ORDER Dr. T.N. Singh, J. -- 1. For this Bench's opinion are referred, in two separate matters, the following two questions : M.A. 64 of 1991 : Whether the Insurer and/or the owner/driver of the offending motor vehicle or vehicles against whom an order of compensation is passed in terms of the provisions of Section 140, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has a right of appeal against that order under Section 173 of the Act? M.M. No. 138 of 1991 : Whether any appeal filed on or After 1.7.1989, challenging an order of compensation passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in terms of provisions of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act or the final award passed under Section 168 of the Act, can be entertained without the appellant fulfilling the requirement of the provisions contained in Section 173 of the Act of making requisite deposit of the sum contemplated thereunder? Hereinafter, the above questions would be referred to as the first and second question respectively. 2. Parties and also facts of the two matters are different, but for the sake of convenience, we are treating them analogous for answering the questions of law above-referred, both involving the same exercise of interpretation of Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, for short, the 'Act'. Indeed, another common feature of the two matters is that orders for interim compensation passed under Section 140 of the Act by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (for short, the MACT) are challenged in the two appeals preferred under Section 173. 3. Appellants in M.A. No. 64/91 are owners of a bus bearing registration No. CPJ 8342, said to be involved in an accident on 24.3.1988 in which the claimant/respondent is found to have been seriously injured. On 18.2.1991, MACT, Bhind passed the impugned order against the owners for payment to the claimant of interim compensation of Rs. 7,500/- after recording the finding that particulars of the Insurer could not be ascertained. In the appeal, the two-fold plea disputes identity of the vehicle involved in the accident and the fact of the claimant suffering permanent disability. When the matter came up for hearing on admission before the learned Single Judge, he took the view that the question of appeal's maintainability deserved consideration and decision of a Larger Bench because it was necessary to examine the correctness of the view expressed in this Court's D.E. decision in Oriental Insurance Co. When the matter came up for hearing on admission before the learned Single Judge, he took the view that the question of appeal's maintainability deserved consideration and decision of a Larger Bench because it was necessary to examine the correctness of the view expressed in this Court's D.E. decision in Oriental Insurance Co. v. Pritamlal, 1989 ACJ 1129 . As such, the respondent was not noticed but when this Bench heard the matter, we requested Shri B.N. Malhotra, Advocate, to assist the Court as amicus curiae. We heard appellants' counsel Shri M. C. Jain, but allowed Shri Malhotra time to file written arguments which have come on record and are perused. 4. In the other matter, the Insurer is the appellant and in that appeal too, in another form, the question of maintainability arises. It was contended by appellant's counsel that though the appeal was preferred under Section 173 of the Act, the accident having taken place on 8.2.1985, prior to enforcement of the new Act, the appellant was not required to make the deposit contemplated under the proviso to Section 173 (1). He had relied on this Court's D.E. decision in Jaswantrao v. Kamlabai ( AIR 1990 MP 354 ) to support his contention which did not appeal to the Referring Judge. That decision he found amenable to reconsideration on its substratum being shaken by this Court's subsequent Full Bench decision in Babulal's case ( 1990 JLJ 422 = AIR 1990 MP 317 ). Under the impugned order, passed on 29.11.1990, by MACT, Morena, for death of Shrichand, his widow (claimant/respondent No.1) and two sons (claimants/respondents 2 and 3) are held entitled to be paid Rs. 15,000/-. There is a finding recorded in the, impugned order that in the accident, two vehicles are involved: Truck No. CPM 9485, owned by respondent No.4, Virendra Pal Singh; and Tractor No. RNT 347, owned jointly by respondents 7 and 8, Bharat Singh and Bhagwan Singh. Both insurers, New India Insurance Co. and the instant appellant United India Insurance Company, along with the owners, have been held jointly and severally liable. Shri J.D. Suryavanshi, appellants' counsel, had suffered an accident and filed belatedly, therefore, on 22.10.1991, his written arguments in this matter. We have perused those and also the written arguments filed by learned amicus curiae. Both insurers, New India Insurance Co. and the instant appellant United India Insurance Company, along with the owners, have been held jointly and severally liable. Shri J.D. Suryavanshi, appellants' counsel, had suffered an accident and filed belatedly, therefore, on 22.10.1991, his written arguments in this matter. We have perused those and also the written arguments filed by learned amicus curiae. The main contention agitated in the memorandum of appeal is that the tractor in question was not insured with the appellant during the relevant period. 5. Lest we lose direction and purpose, we set up below the statutory radar, extracting in extenso, Section 173 :- "173. Appeals. -- (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2),any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court: Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less1. in the manner directed by the High Court: Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees". 6. Two basic legal-Constitutional postulates of undisputed immutability we must also bear in mind. They are – 1. Legislature has plenary power to enact any law within Constitutional limits. Basically, that constraint is two-fold. First, the legislative competence with respect to the subject- matter of legislation, to be determined in terms of part XI and Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Second, insulation of the law enacted against any likely challenge posed by Article 13. Legislative power can be exercised not only for enacting a statute or amending it, but also for repealing it or re-enacting it, with respect to the same subject-matter. 2. Right of appeal is a creature of statute. It is a substantive right, but its scope and ambit depends on legislative intent expressed in the provision enacted. Legislative power can be exercised not only for enacting a statute or amending it, but also for repealing it or re-enacting it, with respect to the same subject-matter. 2. Right of appeal is a creature of statute. It is a substantive right, but its scope and ambit depends on legislative intent expressed in the provision enacted. Because Legislature can enact retrospective legislation, it can modify or even take away a vested right of appeal; such intention is ordinarily explicitly manifested, but it follows also from necessary implication. 7. Judicial legislation is forbidden; but judicial impotence is sinful. That also we must remember because High Courts are Constitutional Courts and its judges are supposed to look ahead and through, tangled wabs, law is to be interpreted teleologically according to constitutionally ordained norms to ensure that the "Paramount Parchment" does not turn into a "Dead Sea Scroll". Provisions, whether of ordinary law or of the Constitution, are to be interpreted, it has been authoritatively held, to effectuate the Directive Principles and to ensure that those are not defeated. See, in this connection, Pathwnma ( AIR 1978 SC 771 ) and Ranjan Dwivedi ( AIR 1983 SC 624 ). A country without written Constitution, England, is also veering increasingly to lean on purposive interpretation. House of Lords' Shah v. Barnat, (1983) 1 A.E.R. 226, is a recent example of that exercise. Constitution Bench, in Minerva Mills' case ( AIR 1980 SC 1789 ) has recognised that trend and has accorded it primacy. Other decisions also may be referred, Girdharilal ( AIR 1986 SC 1499 ) and Utkal Contractors ( AIR 1987 SC 1454 ), but of immediate relevance is the holding of their Lordships in the recent decision in Atmaram Mitta/'s case (AIR 1983 SC 2031). They observed: "purposive interpretation in a social amelioration legislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else". Shetty, J. 's view in Kehar Singh's case ( AIR 1988 SC 1883 ) deserves also to be referred to in this connection: the Court cannot substitute its own notion of legislative intent but it does possess the power of choice; there is no "golden rule" of universal application. A passage from his judgment, we feel tempted to extract below :- "Court would then examine every word, every section and every provision. Court would examine the Act as a whole. A passage from his judgment, we feel tempted to extract below :- "Court would then examine every word, every section and every provision. Court would examine the Act as a whole. It would look at the mis-chiefs which the legislature intended to redress. It would look at the whole situation and not just one-to-one relation. It will not consider any provision out of the framework of the statute. It will not view the provisions as abstract principles separated from the motive force behind. It will consider the provisions in the circumstances to which they owe their origin. It will consider the provisions to ensure coherence and consistency within the law as a whole and to avoid undesirable consequences." (Para 231). 8. In order to answer the first question, we regard it appropriate to extract sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 140 : "140. Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault.