Judgment :- 1. One of the questions involved in the instant petition is, whether in dealing with the undivided property of a family comprising of both independent adult members/sons thereof for the purposes of determination of ceiling area under the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1973, the concept of major sop constituting a separate family derived from the personal law applicable to Mitakshara school of Hindu Law can be applied to the Christians, and Muslims as well. Dealing with the provisions in the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1962, a Bull Bench of the Patna High Court with a majority of 3 out of 5, in State v. K.V. Zuberi AIR 1986 Patna 166 (F.B.), has said: “One may now advert to the second question, namely, if the major sons of a family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu law are entitled to a separate unit, whether the major sons of a family governed by the Mohamedan Law would be debarred therefrom. Now, the fundamental basis on which this issue has to be examined is the settled law within this jurisdiction that in the case of a family governed by the Mitakshara law the major sons are entitled to a separate unit under the Act. This legal position is as well established that no view contrary to the same could be pointed out at all and thus in view of its long history the case has to be accepted on the basis of even the rule or stare decisis . .. Proceeding on the aforesaid articul the premise, it would necessarily follow on the findings arrived at on the preceding question No. I that the major sons of every family would stand on an identical footing for their entitlement to a separate unit irrespective of the personal law of the party. Once it is held, as has already been done that the fundamental base for the ceiling law is now the statutory family concept and not the individual landholder and further the personal law applicable to the family is to be altogether excluded from consideration, then afortiorl if the major sons of a Mitakshara family are admittedly entitled to a separate unit, the same situation would inhere with regard to the major sons of a family governed by the Mohamedan Law as well. On no rationale can the latter be deprived of parity or equality with the similarly placed major sons in a family governed by the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law.” 2. There has, however, been, besides the defiinition of “family” inserted by Act 1 of 1973, in the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act. 1961, Explanation II, inserted by Act 22 of 1976, which provided: “The personal law shall not be relevant or be taken into consideration in determining the composition of the family for the purpose of the Act.” There is no such Explanation to the definition or the application of the law in the Pondicherry Act. Notwithstanding, however, the definition as above and the Explanation, which was accepted by the majority in their respective dissenting judgments, Hari Lal Agrawal, J. (as he then was) and Lalit Mohan Sharma, J., (as he then was) took a contrary view to say: “In Venkadachalam Pillai v. Union Territory of Pondicherry AIR 1985 S.C. 571 , dealing with the Pondicherry Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, the definition of the expression “family” being somewhat analogous to the provisions of the Bihar Act, save and except that there it concluded within its fold the minor sons and unmarried daughters of a person, a question arose as to whether “family” referred to in that Act must conform to the concept of joint family as known to Hindu Law, as in Hindu Law there could not be a family consisting of the father and his divided minor sons for the purpose of fixation of ceiling under the Act, and it was held that the Legislature contemplated a different concept of the family wholly distinct and different from “an undivided Hindu family”, and in that position even the separate properties of the members constituting the statutory family are to be treated as forming part of the holding of the family And this was upheld on the theory that the purpose of the Act was to peg down the process of determination of ceiling area to the state of things that ‘obtained on the appointed day” Nandlal v. State of Haryana AIR 1980 S.C. 2097 was also a case where a similar provision in the Haryana Ceiling Act was challenged. There the definition of “family” also included some minor children and the argument that this provision was contrary to Art. 14 of the Constitution was repelled. The definition of a “landholder” referred to in para 8 of the judgment of the learned Chief Justice is also indicative of the fact that the person who can be declared to be entitled to possess one “unit” of land must have the basic right to hold the land.” and “An examination of the provisions of the Act, as it was originally passed, would show that the Unit for the purpose of acquisition was referable to the area held by an individual land holder. The result was that every minor coparcener in a Mitakshara family was entitled to a separate Unit in his own independent right. Presumably, the requirements of a minor child were not considered at par with the major members in the family and as with a view to acquire larger areas the amendments relied on by the contending respondents were introduced in the Act. The concept of ‘family” defined in S. 2(oo) as the land holder was brought in by the new S. 2(g). But the expression ‘family’ was limited to include the spouse and minor children. The major sons were left but to form separate families with their own minor children. While interpreting the Act, it is essential to keep in mind this narrow meaning of ‘family’ as not including the major children. The exclusion of the personal law by the Explanation II is limited to the determination of the composition of the “Family” and the effect on the acquisition. As I have mentioned in para 4 above, it was not possible to exclude the personal law together, as that would have rendered the Act workable. The other amendments are all consequential and do not have any independent significance. I hoid that the land holder, whether an individual or a “family” within the meaning of the Act belonging to any religion, faith or group. cannot claim additional land for his ceiling area on the ground of a major son. The other amendments are all consequential and do not have any independent significance. I hoid that the land holder, whether an individual or a “family” within the meaning of the Act belonging to any religion, faith or group. cannot claim additional land for his ceiling area on the ground of a major son. The major son is Mitakshara family gets a separate unit for (himself (and his spouse and minor children) in his own independent right and not as the son of his father and major son in a non-Mitakshara family also has a similar right which he has if he owns land in his own right”. 3. It would have been easy for me to to follow the majority view in the above Patna judgment and set aside the impugned orders holding that irrespective of the personal law of the party, the concept of Mitakshara school of Hindu law his to be applied as the foundation or base for the ceiling law, but for the fact that in search of rationale, if such a premise is adopted, certain disastrous consequences may follow including the consequence of recognising an independent right in a major son or a major daughter of a person who holds a property without there being any coparcenary right of the son or the right in an undivided property to a daughter. 4. A Bench of three Judges of the Patna High Court in Iwapai Hasan v. State AIR 1982 Patna 89had taken the view that it cannot be accepted that a Muslim major son also becomes a landholder within the lifetime of his father within the meaning of the Act and constitutes a family on the premise that such a son does not have any personal right in the property belonging to his father until devise and succession. That judgment was overruled by three Judges constituting the majority in a Bench consisting of five of them in State v. K.N. Zuberi AIR 1986 Patna 166 (F.B.). Since it is a question of far reaching consequence in determining the ceiling area of land in possession of a family, and two views are possible, I am inclined to refer this case to a larger Bench. Since it is a question of far reaching consequence in determining the ceiling area of land in possession of a family, and two views are possible, I am inclined to refer this case to a larger Bench. Let the office draw the attention of the Honourable the Chief Justice to the order passed today, so that if the Honourable the Chief Justice feels persuaded, he may constitute a Full Bench, or otherwise order the case to be listed before a Division, Bench. ——— 1. Editorial Note ; In respect of the Order of Reference in this case made on 1-8-1991 by the Honble Mr. Justice Mishra which we are printing herein, we learn that the case is pending and is not disposed of. We have not been able to ascertain whether further orders have been passed making a Reference of the case to a Full Bench or only to a Division Bench. As the Ceiling Laws in Pondicherry and in Tamil Nadu are very similar, we feel that members of our bar will be interested in the outcome. This is the reason for our publishing the Order of Reference made by the learned Judge. (—Ed.)