Judgment :- Thomas, J. Petitioner was Superintending Engineer in the Public Works Department. Though he retired from service on 31-12-1981, some of his actions, while in service, are haunting him even now. Vigilance Department of Police (Kerala) initiated criminal proceedings against him for offences under Ss.5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (for short 'the P.C. Act') and 120 B of the Indian Penal Code in respect of award of contract and purchase of materials alleged to have been done by him in 1981. An FIR was lodged against him on 30-11-1985 with the Special Judge, Thrissur. Sanction to prosecute the petitioner was accorded by the State Government on 28-1-1989 and charge sheets were laid against him along with some others on 30-9-89 for the aforesaid offences. Five criminal cases were registered by the Special Judge, on the said charge sheets. Petitioner has filed this Criminal Miscellaneous Case under S.482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short 'the Procedure Code') to quash the aforesaid criminal cases. 2. The main ground urged in the petition is that since the criminal proceedings instituted are in respect of causes of action or events which arose in 1981 they are barred by limitation as provided in Rule 3 in Part-Ill of the Kerala Service Rules (for short 'the KS.R.'). A learned single judge of this Court has held in Krishnan Nair v. State of Kerala (1988 (1) KLT 166) that the said Rule would operate as a bar against criminal proceedings if initiated after retirement of the person concerned unless such criminal proceedings have been initiated within four years on a cause of action or event. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the ratio in the said decision in support of his argument that the criminal proceedings against the petitioner are liable to be quashed. 3. When this case came up before Thulasidas, J. his Lordship doubted the correctness of the decision in Krishnan Nair's case (cited supra) and referred this case to a Division Bench for reconsideration of the principle laid down in the said decision. 4. Learned single judge, who decided Krishnan Nair's case, noticed that the accused in that case retired from service on 30-4-1978 and charge sheet against him for the offence under S.5(2) of the P.C. Act was laid only on 3-9-84 although FIR was registered in 1979 itself. 4. Learned single judge, who decided Krishnan Nair's case, noticed that the accused in that case retired from service on 30-4-1978 and charge sheet against him for the offence under S.5(2) of the P.C. Act was laid only on 3-9-84 although FIR was registered in 1979 itself. Preliminary objection based on sub-clause (c) of R.3 in Part III of the K.S.R. was raised before the Special Judge, who took cognizance of the offence in that case, but he overruled the objections holding that rules in the K.S.R. cannot override provisions of the P.C. Act or Penal Code or Procedure Code. Learned single judge took a different view and held that the aforesaid clause in R.3 clearly refers to criminal. proceedings which incorporates a provision of limitation in respect of a judicial proceeding. 5. Rules in the K.S.R. were formulated by the Government under Kerala Public Services Act in exercise of the power conferred by Art.309 of the Constitution of India. Part III of the K.S.R. contains rules regarding pension of the Government employee. The very title of Part III is "pension". Rule I in the said part declares that pensions of all Government employees are regulated by the rules in the said part. It is clear that the said part only concerns pension of the Government employees and nothing else. Any reference in that part to any other provision of law must be understood as having an impact on pension of the Government employee. The main body of Rule 3 reads thus: "The Government reserve to themselves the right of withholding or withdrawing a pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specified period, and the right of ordering the recovery from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to Government, if in a departmental or judicial proceeding, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of his service, including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement". The rule empowers the Government to withhold or withdraw pension or part of it or to recover any pecuniary loss caused to Government by an employee. The said power of the Government is made conditional on the employee being found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during his service. Such finding could either be made in a departmental proceeding or in a judicial proceeding. The said power of the Government is made conditional on the employee being found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during his service. Such finding could either be made in a departmental proceeding or in a judicial proceeding. In other words, Rule 3 has no application if the pensioner was not found guilty of grave mis-conduct or negligence either in a departmental proceeding or in a judicial proceeding. The rule is intended to govern only the question of pension. 6. The rule has a proviso which consists of four clauses. The first two clauses are not material in this case, since they refer to departmental proceeding. The last clause is also not very material, since it says that Public Service Commission shall be consulted before final orders are passed. It is .the third clause (clause (c)) of the proviso which relates to judicial proceeding. The said clause is extracted below: "(c) no such judicial proceeding, if not instituted while the employee was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment shall be instituted in respect of a cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such institution." In the Explanation to the Rule it is made clear that "a judicial proceeding shall be deemed to be instituted in the case of a criminal proceeding on the date on which the complaint or report of police officer on which the Magistrate takes cognizance is made". 7. The proviso has no independent existence divorced from the main body of R.3. The proviso is intended to restrict the scope of R.3. It cannot in any manner control or affect the provisions of the Penal Code or the Procedure Code or even the provisions of the P.C. Act. It cannot be forgotten that rules in the K.S.R. were framed by the State Government whereas the P.C Act was enacted by the Parliament. Prima facie it admits of no doubt, especially since the word 'judicial proceeding' in clause (c) of the proviso is qualified by the word "such" which has significance in that the judicial proceeding mentioned therein has reference only to the judicial proceeding envisaged in the main body of R.3. 