- (1) where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under subsection (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twelve thousand rupees." Sub-section (3) and (4) contemplate that the claimant is not to "plead and establish" that the accident occurred due to any "wrongful act, neglect or default" of the owner or owners and that contributory negligence of the victim or the deceased can be no defence against the claim. Sub-section (2) of Section 141, however, deserves to be extracted in extenso for its material bearing on the controversy: "A claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such. Sub-section (2) of Section 141, however, deserves to be extracted in extenso for its material bearing on the controversy: "A claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible and where compensation is claimed in respect of such. death or permanent disablement under Section 140 and also in pursuance of any right on the principle of fault, the claim for compensation under Section 140 shall be disposed of as aforesaid in the first place." Chapter VII A was inserted in the old Act of 1939 with effect from 1.10.1982, containing Section 92A et. seq. Chapter X of the new Act reenacts verbatim those provisions. This statutory innovation owes its origin to the judicial clamour raised at the highest level as recognised in Shivaji Dayanu v. Vatsal ( AIR 1991 SC 1769 = 1991 ACJ 777). At para 5 of the Report, their Lordships extract the Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill of the old Act and at para 6 they proceed to refer to their earlier decisions highlighting the need for "no fault liability". A short passage from one of those decisions, N.K. V. Bros. case ( AIR 1980 SC 1354 ), per Krishna Iyer, J., deserves to be extracted :- "Indeed, the State must seriously consider no-fault liability by legislation. A second aspect which pains us is the inadequacy of the compensation or undue parcimony practised by tribunals. We must remember that judicial tribunals are State organs and Art. 41 of the Constitution lays the jurisprudential foundation for State relief against accidental disablement of citizens. There is no justification for niggardliness in compensation. A third factor which is harrowing is the enormous delay in disposal of accident cases resulting in compensation, even if awarded, being posponed by several years. " 9. Evidently, as noted above, the provision of interim compensation has been envisaged to take care of "cases of underserved wants" to fulfil the constitutional imperative of Art. 41 in order to prevent destitution of widows and orphans and also to care for the permanently disabled victim of a motor accident. " 9. Evidently, as noted above, the provision of interim compensation has been envisaged to take care of "cases of underserved wants" to fulfil the constitutional imperative of Art. 41 in order to prevent destitution of widows and orphans and also to care for the permanently disabled victim of a motor accident. In Shivaji Dayanu (supra), their Lordships have held that orders for interim compensation are to be passed summarily and formal procedure prescribed with regard to adjudication of the claim preferred under Section 110-A (old) to enforce liability of tort- feasors On the principle of fault is not to be followed. Because, legislature has contemplated explicitly as per Section 141 (2) for a certain sum to be made available to the victim or his heirs "as expeditiously as possible". This Court in Mahila Ramdei's case ( 1988 JLJ 412 = AIR 1988 MP 98 ) has held that the "Tribunal is to act suo motu under Section 92-A and until the claim envisaged thereunder is decided it shall have no jurisdiction to proceed further and try the claim petition and adjudicate liability under principle of fault. As held in Shivaji 's case, the Tribunal is only required to "satisfy itself" with respect to the triune requirement: an accident has arisen out of use of one or more motor vehicles: it has resulted in permanent disablement of the claimant or of death of the person whose legal representatives' claim is to be decided; the owner or owners and the Insurer or insurers of the motor vehicle or vehicles involved in accident are held liable. 10. Indeed, nowhere in language of the provisions of Chapter X is the word "award" used; the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to make order under Section 140 is traceable obviously to Section 141 (2) and Explanation to Section 165 (1) but reference may also be made to Section 166(2), proviso, and Section 168(1). proviso. Chapter X is a complete Code which is supposed to deal with all matter" concerning "liability without fault in certain cases" and that position is buttressed by Section 168(1), proviso, mandating disposal of the claim in that regard as per provisions only of Chapter X and thereby excluding applicability of the provisions of Chapter XII which contains Section 168 as also Section 173. No provision for any appeal against the order passed under Section 140 is contemplated in the said Chapter. No provision for any appeal against the order passed under Section 140 is contemplated in the said Chapter. The liability once determined by the Tribunal, acting within the scope of its jurisdiction, with due satisfaction recorded in respect of the conditions-precedent noticed in Shivaji, becomes indefeasible. Although the "owner" or "owners" in terms of Section 140 (1), are primarily liable, their liability devolves statutorily in terms of Section 145 (c) and 149(1) on the Insurer and the Tribunal gets vested with jurisdiction and competence to direct the Insurer to discharge that liability. Section 144 of Chapter X imparts "overriding" effect to other provisions thereof, which are to prevail over "any other provisions of this Act or of any law for the time being in force". For good and valid reason, to achieve the pre-determined and paramount objective, the legislature took care to ensure that no order passed under Section 140 is taken in appeal and that is enforced instantly to reach the destitute immediately the relief granted. Pendency of such appeals in the High Court would interdict the "immediate" relief and frustrate the object of the order. Then the Tribunal refuses arbitrarily to pass an order under Section 140, the claimants would not be remediless. High Courts, where appeals under Section 173 are heard, possess supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to give them due relief with greater expedition. In any case, Courts of District Judges, functioning as Tribunals, are supposed to act with full awareness of the responsibility saddled on them and pass orders exercising their jurisdiction judicially and not arbitrarily . 11. On a comparison of the provisions of Chapter X and XII of the Act, it appears clear that the order contemplated under Section 140 of Chapter X is an interim order passed in the course of the proceeding instituted in the Claims Tribunal. Compensation may be claimed by a person injured in a motor accident and also by legal representatives of deceased in the case of a death. Compensation may be claimed by a person injured in a motor accident and also by legal representatives of deceased in the case of a death. No sooner an application under Section 166 of Chapter XII is lodged, then the statutory obligation of the Tribunal to pass an order with reference to the claim made in the application arises immediately under Section 140 read with Section 141 (2) of Chapter, X irrespective of prayer in that regard being made separately or in the same application as contemplated under the proviso to Section 156 (2). The order is passed in the course of trial of the same claim to which composite character is statutorily imputed and separate provisions are made for dealing with and disposing of at different stages of the proceedings the two different parts of the same claim founded on differing principles of "fault" and "no fault". Although the order passed under Section 140 disposes of finally one part of the claim, the proceedings do not terminate and they continue till final "award" is passed under Section 168. Though proviso to Section 168(1) clearly manifests legislation intent to treat the order passed under Section 140 as an interim order passed in the course of trial of the claim, if does carry also the implication that finality of that interim order is not impugnable under any provision of Chapter XII. Indeed, legislature's competence to make non-appealable any interim order is beyond dispute. Provisions of Sections 96 and 104, CPC exemplify this. In this connection, we refer to Shah Babulal Khimji ( AIR 1981 SC 1786 ) and Rajmata Vijaya Raje Scindia, 1988 JLJ 86 = 1988 MPLJ 78 . Special provision for dealing with the whole hog any claim for compensation on the principle of "no fault" liability contemplated under Chapter X must be accorded primacy and right to appeal against an order passed in that regard being denied expressly, such a right cannot be judicially interpolated. 12. Section 173 (1) of the Act may be liegitimately compared to Section 96(1), CPC; "every decree" is appealable under Section 96(1), CPC, but under Section 173 (1) of the Act, twin conditions, the appellant is required to satisfy. He can challenge only an "award" and he must also be a person who can claim' to be "aggrieved" thereby. 12. Section 173 (1) of the Act may be liegitimately compared to Section 96(1), CPC; "every decree" is appealable under Section 96(1), CPC, but under Section 173 (1) of the Act, twin conditions, the appellant is required to satisfy. He can challenge only an "award" and he must also be a person who can claim' to be "aggrieved" thereby. In Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, the meaning given to the expression "aggrieved person" / "aggrieved party" is - "whose legal right is invaded by an act complained of". Obviously, such a person who can plead in appeal that the tribunal wrongly rejected his lawful plea can be a person who can say that the order invaded his legal right. An order under Section 140 is passed on tribunal's satisfaction recorded in respect of three simple requirements as held in Shivaji's case (supra); sub-sections (2) and (3) expressly bar specifically defence pleas contrary thereto. Although an Insurer may rightly complain in a given case that he had taken the plea before the tribunal that the vehicle was not duly insured with it at the time of accident, on that he may be heard by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution as the question of Tribunal's jurisdiction to hold insurer liable illegally would arise. 13. It is also argued that if the legislature could expressly bar appeals under sub-section (2) when "amount in dispute in the appeal is less than 10,000 rupees", it could also expressl make its intention clear similarly by providing that against order for interim compensation too appeal will not lie. To that contention, there is a short answer. Sub-section (2) speaks of an "award" and indeed Section 173 in its entirety is to be read subject to the provisions of Chapter X. Provisions of Chapter X being expressly invested with an overriding effects a repeat exercise was out of question. Indeed, the innovative provision, the first proviso of Section 173 (1), is meant indeed to take care of a casus omissus; it is atonce beneficent and curative. To read it otherwise may defeat its object and purpose. As is the position under the new Act, under the old Act too Section 92A applied also to a proceeding in the Workmen Compensation Commissioner's Court and a claim for death or injury (even in a motor accident) was triable in that Court. To read it otherwise may defeat its object and purpose. As is the position under the new Act, under the old Act too Section 92A applied also to a proceeding in the Workmen Compensation Commissioner's Court and a claim for death or injury (even in a motor accident) was triable in that Court. Under Section 30 (1), W.C. Act, any order passed by that Court was appealable but on full amount of compensation awarded being deposited. The provision of appeal (Section 110-D) under the old Act failed to maintain parity in regard to award passed by the Claims Tribunal. That "mischief" the new provision in the new Act has sought to remedy to some extent. Legislature has, however, contemplated limited application of the new provision to its field of operation in respect of an "award" impugned in the appeal preferred under Section 173(1) in respect of adjudication of the claim on the principle of" fault"; to extend its scope judicially would be a constitutional sin, relatable to violation of the mandate of Articles 39-A and 41. 