Judgment :- Varghese Kalliath, J. A question relating to jurisdiction of Additional District Judges to act as appellate authority under S.18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the act) has been raised in this case. Certainly, the question has got pragmatic overtones apropos the practice of the courts in the matter of entertaining appeals under the Act. Learned counsel on both sides argued the case very elaborately, highlighting all the shades of the question from different angles. 2. The Civil Revision Petition is against an order passed by the Additional District Judge acting as appellate authority under the Act. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the Additional District Judges have no jurisdiction to exercise the power under S.18 of the Act and so on that ground, the order is liable to be set aside. He submitted that on merits also, he has got a good case. We feel that the question of merits of the revision against the order impugned, can be considered after considering the question of jurisdiction. 3. Whenever a question of jurisdiction regarding a tribunal or court is challenged, a deep study of the matter is required. In this case, learned counsel submits that the jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order of the Rent Control Court is confined to the Principal District Judges and that Additional District Judges have no jurisdiction at all. To resolve this question, naturally we have to investigate first the power source. Deep investigation on this aspect is not necessary, it is easy. The power source is S.18 of the Act read with the notification issued under that provision. S.18 of the Act reads thus:- "18. appeal:-(i)(a) The Government may, by general or special order notified in the Gazette, confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purposes of this Act in such areas or in such classes of cases as may be specified in the order. (b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court, may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In computing the thirty days aforesaid, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. (b) Any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Rent Control Court, may, within thirty days from the date of such order, prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdiction. In computing the thirty days aforesaid, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order appealed against shall be excluded. (2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision on the appeal. (3) The appellate authority shall send for the records of the case from the Rent Control Court and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either directly or through the Rent Control Court, shall decide the appeal. Explanation: - The appellate authority may, while confirming the order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court, grant an extension of time to the tenant for putting the landlord in possession of the building. (4) The appellate authority shall have all the powers of the Rent Control Court including the fixing of arrears of rent. (5) The decision of the appellate authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Rent Control Court shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in S.20". The relevant notification is the latest notification under S.18 of the Act issued on 31-8-1989. It reads thus:-"S.R.O. No. 1631/89: --In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (a) of sub-sector.(1) of S.18 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (2 of 1965) and in supersession of all previous notifications on the subject, the Government of Kerala hereby confer on the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the said Act have been extended, the powers of the appellate Authorities for the purposes of the said Act, in the said areas". 4. S.18(1) of the Act authorises to confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purpose of the Act. The notification was issued on 31-8-1989 and published in Kerala Gazette No. 38. 4. S.18(1) of the Act authorises to confer on such officers and authorities not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge the powers of appellate authorities for the purpose of the Act. The notification was issued on 31-8-1989 and published in Kerala Gazette No. 38. By the notification, the Government of Kerala has conferred on the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the said Act have been extended, the powers of the appellate authorities for the purpose of the Act. The power is conferred on the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas where the Act has. got application. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the notification empowers only the District Judges to exercise the power under the Act and that the object of conferment of power is exclusively confined to the District Judges and that when the power is conferred on the District Judges, only the Principal District Judge of the District alone has got that power and so the order passed in this case by the Additional District Judge is without jurisdiction. So, forthrightly the question is whether the Additional District judges also can exercise the appellate power under S.18 of the Act. He submits that this conferment of power is a conferment of power on persons designated as the District Judges. It is submitted that in such circumstance, the District Judge is acting as a persona designata and so the Additional District Judge has no power to deal with an appeal under S.18 of the Act. This argument, according to counsel for the petitioner, is amply supported by the various decisions of this Court and other courts. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the notification cannot be construed so narrowly to confine the power under S.18 of the Act exclusively to District Judge, viz., the Principal District Judge of the District and said that the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas will take in Additional District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas and as such, the Additional District Judge has also got power to deal with the appeal. He further submitted before us that the power is given though stated to be conferred on the District Judges, it is really a power given to the District Court when the notification uses the term "the District Judges" and so it is not a power given as persona designata. He also submits that this point of view is also amply supported by the decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts. We feel that we are obliged to consider this question a little elaborately. 7. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner referred us to certain provisions of the Kerala Civil Courts Act. He referred us to S.3 of the Kerala Civil Courts Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Civil Courts act) which deals with establishment of District Courts. It is provided that the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, divide the State into civil districts (hereinafter referred to as districts) and alter the limits or the number of such districts. Sub-section (2) of S.3 of the Civil Courts Act says that the Government shall establish a District Court for each district and a judge (hereinafter called the District judge) shall be appointed to such court. He further referred us to S.4 of the Civil Courts Act which deals with appointment of Additional District Judges. S.4(1) of the Civil Courts Act reads thus: "When the state of business pending before a District Court so requires one or more Additional District Judges may be appointed to that court for such period as is deemed necessary". Further, learned counsel emphasised that an Additional District Judge shall discharge all or any of the functions of the District Judge under the Civil Courts Act in respect of all matters which the District Judge may assign to him, or which under the provisions of S.7 may be instituted before him, and in the discharge of those functions he shall exercise the same powers as the District Judge. Counsel for the revision petitioner referred us to 1973 KLT 138 (F.B.) (Jokkim Fernandez v. Amina Kunhi Umma). He submitted that the Full Bench has considered the question of the status of the appellate authority appointed under S.18 of the Act in the matter of application of Limitation Act and said that the appellate authority constituted under it is not a court, but only an authority, acting as a persona designata. He submitted that the Full Bench has considered the question of the status of the appellate authority appointed under S.18 of the Act in the matter of application of Limitation Act and said that the appellate authority constituted under it is not a court, but only an authority, acting as a persona designata. It has to be remembered that the question was considered when the appellate power was given not to the District Judge, but to the Subordinate Judge. By the then notification under S.18 of the Act, the Subordinate Judge has been made the authority under S.18 of the Act. Holding that the appellate authority is a persona designata and not a court, the Full Bench held that S.5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that there is an essential difference in the matter of conferring power on the District Judge and an authority not below the rank of a Subordinate Judge other than a District Judge. The present notification has conferred the power specifically on the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas. We have to consider this aspect of the matter in detail. 