JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - These three writ petitions arise from service dispute between Neeraj Agarwal and his employer Teletronics Limited, Bhimtal (Nainital), which is an undertaking of the State Government. The disputes in these three petitions pertain to petitioner's transfer from Lucknow to Bhimtal and termination of his service in consequence of his failure to join at Bhimtal. 2. The petitioner was appointed to the post of Manager, Marketing by order dated 15th January, 1990 on one year's probation. Clause (b) of the appointment letter reads as follows : "(b) You will be on probation for a period of one year from the date of enforcement of this offer, which period may be extended from time to time at the discretion of the Management. During the period of probation, your services may be terminated without assigning any reason therefor." At the time of petitioner's appointment, Marketing Division of the Undertaking was at Lucknow. It appears that a meeting wars held on 1st September, 1990 which was attended by the Managing Director, Manager Marketing (Petitioner), Marketing Officer, Marketing Trainee (Mr. Rajiv Pandit) and Marketing Trainee (Mr. Amit Anand). Minutes of this meeting have been enclosed as Annexure C-1 to the Undertaking's counter affidavit filed in the first petition. In paragraph-9, it is recorded :- "9. Marketing head office is to shift to Bhimtal. Monthly sales meetings at a later stage may be held at various Sales and Services Centres on rational basis." Thereafter order was passed on 7th September, 1990 transferring the petitioner from Lucknow to Bhimtal. The petitioner did not proceed to the transferred place. Accordingly, he did not receive his salary for the months of September & October, 1990. He had been provided residential accommodation by the Undertaking at Lucknow, rent whereof was being paid by the Undertaking. In view of the fact that the petitioner had been transferred to Bhimtal, the Undertaking stopped payment of rent to the landlord. In view of these actions of the Undertaking, the petitioner filed the first petition in this Court on 9th November, 1990. The first relief claimed on this petition is for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the condition regarding discharge from service without assigning any reason as incorporated in the Service Rules of the Company. In view of these actions of the Undertaking, the petitioner filed the first petition in this Court on 9th November, 1990. The first relief claimed on this petition is for issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the condition regarding discharge from service without assigning any reason as incorporated in the Service Rules of the Company. The second prayer is for issue of a writ of mandamus, commanding the respondents to for with clear all arrears of salary and to continue payment of salary for each month. The next mandamus claimed is to command the respondents to forbear from evicting the petitioner from his official accommodation. On 9th November, 1990, this Court passed the following interim order in this petition :- "In case there is no transfer order transferring the petitioner from Lucknow to Bhimtal or/and in case the petitioner is duly continuing in the office at Lucknow, the petitioner shall not be evicted from the official accommodation in question till the next date of listing." 3. From the above interim order, it is apparent that the order transferring petitioner from Lucknow to Bhimtal was not stayed. Indeed transfer order was not even challenged by the petitioner. Petitioner's plea was that no transfer order had been served upon him and, therefore, he cannot be compelled to vacate house. In the application for interim relief also, the prayer made was :- "...........to direct the respondents to dear arrears of salary and continue to pay each month as and when it falls due and also restrain them from interfering in discharge of official duties and further not to evict the petitioner from the official accommodation....." Even though petitioner's case was that the transfer order had not been served upon him, it is on record as enclosure to Annexure-5, which is a letter written by Managing Director of the Undertaking to the petitioner on 18th September, 1990. When the petitioner did not join at Bhimtal despite reminders, his services were terminated by order dated 19th November, 1990 whereupon the petitioner filed the second writ petition. When the petitioner did not join at Bhimtal despite reminders, his services were terminated by order dated 19th November, 1990 whereupon the petitioner filed the second writ petition. The termination order is Annexure 1 to the second writ petition, and it reads as follows :- "Your services are hereby terminated with immediate effect in accordance with para (b) of the terms and conditions of your appointment letter No. 402 dated 15 January 90." In this case, the following interim order was passed on 28th November, 1990 :- "According to the petitioner his services were terminated by an order dated 19-11-90 without complying with the requirements of having been made