14. The spectre of constitutional apostacy deters any attempt to debble in involved logic as will flout the deliberately proclaimed legislative intendment. Even if the nuances of the legislative venture displays a subtle strain, judicial labour is not to be misdirected; its sources, the "Mischief Rule", is not to be ignored. By making the entitlement of the claimant to compensation on the principle of "no fault" absolute and indefeasible in virtue of Section 144 (which imparts "over-riding effect" to Section 140) the enforcement of the right in terms of order passed under Section 140 is also pari passu secured firmly and the claimant is assured of immediate payment in full, from the owner/insurer, of the amount ordered to be paid to him. If appeal against that order is to be held maintainable under Section 173(1) that provision is to be applied in a truncated form (minus the first proviso) for obvious reasons; judicial amputation of a statutory provision is however constitutionally forbidden. It is obvious that the moment any appeal is filed under Section 173(1) the first proviso thereof becomes operative instantly, imperatively and invariably. It is obvious that the moment any appeal is filed under Section 173(1) the first proviso thereof becomes operative instantly, imperatively and invariably. Claimant's right to get immediate payment of the full amount specified in the order impugned is atonce arrested in virtue of the right contemplated under the said proviso of the appellant to deposit only a part of the amount and claim validly, deferment indefinitely of payment of the balance. Additionally, such an appeal may delay disposal of the claim on the principle of "fault" ; the claimant may be forced to trudge along a tear- shodden path, oriss-crossed by multiple proceedings. 15. We now look at the decisions cited, beginning with Pritamlal (supra) of this Court. What appears clear to us is that the Bench considered the matter from a single angle. The learned Judges thought that if the order of interim compensation passed under Section 92 A (Old) was not regarded as an "award", that would be a "paper order" and would defeat the object of Chapter VII-A (Old). For that, immediate inspiration was provided by Section 110 B (Old) which contemplated recovery as arrear of land revenue of any money due under an "award". This Court's Full Bench has since enlarged the scope of jurisdiction of the Claims Tribunal in Sarmaniya Bai's case ( 1990 JLJ 386 = AIR 1990 MP 306 , 1990 ACJ 860). It is held that the Claims Tribunal is competent to execute its orders awarding compensation in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction which it continues to possess as a Civil Court and that it has jurisdiction to enforce its orders applying the provisions of Order XXI, CPC. As the matter has not been viewed in Pritamlal from any other angle, we arc required to observe only this much that the apprehension which troubled the learned Judges has vanished. That apart, the attention docs not appear to have been paid to the legislative intent of deliberately avoiding use of the word "award" in the entire Chapter VII A (Old). A word or two about Allahabad High Court's decision in Santram v. Suryapal (1986 ACJ 202) on which they relied. Although the learned Single Judge took pains to refer to the different provisions of the Act, at para 10 of the Report, the buck stopped at Section 110-E which was regarded as an "important clue". A word or two about Allahabad High Court's decision in Santram v. Suryapal (1986 ACJ 202) on which they relied. Although the learned Single Judge took pains to refer to the different provisions of the Act, at para 10 of the Report, the buck stopped at Section 110-E which was regarded as an "important clue". Indeed, it is for this reason that Pritamlal drew inspiration from this decision. 16. Learned amicus curiae, Shri Malhotra, has cited case- law expressing divergent views. Because there are only two decisions taking a view similar to ours, we would first refer to them. In Rajasthan State Road Transport v. Chhatariya (1991 ACJ 32), a learned Single Judge has held that appeal against an order granting interim compensation under Section 92 A does not lie and that the appeal may be treated as a revision. He has, of course, given no reason for the view expressed. Another learned Single Judge of J. & K. High Court in Janakraj v. Union of India ( 1989 ACJ 1148 ) has also held that order for interim compensation passed under Section 92 A (Old) is not appealable. Before him also, the Allahabad decision in Santram (supra) was cited without success. The learned Judge proceeded on the basis that the right of appeal being a statutory right and that right being conferred only in respect of an award passed in terms of Section 110 B (Old), the scope of that right cannot be extended to an order passed under Section 92 A (Old). He also observed that if that view is not taken, the object of making provision for payment of compensation on the principle of "no fault liability" would be defeated as the deserving claimant would not receive immediate assistance. 17. We may now refer to the other line of decisions taking the contrary view. However, J. & K. High Court's Full Bench decision in Mohd. Yusuf Wani v. Abdul Rehman Gujri (1983 ACJ 242) to which our attention, Shri Malhotra, has drawn in particular to paras 16, 17 and 19 of the Report, also supports the view we have taken. Separate judgments were rendered in that case by the learned Judges and the reasoning adopted by the majority conforms essentially to our view. Yusuf Wani v. Abdul Rehman Gujri (1983 ACJ 242) to which our attention, Shri Malhotra, has drawn in particular to paras 16, 17 and 19 of the Report, also supports the view we have taken. Separate judgments were rendered in that case by the learned Judges and the reasoning adopted by the majority conforms essentially to our view. A different question, however, was to be decided in that case; whether the order of the Claims Tribunal refusing to set aside an order dismissing the claim petition for non-appearance of the claimant was appealable. According to the majority opinion, the order was not an "award" and was, therefore, not appealable. Per Kotwal, J. at paras 16 and 17, the meaning of the term "award" used in Section 110 D in the context of Section 110 B, is illustratively determined and at para 19, finally, the learned Judge holds the order to be not an "award" and not appealable, because the order did not dispose of the claim petition finally. The reasoning adopted by the reamed judge is essentially same as ours as he holds that if each and every order passed by the Tribunal is regarded as an "award", that would cause considerable delay in granting appropriate relief to the aggrieved party. 18. A learned Single Judge of Bombay High Court in Sulochana v. Gurbachan Singh (1989 ACJ 667) was dealing with claimant's appeal challenging dismissal of the claim petition itself. The claim had been made only under Section 92-A and, therefore, the maintainability of the appeal was challenged. Kotwal, J. 's view was relied on to hold that of the same ingredients were made the order passed under Section 92 A and "award" made under Section 110 B. Section 110-E was also referred to for harmonizing the different provisions of the Act, but mainly, Rule 306 B of Bombay Motor Vehicle Rules, 1959 was relied on to construe the term "award". We do not think, however, if any extra-jural meaning can be given to relieve hardship or in dealing with a "hard case" to the term "award" judicially through a tortuous exercise, by tearing it apart and viewing it in isolation, out of it" statutory context and setting. We do not also think that any subordinate legislation can control the parent law. 19. We do not also think that any subordinate legislation can control the parent law. 19. Another decision taking contrary view is of a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in United Insurance Co. v. Padmavatby (1990 ACJ 751). The word "award" being not defined either in the new Actor in the repealed Act, the learned Judges regarded it legitimate to refer to Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar. They held accordingly that the term "award" ordinarily means, "to adjudge to be due, by judicial determination or deliberate judgment". They accorded the primacy to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 168. Although the learned Judges also referred to sub-sections (2) and(3) as well of Section 168 to support the view taken, we have found ourselves unable to agree with the conclusion reached. We do not think if the Claims Tribunal is in any way handicapped in delivering copies of the order passed under Section 140 or in making direction in regard to satisfaction of that order because this Court's Full Bench in Sarmaniya Bai, as observed above, has held authoritatively that a Claims Tribunal possesses inherent powers and that, in our view, can be exercised to enforce all types of orders it passes. It has obviously inherent jurisdiction to deal also with any incidental matter in respect to the order it passes under Section 140. We need not deal with State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bhagwati Pawar ( 1991 ACJ 73 ) because no question of appealability of order for interim compensation passed under Section 92 A was raised in that case; the question agitated was, if the amount paid (although referred in the judgment as "interim award") was deductible from the final "award". 20. We have been unable to persuade ourselves to subscribe to the Bombay and Kerala views and indeed we have found support for our view from the decisions cited of Rajasthan and J. & K. High Courts. We have already explained the changed circumstances under which it is not possible to hold this Court's decision in Pritamlal (supra) as laying down the law correctly and indeed, reasons also we have given for dissenting from Allahabad High Court's decision in San tram (supra). 21. Accordingly, we answer in the negative the first question. We have already explained the changed circumstances under which it is not possible to hold this Court's decision in Pritamlal (supra) as laying down the law correctly and indeed, reasons also we have given for dissenting from Allahabad High Court's decision in San tram (supra). 21. Accordingly, we answer in the negative the first question. We hold that no appeal lies under Section 173, M.V. Act, 1988 against an order passed under Section 140 of the Act against Insurer and/or the owner/driver of the offending motor vehicle or vehicles. Consequently, the decision in Pritamlal stands overruled. 