8. The decision reported in 1968 KLT 8 (Balakrishna Iyer v. Krishnan) is a Full Bench decision. The question that was considered in this case was under the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1964. S.102 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the KLR act) provided for appeals. Sub-section (1) of S.102 of the KLR Act provided that "Any person aggrieved by the orders of the Land Tribunal under S.31 may appeal against such order within such time as may be prescribed to the Subordinate Judge having jurisdiction over the area in which the holding or part thereof is situate. He shall hear the appeals as a persona designata and his decision thereon shall be. final, subject to the provisions of S.103". The Full Bench was considering the question whether an Additional Sub Judge can exercise power under S.102 of the KLR Act. He shall hear the appeals as a persona designata and his decision thereon shall be. final, subject to the provisions of S.103". The Full Bench was considering the question whether an Additional Sub Judge can exercise power under S.102 of the KLR Act. In considering this question, the Full Bench has given great importance to the fact that S.102 of the KLR Act made it clear that the appellate jurisdiction is conferred not on any court, but a persona designata and further said that a persona designata, as the phrase implies, is a person pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character but this does not mean that a persona designata cannot be designated in terms of his office. Another reason stated by the Full Bench is on the basis of S.12(2) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1125 (hereinafter referred to as 'the General Clauses act). This section of the General Clauses Act provides that unless there is anything repugnant to the subject or context, words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice versa. The words "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context" preclude the application of S.12(2) of the General Clauses Act to S.102 of the KLR Act and said that if the words "the Subordinate Judges" are substituted for the words "the Subordinate Judge" in the section an absurd result would follow. The court came to the inference that in such a case every appeal under S.102 of the K.L.R. Act will have to be heard and decided by all the judges of the Court concerned. We are doubtful whether if the words "the Subordinate Judges" are substituted for the word "the Subordinate Judge" on an interpretation applying S.12(2) of the General Clauses Act will lead to such an anomalous and absurd position in the matter of tire appeal provision, S.102 of the KLR Act. 9. But here the more significant aspect is that the notification proceeds to confer jurisdiction to hear appeals under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act on the District Judges. The word used is plural. When once the statute uses the word plural a consistent interpretation has to be made without making the plural into singular. 9. But here the more significant aspect is that the notification proceeds to confer jurisdiction to hear appeals under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act on the District Judges. The word used is plural. When once the statute uses the word plural a consistent interpretation has to be made without making the plural into singular. S.12(2) of the General Clauses Act is not necessary in this case, since the notification itself says the District Judges. The Full Bench has given, according to us, great importance to the words "the Subordinate Judge" in S.102 of the KLR Act. But the case at hand, there is a very significant peculiarity on this aspect of the matter, since the words used in the notification are "the District Judges". The Full Bench further proceeded to find out the reason to confine the jurisdiction to the Principal Subordinate Judge and not to an Additional Subordinate Judge the appellate power by saying that if plurality is out as regards the expression "the Subordinate Judge" in S.102 of the KLR Act, the question still remains as to who is the Subordinate Judge contemplated by that provision when there are more than one Subordinate Judge attached to a Subordinate Judge's Court. It has to be remembered that this question was posed on the basis that the plurality is out as regards the expression "the Subordinate Judge". Such a situation is absent in this case. 10. The above Full Bench decision was considered by a learned single judge of this Court in 1972 KLT 86 (Beera Koya v. AH Koya). It was also under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The question was whether where there were Munsiff Courts; Principal Munsiff Court and Additional Munsiff Court a notification constituting the Rent Control Courts where the Government appointed by notification the Munsiffs specified in column (1) of the schedule attached to the Rent Control Courts for the local areas specified against them in column (2) thereon. What happened was when the notification was issued in column (2) as regards Kozhikode-1, it was stated that the Munsiff Court, Kozhikode-1, when the notification was issued, it appears, there was only one Munsiff Court at Kozhikode-1. But subsequently when the case came up, there was more than one Munsiff Court at the station. What happened was when the notification was issued in column (2) as regards Kozhikode-1, it was stated that the Munsiff Court, Kozhikode-1, when the notification was issued, it appears, there was only one Munsiff Court at Kozhikode-1. But subsequently when the case came up, there was more than one Munsiff Court at the station. Though the Act was amended by Act 2/65, the notification remained as it was before, without modification even though by that time more than one Munsiffs Court was established at Kozhikode. The court said that so long as there is no specification in the notification as to the particular authority whether 'principal or additional' the rent control petition can be entertained in either of the two courts". The learned single judge also has considered the Full Bench decision reported in 1968 KLT 8 and also the decision reported in 1968 KLT 583 (F.B.) (Ouseph Vareed v. Mary). The learned single judge said thus: "Personae designatae are persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges. Instead of merely describing the designation of the post held by the officer, the argument is that the person who is to fill the post should be mentioned by name". AIR 1961 SC 606 (Central Talkies, Kanpur v. Dwarka Prasad) which was followed in AIR 1971) & K 76 (Mohan v.Abrol) was cited as an authority by the learned single judge. Since this is a very important decision with regard to the question whether the notification giving power to the District Judge postulates a conferment of power to the District Judge as persona designata, we feel that we must quote the relevant portion here itself from AIR 1961 SC 606: "The argument that the District Magistrate was a persona designata cannot be accepted. Under the definition of 'District Magistrate, 'the" special authorisation by the District Magistrate had the effect of creating officers exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the Eviction Act. To that extent, those officers would, on authorisation, be equated to the District Magistrate. A persona designata is 'a person who is pointed or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character'. (See Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. p.253). To that extent, those officers would, on authorisation, be equated to the District Magistrate. A persona designata is 'a person who is pointed or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character'. (See Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. p.253). In the words of Schwabe, C.J., in Parthasaradhi Naidu v. Koteswara Rao -AIR 1924 Madras 56 IFB-personae designatae are 'persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges'. The same consideration applies also to a well known officer like the District Magistrate named by virtue of his office, and whose powers the Addl. District Magistrate can also exercise and who can create other officers equal to himself for the purposes of the Eviction Act. The decision of Sapru, J. in the Allahabad Case, with respect, was erroneous". 11. In AIR 1971) & K. 76, it was held that "where the appointment of an authority is made only by name in its individual capacity, the appointment is persona designata and not in the capacity of the post held by such authority. Where a Presiding Officer of a civil court is selected as an authority, the selection is not as a persona designata but as a member of the court because the authority so appointed to fill in a particular character, e.g.,. a Chief Judicial Magistrate, District Judge, Civil Judge so on and so forth". Of course, the learned single judge said that the case His Lordship has dealt with has no direct relevance as to the question whether the Munsiffs acting as a persona designata when he was acting as a Rent Control Court. 