Judgment :- This writ petition has been filed to issue a writ of certiorarified mandamus to call for the records on the file of the first respondent in A. No. E/353/88/Order No. 478/88, dated 7-10-1988 and quash the proceedings relating thereto and consequently direct the first respondent to redispose of the appeal on merits under Section 35B of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944. 2.The impugned order is one wherein the Customs, Excise and Gold (Control) Appellate Tribunal, South Regional Bench at Madras (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) declined to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the said Tribunal and consequently rejected the stay petitions and appeals. Though the order has been passed in a batch of cases on behalf of more than one party, the writ petition before me has been filed by Murali Match Works and therefore, this writ petition is confined to consideration so far as the present petition is concerned. 3.The writ petitioner is a manufacturer of matches and an assessee on the file of the Superintendent of Central Excise, Chittoor I Range, Chittoor. By an order dated 8-11-1982, the Assistant Collector confirmed the demand for differential duty of Rs. 1, 20, 260.10 in terms of Notification No. 22/82 dated 23-2-1982 issued under the provisions contained in Clause 52 of the Finance Act, 1982 which it is said has been subsequently made part of the provisions of the Act. Against the said proceedings an appeal has been filed before the Collector of Central Excise (Appeals) and by an order dated 15-3-1983, the appeal was rejected. According to the petitioner, the said proceedings have been received by the counsel for the petitioner on 5-4-1983. It is not in dispute that the due date in the normal course for filing an appeal against the said order before the Tribunal expired on 5-7-1983. But the appeal was actually filed before the Tribunal on 29-6-1988. 4.The petitioner, in order to have the delay condoned, has relied upon the fact that the petitioner had filed a writ petition on 20-9-1983 in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh for a writ of mandamus forbearing the Central Excise Department from collecting the differential excise duty and the said writ petition is claimed to have been admitted on 23-9-1983 and interim orders of stay granted appears to have also been made absolute on 5-7-1985. Finally, the High Court appears to have dismissed the writ petition on 9-11-1987. The order of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in W.P. No. 8014 of 1983 is as follows : "This writ petition was filed by nine petitioners seeking a declaration that the action of the respondent in seeking to levy and collect differential excise duty under Section 52 of the Finance Act, 1982, is illegal. The petitioners seek a direction to the respondent restraining him from collecting the differential excise duty. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that out of the nine petitioners herein some petitioners had already filed appeals and action is pending in those cases by way of second appeals. It is said that some petitioners have not filed appeals at all and directly filed the writ petition. From the facts stated in the writ petition we do not find that any order directing the payment of differential excise duty was served on the petitioners. It is open to them to pursue such action as may be available to them under the Act questioning either the show-cause notice or the order, if any, passed direction (sic) to pay differential excise duty. 2. The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid observations. No costs.' 5.The petitioner claims that the disposal of the writ petition was communicated to the petitioner by its counsel only on 17-6-1988 and the delay had occasioned on account of those reasons and such reasons constitute "sufficient cause" for not presenting the appeal within the time prescribed under Section 35B(5) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Department appears to have opposed the applications for condonation of delay and ultimately the Tribunal rejected the request for condonation on the ground that the writ petitioner was not diligent at the relevant points of time before filing the writ petition in the Court and also after the disposal of the writ petition by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Department appears to have opposed the applications for condonation of delay and ultimately the Tribunal rejected the request for condonation on the ground that the writ petitioner was not diligent at the relevant points of time before filing the writ petition in the Court and also after the disposal of the writ petition by the Andhra Pradesh High Court. The Tribunal was also not inclined to accept the plea on behalf of the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner could not get the copy of the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in W.P. No. 8014 of 1983 since according to the Tribunal the copy of the order was not necessary for filing an appeal before the Tribunal. Aggrieved by this order, the above writ petition has been filed. 6.Mr. C. Natarajan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, contended that the Tribunal failed to apply the proper and relevant principles in determining the issue regarding the existence or otherwise of sufficient cause for the delay and therefore, the failure to exercise the discretion in favour of the petitioner by condoning the delay resulted in substantial miscarriage of justice. The learned counsel would also submit that the Tribunal had a non-discretionary duty to condone the delay in the light of the circumstances pleaded before it and the proper approach should have been whether there wasbona fidesor lack ofbona fideson the part of the petitioner in not presenting the appeal within the time stipulated and this not having been done, the order of the Tribunal would be vitiated. 