22. We proceed to answer the second question now. At para 5, Section 173 of the new Act has been extracted in extenso, but in dealing with the second question, reference is to be made also to Section 217 as that has a material bearing on the question mooted. Therefore, relevant portion of that section is also extracted: "217. Repeal and Savings -- (1) The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (4 of 1939) and any law corresponding to that Act in force in any State immediately before the commencement of this Act in that State (hereinafter in this section referred to as the repealed enactments) are hereby repealed. (2) Notwithstc1nding the repeal by sub-section (1) of the repealed enactments -- (a) any notification, rule, regulation, order or notice issued, or any appointment or declaration made or exemption granted or any confiscation made or any penalty or fine imposed, any forfeiture, cancellation or any other thing done, or any other action taken under the repealed enactments and in force immediately before such commencement shall, so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been issued, made, granted, done or taken under the corresponding provision of this Act; (4) The mention of particular matters in this section shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeals." 23. Although a large mass of case-law has been cited by Sarvashri Malhotra and Suryavanshi, of which some citations are common, about the crux of the controversy, we have no doubt. Although a large mass of case-law has been cited by Sarvashri Malhotra and Suryavanshi, of which some citations are common, about the crux of the controversy, we have no doubt. That is, whether in terms of the savings contemplated under Section 217 the pre-existing right contemplated under Section 110 D of the old Act can be invoked in derogation of the new provision of appeal contemplated under Section 173 of the new Act. Potently and patently, the entire old Act (M.V. Act, 1939) is "repealed" by Section 217(1) and we do not know if that clear intendment of the legislature can be defeated by resort to any general theory on which much emphasis is laid, relying on Apex Court's decision in Padma Srinivasan's case ( AIR 1982 SC 836 ). True, we would be required to examine the scope and ambit of sub-section (4) of Section 217; but to that we shall advert in due course. We may profitably refer even at this stage, however to Privy Council's decision in G. Ogden Industries v. Lucas, (1969) 1 All E.R. 121. Construing the terms "right accrued" in Crown Lands Act, 1884 which had repealed the earlier Act of 1861 and had provided that notwithstanding the repeal "all rights accrued" by virtue of the repealed enactment should remain unaffected, their Lordships held that the mere right existing at the date of the repealing statute to take advantage of the provisions of the Act repealed was not a "right accrued" within the meaning of the saving clause. Evidently, legislative competence to extinguish existing right cannot be denied and, therefore, there can be no question of any "right accrued" unless any such right is saved under the new enactment repealing the old provision. 24. A word now about Padma Srinivasan. In that case, their Lordships held that liability of the Insurer would be extended to the legal provision as it stood on the date of the accident and as that had occurred during the currency of the policy insurer's liability was unquestionable. In that case, the enforcement of the particular right was not the right of an appeal, but the right to enforce liability against the Insurer in a proceeding under Section 110 A (old) for compensation. In that case, the enforcement of the particular right was not the right of an appeal, but the right to enforce liability against the Insurer in a proceeding under Section 110 A (old) for compensation. It was in that context that their Lordships observed that "the governing factor for determining the application of the appropriate law is not the date on which the policy of insurance came into force but the date on which the cause of action accrued for enforcing liability arising under the terms of the policy". That dictum's relevance to the instant controversy is unimaginable. Accordingly, reliance also on this Court's Full Bench decision in New India Assurance Company v. Nafis Begum ( 1991 JLJ 490 = 1991 MPLJ 700 ), we hold inappropriate. Although two of the learned Judges constituting the Bench leaned heavily on Padma Srinivasan's case for the view taken, S.K. Jha, Chief Justice, who gave separate judgment in that case, preferred, however, to deal with the question of retrospectively of Section 92 A, old Act, raised in that case in a different manner. Learned Chief Justice took the view that "no fault liability" contemplated under Section 92A would be operative from the date when legislature intended it so and, therefore, the date of enforcement of the provision would be determinative of legislative intent. In that case too, the question was not of right of appeal that was agitated, but of right to enforce the liability itself ("no fault") that was agitated. 25. We examine now the decision in Jaswant Rao (supra), the correctness of which is doubted by the learned Referring Judge. At para 6 of the Report, the Bench referred to, and relied on, this Court's earlier D.B. decisions in Chuluram ( 1979 JLJ 730 = AIR 1980 MP 16 ) and Sitaram (1981 JLJ 171) to lean on the principle that the right of appeal accrued to the parties to the suit on the date of institution of the suit and on that basis indeed reached the conclusion that the objection to the maintainability of the appeal under proviso to Section 173 (1), new Act, was not maintainable and it was held that the appellant was not required to deposit Rs. 25,000/- as contemplated thereunder. 25,000/- as contemplated thereunder. Those two decisions relied on in Jaswant Rao's case have, however, been over-ruled by this Court's Full Bench in Babulal's case ( 1990 JLJ 422 = AIR 1990 MP 317 ) and for the view k1ken, the Full Bench referred to the sk1tutory saving clause, in that case, of Section 97, CPC (Amendment) Act, 1976. They observed, however that "there is no inherent right of appeal (and that) once a right of appeal has been given, it can be taken away only by express provision in the statute or by necessary intendment". 26. Although in Jaswant Rao, the view expressed by D.B. of Allahabad High Court in Oriental Insurance Co. v. Dhanram Singh (AIR 1990 Allahabad 30) was found unaccepcab1e we find the Allahabad decision quite illuminating and, in our view, correct law was laid down in that case by the learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court. It has been rightly held that though right of appeal is a substantive right and that right is saved, matters of procedure relating to that right are not saved. While k1king that view, due consideration was paid to the provisions of Section 217, aforequoted, and also to Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, separately to which reference is incorporated in Section 217 (4). We express our respectful agreement with the conclusion recorded at para 15 of the Report that even in respect of a right of appeal which was accrued under Section 110-D (old), that right must be availed only in the manner provided for under the repealing Act, namely, under Section 173 of the new Act. 27. As observed at para 23 above, impact only of sub-section (4) Section 273 is to be considered on the controversy. Neither sub- section (2) nor sub-section (3), in our view, has any relevance to the controversy though reliance is placed on clause (a) of sub-section (2) and in that regard we have to say a few words. That clause saves apparently any action taken not by any party under the Act, but by any functionary exercising its power and jurisdiction for doing that act under the old Act; though it speaks of "penalty or fine imposed, any forfeiture, cancellation or any other thing done", in terms thereof also, there is no saving contemplated of any pre-existing right or liability of any party. This position, a Division Bench of this Court (Dr. T. N. Singh, J. and R.C. L1hoti, J.) had noted in PrabhavatiSharma's case ( 1990 ACJ 399 ). It was held that sub-section (2)(a) of Section 217 had not kept alive for adjudication under the new Act the "liability" with respect to which, as per Section 6, General Clauses Act, "legal proceeding or remedy" contemplated under the old Act has to be "continued or enforced". That ratio applies squarely to the instant controversy because on a parity of reasoning, we can say that no right to file appeal under and in accordance with the provisions of the old Act (Section 110 D) has been kept alive by Section 217 (2) (a). We reiterate the view expressed in Prabhavati and we do not think, therefore, if fresh examination is at all called for of sub-section (4) which Prabhavati had construed along with the role of Section 6, G.C. Act in the operation of that provision. Still, one word we may add that Section 217 (4) speaks of "general application" of the said Section 6 and it is nothing beyond that; it does not create in terms any saving aliunde in respect of any other matter not enumerated in sub-section (3). 28. What survives now is to note merely the other decisions which counsel cited to establish the accepted position with which there is no quarrel. Reference is made to the decisions in Hoosein Kasam Dada (AIR 1953 SC 321); State of Punjab v. Mohar Singh ( AIR 1955 SC 84 ); Garikapati ( AIR 1957 SC 540 ); State of Bombay v. S.G. Films Exchange ( AIR 1960 SC 980 ); Mukund Deo ( AIR 1965 SC 703 ); Collector of Customs v.A.S. Bava ( AIR 1968 SC 13 ); T.S. Baliah (AIR 1968 SC 701) and Jayantilal Amratlal v. Union of India ( AIR 1971 SC 1193 ). We have gone through those decisions, hut we do not find that view taken by us is indented in any manner by anything stated in those cases. Suffice it to say this much that different saving clauses in different enactments were construed in some of those cases and the construction evidently was founded upon the language of statutory provisions in each case. 29. Suffice it to say this much that different saving clauses in different enactments were construed in some of those cases and the construction evidently was founded upon the language of statutory provisions in each case. 29. It is true, as held in Jayantilal and T.S. Baliah (both, supra), the Court's approach should be "not to enquire if the new enactment has by its new provisions kept alive the rights and liabilities under the repealed law, but whether it has taken away those rights and liabilities". However, it is also held in those decisions, as indeed is mandated by the language of said Section 6, G.C. Act, enquiry is also to be made if the new Act expresses a "different intention". That is really the clinching clue of the present controversy. There is clear departure in the new Section 173 in respect of the mode and manner in which an appeal thereunder can be preferred as there was no provision in the old Act under Section 110 D of the nature of the first proviso to Section 173(1). The clear intention of legislature to circumscribe the right of the appeal in all cases preferred after the new Act is manifested expressly and that intendment admits of no ambiguity. There is a weighty rationale of the new object to be fulfilled by the new provision embodied in the first proviso to Section 173 (1), leaving no scope for any ambiguity about legislative intent underlying the new provision. Frivolous appeals deserved to be curtailed and even otherwise, claimants' right deserved to be safeguarded by insisting on prior deposit of a part of the sum awarded which could be made available to the claimants by an interim order when the appeal is admitted. 