three month's notice and also on the ground that it is mala fide. "Meanwhile, impugned order shall not be given effect to." 4. In order to comply with the above interim order, the Managing Director of the Undertaking passed order dated 22nd December, 1990 wherein it is mentioned :- "In compliance of the order dated 28-11-1990 passed by the High Court in the writ petition No. 12148 of 1990, it has been decided that the impugned order of termination dated 19-11-1990 should not be given effect to till it is not vacated or modified by the High Court .......... "In view of this, you are again directed to submit your joining by 1st January 1991. You are further informed that the question of payment of salary to you shall be considered only on your joining to the transferred place at Bhimtal. All future correspondence in this regard is required to be made tome at Bhimtal." 5. Against this order, the petitioner filed the last petition in which the following interim order was passed on 7th January, 1991 :- "Till the next listing the operation of the impugned order contained in Annexure No. 1, requiring the petitioner to join at Bhimtal, shall remain in abeyance." 6. On behalf of the Undertaking, counter affidavits have been filed in the first and second writ petitions. 7. The entire dispute between the parties has arisen from the petitioner's transfer from Lucknow to Bhimtal. From the material on record, it is apparent that if the petitioner had complied with this transfer order, his services would not have been terminated. Now the petitioner's case in detail may be examined in respect of his transfer from Lucknow to Bhimtal. 8. The entire dispute between the parties has arisen from the petitioner's transfer from Lucknow to Bhimtal. From the material on record, it is apparent that if the petitioner had complied with this transfer order, his services would not have been terminated. Now the petitioner's case in detail may be examined in respect of his transfer from Lucknow to Bhimtal. 8. It is not disputed that the petitioner's services are transferable. In fact, clause (k) of the appointment letter dated 15th January, 1990 specifically provides :- "You may be transferred anywhere in India or abroad on the discretion of the Management." The petitioner's plea is that there is no post of Manager, Marketing, available at Bhimtal and, therefore, there is no occasion to transfer him to that place. This contention of the petitioner cannot be sustained in view of the minutes of the meeting held on 1st September, 1990. The petitioner, of course, denies his presence at this meeting, but that will not detract from the validity of the decisions taken thereat. The meeting is claimed to have been attended by as many as four persons, apart from the petitioner. These four persons do not dispute the correctness of the minutes, copy of which has been filed as Annexure C-2. From these minutes, it is apparent that marketing head office was shifted to Bhimtal. In view of this position, it is obvious that the post of Manager, Marketing was available at Bhimtal when the transfer order dated 7th September, 1990 was passed against the petitioner. 9. A already stated, the entitlement of the Undertaking to transfer the petitioner from one place to another is not disputed. His plea is that no transfer order was actually served upon him. His contention that the transfer order dated 7th September, 1990 was not served upon him separately may, for a moment, be accepted, but the petitioner cannot dispute its service through letter dated 18th September, 1990. Copy of this letter has been filed by the petitioner himself and to this letter has been enclosed transfer order dated 7th September, 1990. After receipt of letter dated 18th September, 1990, there was no justifiable ground with the petitioner for not joining at Bhimtal. Copy of this letter has been filed by the petitioner himself and to this letter has been enclosed transfer order dated 7th September, 1990. After receipt of letter dated 18th September, 1990, there was no justifiable ground with the petitioner for not joining at Bhimtal. Apart from the letter dated 18th September, 1990, petitioner's attention to the transfer order was invited by the Senior General Manager through his letter dated 17th September, 1990 and by the Managing Director through his letters dated 10th October, 1990 and 11th October, 1990. The Managing Director was the appointing authority of the petitioner and his competence to pass transfer order is not under challenge. Accordingly, when the Managing Director wrote letters dated 18th September, 1990, 10th October, 1990 and 11th October. 1990, no doubt should have been left in the mind of the petitioner that he has been transferred from Lucknow to Bhimtal. 