JUDGMENT 1. - These eight appeals lend themselves support to disposal by a common judgment because, common question of law is involved. At the joint request of the parties, these appeals are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. These appeals are directed against judgments dated 5.7.1985 in eight different criminal cases, whereby accused respondents have been acquitted of the offences charged against them. 3. On 11.3.1976, eight criminal complaints were filed for offences punishable under Sections 14(1-A), 14(2), 14-A(1) and 14- A(2) of the Employees Provident Funds Act, 1952 (for short, 'Provident Act'), read with paragraph 76 of the employees Provident Fund Scheme, 1952, against the respondents, namely, M/s Jhumarlal Swarup Lal, P.K. Tewari (its Partner) and Dhanpat Rai (its Manager) and wo others, namely, Smt. Gokul Kumari and A.K. Tewari (both, Partners) who expired during trial, therefore, proceedings were dropped against them on 17.1.1984. In these complaints, the offences relate back to the period intervening between July, 1974 to June, 1975 in different sets of period and amount. 4. Respondent No. 1-Firm, M/s Jhumarlal Swarup Lal Stone Contractors, Karauli, no doubt, is an Establishment under the provisions of the Provident Act and to it, Code No. RJ 765 was allotted. This Firm consisted of Partners, namely, P.K. Tewari, A.K. Tewari and Smt. Gokul Kumari, and one Manager, namely, Dhanpat Rai. Since the Provident Act was no doubt applicable to the firm, its Partners and Manager (respondents) both were legally bound to comply with the provisions of this Act and by virtue of these provisions, the respondents were required to deposit provident fund contribution of their employees as well as their own being their employer under paras 30 and 38 of the Provident Scheme; and that apart, the respondents had to deposit Form No. 12 within a period of 25 days every month in accordance with para 38(2) of the Provident Scheme. Since the respondents failed to comply with the aforesaid provisions of the Provident Act and Scheme, these eight criminal complaints (supra) have been filed against them for the offences stated in the preceding paras, for which they were charged but they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. Since the respondents failed to comply with the aforesaid provisions of the Provident Act and Scheme, these eight criminal complaints (supra) have been filed against them for the offences stated in the preceding paras, for which they were charged but they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. After recording the statements in sup- port of the allegations made in the criminal complaints, and the explanation of the respondents under Section 313, Criminal Procedure Code and their defence version, the Judicial Magistrate, Karauli heard both the parties and vide his judgments, referred to in preceding paras acquitted the respondents of the offences charged against them. Hence these appeals. 5. The respondents have been acquitted of the offence charged by the trial Court on the following grounds inter-alia that, the complaints were not filed by competent person because there was no notification being issued under Section 13 of the Provident Act appointing Shri R.S. Khunteta as Provident Fund Inspector; that, the order determining the amount having been passed by the Commissioner under Section 7-A of the Provident Act itself was illegal that, there were bald allegations against the respondents because the complaints do not constitute the fact as to who was the responsible person for the alleged contravention of the statutory provisions of the Provident Act and Scheme; and that, the amounts had already been deposited in January, 1977. 6. First contention on behalf of the complainant-appellant is that the impugned acquittal is absolutely illegal. In this regard, Shri Narendra Jain drew my attention to the evidence of R.S. Khunteta, Provident Fund Inspector who was appointed as such under Section 13 of the Provident Fund Act and to that effect, R.S. Khunteta in first para of the complaints has also stated that he is duly appointed Inspector under Section 13 of the Provident Fund Act and moreover a public servant within the definition of Section 21 of the Penal Code. According to the evidence of R.S. Khunteta, he was Provident Fund Inspector for Kota region from May, 1969 to May, 1976 and Karauli comes within Kota region. Further, Shri Narendra Jain urged that the sanction for prosecution was accorded by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, authorising R.S. Khunteta as Provident Fund Inspector to file criminal complaint which has been filed under his signature in the Court and the sanction was also marked as exhibited. 7. Further, Shri Narendra Jain urged that the sanction for prosecution was accorded by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, authorising R.S. Khunteta as Provident Fund Inspector to file criminal complaint which has been filed under his signature in the Court and the sanction was also marked as exhibited. 