30. Indeed, even in Garikapati (supra) that position is recognised, holding that though right of appeal is a vested right, it can still be taken away by subsequent enactment if that is so provided expressly or by necessary intendment. The reason why the right of appeal is regarded as a substantive right is that the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all rights of appeal in force are preserved to the parties till the rest of the career of the suit. So, the implied right can be varied too by the legislature expressly or by necessary intendment as held by Garikapati. about other decisions. So, the implied right can be varied too by the legislature expressly or by necessary intendment as held by Garikapati. about other decisions. We need not say anything because of the established position stated in those cases that a right of appeal is not merely a matter of procedure. 31. We conclude accordingly, answering in negative the second question. We reiterate that the law applicable for the exercise of the right of appeal against "award" passed by MACT is the law in force on the date on which the appeal is preferred; the procedure prescribed under the new law would apply to the appeal to be preferred thereunder. We hold that to any appeal pending disposal on 1.7.1989, already preferred under Section 110 D (old), the provisions of Section 173 (new) would not apply; but, to any appeal preferred under the new provision, the old procedure which has been repealed would not apply. In any appeal preferred under Section 173, after 1.7.1989, irrespective of the date of accident and date also of the "award" (whether passed under Section 110 B, Old, or 168, new), the appellate Court would be required, as statutorily mandated under the first proviso to Section 173 (1), to pass necessary order in regard to the requisite deposit to be made for the appeal to be heard and decided. However, in respect of any pending appeal, no deposit, as is contemplated under the new proviso, is required to be made; hearing of that appeal would proceed and decision on that appeal is to be rendered on merits in case only of challenge made in such an appeal to an "award" finally passed by MACT and the appeal challenging any order of interim compensation would be liable to be dismissed as not maintainable. We express our respectful agreement with Allahabad High Court's D.E. decision in Dhanram Singh's case (supra) and we are constrained to hold also that the law laid down in Jaswant Rao's case (supra) by this Court is not the correct law. That decision stands over-ruled. 32. We place on records our appreciation of the valuable assistance which Shri R.N. Malhotra has rendered as amicus curiae in this matter. 33. Records shall now be placed before the Referring Judge for final disposal of the two matters on merits. Per R.C. Lahoti, J. : 34. That decision stands over-ruled. 32. We place on records our appreciation of the valuable assistance which Shri R.N. Malhotra has rendered as amicus curiae in this matter. 33. Records shall now be placed before the Referring Judge for final disposal of the two matters on merits. Per R.C. Lahoti, J. : 34. I have had the advantage of going through the opinion recorded by my learned brother Dr. T.N. Singh, J. Though I express my agreement with his opinion recorded on Question No.2 arising out of M.M. No. 138/1990 as will be noticed hereinafter, yet I have not been able to persuade myself to agree with the view taken by my learned brother on the Question No.1 arising out of M.A. No. 64/91. On that question] proceed to record my own opinion setting out the reasons for taking a different view. 35. Question No.1, noted in 1st para of the opinion of brother Dr. T. N. Singh J. which question I need not reproduce, has two aspects: (1) whether an order directing payment of compensation on the principle of 'no-fault liability' statutorily recognised under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (referred to hereinafter as the New Act, for brevity) can be called an 'award' within the meaning of section 173 of the Act so as to make it appealable inasmuch as section 173 contemplates an appeal against an 'award' alone; (ii) whether the insurer and/or owner and/or the driver of the offending motor vehicles can be said to be 'person aggrieved' by an order of 'no-fault liability' compensation. 36. It is true that Section 140 does not use the term' award' to designate the order of compensation made thereunder. That will not make any difference because we have to determine the nature of such order though the Parliament has chosen not to lend the name 'award' to such an order. To compose the problem, it is: whether an order of 'no-fault liability' compensation under section 140 amounts to an 'award' within the meaning of section 173 (1) of the New Act. The New Act (or the old Act-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 too) does not define the term 'award'. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary (new edition, 1983) defines 'award' to mean - "to adjudge; to determine; to grant -- judgment, final decision; that which is awarded etc". The New Act (or the old Act-Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 too) does not define the term 'award'. Chambers 20th Century Dictionary (new edition, 1983) defines 'award' to mean - "to adjudge; to determine; to grant -- judgment, final decision; that which is awarded etc". Meaning thereby if something has been adjudged or determined or granted or awarded by an order of the Court, that would amount to an 'award'. 37. The question posed calls for examining the correctness of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Co. v. Preetamlal & ors. (1989 A.C.J. 1129). In that case the Division Bench, considering the pari materia provisions contained in Section 92 A and 110 D of the old Act, has taken the view that an order awarding compensation on the principle of 'no-fault liability' under section 92 A was an interim award and hence appealable as an award under section 110 D. The Division Bench assigned mainly two reasons for taking the view: firstly, that the provision of payment of compensation on principle of 'no-fault liability' is an interim relief or interim award in a claim case in which compensation is claimed both on principle of 'no-fault liability' and on the basis of allegations of commission of negligence or tort; secondly, that taking the view that such order was an 'award' would make it both recoverable as well as appea1able; otherwise grant of such compensation would only be a paper-order and would defeat the very object of Legislature in introducing the provisions giving speedy relief to the victim of motor accidents, for the (old) Act provided no remedy for execution of such orders, unless they were held to be the awards. 38. In my opinion, the view taken by the Division Bench is right and does not call for any reconsideration. The interpretation placed by the Division Bench on section 92 A and section 110 D of the (old) Act applies with full force to the successor provisions contained in sections 140 and 173 of the New Act. 39. As I have already stated that bare dictionary meaning of the term 'award' permits an order directing payment of compensation under 'no-fault liability' being included within its meaning. Additional clue is provided by section 168 of the New Act. Sub- section (1) of section 168 reads as under :- "168. 39. As I have already stated that bare dictionary meaning of the term 'award' permits an order directing payment of compensation under 'no-fault liability' being included within its meaning. Additional clue is provided by section 168 of the New Act. Sub- section (1) of section 168 reads as under :- "168. Award of the Claims Tribunal-(1) On receipt of an application for compensation made under section 186, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be : Provided that where such application makes a claim for compensation under section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X." The proviso clearly indicates that an order under Section 140 of the New Act is definitely referable to section 168 (1) of the Act and is nothing but a part and parcel of an award to be finally made by the Tribunal. At times, an application for compensation might be disposed of finally with an order passed under section 140 of the Act itself which would be an award under section 168 too, appealable under section 173; the claim having been made solely on the basis of 'no-fault liability' without reference to liability under the law of torts. 40. In Bhagwandas & anr. v. National Insurance Co. 40. In Bhagwandas & anr. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. ( 1990 MPJR 578 ) while disposing of the appeal on the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of this Court (vide paras 91 and 93) of the report, I have said: "A new liability under concept of 'no-fault liability', hitherto unknown to common law was brought statutorily into existence for the first time, creating a corresponding right in favour of heirs of the deceased in a motor accident and persons suffering permanent disability in an accident." xx xxx "A new head of liability having been created and a new measure of damages having been brought into existence taking a long-march in the field of law of torts, the amendment is certainly within the domain of substantive law and not procedural law. The common law recognised concept of liability in road accidents only on proof of negligence and hence enactment of 'no-fault liability' cannot be termed a 'pre-existing liability'? Section 92-A cannot be read as providing procedure merely for enforcement of such liability." 41. Thus, an order made under section 140 of the New Act is within the domain of substantive law and determines the substantive rights and liabilities. 42. Sarmalliya's case ( 1990 JLJ 386 = AIR 1990 MP 306 ) to which decision I was also a party does not have any material bearing on resolving the problem at hand. The Full Bench was posed with a question as to whether recovery through Collector as arrears of land revenue was the only mode of execution of the award of the Tribunal and the Full Bench held that it was not the only method but the Claims Tribunal could execute its award in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure also. To be executable whether through the Collector or by the Tribunal itself, the order has to be an executable order. If an order under section 140 of the New Act were to be taken as an order merely declaring the right to recover and the liability to pay compensation, it would not be executable. If it is an order directing compensation to be paid, then it becomes an award in the ordinary meaning of the term. It is settled that while interpreting the law that view has to be preferred which gives the laws its claws. 