Judgment : 1. Thepetitioners are accused 1 to 3 in C.C.No.184 of 1989 pending on the file of the Judicial Magistrate, Mathuranthagam. 2. On a private complaint instituted by the respondent before the learned Magistrate alleging commission of offence under Secs.341 and 447, I.P.C. by the petitioners, in respect of an occurrence stated to have taken place on 13.6.1988 at Mathur village, after recording the sworn statement of the respondent, the learned Magistrate chose to take the case on file only for an offence under Sec.341, I.P.C. 3. The allegation in the complaint show that the respondent as well as the wife of the first petitioner Andal Ammal, the aunt of the respondent, had equal share in the lands in S.No.186/1 and S.N0.232/1A situated at Mathur village, to an extent of 0.49 hectares and 0.15 hectare, respectively. The complaint also shows that both the parties had equal rights in the well and the pumpset motor. 4. The complaint alleges, that on 2.8.1987 when the respondent proceeded to his land to till the same, his aunt Andal Ammal, along with the first and second petitioners, prevented him from ploughing the land. Aggrieved respondent chose to prefer a suit before the District Munsif, Maduranthakam praying for an injunction restraining Andal Ammal and her agents from interfering with his’ possession, of that portion of his land. The complaint would further allege, that an order of injunction was granted and the said order was duly served on the petitioners and Andal Ammal. After service of the order of injunction, petitioners 2 and 3 locked up the pumpset motor room situate in S.No.186/1. The respondent claims, that the petitioners are rich and influential people and inspite of an order of injunction, he could not enjoy his property. 5. The complaint further alleges, that in the said background, when the respondent went over to his land on 13.6.1988, he found the motor in operation, pumping water to that portion of the land enjoyed by his aunt Andal Ammal. When he attempted to approach the motor pumpset room, the petitioners wrongfully restrained him and prevented him from reaching the pumpset room. They also abused him in vulgar language. When the petitioners attempted to beat him, out of fear, he ran away to his house. 6. On the next day (14.6.1988), he preferred a complaint before Melmaruvathur Poliice Station. When he attempted to approach the motor pumpset room, the petitioners wrongfully restrained him and prevented him from reaching the pumpset room. They also abused him in vulgar language. When the petitioners attempted to beat him, out of fear, he ran away to his house. 6. On the next day (14.6.1988), he preferred a complaint before Melmaruvathur Poliice Station. Since Melmaruvathur Police directed him to file a civil suit, he chose to prefer a private complaint before the trial Magistrate on 20.6.1988. 7. Learned Magistrate, on receipt of the private complaint, forwarded it under Sec.156(3), Crl.P.C. to the Melmaruvathur Police Station, for investigation and report. On receipt of the complaint from the Magistrate, the Melmaruvathur Police registered Crime No. 151 of 1988 under Secs.341 and 447, I.P.C. After investigation, Melmaruvathur Police chose to refer the complaint as ‘mistake of fact’. Thereafter, setting out all these details, the respondent chose to file the impugned private complaint, which, as stated earlier, was taken on file for an offence under Sec.341, I.P.C. alone. 8. Mr.R.Rajasekaran, learned counsel representing Mr.T.Sudanthiram, contended that the respondent has suppressed the nature of order passed by the civil Court in O.S.No.401 of 1987 and had attempted to convert a case purely of civil nature, into one involving criminal liability. He then contended, that once the learned magistrate had accepted the report of the investigating agency, referring the case as ‘mistake of fact’, on the same facts a second complaint was not feasible and the respondent must have taken steps to have the order of the Magistrate set aside in revision. 9. I have heard Mr.S.Udayakumar, learned counsel representing the respondent on all these contentions. He contended that no opportunity was given to the respondent before the learned Magistrate chose to accept the report of the Melmaruvathur Police. He vehemently argued that the impugned complaint was maintainable in law. 10. Mr.Rajasekaran has placed for my consideration certain decided cases, which I will refer to, at the appropriate time. 11. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the opposing counsel. As far as the first ground of challenge is concerned, I am afraid that it would not enure in favour of the petitioners. 10. Mr.Rajasekaran has placed for my consideration certain decided cases, which I will refer to, at the appropriate time. 11. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the opposing counsel. As far as the first ground of challenge is concerned, I am afraid that it would not enure in favour of the petitioners. I did agree to look into the order passed by the Civil Court in O.S.No.401 of 1987, dated 21.8.1987, since in the complaint itself, it has been stated, that the interim order passed by the Civil Court had been appended thereto. As rightly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the order is not one of injunction preventing the petitioners from interfering with the possession of the respondent, as stated in the complaint,but one of maintenance of status quo. The words ‘maintenance of status quo’ can only indicate that both parties will have to maintain the same position that had existed before the passing of the order dated 21.8.1987. In the complaint as well as his sworn statement, not only the entitlement to the land and the pumpset room has been mentioned by the respondent but it has also been stated that when he exercised his right of possession, he was prevented, by the petitioners. It must also be borne in mind, that between 21.8.1987 and 13.6.1988, there has been no untoward incident between the parties. Anyhow, I do not want to dwelve on that aspect, since it has to be relegated to the trial Court for consideration, after evidence is brought on record. The fact remains, on the allegations made in the complaint,when accepted at their face value, without addition or subtraction, that both parties have a right in the land and the motor pumpset room and both of them were