12. A Division Bench of this court distinguished 1968 KLT 8 in 1972 KLT 595 (Kottekadan Mohammed Haji v. Poozhikkutathu Abubaker). The Division Bench followed 1972 KLT 86. The reason stated is apposite in the context of this case. Govindan Nair, J. as he then was, very clearly put the substance of the matter thus :- "If the plural of Munsiffs employed both in the preamble as well as in the heading to column (1) of the Schedule should apply to every area mentioned in the Schedule, then all the Munsiffs in an area, for instance, at Manjeri, are conferred with jurisdiction as "Rent Control Courts". There is no violence to the language in so reading the notification. A normal grammatical reading of the notification justifies only such an interpretation. That being so, if there were more than one Munsiff in the Manjeri area for the Manjeri Panchayat, both those Munsiffs will get jurisdiction and would become "Rent Control Courts" within the meaning of that expression as defined in S.2(5)of the Act". The Division Bench distinguished the Fuli Bench decision reported in 1968 KLT 8 with simple logic. The learned single judge quoted paragraph 6 of the Full Bench decision wherein the Full Bench has referred to S.12(2) of the General Clauses Act and said that Section of the General Clauses Act can be used only when there is nothing repugnant to the subject or context and in such a case the words in the singular shall include the plural and further said that if the words "the Subordinate Judges" are substituted for the words "the Subordinate Judge" in the Section, a result that is absurd will follow. The Division Bench said that what is stated in the Full Bench is in answer to the contention urged by counsel that the expression that 'the Subordinate Judge' used in S.102 of the K.L.R. Act must be read as the 'Subordinate judges' in view of S.12(2) of the General Clauses Act. Further it was said that the Full Bench observed that S.12(2) of the General Clauses Act will apply only when there is nothing repugnant to the subject or context in so reading and it also came to the conclusion on interpreting S.102 of the K.L.R. Act that to read 'the Subordinate Judges' for the expression 'the Subordinate Judge' would be repugnant to the subject and context and finally said that in the case before the Division Bench, the Division Bench has not been asked to rely on any provision under the General Clauses Act and it was possible to read the notification in the ordinary manner and according to its simple language where the words are not singular, but plural and so there was no necessity to press into any of the enabling provisions of the General Clauses Act in giving the extended meaning used in the notification in question. Stating so, the Division Bench distinguished the decision reported in Balakrishna Iyer v. Krishnan (1968 KLT. 8). Stating so, the Division Bench distinguished the decision reported in Balakrishna Iyer v. Krishnan (1968 KLT. 8). The notification we are considering in this case also uses the word 'Judges' and so there is no necessity for us to press into service any of the provisions of the General Clauses Act. Further, S.102 of the K.L.R. Act is significantly distinct and clear as to the status of the Subordinate Judge appointed as the appellate authority since the Section itself has said that the Subordinate Judge should act as persona designata. Of course, the Division Bench has not adverted to the fact whether the Munsiffs acting under the notification are acting as personae designatae or not, but it assumes so. We also adopt the reasons stated by the Division Bench in 1972 KLT 595 and 1972 KLT 86 to hold that since the plural is used the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas have got the power to deal with appeals under S.18 of the Act, of course, without assuming the status of District Judges as personae designatae. 13. The distinction between the power conferred upon a judge of an established court and the power conferred upon a court was considered by the High Court of Australia in Kahn v. Board of Examiners (62 CLR 422). The statute provided that a person dissatisfied with a decision of a board was given a right to appeal to "the judges of the Supreme Court" and the appeal was to be heard by three or more Judges. The High Court of Australia held that when they heard the appeal they did so as Supreme Court and that an appeal lay to the High Court from their decision. In Medical Board of Victoria v. Meyer (56 CLR 62) Evatt, J. plainly refused to accept the theory that "while a jurisdiction is conferred upon xa judge of the Supreme Court" it is distinguishable from that of the Supreme Court. 14. In AIR 1949 Nag. 408 (Ganpat Pralhad and others v. Mahadeo Paikajee Kolhe and others), Bose C.J. and Mangalmurti, J. were considering a question of jurisdiction of Additional District Judges to grant probate of Will under S.264(1) of the Succession Act. 14. In AIR 1949 Nag. 408 (Ganpat Pralhad and others v. Mahadeo Paikajee Kolhe and others), Bose C.J. and Mangalmurti, J. were considering a question of jurisdiction of Additional District Judges to grant probate of Will under S.264(1) of the Succession Act. In para.13, the court observed that the term "the District Judge" means the District Court in many places because the District Judge, when he acts under the provisions of the Succession Act, acts as a Court. TheprovisioninS.270oftheSuccession Act speaks of probate being granted by a District Court and not by the District Judge was also relied on by the court to say that when the words used is "a District Judge" it can be only "the District Court". Finally the court said thus:- "The term 'District Judge' is used in S.264 as a term of art and is defined in S.2(bb) as the judge of a principal civil court of original jurisdiction. Reading S.2(bb) with S.13, General Clauses Act and Ss.17(c) and 26(1), Central Provinces Courts Act, the Judges of the District Court include not only the District judge properly so termed but also all the Additional Judges appointed to that Court and the jurisdiction of each of these judges is co-extensive with that of the District Judge properly so called unless such jurisdiction is specially curtailed by general or special order". Observing thus, the court said that the Additional District Judge also has got the power to grant probate of Will within his jurisdiction if the matter comes within his jurisdiction. 15. We would like to make it clear that S.4(1) of the Civil Courts Act would not militate against the conclusion we have reached. S.4(1) of the Civil Courts Act reads thus: "Appointment of Additional District Judges--(1) When the state of business pending before a District Court so requires one or more Additional District Judges may be appointed to that Court for such period as is deemed necessary". An analysis of S.4(1) of the Civil Courts Act would inform us that, the Section only mandates appointment of more judges to "that court" - there more judges to be appointed are District Judges and not any other class of judges, and that Court is District Court. When such appointments are made these District Judges will be called Additional District Judges of the District Court. 16. When such appointments are made these District Judges will be called Additional District Judges of the District Court. 16. It has to be remembered that appointments of persons to be and the posting and promotion of District Judges are governed by a constitutional provision, Art.233(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India. Art.233(1) and (2) of the Constitution of India reads thus: "233. Appointment of district Judges:--(1) Appointments of persons to be, and the posting and promotion of, district judges in any State shall be made by the Governor of the State in consultation with the High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to such State. (2) A person not already in the service of the Union* or of the State shall only be eligible to be appointed a district judge if he has been for not less than seven years an advocate or a pleader and is recommended by the High Court for appointment". Constitution does not contemplates the appointment of an Additional District Judge. S.2 of the Civil Courts Act deals with classes of Subordinate Civil Courts. S.2(1) of the Civil Courts Act makes it clear that the Court of a District Judge has to be referred as the District Court. It is not uncommon to appoint a person selected and appointed as District Judge as an Additional District Judge. In such a situation it is difficult to hold that he is not a District Judge of a District Court. We hold that all the Additional District judges are empowered under the notification to act as appellate authority under the Act. 1-7. A larger question was canvassed before us and we are bound to answer that question also. This relates to the question whether the notification conferring power on the District Judges is a grant of power in the status of persona designata or not. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that by virtue of the notification, the District Judges are not acting as personae designatae. The meaning of the words 'personae designata'is' a person who is pointed or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character', (see Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn. p. 253). In order to understand the meaning of persona designata we feel that we have to refer certain decided cases. p. 253). In order to understand the meaning of persona designata we feel that we have to refer certain decided cases. We have already referred to two decisions when we were dealing with the first question, viz., AIR 1961 SC 606 and AIR 1971 J & K 76. But we want to refer these decisions once again in order to meet the argument that the District Judges under the notification are not persona designatae. 