8. A similar contention was raised before the Madras High Court while challenging a prosecution proceeding launched against a retired Government officer. 8. A similar contention was raised before the Madras High Court while challenging a prosecution proceeding launched against a retired Government officer. The challenge was based on Article 351A of the Madras Pension Code which contained a similar rule as in Rule 3 in Part III of the K.S.R. Repelling the contention Natarajan, J. (as he then was) observed in Venkatavaradan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1979 MLL Vol. XXIII -275) thus: "Even this contention must fail, for, a prosecution under S.161 and/or S.165, Indian Penal Code, read with S.5(1)(a) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, is not controlled or restricted or trammeled in any manner by the Madras Pension Code. The provisions of the Pension Code may, if at all, be relied on only for safeguarding the pension, and cannot be pressed into service to defeat a prosecution on the threshold itself'. In State of Punjab v Charan Singh ((1981) 2 SCC 197) conviction of a retired Government Officer for the offence under S.5(1)(d) of the P.C. Act was challenged, inter alia, on the ground that prosecution was hit by R.16.38 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934. Though the argument was accepted by a learned single judge of the Punjab High Court, the Supreme Court reversed the decision and held thus: "It is dear that R.16.38 is not designed to be a condition precedent to the launching of a prosecution in a criminal court; it is in the nature of instructions to the department and is not meant to be of the nature of a sanction or permission for a prosecution. Nor can it override the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act". Though the said decision is not exactly on the point, the principle evolved in it is of help in this case. 9. Over and above those decisions, the Supreme Court had occasion to deal with an identical rule in the Punjab Civil Service Rules (for short'the Punjab rules') in State of Punjab v. Kailash Nath ((1989) 1 SCC 321). The facts in the said case were these: One Kailash Nath was an Executive Engineer in Public Works Department in the State of Punjab. He placed orders in 1979 for purchase of sign boards which were required by the Department to avoid accidents on roads and also for road safety. He retired from service in-1982. The facts in the said case were these: One Kailash Nath was an Executive Engineer in Public Works Department in the State of Punjab. He placed orders in 1979 for purchase of sign boards which were required by the Department to avoid accidents on roads and also for road safety. He retired from service in-1982. The vigilance bureau of the State of Punjab lodged an FIR against him in the year 1985 for offences under S.5(1) and (2) of the P.C. Act in respect of the orders placed by Kailash Nath during 1979. The FIR was challenged in the Punjab High Court on the ground that the FIR having been lodged six years after the event of purchase of sign boards was in violation of R.22 in Volume II of the Punjab Rules. The plea was found favour with the High Court and the FIR was quashed. But the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the High Court. Rule 2.2 in Volume II of the Punjab Rules is identical with Rule 3 in Part-Ill of the K.S.R. Following observations made by the Supreme Court in the decision would clear the law beyond any doubt: "Even on a plain reading of R.2.2, it is apparent that the intention of framing the said rule was not to grant immunity from prosecution to a government servant, if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied. As seen above, Rule 2.2 is in Chapter II of the Punjab Civil Service Rules which deal with ordinary pension. There can be no manner of doubt that making provision with regard to pension falls within the purview of 'conditions of service the purpose of the third proviso there to is, as is the scope of a proviso, to carve out an exception to the right conferred on the government by the substantive clause if the conditions contemplated by the proviso are fulfilled. This purpose can be achieved if the said proviso by adopting the rule of reading down is interpreted to mean that even if a government servant is prosecuted and punished in judicial proceedings instituted in respect of cause of action which arose or an event which took place more than four years before such institution the government will not be entitled to exercise the right conferred on it by the substantive provision contained in clause (b) with regard to pension of such a government servant. The word such in the beginning of the third proviso also supports this interpretation. 10. Dealing with a line of argument raised in the said case that the embargo in the rule is a condition of service calculated to ensure peace of mind to a retired employee and that an assurance to him that he shall not be prosecuted after his retirement, after the lapse of a particular time would fall within the purview of "conditions of service" as contemplated by Art.309, their Lordships observed as follows: "Making a provision that a government servant, even if he is guilty of grave misconduct or negligence which constitutes an offence punishable either under the Penal Code or Prevention of Corruption Act or an analogous law should be granted immunity from such prosecution after the lapse of a particular period so as to provide incentive for efficient work would not only be against public policy but would also be counter-productive. It is likely to be an incentive not for efficient work but for committing offences including embezzlement and misappropriation by some of them at the fag end of their tenure of service and making an effort that the offence is not detected within the period prescribed for launching prosecution or manipulating delay in the matter of launching prosecution". 11. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the law has not been correctly stated in Krishnan Nair v. State of Kerala (1988 (1) KLT 166). We further hold that nothing in Rule 3 (of Part-Ill) of the K.S.R. is a bar for launching prosecution proceedings against the petitioner. We dismiss the Criminal Miscellaneous Case and direct the Special Judge, Thrissur to proceed with the cases pending against the petitioner.