7. Shri Narendra Jain then argued that a copy of the notification duly published in the Gazette of India dated 13.1.1967 has been placed before this Court which denotes that R.S. Khunteta was duly appointed as Provident Fund Inspector under Section 13 of the Provident Act. Therefore, Shri Narendra Jain con tended that according to the provisions of Section 57 of the Indian Evidence Act, a judicial notice of this publication must be taken by this Court as has been done in the following cases wherein it has been laid down that a copy of the notification need not be put as Exhibit and the Court can take judicial notice on it even if it. not formally tendered in evidence because, the Gazette is a public document: Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1960 Patna p.243 , State of Kerala v. V.P. Enadeen, AIR 1971 Kerala p. 193 (FB) . 8. In this regard, Shri Jain added that even if documentary evidence is not produced but there is oral evidence on record then the oral evidence would not be inadmissible, as has been interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Jahuri Sah v. Dwarika Prasad, AIR 1967 SC 109 , while dealing with Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act and by virtue of Section 81 of the Evidence Act there would be a presumption on the correctness of facts published in the Government gazette. 9. Having considered the aforesaid contentions, I may observe at the threshold that the learned Magistrate was totally wrong in arriving at the conclusion that since no notification having been issued under Section 13 of the Provident Act for appointing R.S. Khunteta as Provident Fund Inspector, has been produced on record, it could not be held that R.S. Khunteta was Provident Fund Inspector and, therefore, R.S. Khunteta could not be held competent to file the criminal complaint. 10. 10. The question is, has it been proved that the complainant, R.S. Khunteta is a Provident Fund Inspector appointed under Section 13 of the Provident Act so as to be a person authorised under the notification to institute prosecutions for offences under the Provident Act. Therefore, the fact to be proved or the fact in issue would be that the complainant held that office as Provident Fund Inspector at the time he instituted the prosecution and the fact of his appointment to the office would be only a relevant fact for the purpose of proving this fact in issue. As pointed out rightly by Shri Jain and taken note of the fact, above, R.S. Khunteta (complainant) not only stated in the criminal complaints but also in his evidence that he has been duly appointed as Provident Fund Inspector under Section 13 of the Provident Act and was a public servant within the meaning of Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code. Even he has given evidence that he has been Provident Fund Inspector for Kota Region including Karauli area from May, 1969 to May, 1976. In this state of situation, I may observe that once a person adduces evidence to the effect that he holds a particular office, he is giving direct evidence of that fact within he meaning of Section 60 of the Evidence Act. If that evidence is challenged in any way though in the case at hand, it has been unchallenged, then only he would be required to think of producing other evidence, e.g. the order of his appointment, and in that case, if he does not do that, then it would be a matter of appreciation as to whether he should be believed but there can be no denying that his oral evidence on the question is relevant and admissible. There- fore, unless it is effectively challenged, his own testimony to the effect that he holds the office of Provident Fund Inspector, cannot be discarded rather it will be accepted and in my view, rightly deserves to be accepted as proof of that fact. R.S. Khunteta was not cross-examined by the accused side on the above fact and question, inasmuch as undoubtedly, neither the Court below nor the accused side asked the Provident Fund Inspector to produce the gazette notification about the fact of his appointment under Section 13 of the Provident Act. R.S. Khunteta was not cross-examined by the accused side on the above fact and question, inasmuch as undoubtedly, neither the Court below nor the accused side asked the Provident Fund Inspector to produce the gazette notification about the fact of his appointment under Section 13 of the Provident Act. R.S. Khunteta's evidence on the point being unchallenged, in the case at hand, as discussed above, in my considered view based on Full Bench decision in State v. F.P. Enadeen (supra), it should have been accepted by the learned trial Magistrate as proving that R.S. Khunteta was a Provident Fund Inspector. 11. I may add that if the trial Magistrate had any doubt on the point of accession of R.S. Khunteta to the office of Provident Fund Inspector in terms of notification under Section 13 of the Provident Act, then the Magistrate was bound to take judicial notice under Section 57(7) of the Evidence Act, the fact of his appointment having been notified in the official gazette-that fact, as taken note of earlier in preceding paras, was asserted in the complaint, itself, therefore, it was not as if the Magistrate was not made aware of it; and further the Magistrate was his duty to resort to the appropriate document of reference. Having failed to do so, and the fact of the complainant (R.S. Khunteta)'s appointment as Provident Fund Inspector not having been challenged, the trial Magistrate, after close of the trial, could not have taken aid by the fact of non-production of the notification on record so as to base the impugned acquittal. 