18. In AIR 1961 SC 606, the case arose under Houses and Rents - U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. There an Additional District Magistrate was empowered under S.10(2) of Criminal P.C. to exercise all powers of District Magistrate. S.3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act conferred District Magistrate the power to grant permission to file a suit in any civil court. The Supreme Court said that the District Magistrate mentioned in S.3 of the U.P. Act is not a persona designata. The court said "Under the definition of District Magistrate in S.2(d) of that Act the special authorisation by the District Magistrate had the effect of creating officers exercising the powers of a District Magistrate under the Eviction Act. To that extent, those officers would, on authorisation, be equated to the District Magistrate. A personae designatae is 'a person who is pointed out or described as an individual, as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of a class, or as filling a particular character". The Supreme Court approved the decision reported in AIR 1924 Mad.561 (K. Parthasaradhi Naidu Garu v. C. Koteswara Rao Garu and another) wherein Schwabe, C.J. observed that persona designata are "persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in. their capacity as judges", (emphasis added ) What we have emphasised in the above quote is very important, since in this case the notification confers powers to the District Judges to act not in their private capacity. In AIR 1924 Mad. 561, the court was consideringaquestionofrevisionunderS.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The power granted under a particular enactment was to a District Judge. The question arose whether the District Judge was acting as a persona designata. The Division Bench (AIR 1924 mad. In AIR 1924 Mad. 561, the court was consideringaquestionofrevisionunderS.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The power granted under a particular enactment was to a District Judge. The question arose whether the District Judge was acting as a persona designata. The Division Bench (AIR 1924 mad. 561) held that though the words used are District judge in the particular section, since a District Judge is not acting in a different capacity other than that of a court, it is not at all possible to say that the words used would denote that the District Judge was acting as persona designata. 19. In AIR 1977 J&K. 38 (Badirnath Gupta v. Estates Officer (Controller of aerodromes ) Dr.A.S. an and, J.asHe then was, also considered a similar question. The learned judge said thus: "A perusal of S.9 of the Act (Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) act) shows that an appeal lies to the District Judge of the District concerned. This District Judge is not prescribed as an appellate authority by his name and no District Judge has been singled out from the class of District Judges to whom the appeals may lie under S.9 of the Act. The term'persona designata 'implies the appointment of a person or the selection of a person in his individual and personal capacity as opposed to his capacity as a member of a particular class. With a view to determine whether the appointment of a person has been made as a persona designata or as a particular member of a class, it is necessary to find out whether the person appointed has been appointed by his name only or has he been appointed because of his occupation, profession or the post held by him, (emphasis added). The learned judge has relied on an earlier Full Bench decision of the same High Court reported in AIR 1971 J&K 76. The Full Bench observed thus: "if the appointment is by name in the individual capacity of the officer he is persona designata; if the Presiding Officer of a Civil Court is selected as an authority and empowered to act judicially and possesses all the trappings of a court and has to abide by the rules of evidence, the appointment is as a court and not as a persona designata". Both these decisions of the J & K High Court are clear and plain and admit of no doubt that since the conferment of power is on a class of persons who are District Judges and Subordinate Judges, it is difficult to hold that, that class of persons are acting as personae designatae. 20. In AIR 1978 SC 1 (Thakur Das v. State of Madhya Pradesh and another), the Supreme Court has referred to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, 1975 Cr1.L J. 144 (Public Prosecutor (A.P.) v. L fiamayya). In the Full Bench decision, two questions were referred to. The first question was whether the District and Sessions Judge who is appointed judicial authority for hearing appeals under S.6C of the Essential Commodities Act is a persona designata or an inferior criminal court? The second question was whether even if it is an inferior criminal court a revision application against the order of the appellate authority would lie to the High Court? We are not concerned now with the second question. The Full Bench answered the first question holding that District Judge is not acting as a persona designata. The reasons for holding that in the circumstance the District and Sessions Judge is not acting as persona designata are significant. The Full Bench has held that "when a judicial authority like an officer who presides over a court is appointed to perform the functions to judge and decide in accordance with law and as nothing has been mentioned about the finality or otherwise of the decisions made by that authority, it is an indication that the authority is to act as a court in which case it is not necessary to mention whether they are final or not as all the incidents of exercising jurisdiction as a Court would necessarily follow". The Supreme Court expressed its broad agreement with the conclusion of the Full bench decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court. 21. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court reported in AIR 1964 All. 562 (Chatur Mohan and others v. Ram Behari Dixit) had occasion to consider the jurisdiction exercised by a Munsiff under S.7E of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In considering this question, the court had occasion to search-light the different aspects of conferment of jurisdiction by a particular enactment on an established court. 562 (Chatur Mohan and others v. Ram Behari Dixit) had occasion to consider the jurisdiction exercised by a Munsiff under S.7E of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. In considering this question, the court had occasion to search-light the different aspects of conferment of jurisdiction by a particular enactment on an established court. The court observed that the ordinary jurisdiction of a Munsiff extends to original suits for the time being cognizable by civil courts. Under S.9 C.P.C. civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The relations between a landlord and tenant are governed by the Transfer of Property Act and the Contract Act and any enforcement of a right or a liability accruing under them would be through a civil court. Under the said statutes a tenant has no right to call upon the landlord to make the accommodation windproof and waterproof and to carry out repairs which the landlord did not undertake to carry out; consequently he would have no right to go to a civil court for an order of the nature contemplated under the particular enactment. Such a right has, however, been conferred upon him by S.7E of the Control of Rent and Eviction Act. This provision not only created a right in the tenant but also provided that the right would be enforced by "the Munsiff having jurisdiction". The court posed the question, what did the legislature intend by the said provision? The court explained: "Did it intend that the Munsiff, e.g. the presiding officer of a court of Munsiff, should pass such an order in the exercise of his ordinary jurisdiction or that a special jurisdiction was conferred upon him to pass it? The Full Bench said that the intention of the legislature was that he should pass it as a part of his ordinary jurisdiction. The Full Bench said that the intention of the legislature was that he should pass it as a part of his ordinary jurisdiction. The court said that there is nothing in the Act to indicate that it intended to oust the ordinary jurisdiction of civil courts over the right or to create a special authority for enforcing it and said that the intention is not inconsistent with its specifying a Munsiff s. Court as the court competent to grant the relief; otherwise a Munsiff or a Civil judge would have been competent to grant it depending upon the valuation placed upon it by the tenant. Further the court said that the words "having jurisdiction" used in sub-section (4) certainly mean territorial jurisdiction. In paragraph 4 Desai, CJ. speaking for the Full Bench said that His Lordship is not enamored of the distinction made between "a Munsiff" and "a court of Munsiff' and of the argument based upon it to the effect that "a Munsiff' acts as a persona designata, whereas "a court of Munsiff '.acts as a court constituted under