JUDGMENT - K. SUKUMARAN, J. :---The petitioners had issued certain cheques to the respondents, which on presentation, were not honoured by the Bank. This resulted in 11 complaints in relation to the 11 cheques, for offences punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and section 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The defence of the petitioners is not relevant at this stage. They were facing a trial by the Criminal Court. A challenge to the very constitutionality of section 138 of the Act, was felt worth attempting in the circumstances. The writ petition is accordingly filed, the Union of India and others being arraigned as the respondents. 2. A basic argument was advanced that the Amendment Act 66 of 1988 which introduces sections 138 and 138-A, would not fit in with Entries 45 and 46 of List I of 7th Schedule to the Constitution. One serious contention is about a presumption drawn under section 139 in favour of the holder that he received the cheque for the discharge of any debt or other liability. The section does not postulate 'mens-rea' as an ingredient of the offence. That, according to the petitioner, is against the basic concept of a crime in the criminal jurisprudence of this country. The act of issuing of cheque without any balance in Bank amounts to a criminal breach of trust, deceit, or cheating, and under the scheme of the Penal Code, mens-rea is postulated in respect of the offences covered under sections 405, 415 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code by the inclusion of the words "dishonestly", "fraudulently" and/or "intentionally". This aspect is referred to as a circumstances to support that submission that a harsher treatment under the Negotiable Instruments Act is unjustified. A vague and general ground of infraction of the provisions of Article 20 is also put forward. A further submission is that when the act of parties relates to civil rights of the parties, it is impermissible for the Parliament to make a law of a criminal nature making it an offence. Parliament's dictate not to take into consideration the circumstances under which there was a failure to pay, according to the petitioners, makes the provision unconstitutional. 3. We shall deal with the contentions seriatim. 4. Parliament's dictate not to take into consideration the circumstances under which there was a failure to pay, according to the petitioners, makes the provision unconstitutional. 3. We shall deal with the contentions seriatim. 4. The background in which Chapter XVII containing sections 138 to 142, was incorporated in the Act, are indicated in the statement of objects accompanying the Bill leading to the enactment. We extract below the pertinent passage: "Section 4 of the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendments) Act, 1988 has inserted Chapter XVII in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1981. The statement of objects and reasons appended to the Bill explaining the provisions of the new chapter read as follows : "This clause (Clause 4 of the Bill) inserts a new Chapter XVII in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The provisions contained in the new chapter provide that where any cheque drawn by a person for the discharge of any liability is returned by the Bank unpaid for the reason of the insufficiency of the amount of money standing to the credit of the account on which the cheque was drawn or for the reason that it exceeds the arrangements made by the drawer of the cheque with the bankers for that account, the drawer of such cheque shall be deemed to have committed an offence. In that case, the drawer, without prejudice to the other provisions of the said Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. In that case, the drawer, without prejudice to the other provisions of the said Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. The provisions have also been made that to constitute the said offence --- (a) such cheque should have been presented to the bank within a period of six months of the date of its drawal or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier, and (b) the payee or holder in due course of such cheque should have made a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to drawer of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque unpaid, and (c) the payee or holder in due course of such cheque should have made a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to drawer of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque unpaid, and (d) the drawer of such cheque should have failed to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice. It has also been provided that it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of such cheque received the cheque in the discharge of a liability. Defences which may or may not be allowed in any prosecution for such offence have also been provided to make the provisions effective. Usual provision relating to offences by companies has also been included in the said new chapter. In order to ensure that genuine and honest bank customers are not harassed or put to inconvenience, sufficient safeguards have also been provided in the proposed new chapter. Usual provision relating to offences by companies has also been included in the said new chapter. In order to ensure that genuine and honest bank customers are not harassed or put to inconvenience, sufficient safeguards have also been provided in the proposed new chapter. Such safeguards are --- (a) that no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except on a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque ; (b) that such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises; and (c) that no Court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class