either in possession or were exercising acts, to indicate possession. The intricate questions of acts of possession by either party, will again have to be canvassed and considered during trial. Once the allegations in the complaint, prima facie make out the ingredients of the offences alleged, it will not be possible to halt the trial at its track by invoking the inherent powers under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. The order of the civil court does not appear to held either party, at this stage. Once the allegations in the complaint, prima facie make out the ingredients of the offences alleged, it will not be possible to halt the trial at its track by invoking the inherent powers under Sec.482, Crl.P.C. The order of the civil court does not appear to held either party, at this stage. II the learned Magistrate had taken the case on file for trespass as well, it could have easily been held, on the material available that taking of cognizance for an offence under Sec.447, I.P.C, was not maintainable. I am unable to find any impediment in the Magistrate having taken cognizance of an offence under Sec.341, I.P.C. alone, on the averments made in the complaint and the sworn statement. The first ground of challenge, is rejected outright. 12. As far as the second ground of challenge is concerned, very many decisions have been placed before me. Padmini Jesudurai, J., in Crl.M.P. No.1548 of 1988, by an order-dated 21.7.1989, in somewhat similar circumstances, held as here under: “Whatever that be, in view of the clear pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the two decisions referred to above, I have to necessarily hold that when the Magistrate drops action on receipt of a report by the police referring the case, he accepts the reasons given in the refer report and agree with the police that the matter has to be dropped. When, therefore, he, drops the matter, it has to be taken that he has acted on the report accepting it. Under such circumstances, if on the same set of facts when exactly a similar (complaint) is given later, then it would not be open to the learned Magistrate to take cognisance of the said complaint, contrary to his earlier decision agreeing to drop the matter. In the instant case, the learned Magistrate had decided to drop action since the case was referred as a mistake of fact. It should be taken that the learned Magistrate agreed with the report of the police and accepted them. He cannot therefore take cognizance of the said complaint.” 13. Before Padmini Jesudurai, J. the judgment of S.Natarajan, J., (as he then was) reported in Manoharlal v. Vasudev, 1983 L.W. (Crl.) 319 was cited. It should be taken that the learned Magistrate agreed with the report of the police and accepted them. He cannot therefore take cognizance of the said complaint.” 13. Before Padmini Jesudurai, J. the judgment of S.Natarajan, J., (as he then was) reported in Manoharlal v. Vasudev, 1983 L.W. (Crl.) 319 was cited. In that case, S.Natarajan, J., held as follows: “It is well-known that when a Magistrate sends a complaint for enquiry under Sec. 156(3), Crl.P.C, he does not take cognizance of the case. Consequently, when he receives a police report stating, that the complaint be referred either as ‘false’ or as ‘mistake of fact’ or ‘mistake of law’, he dose not pass any judicial order; but merely lodges the complaint and does not take any further action. In such circumstances, there is no bar in law for the Magistrate to entertain a second complaint and take cognizance of it and issue process to the accused.” 14. Padmini Jesudurai, J., referring to this decision of S.Natarajan, J., observed as follows: “I am not sure about the facts of the case which the learned judge had to deal.” A perusal of the judgment rendered by S.Natarajan, J., shows in paragraph 2, that the respondent therein had filed a complaint against the petitioner for offences of criminal breach of trust etc. The complaint was sent for enquiry, by the Magistrate under Sec.156 (3), Crl.P.C. After enquiry, the police gave a report staling that the petitioner had not committed any offence and the complaint deserved to be referred on the ground of ‘mistake of law. “In view of the report of the police, no further action was taken on that complaint. Subsequently, the respondent filed another complaint against the petitioner in respect of the very same offences complained of in the earlier complaint. The complaint was taken on file and process issued to the petitioner. It was at that stage, the petitioner therein had chosen to invoke the inherent powers of the High Court to have the pending proceedings quashed. 15. S.Natarajan, J. has referred in Manoharlal v. Vasudev, 1983 L.W. (Crl.) 319 the Judgment of Maheswaran, J., in T.K.Submmanian and others v. T.K.Gnanasekaran (1982) L.W. Crl. 245. The learned Judge observed as hereunder: “When the Magistrate orders investigation under Sec. 156(3) of the Crl.P.C, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. 15. S.Natarajan, J. has referred in Manoharlal v. Vasudev, 1983 L.W. (Crl.) 319 the Judgment of Maheswaran, J., in T.K.Submmanian and others v. T.K.Gnanasekaran (1982) L.W. Crl. 245. The learned Judge observed as hereunder: “When the Magistrate orders investigation under Sec. 156(3) of the Crl.P.C, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of the offence. In the instant case, the Magistrate did not apply his mind to the complaint for deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. He ordered only an investigation under Sec.156(3) of the Crl.P.C. In the case of a complaint in respect of a cognizable offence, the Magistrate can invoke Sec.156(3) before he takes cognizance of the offence under Sec.190(1)(a) of the Code. In the present case, the Magistrate did not embark upon the procedure under Chapter XV of the Crl.P C. He did not examine the complainant and, the witnesses under Sec.200, Crl.P.C. The question of dismissing the complaint under Sec.203, Crl.P.C, therefore, did not arise. The argument of the petitioners that. the order stating “Lodge the F.I.R.” will amount to a dismissal under Sec.203, Crl.P.C. is devoid of substance and must fail. As the complaint had not been dismissed under Sec.203 of the Crl.P.C. there is no prohibition for the entertainment of a second complaint.” 