the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act or the Oudh Courts Act. Thus Desai, C. J. clarified the positition thus:- "When the Legislature speaks of "a court of Munsiff' it certainly means a court and not a persona designata, but the converse is not always true and it may speak of "a Munsiff meaning thereby "a court of Munsiff. There is certainly a distinction between a court and the officer presiding over it, but while a reference to a court always means what it says, a reference to the officer presiding over it is ambiguous and may mean either the court or him as distinct from the court. It is always open to the Legislature to confer a special jurisdiction upon an authority presiding over a court and when it does so it may have to refer to the fact of his presiding over the court in order to describe or identify him. In such a case the reference to his presiding over the court is only accidental and does not mean that he has to exercise jurisdiction as a Court. In such a case the reference to his presiding over the court is only accidental and does not mean that he has to exercise jurisdiction as a Court. When the Legislature referred in S.7-Eto "the Munsiff having jurisdiction" it does not seem to have meant the person presiding over a court of Munsiff as distinct from the court and to have referred to the fact of his presiding over the court simply to describe him". This decision was approved by the Supreme Court in AIR 1966 SC 1888 (Ram Chandra Aggarwal and another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and another ). 22. In AIR 1951 Bom. 147 (James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. v. National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd.) the Bombay High Court observed that where a statute directs that an appeal shall lie to a court already established the appeal mist be regulated by the practice and procedure of the court. Swinfen Eday L.J. observed in (1916) 2 KB 126 (Colchester Brewing Co. Ltd. v. Tendring Licensing Justices) thus:- "Where a new jurisdiction is given to a Court, prima facie that Court is to exercise that jurisdiction in accordance with all its ordinary powers". There is no difficulty in holding that a statute grants power to a court, of course, naming it as a court, it cannot function as a persona designata. It has to function as a court and it should be regulated by its own general regulatory provision. But the difficulty arises when in spite of not specifically mentioning court the conferment of the power is given by an eo-nominee statement in the notification or the statute, the judge or the Munsiff. Desai, C.J. while considering S.7E of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act providing some powers to the Munsiff having jurisdiction, plainly said that it is a conferment of power on the Munsiff Court. One thing is certain that when a matter is referred to be decided by an established court without more it imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that court are to attach. The Full Bench (AIR 1964 All. 562) also relied on AIR 1961 SC 606 where the power conferred on the District Magistrate is found to be not a power granted to a persona designata. 23. The Full Bench (AIR 1964 All. 562) also relied on AIR 1961 SC 606 where the power conferred on the District Magistrate is found to be not a power granted to a persona designata. 23. We have to note that in 1968 KLT 583 (Ouseph Vareed v. Mary) a Full Bench of this Court had occasion to say that although the person appointed to function as the Rent Control Court or as the appellate authority may be a Munsiff or "a District Judge"? In the judicial service of the State, his appointment to such post under the Act is as a persona designata and he will be functioning only as such and not as a court while exercising jurisdiction as Rent Control Court or as an appellate authority under the Act. But considering jurisdiction under S.20 of the Act exercised by the District Court by way of revision from the decision of the appellate authority, the Full Bench said that the revisional authority functions as a court and not as a persona designata. It is for the obvious reason that the revisional power is granted to the District Court, under S.20 of the Act. 24. In this context, we may again refer to the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in AIR 1924 Mad. 561. This case arose under the Madras Local Boards Act (XIV of 1920). By the Rules framed by the local Government a District Judge was empowered to enquire into an objection to the election of the president of a Taluk Board under R.I of the Rules. The question arose whether the determination of the District Judge can be considered as the determination of the District Court and as such, it is revisable under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court held that the decision of the District Judge on the enquiry is revisable by the High Court in spite of the fact that his decision is declared "final" by S.57 of the Madras Local Boards Act and Rule 12(2) of the Rules framed under the Act. Chief Justice Sir Walter Salis Schwabe observed that when the word 'Judge' is used and not the word 'Court', one has to look carefully to see whether the word 'Judge' is used in his capacity as judge or in his personal capacity. Chief Justice Sir Walter Salis Schwabe observed that when the word 'Judge' is used and not the word 'Court', one has to look carefully to see whether the word 'Judge' is used in his capacity as judge or in his personal capacity. Ultimately, the court said after considering the other provisions of the Act and the Rules that reference to a 'District Judge' is reference to the 'District Court'. 25. But the above approach of the Full Bench is not seen adhered to in some Single Bench decisions of the same High Court. We feel that we should advert to those cases in this context. In (1947) 1 MLJ 207 (M. Abdul Wahib Sahib v. Dewanjee Abdul Khader sahib), a similar question arose under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. There, the question was whether the appellate authority appointed by the Government notification is a persona designata or court. Justice Yahya Ali held that the question has to be decided on the provisions of the Act and the notification. After observing that there are various decisions bearing on the point, the learned judge said that the test to be applied in such cases is whether the appointment of the authority was in his personal capacity or as a court and found that the language of S.12 Of the Act seems to be clear that the District Judges and Subordinate Judges mentioned in the notification were appointed as personae designatae and not as Courts. The court also observed for supporting the conclusion that the District Judges and Subordinate Judges mentioned in the notification have been appointed as personae designatae and not as courts; the procedure required for the purpose of the appeal has been delineated in S.12 of the Act which would have been wholly unnecessary if the appellate authority was to function as a court, in which case the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would be automatically applicable. 26. The Madras High Court followed the above decision in (1948) 1 MLJ 314 (Chinniah Thevarv. P.M. Badsha ), (1949) 1 MLJ 419 (S. Rajamayyar v. Pavanambal) and AIR 1975 Mad. 383 (S. Ganapathi v. N. Kumaraswami). But all the above decisions are decisions of Single Bench. In (1981)1 MLJ 275 (E.K. Venkaimarbon v. Dakshina-moorthy), Balasubrahmanyan, J. sitting single considered the question again under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act itself. P.M. Badsha ), (1949) 1 MLJ 419 (S. Rajamayyar v. Pavanambal) and AIR 1975 Mad. 383 (S. Ganapathi v. N. Kumaraswami). But all the above decisions are decisions of Single Bench. In (1981)1 MLJ 275 (E.K. Venkaimarbon v. Dakshina-moorthy), Balasubrahmanyan, J. sitting single considered the question again under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act itself. The question was whether the appellate authority constituted under the Act is a persona designata or a court. This was considered in the context of an application of S.5 of the Limitation Act. We would say a very pragmatic and bold approach was made by Balasubrahmanyan, J. The learned judge took the view that the earlier decisions of the Madras High Court holding that the appellate authority is not a court, but a persona designata and because the appellate authority is a persona designata, and so it is not possible to invoke S.5 of the Limitation Act is not in conformity with the dictum laid down in AIR 1961 SC 606. The learned judge said that the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 606 made it clear that only those appointed by their proper names are persona designata and it would be a misnomer to regard as persona designata those who are appointed by reference to a class name or by a generic description of status or legal character. Taking this view, the learned judge said that all the earlier decisions of the Madras High Court which we have already referred, must be regarded as incorrectly rendered when they said that the appellate authority constituted under S.23 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was persona designata. 27. The learned judge understood the Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 1961 SC 606 in a forthright manner and he observed that the gist of what the Supreme Court said was that only those appointed by their proper names as Mr. 