shall try any such offence." Again the background of the amendment of the Act in so far as it relates to the section 138-A is gatherable from the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying the Banking, Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable Instruments Laws (Amendment) Act, 1988. The relevant extract reads as under: "The Banking Laws were last amended through the Banking Laws (Amendment) Act, 1985 (81 of 1985), the various provisions of which were brought into force on different dates in 1985 and 1986. Since then, in the course of administering various laws relating to banks and public financial instituions, a need has arisen for some further amendments to the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1981 ... ... ... .. ... to achieve the following objectives. (i) ... ... (ii) ... ... (iii) ... ... (iv) ... ... (v) ... ... (vi) ... ... (vii) ... ... (viii) ... ... (ix) ... ... (x) ... ... (xi) to enhance the acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the drawer liable for penalties in case of bouncing of cheques due to insufficiency of funds in the accounts or for the reason that it exceeds the arrangements made by the drawer, with adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawers." 5. The importance of the banking sector in the developing economy could not be under-rated. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to peep into the history of the development of law, whether it be the Bills of Exchange Act of England of the year 1882, the Cheques Act, 1957, and various other statutory exercises. 6. The importance of the banking sector in the developing economy could not be under-rated. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to peep into the history of the development of law, whether it be the Bills of Exchange Act of England of the year 1882, the Cheques Act, 1957, and various other statutory exercises. 6. It is in the larger public interest that commercial transactions maintain the speed and tempo, and that a swift sale or a prompt purchase, is not unduly impeded by suspicion always hovering round that part of promise to be performed in future. The issue of a cheque carries with it assumptions which could regulate the normal functioning of a honest citizen. At a period of time when multitudenous person and institutions press in to services, devices and facilities available under the Negotiable Instruments Act, it may be necessary to ensure that those who issue such vital documents, do not adopt a casual or careless attitude which could block the free flow of trade. It is in the light of the experience which the State had, that the enactment has been attempted. We are unable to detect any legal infirmity or constitutional incompetence. 7. No attempt has been made out as to show how Article 20 of the Constitution can be attracted to such a situation. The statute, therefore, cannot be struck down, merely because the petitioners decide to see its collapse. Entries Nos. 45 and 46 respectively refer to Banking, Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and other instruments. The impugned provisions, would come well within the larger ambit of the entries. It is connected with negotiable instruments which clearly come within the aforesaid entries dealing with legislative power. 8. We are unable to see any provision in arbitrariness or infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution. Those who deal in negotiable instruments are not to resort to sharp practices. A time consuming civil litigation may not give immediate or adequate remedy to the victims of an illegal act or a dishonest move. The Parliament could then make a provision with sufficient teeth, as to strongly deal with the ruffians in the trading area, or the unscrupulous elements who play foul with negotiable instruments. We repel the contention about the enactment going counter to the contents of Article 14 of the Constitution and being ultra vires on that premise. 9. The Parliament could then make a provision with sufficient teeth, as to strongly deal with the ruffians in the trading area, or the unscrupulous elements who play foul with negotiable instruments. We repel the contention about the enactment going counter to the contents of Article 14 of the Constitution and being ultra vires on that premise. 9. As indicated earlier, it is for the Parliament to see whether a criminal provision should be additionally provided for, to supplement the civil rights of parties. (Rylands v. Flatcher)1, (1868)3 Cases 330 (HL) is a classic case of civil liability, of strict liability. Notwithstanding the availability of remedy under common law, Parliament in England enacted very many environmental enactments, creating new offences in respect of the same class of torturous acts or civil wrongs. 10. To a conservative mind or Court, a pronouncement of the opinion on the points raised should be the last line in the judgment. Those who sit on the Bench, may, however, recollect that the banker (banque-Latin equivalent for the Benches) is another person who had been sitting on the Bench, from the historical perspective. The history of the Banks would indicate that the money-lenders seated in market places (like those in Lambardy) used to sit on their own Benches when business was brisk but had lost those Benches (bank-rupt) when the business collapsed. A historic reference to that ancient history is indeed helpful in evaluating the legal contention regarding the constitutionality of the recent Parliamentary exercise in relation to an ancient institution. It is desirable that persons do not lose their benches or snatch away those on whom others are already seated. The writ petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed. *****