43. If it is an order directing compensation to be paid, then it becomes an award in the ordinary meaning of the term. It is settled that while interpreting the law that view has to be preferred which gives the laws its claws. 43. It is only if an order under section 140 would be deemed to be 'an order allowing a claim for compensation' then the Tribunal would be enabled under section 171 also to award interest on the quantum of compensation from the date of making the claim. 44. In my opinion, placing an interpretation which would make 'an order. directing payment of compensation under no-fault liability' an award, appealable under section 173 of the New Act, would not in any manner offend the rule of beneficial interpretation of remedial and welfare legislations. It would rather advance the cause of rule. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal is a Civil Court subordinate to the High Court and the orders passed by it in course of proceedings are open to revision under section 115 C.P.C. if not appealable. [See, Opinion by R.J. Bhave J. on difference between S.B. Sen & Raina JJ. in Krishna Gopal Devi Prasad and others v. Dattatraya Madho Lad ( 1971 JLJ 903 = AIR 1972 MP 125 = 1971 ACJ 372 ); Anirudh Prasad Ambasta v. State of Bihar & another (AIR 1990 Patna 49 FB); and United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. K Raghavareddy ( AIR 1989 AP 33 )]. If an order of the Tribunal is held to be not appealable, then it would be revisable. If only we were to examine the law from the point of view of the claimants, holding an order of 'no-fault liability' compensation to be an award would be a more beneficial and purposive interpretation because if appealable, the insurer/owner/driver appealing against the order would be required to make deposit contemplated by proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 of the New Act, which they would not be obliged to do if the order would not be appealable but merely revisable. In the event of a claimant being wrongly denied compensation under 'no-fault liability' clause, he too would have a right of appeal giving a wider scope of hearing than what is permitted in revisional jurisdiction or in exercise of powers of superintendence under Art. 227 of the Constitution. In the event of a claimant being wrongly denied compensation under 'no-fault liability' clause, he too would have a right of appeal giving a wider scope of hearing than what is permitted in revisional jurisdiction or in exercise of powers of superintendence under Art. 227 of the Constitution. Merely because a Judge hearing an appeal against an order passed under 'no-fault liability' clause would have a jurisdiction to grant stay or regulate the manner of deposit of awarded amount cannot be a factor relevant for determining the nature of the order. Power to grant stay is capable of being exercised even by a Judge hearing a revision or a Bench hearing a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. On the contrary, the power to give stay under these two jurisdictions is unbridled while the power to grant stay in exercise of appellate jurisdiction is circumscribed by an obligation to secure deposit under section 173 (1) Proviso of the New Act. 45. Sections 141 (2) and 144 of the New Act merely contemplate expeditious disposal of claim for 'no-fault liability'. These provisions do not render any assistance in determining the nature of the order. Section 165(1) speaks of constitution of Claims Tribunals for adjudicating upon the claims for compensation. The adjudication would naturally be an award. The Explanation appended to sub-section (1) of section 165 provides -"Explanation:-- For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that the expression "claim for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles" includes claims for compensation under section 140." The Explanation lands strength to the contention that fault or no fault, whatever is claimed is a claim for compensation. It follows as a corollary that an adjudication of either nature of claim for compensation would be an 'award'. 46. Section 144 occurring in Chapter X -- of Liability Without Fault in Certain Case, gives the provisions of Chapter X an over-riding effect over other provisions of the Act including Chapter XII. That does not however mean that exclusion of Chapter XII to all the provisions contained in Chapter X is to be inferred. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals, impleading insurer in certain cases and award of interest where any claim is allowed are the provisions to be found• in Chapter XII. That does not however mean that exclusion of Chapter XII to all the provisions contained in Chapter X is to be inferred. Procedure and powers of Claims Tribunals, impleading insurer in certain cases and award of interest where any claim is allowed are the provisions to be found• in Chapter XII. Recovery of money from insurer and bar of jurisdiction of Civil Courts are also to be found contained in Chapter XII. All these apply to claim u/s 140, Ch. X. Once it is held that an order directing payment of compensation on the principle of 'no fault' is an award, it would be appealable under section 173 and it is difficult to read any provisions in the Act excluding applicability of section 173 of the Act to the order under section 140 either expressly or by necessary implication. 47. A word about the decisions cited at the Bar only the relevant ones out of them. The Full Bench of Jammu & Kashmir High Court in Mohammad Yousuf Wani & others v. Abdul Rehman Gujri and others (1983 ACJ 242) was posed with the question of appealability of an order dismissing compensation application for non-appearance of claimants and not the problem posed before us. In Janak Raj v. Union of India and others ( 1989 ACJ 1148 ) the learned Single Judge of Jammu & Kashmir High Court in holding the interim award not appealable chose to follow the earlier view of that High Court, as he was duty bound to do, in preference to the weight of authorities emenating from Allahabad, Bombay and Karnataka High Courts, taking a view to the contrary. The reason assigned vide para 5 by the learned Judge for not following the view taken by the three High Courts, is a very casual one and does not appeal to me. 48. As already noticed the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Sant Ram and another v. Surya Pal and others (1986 ACJ 202) has been followed by a Division Bench of this Court in Preetamlal's case (supra) and is also in line with the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Oriental Fire & General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Aleixo Fernandes and others (1986 ACJ 1137) and Karnataka High Court in Mohammad Iqbal v. Bhimaieh and others (1985 ACJ 546). A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Aleixo Fernandes and others (1986 ACJ 1137) and Karnataka High Court in Mohammad Iqbal v. Bhimaieh and others (1985 ACJ 546). A Division Bench of Kerala High Court in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Padmavat by and others (1990 ACJ 751) has also taken the view that an order of compensation on 'no- fault liability' is an award, also appealable. 49. For the foregoing reasons I subscribe to the view taken by the Division Bench in Preetamlal's case (supra). I am also unhesitatingly of the view that an order of compensation passed in terms of section 140 is an 'award', appealable under section 173. 50. Once it is held 'that an order directing payment of compensation under 'no-fault liability' clause is an 'award', it would be appealable at the instance of any person aggrieved by an award of Claims Tribunal, which would include all or any of the persons saddled with the liability. The term 'person aggrieved' has come up before the Apex Court on more occasions than one. Any person who has a genuine grievance because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests is a person aggrieved. [See, Maharaj Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1976 SC 2602 -Pro 20-21); Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar ( AIR 1975 SC 2092 ). State of Punjab v. Amarsingh and another ( AIR 1974 SC 994 - Pro 84) confers a right of appeal on a person whether a party to the decree or order or not, if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by an order or is prejudicially affected by it, subject to leave of the Court, if he be not a party. 51. It cannot be denied that the insurer/owner/ driver are the persons bound by, also adversely affected by the order directing payment of compensation. Their liability is joint and several. The claimant may recover from any or all of them. Cases are not difficult to seek where the vehicle may not be insured or the Tribunal may prima facie find that though the vehicle was insured yet the insurer was not even prima facie liable. In that event the liability would fall on the owner and/or driver. We cannot lay down different interpretations for different situations. Cases are not difficult to seek where the vehicle may not be insured or the Tribunal may prima facie find that though the vehicle was insured yet the insurer was not even prima facie liable. In that event the liability would fall on the owner and/or driver. We cannot lay down different interpretations for different situations. If anyone answers the test of 'person aggrieved', be it an owner or a driver or an insurer, he must have a right of appeal. The right cannot be denied and nipped in the bud at the threshold though on hearing on merits, the appellate Court may find that there was no genuine grievance to be canvassed and hence may dismiss the appeal. 52. For the foregoing reasons, I answer the Question No.1 arising in M.A. No. 64/91 in the following terms: "The insurer and/or owner and/or driver of the offending motor vehicle or vehicles against whom an order of compensation is passed in terms of provisions of section 140, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, has a right of appeal against that order under section 173 of the Act." 53. On Question No.2(M.M. No. 138/90) agree with the conclusion arrived at by my learned brother Dr. T.N. Singh, J. holding that the law applicable for the exercise of the right of appeal against award passed by M.A.C.T. is the law in force on the date on which the appeal is preferred; that is to say that any appeal filed on or after 1-7-89 against the award of the Tribunal must comply with the provisions relating to the deposit enacted by Proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 of the Act of 1988. 54. A reading in juxta-position of section 173 of the New Act with section 110-D of the (old) Act shows that the right of appeal, the forum, the limitation, have all been kept intact with the only distinction that a condition as to deposit of a limited amount out of the awarded amount has been imposed on the appellant to make the appeal entertainable. It is not a case where the right of appeal has been taken away or repealed or such onerous conditions have been imposed as to narrow down and whittle down substantially the right of appeal compared with the predecessor right of appeal. 