'So-and So' or Miss, or Mrs. 'So-and So' are persona designata. It would be a misnomer, and a misconception in law, to regard as persona designata those who are appointed by reference to a class-name, or by a generic description of status or legal character. 'So-and So' or Miss, or Mrs. 'So-and So' are persona designata. It would be a misnomer, and a misconception in law, to regard as persona designata those who are appointed by reference to a class-name, or by a generic description of status or legal character. The learned judge of course was considering a question whether S.5 of the Limitation Act is applicable with regard to an appeal filed before the appellate Authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The decision refers to the object of the legislation and said that it is a welfare legislation and should get a liberal interpretation; so as to give more protection to persons to solve their problems under that special statute, viz., Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. In declining to follow the earlier decisions of the Madras High Court including the decision in Ganapathy v. Kumarawami (1975) TNLJ 264) rendered by Gokulakrishnan, J. holding that the appellate authority under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is persona designata the learned judge said that those decisions must be regarded as not binding on him as per curium particularly in view of the exposition of law by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 606. In Ganapathy v. Kumaraswmy, Gokulakrishnan, J. has adverted to the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC606 and distinguished that decision. Gokulakrishnan, J. took the view that the Supreme Court did not lay down any binding principle for application of the position with respect to powers of appellate authorities under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and on that basis, the learned judge thought that His Lordship is bound to adhere to the long line of authorities of the same court and simply adopted without examining the correctness of the 'decisions rendered by the learned single judges - Yahya Ali, J., Clarke, J., Mack, J. and N.S. Ramaswami, J. - who rendered the judgments referred to earlier. 28. We may now give a little more details of the case decided by the Supreme Court in 1961 SC 606 in this context. The Supreme Court delineated and put necessary tests to fix an authority whether a persona designata or not. 28. We may now give a little more details of the case decided by the Supreme Court in 1961 SC 606 in this context. The Supreme Court delineated and put necessary tests to fix an authority whether a persona designata or not. The court was dealing with an argument that a District Magistrate was persona designata under a special statute and that being so, an Additional District Magistrate could not lawfully do what the District Magistrate alone was empowered to do under that statute. In order to solve this question Supreme Court considered the status of the authority. The question before us is also identical in so far as here the question is whether the Additional District Judge can exercise power of an appellate authority under S.18 of the Act and now we are considering the status of the Additional District Judge acting as an appellate authority. In the Supreme Court decision, the question arose in an ejectment suit which was instituted by a landlord against a tenant under S.3 of the United Provinces (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1946. Under that particular provision, any landlord seeking to sue his tenant in ejectment on certain grounds must get the prior permission of the District Magistrate; otherwise the suit would not lie. The landlord in that case got permission of an Additional District Magistrate. This Additional District Magistrate was a Magistrate of the First Class on whom the Provincial Government had conferred powers as District Magistrate under S.10 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The question that surfaced was whether the Additional District Magistrate can give permission under the Uttar Pradesh Eviction Act, 1946. It was urged before the Supreme Court for the tenant that when S.3 of that Act named the District Magistrate, he was persona designata and this meant that any one other than a District Magistrate could not discharge that function. The Supreme Court rejected, this contention. The Supreme Court examined the validity of this submission and in order to meet that submission, went into the question of the content of the legal concept of persona designata. 29. It was urged before the Supreme Court that there was no provision in the. Uttar Pradesh Eviction Act enabling an Additional District Magistrate to be equated to a District Magistrate. 29. It was urged before the Supreme Court that there was no provision in the. Uttar Pradesh Eviction Act enabling an Additional District Magistrate to be equated to a District Magistrate. The Supreme Court rejected the contention and said that it was quite sufficient that an Additional District Magistrate was conferred with the powers of a District Magistrate by the Provincial Government under S.10 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Supreme Court also accepted the meaning given in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn., p.253 and accepted the Full Bench decision reported in AIR 1924 Mad. 561, wherein the Full Bench has said that personae designatae are "persons selected to act in their private capacity and not in their capacity as Judges", This case (AIR 1961 SC 606) has been referred to in two later decisions of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1966 SC 1888 and AIR 1969 SC 483 (Hari Chand Aggarwal v. The Batata Engineering Co. Ltd. & others). 30. In AIR 1966 SC 1888, the Supreme Court referred to AIR 1961 SC 606 and has accepted the meaning given to the expression persona designata in Osborn's Concise Law Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 263 as "a person who is pointed out or described as-an individual as opposed to a person ascertained as a member of class, or as filling a particular character". The Supreme Court observed that when a special or local law provides for an adjudication to be made by a constituted Court - that is, by a Court not created by a special or local law but to an existing Court - it in fact enlarges the ordinary jurisdiction of such a Court. 31.We have adverted to certain decisions which held that when power is granted to a Munsiff, it is possible to read that the power is granted to the Munsiff Court or the Court of Munsiff. We have to examine when a statute uses the words 'District Judge' whether it is possible to say that the phraseology will take in and embrace on account of the traditional and constant use of the District Judge synonymous with the District Court; the District Court. 32. In 1990 (1) KLT 670 (Vasu v. Pathooty Umma) a Division Bench of this Court was considering a question under S.18 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. 32. In 1990 (1) KLT 670 (Vasu v. Pathooty Umma) a Division Bench of this Court was considering a question under S.18 of the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965. The question related to the proper forum which has to decide appeals pending after the notification dated 26-9-1989 conferring power on the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas and superceding the earlier notification which has granted power to Subordinate Judges. The High Court issued an official memorandum to the concerned judges thus: "When the notification comes into force, the Subordinate Judges will send the records of the pending cases to the concerned District Judges after issuing notice to the counsel/parties requesting them to appear before the transferee court on the dates specified therein, under intimation to the High Court. The District Judge will take up the cases on the notified dates and pass appropriate orders". In compliance with the above direction from the High Court, the Subordinate Judge sent the records of the appeal to the District Judge of the District, who ultimately heard the appeal and allowed the appeal filed by the landlord. A revision was filed before this Court. In an earlier decision of this Court reported in 1990 (1) KLT 651 (Kunhikannan v.