10. The petitioner has made allegations of mala fides against the Managing Director Sri D.K. Rastogi. According to the petitioner, the Managing Director asked the petitioner to resign from the post. The petitioner asserts that this step was taken by the Managing Director in order to appoint his own person in place of the petitioner, The petitioner's plea of mala fide cannot be accepted as, if the Managing Director wanted to appoint one of his own men in place of the petitioners, nothing was easier than to dispense with petitioner's service, as probation period had not yet expired. Instead of doing this, Sri D.K. Rastogi was only requiring the petitioner again and again to join at Bhimtal in pursuance of the transfer order. Sri Rastogi did not immediately pass order of termination of service, on petitioner's failure to comply with the transfer order. Instead, he reminded the petitioner of his obligation and also of the serious consequences which could flow from petitioner's refusal to comply with the transfer order. In letter dated 18th September, 1990, the petitioner was warned that if he did not join at Bhimtal immediately, disciplinary action could be taken against him. In letter dated 10th October, 1990 after directing the petitioner to join at Bhimtal immediately, he was warned that if he did not do so, it will be presumed that he was no longer interested in working in the Organisation and action may be taken according to Rules. In letter dated 10th October, 1990 after directing the petitioner to join at Bhimtal immediately, he was warned that if he did not do so, it will be presumed that he was no longer interested in working in the Organisation and action may be taken according to Rules. In letter dated 11th October, 1990 also it was stated that if the petitioner did not join immediately at Bhimtal, entire responsibility will be his. Repeated efforts of Sri Rastogi to persuade the petitioner to join at Bhimtal negative the petitioner's plea of mala fides. 11. The petitioner had been provided official accommodation at Lko. in connection with his official duties at Lucknow. Once he is transferred from Lucknow, there is no occasion for him to retain the official accommodation. Accordingly, the opposite parties were justified in requiring the petitioner to vacate the official accommodation provided to him. Since the petitioner without any justification did not proceed on transfer to Bhimtal, the opposite parties were further justified in stopping payment of rent to the landlord. The petitioner cannot complain against this action of the opposite parties. 12. Salary is paid to employee for work done by him for the employer. When the employee does not do any work, there is no question of payment of salary to him. After his transfer from Lucknow to Bhimtal, the petitioner was required to discharge duties at Bhimtal He did not join at Bhimtal and from petitioner own averments it is apparent that he was not allowed to discharge duties at Lucknow. The consequence was that the petitioner did not discharge any duty either at Lucknow or at Bhimtal and for this, the fault does not lie upon his employer, but upon petitioner himself. Accordingly, the petitioner's claim for salary is misconceived . 13. The petitioner has annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition what has been claimed by him as 'Service Rules' of the Undertaking. He challenges the validity of the Rules providing for discharge from service without notice and without payment of salary. Accordingly, the petitioner's claim for salary is misconceived . 13. The petitioner has annexed as Annexure-2 to the writ petition what has been claimed by him as 'Service Rules' of the Undertaking. He challenges the validity of the Rules providing for discharge from service without notice and without payment of salary. Mode of discharge of a probationer is prescribed as follows :- "An employee directly recruited to a post, during the period of probation or during the extended period of probation as the case may be, may be discharged from the service of the Company under the orders of the competent authority providing that the competent authority shall give at least ninety days notice in writing in that behalf or pay a sum of equal to ninety days' substantive pay plus dearness allowance to the employee." "An employee during the period of probation or during the extended period of probation, as the case may be, may leave or discontinue from the service of the company after giving ninety day's notice in writing or deposit an amount equal to the pay and dearness allowance for this period in lieu of such notice. The Board or the Managing Director with proper delegation of authority from the Board may waive off the provision of giving such notice or payment, in lieu thereof." There is also a provision for discharge of a confirmed employee on three month's notice or three month's salary in lieu thereof, Since the petitioner was not a confirmed employee, it is not necessary for me to deal with this provision. 14. