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1991 DIGILAW 53 (GAU)

Union of India v. Gathia Nath

1991-03-20

J.M.SRIVASTAVA, R.K.MANISANA SINGH

body1991
R. K Manisana, J — This appeal arises from an award made on 12.11.86 by the Arbitrator in Misc. (Arb) Case Nos. 5 to 18 of 1975. 2 Facts, - A piece of land measuring 28 acres situated at ICaitasiddhi Village in Chayani Mouza was to questioned in the year 1963 under the Defence of India Act, 1962. The said land was subsequently acquired under the Requisitioning and Acquisition of Immovable Property Act, 195J (for short,' the Act') in the year 1970 by the Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup. The Deputy Commissioner assessed the market value at Rs 4000/- to 500/ per bigha and annual recurring compensation at Rs. 45/- to 50/- per bigha. On account of dispute as to the amount of compensation, an Arbitrator was appointed under the Act to determine compensation. The Arbitrator awarded compensation at Rs. 7503/- per bigha and recurring compensation at Rs. I75/- per bigha, at a uniform rate. The Arbitrator further awarded solatium at 15% of the market price as additional compensation and interest @ Rs. 6% per annum on the principal amount of compensation from the date of acquisition till the final payment. 3. Mr. R. P. Kakati, Jearaed Additional Senior Central Government Standing Counsel, has contended that under the Act there is no provision f-jf awarding interest as well as solatium and, therefore, the claimants are not entitled to interest and solatium. 4. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the claimants are entitled to interest. In Abhay Singh vs. Ministry of Communi­cation, AIR 1987 SC 2177 , the Supreme Court has held that the owner of they land is entitled to interest on the compensation awarded under 'the Act. This Court also in a series of cases held that owner is entitled to interest on the principal amount of compensation under the Act. In that view of the matter, the contention of Mr. Rakati cannot be accepted. 5. The next question is whether the claimants are entitled to solatium. In Mawaueddutldin vs Collector Hyderabad, AIR 1984 AP 217 (OB), it has been held that, where property is acquired under the Act, the Arbitrator is competent to award solatium. In that view of the matter, the contention of Mr. Rakati cannot be accepted. 5. The next question is whether the claimants are entitled to solatium. In Mawaueddutldin vs Collector Hyderabad, AIR 1984 AP 217 (OB), it has been held that, where property is acquired under the Act, the Arbitrator is competent to award solatium. In Competent Authority vs. Thota Pentft Reddy, AIR 1988 AP 208 (DB), the Andhra Pradesh High Court doubted the view taken in Meivahedduddin's case (supra) and intended to a larger Bench, however, considering the decision of the Supreme Court in Prakash Amichand vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1986 SC 468 , the Andhra Pradesh High Court affirmed rejection of claim for solatium by the Arbitrator. 6. in Prakash Amichand vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1986 SC 468 , a question arose whether denial of solatium in addition to the compensation payable for lands acquired by the local authority under the Bombay Towo Planning Act, 1954 for the purpose of the scheme made the Bombay Act discriminatory. la that case, the decisions of the Supreme Court in Nagpur Improvement Trust vs. Vithal Rao, AIR 1973 SC 689 ; State of Kerala vs. T M Peter, AIR 1980 SC 1438 and P. C. Goswami vs. Collector, Darrang, AIR 1982 SC 1214 were considered. In Nagpur Improvement Trust's case ( AIR 1973 SC 689 ), it has been held that the diff.-rent terms of compensation of land acquired under two Acts would be discriminatory. In State of Kerala vs. T. M. Peter ( AIR 1980 SC 1438 ), the decision in Nagpur Improvement Trust's case ( AIR 1973 SC 689 ) was followed. The decision in P. C. Goswami vs. Collector Darrang (Al C 1982 SC 1214) is also similar to that of State of Kerala vs. T. M. Peter ( AIR 1980 SC 1438 ). 7. In Prakash Amichand vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1986 SC 469. The decision in P. C. Goswami vs. Collector Darrang (Al C 1982 SC 1214) is also similar to that of State of Kerala vs. T. M. Peter ( AIR 1980 SC 1438 ). 