12. Taking the aid of the law laid down by their Lordships of the Patna High Court in Ramlagan Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), I may reiterate that judicial notice under Section 57(7) of the Evidence Act can be taken if the Gazette is produced for perusal of the Court at the time of the argument even in the original, appellate or revisional court and it is obviously not necessary to put a copy of the relevant notification on the record as an exhibit. The complainant-appellant in the cases at hand, has produced a copy of the notification published in the Gazette of India dated 13th January, 1967 before this Court which notified the appointment of R.S. Khunteta (complainant) as Provident Fund Inspector under Section 13 of the Provident Act. The complainant-appellant in the cases at hand, has produced a copy of the notification published in the Gazette of India dated 13th January, 1967 before this Court which notified the appointment of R.S. Khunteta (complainant) as Provident Fund Inspector under Section 13 of the Provident Act. And, I take judicial notice of the office occupied by R.S. Khunteta. In view of the aforesaid notification dated 13.1.1967, there can be no doubt that R.S. Khunteta (complainant, PwI) was a Provident Fund Inspector on the date on which he instituted the prosecutions in the cases at hand. Therefore, I find that the fact that R.S. Khunteta was appointed as Provident Fund Inspector, has been duly proved and that therefore, the authority to institute a prosecution under the notification under Section 13 of the Provident Act has been established. 13. Now I advert to deal with the contentions of the parties on the second ground of acquittal. 14. Shri Narendra Jain contended that the recovery and criminal proceedings both are independent and separate, as would be appearing from a bare look at Section 7A of the Provident Act, as inasmuch as the determination of dues from employer under Section 7A of the Provident Act once made, is final by virtue of sub- section (4) of Section 7A of the Provident Act and cannot be challenged or could not be questioned or examined by any Court of law and at the most, its legality can be examined in its extra ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the High Court. Shri Narendra Jain then added that the criminal court had no jurisdiction to examine the legality or correctness of the order of the Commissioner determining the dues under Section 7A of the Provident Act and thus, on the basis of examination of the point without jurisdiction, the acquittal can not be sustained. 15. Having considered the points raised, which are worth acceptance, I observe that the subordinate Magistrate had no jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the order of the Commissioner having been passed under Section 7A of the Act for the purposes of criminal proceedings. 15. Having considered the points raised, which are worth acceptance, I observe that the subordinate Magistrate had no jurisdiction to examine the correctness of the order of the Commissioner having been passed under Section 7A of the Act for the purposes of criminal proceedings. Whether the dues determined under Section 7A of the Provident Act were legal or not, to scan it was not within the domain of the subordinate Magistrate particularly when such an order remained unchallenged and without any change in any appropriate forum, nor it could have been assumed on the basis of the authoritative decisions on the point that the order passed under Section 7A of the Provident Act was illegal without having been challenged in any higher forum under law. That apart, under law, passing of the order under Section 7A of the Provident Act is absolutely not necessary for criminal prosecution. Moreover, once it remained unchallenged that there was delay in depositing the dues under the Provident Act during the relevant time, as has been arrived at by the trial Court, itself, the amount in dispute had been deposited in January, 1977 belatedly, in other words, it tends to draw a reasonable inference that the amount in question had not been deposited within the time thereby the respondents violated the provisions of the Provident Act and Scheme. In this state of circumstances, and admitted position, so much so there is no controversy regarding the amount due from the respondents which they have deposited in January, 1977, there is no scope for any enquiry under Section 7A of the Provident Act, as has been held in Pioneer Kethalampallam Estate v. State Viewed thus, the subordinate Magistrate could not have assumed that the determination of dues under Section 7A of the Provident Act was illegal, taking the aid of the decisions, referred to in the judgment, which in my view were not on criminal proceedings. Therefore, the subordinate Magistrate was wrong in holding that when the determination of dues was itself illegal, the respondents could not be punished for those illegal dues. 16. The reasons given by the learned subordinate Magistrate for the so-called acquittal were clearly wrong and not sustainable. 17. The complainant categorically stated in the complaints in para 3 that the respondents were responsible persons of the Firm for being managed its affairs, and to comply with the provisions of the Act. 16. The reasons given by the learned subordinate Magistrate for the so-called acquittal were clearly wrong and not sustainable. 