finding of the learned District Judge on the said point. The learned District Judge has in his order come to the finding that there was nothing on record to show that the notice had been served upon petitioners, although, from the records it appeared that the notice had been issued as provided under s. 4 of the said Act. On the basis of these two grounds, Mr. Banerjee submitted that the learned District Judge had exercised his jurisdiction erroneously and the impugned order was required to be set aside. 6. On the basis of these two grounds, Mr. Banerjee submitted that the learned District Judge had exercised his jurisdiction erroneously and the impugned order was required to be set aside. 6. Mr. Som, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents, submitted that having filed an application for recalling the order of 17th June, 1982 passed by the Estate Officer, hut the same having been rejected the petitioner was not competent to challenge the order dated 17th June, 1982, in as much as, the same did not amount to an order under s. 5(1) of the aforesaid Act. In support of his submission, Mr. Som referred to the provisions of s. 9(2)(a) of the aforesaid Act which provides that in the case of an appeal from an order under s. 5 an appeal as contemplated under sub- s. (1) is to be preferred within tweleve days from the date of publication of the order under sub-s. (1). Mr. Som pointed out that there was a prescribed form in which an order under S. 5(1) of the aforesaid Act is required to be made and communicated to the concerned party. Mr. Som pointed out that the communication in terms of the above was effected on 30th June, 1982 and the appeal therefore, could not but be held to be premature. Mr. Som also referred to the provision of is 10 of The Act which provide that except as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, every order made by an Estate Officer or Appellate Officer under the Act would be final and would not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding and no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in pursuance of powers conferred by or under the Act. Mr. Som therefore. Submitted that no interference was called for by this Court against the impugned judgment of the learned District Judge, Burdwan. 7. Apart from the above, there is another aspect of the matter which relates to the filing of a suit by the petitioner herein in the First Court of Munsif, Durgapur for declaration and consequent relief. Mr. Som therefore. Submitted that no interference was called for by this Court against the impugned judgment of the learned District Judge, Burdwan. 7. Apart from the above, there is another aspect of the matter which relates to the filing of a suit by the petitioner herein in the First Court of Munsif, Durgapur for declaration and consequent relief. It appears that the said suit is still pending, although, the same has been stayed under Order XXX Rule 2 of [he Code of Civil Procedure on the basis of an application made on behalf of the respondent. 8. The only point for determination in this application is whether the learned District Judge. Burdwan was right in holding that the appeal preferred by the petitioner was premature inasmuch as, the final order in terms of s. 5(1) was passed on 30th June, 1982 and the appeal was preferred on 29th June, 1982. I am unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned District Judge, inasmuch as in my view the order passed on 17th June, 1982 must be held to be an order under s. 5(1) of the aforesaid Act. The order clearly reflects that the Estate Officer assumed jurisdiction under s. 5(1) and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises in question within fifteen days from the date of publication of the order. Admittedly, the order was signed on 17th June, 19.82 itself and the same must be held to be the date of publication of the order. It is no doubt true that the order is to be communicated in the prescribed form, but it cannot be said that the communication of the order in the form prescribed tantamount to being the order itself. In my view, the order dated 17th June, 1982 is no less an order under s. 5 (1) of the aforesaid Act Section 9(1) of the Act provides that an appeal shall lie from every order of the Estate Officer made in respect of any public premises under s. 5 or 5B or s. 7. The order passed on 17th June, 1982, being in order under s. 5(1) of the Act, the petitioner was entitled to prefer an appeal against the said order and the appeal preferred by the petitioner against such order on 29th June, 1982 is in my view wholly maintainable. The order passed on 17th June, 1982, being in order under s. 5(1) of the Act, the petitioner was entitled to prefer an appeal against the said order and the appeal preferred by the petitioner against such order on 29th June, 1982 is in my view wholly maintainable. As far as s. 10 of the Act is concerned, the same will have effect in respect of any other order made by an Estate Officer or Appellate Officer, except in the cases referred to in s. 9 The provisions of s. 10 can therefore, have no application to the facts of the present case. As far as the pending civil suit is concerned, I refrain from making any observation in respect of the same and the parties will be at liberty to take whatever steps they choose in the Suit. 9. In view of the above, this application succeeds. The Rule is made absolute. The learned District Judge, Hurdwan is directed to rehear the appeal on merits, including the question relating to service of notice under s. 4 of the above mentioned Act. There will be no order as to costs. Rule made absolute.