7. In Prakash Amichand vs. State of Gujrat, AIR 1986 SC 469. the Supreme Court observed : We do not understand the decision ia Nagpur Improvement Trust's case, ( AIR 1973 SC 689 ) (supra) as laying| down generally that wherever land is taken away by the Government under a separate statute compen­sation should be paid under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 only and if there is any difference between the compensation payable under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and tae compensation payable under the statute concerned the acquisition under the statute w ould be discriminatory." Thereafter, the Supreme Court has held that the case before the Supreme Court in Prakash Amichand (supra) was distinguishable from the earlier decisions referred to above and in the context of the Bombay Act came to the following conclusion g "It cannot also be said as a role that the State which has got to supply find maintain large public services at great cost should always pay in addition to a reasonable compensation some amount by way of solatium The interest of the public is equally important. In any event it is not shown that the compensation payable in this case is illusory and unreal." (emphasis added) It may be stated here that the above quoted observation of the Supreme Court indicate that, where there is no reasonable compensation, solatium may be granted. 8. In F.A. 40 of 1975 between Saifuddin vs. Collector Sibsagar of this Court (to which one of us was a party), it has been held that the owner is not entitled to solatium in case of awarding just compensation. In that case this Court was satisfied that the compensation awarded was reasonable and, therefore the owner was not entitled to solatium, in the context of the case, basing on the observations of the Supreme Court above (last quotation). 9. Let us now examine the case on hand. Under section 8 (1J of the Act, there are two principles and/or met nods for determination of compensation. First, under section 8 (1) (a), where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement. 9. Let us now examine the case on hand. Under section 8 (1J of the Act, there are two principles and/or met nods for determination of compensation. First, under section 8 (1) (a), where the amount of compensation can be fixed by agreement, it shall be paid in accordance with such agreement. Secondly, under section 8 (I) (e),where no such agreement can be reached. an Arbitrator appointed under the provisions of section 8 (1) is empowered to determine “the amount of compensation which appears to him to be just”. However, section 8 (3) provides that the compensation payable for the acquisition of any property shall be the price which the requisitioned property would have fetched in open market, if it had remained in the same condition as it was at the time of requisitioning and been sold on the date of acquisition. 10. Section 8 (1) (e) authorises the Arbitrator to determine 'just compensation'. The word 'just' has been used in section 8 (l)(e) to mean full, adequate or due, and to intensify the meaning of the word 'compen­sation'. Generally, a full compensation for the property acquired is to be paid to the owner. Therefore, the determination of 'just compensation' would ' depend upon varieties of factors, and the Arbitrator has to determine what thinks to be 'just' between the parties having regard to the particular facts of the case. But under section 8 (3) the word 'compensation' has been used to mean open market price whereas under section 8 (1) (e) 'just compensa­tion' is to be determined. As already stated, the word 'just' has been used in section 8 (1) (e) to intensify the meaning of the word 'compensation' and, therefore, if the meaning of the word Compensation' under section 8(3) is intensified, open market price alone would not be 'just compensation'. The construction we are putting will harmonies the two provisions of the Act, namely sections 8 (1) (e) and 8 (3). In that view of the matter the decisions referred to above are distinguishable from the present case, 11. The word 'solatium' means a sum paid to a person as compensation or consolation for the injury to the feelings. When a properly is acquired compulsionly it injures or hurts owner's feelings. Therefore, 'solutium' is to be one of the factors to be considered while determining 'just compensation'. The word 'solatium' means a sum paid to a person as compensation or consolation for the injury to the feelings. When a properly is acquired compulsionly it injures or hurts owner's feelings. Therefore, 'solutium' is to be one of the factors to be considered while determining 'just compensation'. In such a situation, the principle underlying the Land Acquisition Act should be extended in the interest of administration of justice. In that view of the matter, the Arbitrator could award solatium. For these reasons, the contentions of Mr. R.P. Kakati cannot be accepted. 12. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. We leave the parties to bear their respective costs.