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the opposite parties, it has been stated that the Rules relied upon by the petitioner were only draft-rules. The Rules as finally adopted have been annexed as Annexure C-3 to the counter affidavit filed in the first writ petition. In these Rules also there is provision for discharge during probation period The said Rules read as follows :- "Any employee directly recruited to a post during the period of probation or during the extended period of probation, as the case may be, may be discharged from the service of the Company under the orders of the competent authority without assigning any reason therefor. "An employee during the period of probation or during the extended period of probation, as the case may be, may leave or discontinue from the service of the Company after giving thirty days' notice in writing or deposit an amount equal to the pay and dearness allowance for this period in lieu of such notice. The Board or the Managing Director with proper delegation of authority from the Board may waive the provision of giving such notice or payment in lieu thereof." Regarding discharge of a confirmed employee, it is provided thus :- "A confirmed employee may be discharged from the service of the Company under the orders of the competent authority on one month notice or by giving one month salary in lieu thereof. The competent authority for the purposes of this Rules will Be the next higher level than the appointing authority for that category of post. The competent authority on getting a recommendation from the appointing authority for the discharge of a confirmed employee with reasons therefor, may give an opportunity to die employee concerned for explaining himself before coming to a decision." 15. In the present case, as already observed, I am not dealing with a confirmed employee. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has cited a large number of authorities in which provision for discharge of a confirmed employee on notice or payment of salary in lieu of notice, was held to be ultra vires and unconstitutional. These authorities have no application to the facts of the present case as the petitioner was not a confirmed employee. These authorities may, therefore, only be noticed. They are :- (1). (1985) 3 SCC 116 : West Bengal State Electricity Board and others v. Desk Bandhu Ghosh and others' (2). (1986) 3 SCC 156 : Central Inland Water Transport Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another; (3). AIR 1987 SC 111 : O.P. Bhandari v. Indian Tourism Development Corporation Limited and others; (4). (1987) SCC (Suppl) 643 : M.K. Agarwal v. Gurgaon Gramin Bank and others; and (5). AIR 1991 SC 101 : Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others. 17. In respect of M.K. Agarwal's case (Supra) it was sought to be made out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was not a case of confirmed employee, but was case of a probationer. AIR 1991 SC 101 : Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and others. 17. In respect of M.K. Agarwal's case (Supra) it was sought to be made out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it was not a case of confirmed employee, but was case of a probationer. This argument was sought to be substantiated by reference to paragraph-2 of the report. However, learned counsel for the opposite parties has invited my attention to paragraph-8 of the report from which it is apparent that the petitioner's claim of having been confirmed was upheld. This judgment is also, therefore, not relevant for the purposes of the present case. 18. Position of a probationer is fundamentally different from that of a confirmed employee. A confirmed employee has got a right to hold the post. An unconfirmed employee does not have such right. If in respect of a confirmed employee, a Rule is framed by a public authority to dispense with his service by giving him notice or salary in lieu thereof, but without any rhyme or reason, the Rules would have effect of taking away his rights and the same may be described as arbitrary. But such a Rule framed in respect of a probationer cannot be said to be arbitrary because no right will be taken away thereby. The purpose of appointing a person on probation is to judge his suitability by watching his performance during the probation period. Therefore, from the very beginning a probationer knows that his continuance in service is dependent on his satisfactory discharge of duties. This is not the position of a confirmed employee. A confirmed employee can reasonably expect to continue in service unless he is found guilty of misconduct or dereliction of duty. Initial appointment on probation is a normal incidence of service under the State or under its authorities. It is not suggested that placement on probation itself is arbitrary. Under the Rule relied upon by the petitioner, ninety days' notice or ninety days' pay in lieu thereof is required. Under the Rule relied upon by the opposite parties, the employer is not required to give any notice or pay to the probationer while discharging him from service. Mere absence of provision in the Rule for notice or pay will not, in my opinion, render the Rule of discharge arbitrary and, therefore, invalid. 19. Under the Rule relied upon by the opposite parties, the employer is not required to give any notice or pay to the probationer while discharging him from service. Mere absence of provision in the Rule for notice or pay will not, in my opinion, render the Rule of discharge arbitrary and, therefore, invalid. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner now contends that the Rule of discharge contained in the Rules relied upon by the opposite parties is invalid because it is discriminatory. It is pointed out that for discharge of probationer by the employer, no notice is required to be given and no salary is required to be paid. But if the probationer leaves the employment, he is required to give thirty days notice or to deposit pay and dearness allowance for this period. This according to the learned counsel, is discriminatory and, therefore, violative or Article 14. I decline to entertain this pica for four reasons :- (i) The plea in the form urged during oral arguments has not been raised in the pleadings ; (ii) the impugned action has not been taken under the Rule referred to in the counter affidavit of the opposite parties, but in the terms of the appointment letter ; (iii) on the facts of the present case, the action of the opposite parties impugned in the three petitions cannot be faulted from any angle ; and (iv) the petitioner is obviously an in disciplined person and has concocted facts in order to support his plea and mala fides against his Managing Director. 20. The Rules annexed by the petitioner to his first petition were not final Rules, but were draft-rules as pointed out in the counter affidavit. In respect of the Rules filed by the opposite parties, averments have been made in paragraphs 15 to 17 of the rejoinder affidavit. Material allegation made in paragraph 15 is thus :- ".......Service Rules have deliberately been changed." In the same paragraph, it is further stated :- "......The petitioner submits that the change so made by the respondents was only to help the case of the petitioner inasmuch as the change has made the Rules wrose that they were before." The term "wrose" has not be elaborated. In paragraph 16 it is averred :- "The petitioner submits that except for the portion of Rules which has been challenged by the petitioner is ultra vires. In paragraph 16 it is averred :- "The petitioner submits that except for the portion of Rules which has been challenged by the petitioner is ultra vires. There appears to be no significant change in the Rules supplied to the petitioner and annexed by the respondents. In paragraph 17, it is mentioned :- "The allegation that no notice is required to be given prior to discharge from service only substantiates that the Service Rules of opposite party no. 1 are ultra vires being unconstitutional and opposed to public policy as well as fair play and equity." There is no averment that the Rule is ultra vires because it provides for notice/pay when the employee leaves service, but it does not provide for notice/pay when the service is dispensed with by the employer. When vires of a provision is challenged, detailed facts and grounds should be stated in the pleadings A ground for which no foundation has been laid in the pleadings cannot be entertained during the course of oral arguments. 21. Clause (b) of the appointment letter has been reproduced herein above. This clause provides :- "...During the period of probation, your services may be terminated without assigning any reason therefor." The impugned order of termination of service refers to this clause and not to the Rule. In other words, power to terminate petitioner's service has been derived from the appointment letter and not from the Rule. Of course, Rule filed by the opposite party is also to the same effect. In the writ petition, neither clause (b) of the appointment letter has been challenged nor any clause of the Rule filed by the opposite parties. In other words, power to terminate petitioner's service has been derived from the appointment letter and not from the Rule. Of course, Rule filed by the opposite party is also to the same effect. In the writ petition, neither clause (b) of the appointment letter has been challenged nor any clause of the Rule filed by the opposite parties. The prayer clause in the first writ petition reads as follows : "(i) Issue a writ of Certiorari or writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari quashing the condition regarding discharge from service without assigning any reason as incorporated in the Service Rules of the Company after summoning the original to this Hon'ble Court." The ground referable to this prayer is "A" which reads as follows :- "A. Because the condition regarding termination of service without assigning any reason and by merely giving 3 months notice or salary in lieu thereof is completely arbitrary and confers unguided powers upon the respondents to terminate the services of an employee for apparently no reasons and consequently hit by Article 14 of the Constitution and is liable to be struck down." In the second writ petition, the prayer is contained in clause (ii) which reads :- "(ii). issue an appropriate writ, order or direction striking down the conditions of terminating the services of an employee by mere giving of three months notice as ultra vires." The ground referable to this prayer is :- "D. Because the Rules, as applicable to the employees of opposite party no. 1 in so far as they confer a blatant