7.The learned counsel relied upon the following judicial pronouncements in respect of his claim : The decision inJ.M Bhansali and Othersv. The State of Madras 1968 (21) STC 411 , 1968 (1) MLJ 442 is one where a Division Bench of this Court while considering the question of sufficient cause for the delay in filing the appeal came to the conclusion that the most relevant factor to be taken into account is whether the party concerned hasbona fideprosecuted some other proceeding on account of which delay has occurred in filing the appeal and that so long as the party concerned has actedbona fide, the delay should be condoned. The delay involved in the time taken by the pendency of the other proceedings should be condoned. The decision inState of Uttar Pradeshv. The delay involved in the time taken by the pendency of the other proceedings should be condoned. The decision inState of Uttar Pradeshv. District Judge, Unnao and Others 1984 AIR(SC) 1401, 1983 (2) Scale 1035 , 1984 (2) SCC 673 , 1984 ALJ 175, 1984 AWC 106, 1984 All(LJ) 175 is one where the Apex Court cautioned against adopting rigid and inflexible view of the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 or Article 226 of the Constitution of India and came to the conclusion that where the court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India is convinced, that the party concerned had established that it was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time, the Court had every jurisdiction to condone the delay unmindful of the fact that it will reverse the view taken by the authority below. The decision inCollector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anotherv. Mst. Katiji and Others 1987 AIR(SC) 1353, 1987 (62) CC 370, 1988 (19) ECR 565, 1987 (55) FLR 609, 1987 (71) FJR 143, 1987 (167) ITR 471, 1987 (3) JT 537, 1987 (66) STC 228, 1987 (3) Scale 413, 1987 (2) SCC 107 , 1987 (2) SCR 387 , 1987 (2) UJ 29 , 1987 (62) CTR 23, 1987 (1) LLJ 500 , 1987 (28) ELT 185 , 1987 UPTC 2128, 1987 (35) Taxman 17, 1975 AIR(Mad) 137, 1989 SCC(Tax) 172, 1987 (13) ALR 306, 1987 (62) CTR(SC) 23, 1987 (1) JT(SC) 537, 1987 (62) CTR(Syn) 23 = 1987 AIR(SC) 1353, 1987 (62) CC 370, 1988 (19) ECR 565, 1987 (55) FLR 609, 1987 (71) FJR 143, 1987 (167) ITR 471, 1987 (3) JT 537, 1987 (66) STC 228, 1987 (3) Scale 413, 1987 (2) SCC 107 , 1987 (2) SCR 387 , 1987 (2) UJ 29 , 1987 (62) CTR 23, 1987 (1) LLJ 500 , 1987 (28) ELT 185 , 1987 UPTC 2128, 1987 (35) Taxman 17, 1975 AIR(Mad) 137, 1989 SCC(Tax) 172, 1987 (13) ALR 306, 1987 (62) CTR(SC) 23, 1987 (1) JT(SC) 537, 1987 (62) CTR(Syn) 23 (S.C.)] is one where the Apex Court while considering the question of sufficient cause for purposes of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, expressed the view that the Court should adopt a liberal approach. The guidelines laid down in the said decision are found stated in paragraph 3 of the judgment which can be usefully referred to as hereunder :-" * The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on 'merits'. The expression " sufficient cause' employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that :- 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately or on account of culpable negligence, or on account ofmala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.' 8.The learned counsel for the respondents opposed the claim of the petitioner while reiterating the reasoning contained in the impugned order. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.' 8.The learned counsel for the respondents opposed the claim of the petitioner while reiterating the reasoning contained in the impugned order. 9.I have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. In my view, even judging by liberal standards the delay in the present case could not be said to have been sufficiently explained and unlike the cases relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the delay in the instant case is substantial. As pointed out by the Tribunal, the order of the Collector of the Central Excise Department, was on 15-3-1983 and served on 5-4-1983. Even in approaching the Andhra Pradesh High Court, there had been delay. There is absolutely no justification for the delay after the disposal of the case by the Andhra Pradesh High Court on 9-11-1987. The reasoning of the petitioner that the petitioner was waiting for the copy of the order of the Andhra Pradesh High Court is not an explanation and it is not an excuse inasmuch as the same is not necessarily required for filing an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal has adversely commented upon the delay even after the receipt of the copy. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it could not be said that the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal in the cumulative effect of the facts noticed is either erroneous or vitiated by perversity of approach or irrational. Consequently, I see no reason to interfere with the manner of discretion exercised by the Tribunal in these proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, this Court does not, at any rate, function as an appellate authority in considering the legality or validity of the order of the Tribunal in these proceedings. The plea in this regard on behalf of the petitioner, therefore, is rejected.10.The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the nature of the order passed by the Tribunal is such that the appeal itself should be deemed to have been disposed of having regard to the observations of the Tribunal that the stay petitions and the appeals are also dismissed. On that aspect, the learned counsel for the respondents contends that the remedy before this Court will not lie. The learned counsel for the petitioner while answering the submissions made on behalf of the respondents, relied on certain case law to show that the disposal could not be said to be a disposal on merits of the appeal and therefore the stand taken by the respondents is misconceived. Having regard to the fact that I have concurred with the order of the Tribunal on the question of absence of sufficient cause for condonation of delay, I consider it unnecessary to deal with this aspect and render a finding. The writ petition therefore fails and stands dismissed. No costs.