55. It is not a case where the right of appeal has been taken away or repealed or such onerous conditions have been imposed as to narrow down and whittle down substantially the right of appeal compared with the predecessor right of appeal. 55. I propose to refer to two more decisions of the Supreme Court In Vijay Prakash D. Melita and another V. Collector of Customs (Preventive) Bombay ( AIR 1988 SC 2010 ) their Lordships have made observations which supply additional strength to the view taken hereinabove. Their Lordships were examining the effect of refusing to entertain the appeal unless certain amount is deposited. Their Lordships observed: "It could not be said that the appellant's right of appeal is whittled down by an alteration of procedure." xx xx xx "Right to appeal is neither an absolute right nor an ingredient of natural justice the principles of which must be followed in all judicial and quasi judicial adjudication. The right to appeal is a statutory fight and is can be circumscribed by the conditions in the grant. It is not the law that adjudication by itself following the rules of natural justice would be violative of any right - Constitutional or statutory - without any right of appeal, as such. If the Statute gives a right to appeal upon certain conditions, it is upon fulfilment of those conditions that the right becomes vested and exercisable to the appellant." 56: In M/s Hardeodas Jagannath v. State of Assam and others ( AIR 1970 SC 724 ) the facts were that section 30 of Assam Sales Tax Act, 1947 was amended requiring deposit of assessed tax and penalty as a condition for filing an appeal. The amendment came into force on 1-4-58. Assessment under appeal was for the period ending with date prior to 1-4-58. Their Lordships held: "The appeals against the assessments were filed after the amendment, the appeals are governed by the amended section and the Ass ist.1nt Commissioner can ask the appellants to comply with the provisions of the amended section, namely, depositing of assessed taxes and penalty, before dealing with the appeals. In such a case it cannot be said that the amending Act has been given retrospective effect." 57. The object behind enacting Proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 of the New Act is remedial and beneficial. In such a case it cannot be said that the amending Act has been given retrospective effect." 57. The object behind enacting Proviso to sub-section (1) of section 173 of the New Act is remedial and beneficial. This is a paramount consideration for repelling the argument to the contrary that Proviso should not be applied to the appeals filed on or after 1.7.89, though arising out of the claim cases instituted prior to that date. 58. Only by way of abundant caution I would like to make it clear that whatever has been said by me is not supposed to have applicability for interpreting section 173 (2) which completely takes away the right of appeal against award of Claims Tribunal if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than Rs. 10,000/ though the predecessor provision contained in section 110 D (2) of the Old Act prohibited exercise of right of appeal only "when the amount in dispute in the appeal was less than two thousand rupees. Needless to say, that question is also not before us. Per K.M. Pandey, J.: 59. I have had the advantage of going through the opinion recorded by my learned brothers Dr. T. N. Singh and Mr. R.C. Lahoti, JJ. I find myself in agreement with the view expressed by my learned brother Dr. T. N. Singh, J. on both the points but I would like to add something more in answer to the question No. 1. So far question No.2. is concerned I do not feel like adding anything more. 60. The following questions have been referred for opinion by this Bench:-- Question No.1 (in M.A. 64 of 1991):-Whether the Insurer and/or the owner/driver of the offending motor vehicle or vehicles against whom an order of compensation is passed in terms of the provisions of Section 140, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has a right of appeal against that order under section 173 of the Act? Question No.2 (in M.A. 138 of 1990) :- Whether any appeal filed on or after 1.7.1989, challenging an order of compensation passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in terms of provisions of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Actor the final award passed under Section 168 of the Act, can be entertained without the appellant fulfilling the requirement of the provisions contained in Section 173 of the Act of making requisite deposit of the sum contemplated thereunder? The above-mentioned questions hereinafter will be referred as question No.1 and question No.2 respectively. Although these questions have arisen in two separate matters, but it would be proper if we treat them analogous for answering. 61. Question No.1 :-- Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is the subject matter of interpretation and the other common point in the two matters is the question whether the order for interim compensation granted under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter to be called as the Act only) is appealable? 62. The appellants in M.A. No. 64 of 1991 are owners of a bus which is said to be involved in accident on 24.3.88. The claimant/respondent was seriously injured. On 12.2.91 the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (M.A.C.T.) Bhind passed an order against the owners for payment to the claimant, of interim compensation amounting to Rs. 7,600/- after recording a finding that the particulars of the Insurer could not be ascertained. In appeal, the dispute about the identity of the vehicle involved in the accident and the fact about the claimant suffering permanent disability arose. When the matter was taken up for consideration on admission by the learned Single Judge, he was of the view that the matter deserved to be referred to a larger Bench because it was necessary to examine the correctness of the view expressed in this Court's D.B. decision in Oriental Insurance Co. v. Pritamlal, 1989 ACJ 1129 . 63. In the other matter also the Insurer is the appellant and in that appeal too the question of maintainability arose. It was contended by the appellant that though the appeal was preferred under Section 173 of the Act, the fact remains that the accident had taken place on 8.2.1985 when the present Motor Vehicles Act had not come into existence and the question was whether the appeal is to be decided according to the old law (Motor Vehicles Act, 1939) or the present Act of 1988 will govern it? 64. In the accident two vehicles were involved. They are truck No. CPH 9485 owned by respondent No.4 Virendra Pal Singh (in M.A. No. 138 of 1990) and tractor No. RNT 347 owned jointly by Bharatsingh and Bhagwant (respondents No.7 and 8 respectively in M.A. No. 138 of 1990). 64. In the accident two vehicles were involved. They are truck No. CPH 9485 owned by respondent No.4 Virendra Pal Singh (in M.A. No. 138 of 1990) and tractor No. RNT 347 owned jointly by Bharatsingh and Bhagwant (respondents No.7 and 8 respectively in M.A. No. 138 of 1990). Both the Insurer namely The New India insurance Company and the instant appellant United India Insurance Company have been held jointly and severally responsible. The main contention was that the tractor, in question, was not insured with the appellant. 65. Right of appeal is a creature of statute and it is a right of the aggrieved party. In order to give any answer to the first question we have to consider and examine sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 140 of the Act. Section 140 of the Act is a new Section introduced in the Motor Vehicles Act and has for the first time propounded a new theory about liability without fault in certain cases. It reads as below :- "140. (1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. (2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under subsection (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of twenty-five thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of twelve thousand rupees. (3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. . (3) In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. . (4) A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement." 66. Section 141 makes a provision about the right to claim compensation for death or permanent disablement. Sub-section (1) of Section 141 says that the right to claim compensation under Section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person shall be in addition to any other right (hereinafter in this section referred to as the right on the principle of fault) to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this Act or for any other law for the time being in force. Sub-section (3) says that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) where in respect of death or permanent disablement of any person, the person liable to pay compensation u/s. 140 is also liable to pay compensation in accordance with the right on the principle of fault, the person so liable shall pay the first mentioned compensation and this section further makes provision as to how the compensation will be paid in case of difference between the first mentioned compensation and the second mentioned compensation. We need not discuss. 67. The short point for consideration in answer to question No.1 is -- whether an appeal lies against an order under section 173 of the Act. The Motor Vehicles Act does not provide for an appeal against an order for compensation under Section 140. A reading of the Act and the provisions of Chapter X makes it clear that the Legislature intended to provide for compensation irrespective of the fault of the person concerned. The Motor Vehicles Act does not provide for an appeal against an order for compensation under Section 140. A reading of the Act and the provisions of Chapter X makes it clear that the Legislature intended to provide for compensation irrespective of the fault of the person concerned. Section 140 makes it absolutely clear that if an accident has taken place the owner of the vehicle shall jointly and severally be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section. No evidence on the amount of compensation to be paid or the loss suffered by the victim is to be assessed while awarding compensation under this provision. The minimum compensation has been provided in the statute for payment to the victim in case of death or permanent disablement. This provision appears to have been made on compassionate ground and the amount so fixed for payment as compensation under this section is a sum of Rs. 25,000/- in case of death and Rs. 12,000/- in case of permanent disablement. The law has been so framed as to rule out an investigation about the loss suffered or the question of fault. As a matter of fact Chapter X fixes liability without fault in certain cases. Even if the owner of the vehicle is not at fault even then the Legislature thought it fit to award this minimum compensation because of the death or permanent disablement suffered by the victim. Sub-section (3) of Section 140 makes the intention of the Legislature very clear. While making provision for this compensation the Legislature consciously appears to have avoided any provision for appeal or evidence in this section. Sub- sections (3) and (4) make the intention of the Legislature very clear. Sub-section (3) of Section 140 makes the intention of the Legislature very clear. While making provision for this compensation the Legislature consciously appears to have avoided any provision for appeal or evidence in this section. Sub- sections (3) and (4) make the intention of the Legislature very clear. Sub-section (3) reads as follows :- "In any claim for compensation under sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required 10 plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person." Sub-section (4) reads as follows:- "A claim for compensation under sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death 01 permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement." 