17. The complainant categorically stated in the complaints in para 3 that the respondents were responsible persons of the Firm for being managed its affairs, and to comply with the provisions of the Act. This fact has not been controverted by the respondents. The facts stated in the complaint and the statement recorded of the Provident Fund Inspector were sufficient as has been held in, AIR 1986 Patna p. 254. Moreover, considering the entire scheme and object of the Act and the different provisions made therein the conclusion is clear that in all cases not covered by sub-s. (1) of Section 14, the criminal intention is not the essential element of the offence under the Act or the Scheme. Under Section 14 etc. of the Provident Act only the employer can be held responsible for non-compliance and contraventions of the provisions of the Act and the Scheme. No doubt, the respondents were the employers and it was their legal duty under the Provident Act to comply with the provisions of socioeconomic legislation. It does make no difference that the employer had fixed responsibility upon its employees to ensure compliance of the provisions of the legislation. The employer is the Principal and is also responsible for the acts of omission or commission on the part of his agent or employee. Therefore, it cannot be said that there were bald allegations. 18. The complaints were filed on 11.3.1976 for the offences relating to the period in between 1st July 1974 and June, 1975. Para 38 of the Provident Scheme deals with mode of payment of contribution. It empowers the employer to deduct the employee's contribution from his wages. Within fifteen days of the close of the month, he should pay to the Fund that amount together with his own contribution as well as administrative charges in the manner prescribed in the para- graph and furnish a monthly consolidated statement to the Commissioner in the form No. 12 showing the recoveries made from the wages of each employee and the amount contributed by the employer in respect of each employee. Form No. 12 is required,to be filed within a period of 25 days as per para 38(2) of the Provident Scheme, In the cases at hand, admittedly, the respondents had not deposited the amount due as has been required to be done under the provisions of the Provident Act and the Scheme, alongwith prescribed form within statutorily prescribed time. And, the said amount for the period of July, 1974 to June, 1975, has no doubt been deposited by the respondents in January, 1977. Thus, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the considered opinion that the accused (respondents) have committed an offence punishable under Section 14(IA) of the Provident Act as they failed to deposit the employers' as well as employees' shares of the contributions and also the ad- ministrative charges prescribed under the Provident Act and the Scheme, within time, and thus, they are convicted accordingly. 19. As regards the sentence, Section 14(IA) of the Provident Act, inter alia provides that an employer who contravenes or makes default in complying with its provisions shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, but the term of imprisonment shall not be less than three months in the case of default in payment of the-employees' contribution which has been deducted by the employer from the employees wages and not less than one month in any other case, and shall also be liable to fine which may extend to two thousand rupees provided that the Court may, for any adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a lesser term or of fine only in lieu of imprisonment. 20. The offence is alleged to have been committed in the year 1974-75 and an interference in the judgment of acquittal after a lapse of 14-16 years is an exception and can be done in rarest of rare cases. As stated earlier, respondents have committed socioeconomic offence and, therefore, I deem it proper that they should not go unpunished. However, they are constantly undergoing the trauma of the protracted judicial proceedings since then. Therefore, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the present cases, I am of the considered opinion that a fine in the sum of Rs. However, they are constantly undergoing the trauma of the protracted judicial proceedings since then. Therefore, taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances of the present cases, I am of the considered opinion that a fine in the sum of Rs. 500/- each on respondents namely, P.K. Tewari and Dhanpat Rai, in each of the eight appeals, i.e. total Rs. 8,000/- (eight thousand) will meet the ends of justice. In default of payment of fine, each accused shall undergo rigorous imprisonment for one month. 21. For the reasons recorded above, all the eight appeals succeed and are allowed. The acquittal of the accused by the trial Court is set aside in all eight criminal cases and they are convicted and sentenced as mentioned above. The fine to be paid within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the notice to be sent by the trial Court. The trial Court shall take necessary steps for recovery of the fine in accordance with law.Fine if realised, then shall be paid to the provident fund established under the Scheme to the credit of the employees in respect of whom the defaults were committed by the employers.The records be sent back.Appeal allowed. *******