-MannanPaithal), a learned Single Judge of this Court took the view that the institution of a proceeding carries with it right of appeals in accordance with the law then in force and so that vested right of appeal can betaken away only by a subsequent enactment expressly or by necessary implication and not otherwise and found that the said principle is applicable to maintain an appeal filed before the Subordinate Judge (appellate authority) before the. Government notification and pending on that day has to be disposed of by the Subordinate Judge since the notification does not expressly or by necessary implication required the appeal to be disposed of by the 'District Court' on whom the notification confers power of appellate authority. It is significant to note that the Division Bench is using the words' District Court' instead of District Judge in the above sentence. The Division Bench did not agree with the learned single judge and held that the appeal filed before the notification also has to be disposed of by the District Judge. It is significant to note that the Division Bench is using the words' District Court' instead of District Judge in the above sentence. The Division Bench did not agree with the learned single judge and held that the appeal filed before the notification also has to be disposed of by the District Judge. In paragraph 8, the Division Bench said that the Government has, by the notification conferred on District Courts power of appellate authorities. Only the District Courts have the power to entertain and dispose of appeals. It is possible to say that in using the words 'District Courts' in the above two sentences and the sentence we have adverted to earlier, the Division Bench was not so accurate and the use of the term was not purposeful, but may be an in advertant mistake. We are not prepared to say that Bhat, J. as He then was, speaking for the Division Bench has used the words 'District Courts' saying that the notification conferred on District Courts power of appellate authorities by an in advertant mistake. It may be on account of the fact that in several decisions, the words 'District Judge' is synonymously used to indicate 'District Court'; 33. In 1989 (1) KLT 451 (K.S.E.B. v. Cheriyan Varghese), a Division Bench of this Court was considering a question under sub-section (5) of S.16 of the Telegraph Act which provided that the determination of dispute by the District Judge under subsection (3) or (4) shall be final subject to the proviso preserving the right of any person to recover by suit the whole or any part of the compensation paid by the Telegraph authority to any other person. The court said that the above said provision should not be construed as a bar in filing a revision to the High Court under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In holding so, this Court said: "There cannot be any doubt that the District Judge referred to in S.18(3) is the District Court. The court said that the above said provision should not be construed as a bar in filing a revision to the High Court under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In holding so, this Court said: "There cannot be any doubt that the District Judge referred to in S.18(3) is the District Court. The District Judge acts not as a persona designata, but as a court subordinate to the High Court " It is also a case where the Division Bench took a different view taken by a learned single judge in 1988 (2) KLT 941 (Kerala State Electricity Board v. Thampi) and 1988 (2) KLT 656 (Neelandan v. K.S.E. board), wherein the learned single judge held that an order passed by the District Judge under S.16(3) of the Telegraph Act is not revisable under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Of course, the learned single judge was following the decision reported in 1987 (1) KLT 53 (SC) (Aundal Ammai v. Sadasivan Filial) wherein the Supreme Court has held that under the Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act a second revision will notice under S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure from the decision of the District Court under S.20 of the Act. Any how, the Division Bench, as we said earlier, held that the term used as 'District Judge' in S.18(3) of the Telegraph Act has to be understood as 'District Court'. -So in a case where a special statute makes the District Judge as the adjudicating authority in regard to certain types of disputes, the Division bench held that since the term used is 'the District Judge', it is possible to hold that the power has been given to the District Court. Both the decisions, 1988 (2) KLT 656 and 1988 (2) KLT 941 were overruled by the Division Bench. 34. Both the decisions, 1988 (2) KLT 656 and 1988 (2) KLT 941 were overruled by the Division Bench. 34. In (1991) 2 SCC 637 (Maharashtra State Financial Corporation v. Jaycee Drugs and Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd. and others), Ojha, J. speaking for Ranganathan, J and himself in a case coming under State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 had occasion to consider the effect of conferring power by a special statute on a District Judge, in this case S.31 of the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951, the Supreme Court, following the Central Talkies Ltd. v. Dwaraka Prasad (AIR 1961 SC 606), said that since the term used in S.31(1) of the State Financial Corporation Act is "District Judge", it cannot be doubted that the District Judge is not a persona designata, but a court of ordinary civil jurisdiction while exercising jurisdiction under Ss.31 and 32 of the Act. 35. We are not called upon to decide in this case whether the District Judges having jurisdiction over the areas within which the provisions of the Act have been extended are acting as persona designata. The question we have to answer is whether an Additional District Judge can act as an appellate authority under the notification. We have already found that under the provisions of S.18 of the Act read with the notification, an Additional District Judge can also act as appellate authority. But since this question was intimately interlinked with the question of the status of the appellate authority whether persona designata or not, we have considered that aspect also. We need not hold for the purpose of deciding this case that District Judges/ Additional District Judges acting as appellate authority under S.18 of the Act are personae designatae or not though we are of the opinion that the District Judges/ Additional District judges acting as appellate authority are not acting as personae designatae. Since this question has not arisen in this case, we are not deciding this question conclusively, since judicial discipline requires that the matter has to be decided by a Full Bench or a Larger Bench, because a Full Bench of this Court very plainly said that the notification under S.18 of the Act appointing Sub Judges as appellate authority are personae designatae under a similar earlier notification. We leave the matter there. 36. The foregoing discussions and references to several decisions made this order elliptical. We leave the matter there. 36. The foregoing discussions and references to several decisions made this order elliptical. To say plainly we regret over the prolix excursion of this order. We know brevity is the soul of wit. Piquant and pithy judgment command greater credibility. Then why: we justify the prolixity of this order thus. It is the polite commendation the reward prize and encomium we can offer for the learning and semantic arguments of counsel on both sides presenting an encyclopedic view of judicial thought of various High Courts and Supreme Court over the subject. We confess that from the plennitude and frozen limit of rulings cited, we skipped some of them here and there by a process of calculated riddance using utmost care not to omit more perspicuous distinct and relevant cases. 37. We have kept in mind that law is a practical instrument and should be a working tool in a work a day world and where, as here, the affected segment of the community is the working class people civil servants, professionals and ordinary folk who cannot afford to have a house of their own. We feel that the stand taken by us that Additional District Judge also has got the power to act as an appellate authority is legally correct, on a proper purposive interpretation of the provisions, but we would say that we were also guided by that Rule of construction that "construction follows common sense, not casuistry, context, nor strictness and not subtle miance but plain sense". An interpretation which would take the view that the appellate power under S.18 of the Act should be strictly confined to the District Judges alone and not to Additional District Judges necessarily will cause delay in disposing of appeals considering the large number of appeals that are being filed under S.18 of the Act. Further it would create confusion and chaos in respect of appeals disposed of by and pending before the Additional District Judges. As far as possible, the judicial approach even in the matter of construing a statutory provision should aim at avoiding delay in the dispensation of justice. Pope Paul in opening the judicial year of the Second Roman Rota pontificated that delay in dispensing justice is' in itself an act of injustice'. As far as possible, the judicial approach even in the matter of construing a statutory provision should aim at avoiding delay in the dispensation of justice. Pope Paul in opening the judicial year of the Second Roman Rota pontificated that delay in dispensing justice is' in itself an act of injustice'. Justice Krishna Iyer in one of his decision when dealing with the delay of dispensing justice said that "Systematic slow motion in this area must claim the nation's immediate attention towards basic reformation of the traditional structure and procedure if the Indian Judicature is to sustain the litigative credibility of the community. Justice Lord Devlin cautioned with this warning about the British Judicial system thus: "If our business methods were as antiquated as our legal methods, we would be a bankrupt country". 