68. A bare reading of the aforesaid provision shows that the Legislature never intended to make the subject matter of compensation a matter of dispute or evidence. Fault or no fault, the compensation has to be paid and the Legislature has gone to this extent that the responsibility of the accident and the manner of the accident will not be a subject-matter of investigation. When at the very inception the Legislature thought it fit to grant compensation and did not permit to admit evidence or fix responsibility about the factum of accident for the amount to be granted as compensation, it lends to the necessary inference that Legislature wanted this amount of compensation in case of death or permanent disablement to be away from litigation. The State is a welfare State in a democracy and this provision appears to have been inserted as a welfare measure on compassionate ground for the victim. 69. If the Legislature intended to keep this matter of compensation beyond proof of the manner of accident, and fault liability of the person concerned, then it is unthinkable that the Legislature intended to provide for an appeal against the compensation and make it a subject-matter of dispute. 69. If the Legislature intended to keep this matter of compensation beyond proof of the manner of accident, and fault liability of the person concerned, then it is unthinkable that the Legislature intended to provide for an appeal against the compensation and make it a subject-matter of dispute. after all, appeal has to be provided for what when the liability has been fixed without fault and the amount of compensation has also been fixed and no evidence is permitted to be invited in this regard. It would be adding something in the mouth of the Legislature if we say that the order passed under Section 140 is appealable. 70. The doors of the claimant have not been closed for claiming higher amount. Section 141 says that the right of claim compensation under section 140 in respect of death or permanent disablement shall he in addition to any other right (hereinafter in this section referred to as the right of principle of fault) to claim compensation in respect thereof under any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force. Thus, if the claimant is awarded compensation for the death or disablement on the principle of "fault", the claim for compensation under Section 140 shall be disposed of as a fore said in the first place. Sub-section (3) of Section 141 makes provision for the payment of compensation and the manner in which the compensation on the principle of "fault" is to be adjusted. The result is that it cannot be said there Legislature wanted to fix the limit of compensation in case of such death or accident and closed the doors for claiming higher amount of compensation. It was left open to claim any amount of compensation on proof. The remedy available in civil law or any other law for the time being in force has not been denied. Section 140 of the Act only makes a minimum amount of compensation to be paid irrespective of the fault and this liability without fault in certain cases introduced in Chapter X appears to be within the ambit of welfare activity of the State and on compassionate ground. The Legislature did not intend to make this amount also disputable and a subject-matter of controversy. The Legislature did not intend to make this amount also disputable and a subject-matter of controversy. The intention is clear that the Legislature intended that this amount should be paid irrespective of the fault and should be kept above unnecessary controversy. It is clear that the Legislature never intended to make this amount a subject-matter of dispute to be dragged in a Court of law. the omission for providing the appeal in a claim for compensation under Section 140 does not appear to be an accidental omission in the statute. It is very much intentional and fits him with the provisions of Chapter X. The Legislature has enacted a forum for agitating the amount of compensation. Chapter XII makes provision for claims Tribunals and compensation for higher amount can be claimed in that forum. Section 173 of the Act makes provision for appeals against orders of Claims Tribunals under certain conditions within 90 (ninety) days. Herein, also, it is crystal-clear that the Legislature never intended to make the compensation upto Rs. 25,000/-, a subject- matter of controversy. Although this section provides appeal against award of a Claims Tribunal, but the first proviso to Section 173 also indicates in the same direction. It makes the provision for preferring an appeal to the High Court against an order of Claims Tribunal, but clarified it in the proviso that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it Rs. 35,000/- or 50% of the amount so awarded whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court and second proviso says that the High Court may entertain an appeal after expiry of the period of 90 (ninety) days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. No appeal has been provided against any award of Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute, in the appeal, is less than Rs. 10,000/-. What I mean to impress is that the amount of Rs. 25,000/- has been intended to be made secured by the Legislature and the right of appeal has even been denied against an award of Claims Tribunal. This amount of Rs. 25,000/- has to be paid to the victim in any case. 71. 10,000/-. What I mean to impress is that the amount of Rs. 25,000/- has been intended to be made secured by the Legislature and the right of appeal has even been denied against an award of Claims Tribunal. This amount of Rs. 25,000/- has to be paid to the victim in any case. 71. It is also significant to note that the expression "award" has not been used in Chapter X where liability without fault has been fixed. The expression "award" has been used by the Legislature for the first time in Chapter XI. This also makes it clear that any order by which a compensation is made under Chapter X is not a subject-matter of dispute and care has been taken not to use this word "award" in Chapter X. The Legislature has used the words "compensation" and "liability without fault" in such cases. It appears that the Legislature never intended to make this provision for liability without fault a subject-matter of controversy in a Court of law. It is unthinkable that the compensation which has not been made a subject-matter of dispute at the initial stage should be thrown into a dust-bin of controversy at the appellate stage I am therefore, clear in my mind that the amount of compensation which is payable under Section 140 is not appealable and would be completely against the intention of the Legislature. 72. In the case of Shivaji Dayanu v. Vatsula, ( AIR 1991 SC 1769 ) their Lordships have held that the orders for interim compensation are to be passed summarily and formal procedure prescribed with regard to the adjudication of the claim preferred under section 110 A (old) to enforce liability of tort- feasors on the principle of fault, is• not to be followed because Legislature has contemplated explicitly as per Section 141(2) for a certain sum to be made available to the victim or his heirs as expeditiously as possible. Chapter-X is a complete Code which is supposed to deal with all matters concerning liability without fault in certain cases. 73. A question may arise about the remedy available to a person, if the compensation under Section 140 is arbitrarily refused, I think, the Legislature has taken care of it. The Courts of District Judges functioning as Claims Tribunals are expected to be careful about the intention of the Legislature and the right of the claimant. 73. A question may arise about the remedy available to a person, if the compensation under Section 140 is arbitrarily refused, I think, the Legislature has taken care of it. The Courts of District Judges functioning as Claims Tribunals are expected to be careful about the intention of the Legislature and the right of the claimant. Not only this, but the High Court can also interfere in its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. 74. The law applicable for the exercise of the right of appeal against an award passed by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is the law in force on the date on which the appeal is preferred. The appeal filed on or after 1.7.1989 against an award of the Tribunal, must comply with the provisions as required under Section 173 of the Act. 75. In view of the discussions above my answer to the question No.1 is in the negative. No appeal lies under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 against an order passed under Section 140 of the Act against the insurer or the driver or the owner of the offending motor vehicle. The two questions are answered accordingly. ORDER OF THE COURT I. First question arising out of Misc. Appeal No. 64 of 1991 is answered, as per majority opinion, in the negative. No appeal is maintainable under Section 173, Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, against an order of compensation for "no fault" liability, passed under Section 140 of the said Act. Law laid down to the contrary in Oriental Insurance Co. v. Preetamlal (1989 ACT 1129) would no longer hold good and that decision is over-ruled. II. Second question arising our of M.M. No. 138 of 1991 is answered unanimously, also in the negative. In respect of any appeal filed after 1.7.1989 under Section 173, challenging any award passed under Section 168 after 1.7.1989, in terms of the first proviso to Section 173 (1), it would be necessary for the appellant to make the requisite deposit contemplated thereunder irrespective of the date of accigent. Accordingly, Jaswant Rao v. Kamlabai ( AIR 1990 MP 354 ) stands over-ruled. Both questions are answered as above and the Reference stands disposed of accordingly. Records shall be placed now before Referring Judge for passing appropriate orders in the two matters separately.