16. As before Padmini Jesudurai, J., lea rned counsel for the petitioners contended before me, relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Tula Ram v. Kishore Singh, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2401 and H.S.Bains v. State (Union Territory of Chandigarh), A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1883 that a Magistrate receiving a police report under Sec.173 (2), Crl.P.C. on a complaintsent by him to the police under Sec.156(3), Crl.P.C. had only three courses open, whereas in the instant case, the learned magistrate had embarked upon a fourth course of action, which law does not permit. 17. S.Natarajan, J., Padmini Jesudurai, J., and Maheswaran, J., had no occasion to consider the judgment of the Supreme Court in Bhagvant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1285. The Apex Court observed, that in a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-sec.(2) of Sec.173, decides not to lake cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient. The Apex Court observed, that in a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-sec.(2) of Sec.173, decides not to lake cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient. ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the first Information Report, the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report. It was further stated by the Supreme Court, that it must be presumed that the informant would equally be interested in seeing that the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process, because that would be the culmination of the First Information Report lodged by him. The further observations of the Supreme Court need extraction: ”Now, when the report forwarded by the Officer-in-charge of a police station to the Magistrate under sub-sec.(2)(i) of Sec.173 comes up for consideration by the Magistrate, one of two different situations may arise. The report may conclude that an offence appears to have been committed by a particular person or persons and in such a case, the Magistrate may do not of three things: (1) hemay accept the report and take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (2) hemay disagree with the report and drop the proceeding, or (3) he may direct further investigation under sub-sec.(3) of Sec.156 and require the police to make a further report. The report may on the other hand state that, in the opinion of the police, no offence appears to have been committed and where such a report has been made, the magistrate again has an opinion to adopt one of three courses: (1) hemay accept the report and drop the proceedings; or (2) he may disagree with the report and taking the view that there is sufficient ground for proceeding further, take cognizance of the offence and issue process, or (3) he may direct further investigation to be made by the police under sub-sec.(3) of Sec.156. where, in either of these two situations, the Magistrate decides to take cognizance of the offence and to issue process, the informant is not prejudicially affected nor is the injured or in case of death, any relative of the deceased aggrieved, because cognizance of the offence is taken by the Magistrate and it is decided by the Magistrate that the case shall proceed. But if the Magistrate decides that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding further and drops the proceedings or takes the view that though there is sufficient ground for proceeding against some, there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against others mentioned in the First Information Report, the informant would certainly be prejudiced because the First Information Report lodged by him would have failed in its purpose, wholly or in part. Moreover, when the interest of the informant in prompt and effective action being taken on the First Information Report lodged by him is clearly recognised by the provisions contained in sub-sec.(2) of Sec.154, sub-sec.(2) of Sec.157 and sub-sec.(2)(ii) of Sec.173, it must be presumed that the informant would equally be interested in seeing that the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence and issues process, because that would be culmination of he First Information Report lodged by him. There can, therefore, be no doubt that when, on a consideration of the report made by the officer-in-charge of a police station under sub-sec.(2)(i) of Sec.173, the Magistrate is not inclined to take cognisance of the offence and issue process, the informant must be given an opportunity of being heard so that he can make his submissions to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process. We are accordingly of the view I hat in a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under sub-sec.(2)(i) of Sec. 133 decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the First Information Report the Magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him an opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of the report.” 18. Admittedly, on the facts placed before me, no notice was given to the respondent before the learned Magistrate, chose to accept the referred report forwarded to him under Sec.173, Crl.P.C. The respondent, who had lost a vital right, to place before the Magistrate, his submissions, to persuade the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence and issue process, cannot be prevented from filing a complaint over again on the same set of facts. Principles of Natural Justice, would permit it, since the earlier disposal is a non-est, in the eye of law. Hyper-technical approach can only account for “laws delays”. At the risk of repetition, it will have to be stated, that every detail of all that had happened prior to the filing of the impugned complaint, have been stated by the respondent, in his private complaint. As a clear decision is possible on the facts of this case, as to the sustainability of the impugned complaint, controversy, if any, between the views expressed by Padmini Jesudurai, J. and those expressed by S.Natarajan, J., and Maheswaran, J., need no further scrutiny. On the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1285 the impugned complaint should be held to be maintainable. 19. M.N.Moorthy, J., and David Annoussamy, J., have taken the very same view, enunciated by the Supreme Court, in the aforestated Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1285. 20. This petition, which has no merit, shall stand dismissed.