power upon the respondents' company to terminate the services of an employee by giving of a mere notice confers an unguided and arbitrary power which opposed to fair play and good conscious and is hit by the provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution and are liable to be struck down." Rules filed by the Opposite parties do not provide for three month's notice or payment of three months' salary in lieu thereof for terminating services of a probationer. Such a provision is contained only in the draft-rules filed by the petitioner. It is, therefore, apparent that the prayers in the first and second writ petitions regarding quashing of Rules are relatable to the draft-rules and not to the final Rules, copy of which has been filed by the opposite parties. Such a provision is contained only in the draft-rules filed by the petitioner. It is, therefore, apparent that the prayers in the first and second writ petitions regarding quashing of Rules are relatable to the draft-rules and not to the final Rules, copy of which has been filed by the opposite parties. Thus, there is no effective challenge by the petitioner against the final Rules framed by the Undertaking. The validity of Clause (k) has not been challenged. 22. In the following case, termination of service on the ground of refusal to obey the transfer order was upheld by their lordships of the Supreme Court :- (1) AIR 1989 SC 1433 : (1989) 2 SCC 602 , Gujarat Electricity Board and another v. Anna Ram Sungomal Poshani. Id paragraph 4 of the case (SCC) it has been observed as follows :- "Transfer of a Government servant appointed to a particular cadre of transferable post from one place to the other is an incident of service. No Government servant or employee of Public Undertaking has legal right for being posted at any particular place. Transfer from one place to other is generally a condition of service and the employee has no choice in the matter. Transfer from one place to other is necessary in public interest and efficiency in the public administration. Whenever, a public servant is transferred he must comply with the order but if there be any genuine difficulty in proceeding on transfer it is open to him to make representation to the competent authority for stay, modification or cancellation of the transfer order. If the order of transfer is not stayed, modified or cancelled the concerned public servant must carry out the order of transfer. In the absence of any stay of the transfer order a public servant has no justification to avoid or evade the transfer order merely on the ground of having made a representation, or on the ground of his difficulty in moving from one place to the other. If he fails to proceed on transfer in compliance with the transfer order, he would expose himself to disciplinary action under the relevant rules, as has happened in the instant case. If he fails to proceed on transfer in compliance with the transfer order, he would expose himself to disciplinary action under the relevant rules, as has happened in the instant case. The respondent lost his service as he refused to comply with the order of his transfer from one place to the other." In the above case, order of discharge from service had been passed under a statutory Services Regulation which reads as follows :- "The continued absence from duty or overstay, in spite of warning, to return to duty shall render the employee liable to summarily discharge from service without the necessity of proceedings under the Gujarat Electricity Board, Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Procedure." The above Regulation did not provide for giving of any notice prior to passing order of discharge. Despite this, the order of discharge was upheld. The Regulation contemplated issue of warning before issuing order of discharge. In the case before their lordships such a warning had been given. Learned counsel for the petitioner tried to distinguish the present case from the case decided by their lordships on the ground that in that case there was a statutory provision which permitted discharge on failure to comply with transfer order. 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously submits that the counter affidavit itself indicates that the foundation for the termination of petitioner's service is his misconduct, namely, "deliberate, intentional and wilful non-compliance of the order of transfer dated 7th September, 1990." and in respect of this misconduct the petitioner had not been afforded opportunity of hearing. Learned counsel for the opposite parties, on the other hand, submits that the petitioner had been warned of the consequence of non-compliance of the transfer order and on the facts of the case this was sufficient compliance of principles of natural justice. Attempts made by the opposite parties to procure from the petitioner compliance of the transfer order are apparent from the Annexures filed along with the writ petition. The transfer order is dated 7th September, 1990. The petitioner claims that it was not served upon him. We may accept that it was not served upon him on 7th September, 1990 