38. Certainly a right of appeal is a substantive right and so granting that right is a substantive law. The forum where the appeal has to be filed and who should be empowered to dispose of the appeal is in the sphere of adjective law in contrast to the correspondent term substantive law. Jeremy Bentham said that substantive code of law is the greatest happiness of the greatest number and so the object or end of the procedural code of law which is an "accessory code" is to give execution and effect to the substantive code should imbibe that spirit of object of the substantive code. When the question of execution and giving effect to the substantive law by a procedural code of law and the court is called upon to construe a provision in the procedural code of law, we feel that we must bear in mind that we are duty bound to construe the provisions to see that all avoidable delays are eliminated, of course without doing any violence to the statutory provisions and the principles of statutory construction. All aids, principles and norms of construction are intended to lead to a reasonable construction. The appalling cost and terrifying delay have turned litigation which ought to be a gentle solvent of disputes into a thing of horror. 39. It was the bonny boat of emperor august us that he found "Rome of brick and left it of marble". All aids, principles and norms of construction are intended to lead to a reasonable construction. The appalling cost and terrifying delay have turned litigation which ought to be a gentle solvent of disputes into a thing of horror. 39. It was the bonny boat of emperor august us that he found "Rome of brick and left it of marble". How nobler it would be if the state could claim the legitimacy to say that we found law dear and high priced and left it moderate and cheap; found it in a cold closed book, left it the throbbing living letter; found it the bequest of the rich, left it the heritage of the poor and the rich alike; found it lethargic, left it dynamic; found it slow moving, left it fast moving; found it ambiguous, left it meaningful and purposive; found it the double edged instrument of artifice and harassment, left it the sceptre of honesty and the mantle of purity. Here we add a postscript. The above is a platitude, but it is time for us to transform rhetoric into reality, platitudes into performance and aspirations into achievements. We must not fail nor falter in the pursuit of justice -the greatest aspirations of man on earth. Procedural law should be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. 40. We hold that the preliminary objection that the Additional District Judge who has disposed of the appeal, has no jurisdiction is devoid of any merit. We hold that all Additional District Judges can exercise the power of an appellate authority under S.18 of the Act. Now, on the facts of the case. 41. Tenant is the revision petitioner. The application for eviction was under S.11(4)(i) of the Act. The plaint schedule building belonged to M/s.Kurikayil Finance Company: The Company claimed that it obtained the building by way of a gift from Ramanatha Kammath. Respondent, petitioner before the Rent Control Court is M/s. Ananda Kammath & Sons, Shcrthala. In the petition before the Rent Control Court, it is stated that the petitioner is a Company registered under the Indian Partnership Act. The petition is signed by its managing partner. Of course, in paragraph 2, it is stated that the petitioner-firm carries on business in textiles in its own name and a business in financing, in the name and style M/s.Kurikayil Finance Company. 42. The petition is signed by its managing partner. Of course, in paragraph 2, it is stated that the petitioner-firm carries on business in textiles in its own name and a business in financing, in the name and style M/s.Kurikayil Finance Company. 42. Revision petitioner had executed Ext. Al rent deed on 21-1-1983 in favour of K.N.Ramanatha Kamath agreeing to pay an amount of Rs.75/- per month as rent. Ramanatha Kamath executed Ext. A2 gift deed on 23-9-1985 in favour of M/s.Kurikayil Finance Company. When once the gift deed is executed in favour of a Firm, naturally the partners of that Firm will become the owners of the property under the gift deed. The case of the respondent herein is that the execution of the gift deed and the transfer of the petition schedule property was intimated to the revision petitioner and the revision petitioner had paid the rent to M/s.Kurikayil Finance Company. Ext. A6, the rent receipt issued by M/s.Kurikayil Finance Company establishes the payment and receipt of the rent in accordance with Ext. Al rent deed. Revision petitioner submits before us that how the respondent can claim eviction in respect of a building which belongs to M/s.Kurikayil Finance Company. Respondent's case is that it was carrying on business in textiles in its own name and a business in finance in the name and style M/s. Kurikayil Finance Company. It was contended that that may not be sufficient for maintaining a petition by the respondent herein without disclosing further facts. 43. So, though there was no clear denial of the title, the tenant submitted that the respondent herein cannot maintain the petition. This contention was considered by the Rent Control Court and it held that since there was no clear denial of the title of the landlord over the plaint schedule property, the second proviso to S.11(1) of the Act is not attracted in the case and on merits, the Rent Control Court ordered eviction. The finding regarding the maintainability of the petition was confirmed by the appellate court. Further the appellate court considered the question whether eviction can be ordered under S.11(4)(i) of the Act and the appellate court confirmed the finding of the Rent Control Court on this aspect of the matter also. 44. The finding regarding the maintainability of the petition was confirmed by the appellate court. Further the appellate court considered the question whether eviction can be ordered under S.11(4)(i) of the Act and the appellate court confirmed the finding of the Rent Control Court on this aspect of the matter also. 44. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that an application under the Act in the Firm's name is not maintainable, since the provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure relating to institution of suits by Firms do not apply to proceedings under the Act. For this proposition, counsel referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1984 SC1570 (M/s. Chhotelal Pyarelal v. Shikharchand). In this decision, the Supreme Court has said that the Firm is merely a compendious name for the partners constituting it and it is only by virtue of the provisions of Order 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure that a Firm can sue and be sued in its own name without the partners being impleaded eo-nominee. On this premise the Supreme Court held that a Firm could not be sued in the Firm name by the landlord in so far as an application for eviction under the Rent Control Order was concerned. In the same decision, the Supreme Court after holding that in the Firm name no action can be taken under the "C.P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, held that if a petition has been filed in the Firm name, such a petition is not liable to be dismissed. It should be considered as merely a case of misdescription of the party and that misdescription can be corrected at any stage of the proceedings. The partners can come in, since they are in a way before the court in the name of the Firm. In the Supreme Court case, on a request made by counsel appearing for the respondent, the Supreme Court granted leave to amend the cause title of the application by adding the names of the partners of the Firm and to carry out necessary consequential amendment in the body of the application and remitted the case back to the Rent Controller to dispose it on merits. 45. 45. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that in this case also since the application has been filed before the Rent Control Court in Firm name, the petition is required to be rejected. Nevertheless, since it is only a misdescription, it is only fair and proper to allow an amendment of the cause title of the petition and to allow to make consequential amendment in the body of the petition. No serious argument was advanced by counsel for the respondent contraverting the position that in the Firm name a petition can be filed under the Act. Learned counsel for the revision petitioner also did not seriously contend that the petition has to be dismissed and that no opportunity should be given for the respondent to amend the petition to make it a proper and legally maintainable petition. In these circumstances, we set aside the order of the Rent Control Court and the judgment of the appellate authority and direct the Rent Control Court to dispose of the case after giving an opportunity to the respondent to amend the cause title and consequential amendment in the body of the petition. Of course, after the amendment, petitioner herein/tenant should be given an opportunity to file objection and thereafter, the matter has to be disposed of as expeditously as possible, at any rate, within six months from today. The case can be disposed of on the evidence adduced in the case. But if the parties want to adduce additional evidence in the case, they may be allowed to do so. In the result, order of the Rent Control Court and judgment of the appellate authority are set aside and the case is remitted for disposal in the light of the observations made in this order.