or immediately thereafter, but its service upon the petitioner through letter dated 18th September, 1990 cannot be denied by the petitioner. The transfer order is dated 7th September, 1990. The petitioner claims that it was not served upon him. We may accept that it was not served upon him on 7th September, 1990 or immediately thereafter, but its service upon the petitioner through letter dated 18th September, 1990 cannot be denied by the petitioner. Along with this letter copy of the transfer order dated 7th September, 1990 was sent to the petitioner with specific direction "to join at Bhimtal immediately, failing which disciplinary action can be taken against you;'. This was sufficient warning to the petitioner that in case he did not comply with the transfer order, something serious may happen. The Senior General Manager Sri S.C. Bhargava also sent letter dated 17th September, 1990, Annexure-6 to petitioner's first writ petition warning him, "It amounts an act of insubordination and misconduct on your part." Again in the succeeding paragraph he states, "You are, therefore, required to join your duties at Bhimtal immediately on receiving this letter. This is in your own interest failing which suitable disciplinary action maybe taken against you". Instead of joining at Bhimtal, the petitioner wrote letter on 20th September, 1990 raising plea that Sri D.K. Rastogi, Managing Director was pressurising him to resign from service. If this was really so, petitioner should have been all the more cautious. Next opportunity was afforded to the petitioner by the same Sri D.K. Rastogi against whom he makes allegation of mala fides, on 10th September, 1990 when he wrote letter, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure No. 12 to the writ petition. In this letter, after referring to the previous communication Sri Rastogi States, "You are, therefore, once again ordered to report for duty at Bhimtal office immediately. If you don't report for duty at Bhimtal, it will be presumed that you are no more interested to work in the organisation and the action will be taken as per rule." Yet another opportunity was afforded by the same Mr. Rastogi when he wrote letter dated 11th October, 1990, Annexure 13 to the writ petition. In paragraph 2 of this letter he writes, "...You are also ordered to report for duty at Bhimtal office immediately failing which the whole responsibility will be of your". Rastogi when he wrote letter dated 11th October, 1990, Annexure 13 to the writ petition. In paragraph 2 of this letter he writes, "...You are also ordered to report for duty at Bhimtal office immediately failing which the whole responsibility will be of your". When despite this warning, the petitioner does not join at Bhimtal, it is apparent that he has decided to serve the institution either at Lucknow or not at all. Once the office itself has been transferred to Bhimtal, there is no place for the petitioner to stay at Lucknow. In the circumstances, the transfer order is fully justified and its non-compliance by the petitioner has no justification whatsoever. Warnings issued to the petitioner constitute sufficient compliance with the principles of natural justice, if they were required to be complied with at all. I am unable to agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that a formal charge-sheet should have been issued to the petitioner and formal enquiry should have been held. By holding this enquiry, the Undertaking would have been unnecessarily burdened with payment of subsistence allowance to the petitioner during period of enquiry. Public funds cannot be allowed to be wasted on in disciplined employee. 24. The petitioner has not only displayed insubordination, he has also concocted facts to maintain this petition and has also tried to mislead this Court. This Court's interim order dated 9th November, 1990 clearly shows that the same was obtained on the representation that there was no transfer order against the petitioner. Transfer order was already part of the writ petition. In view of that transfer order, there was no occasion for the petitioner to obtain stay of his eviction from the official accommodation as was done by order dated 9th November, 1990. 25. Sri D.K. Rastogi, Managing Director, against whom allegation of mala fides has been made, has filed counter affidavit in the second writ petition. In paragraph-4 of his counter affidavit he has denied the petitioner's allegation that he pressurised him to resign from the post. Sri Rastogi has stated that the assertion is purely concoction of facts & has no basis. Sri Rastogi has further stated in the same paragraph that he had personally handed over transfer order dated 7th September, 1990 to the petitioner. Looking to the conduct of the petitioner, I see no reason to disbelieve the submission of Sri Rastogi. Sri Rastogi has stated that the assertion is purely concoction of facts & has no basis. Sri Rastogi has further stated in the same paragraph that he had personally handed over transfer order dated 7th September, 1990 to the petitioner. Looking to the conduct of the petitioner, I see no reason to disbelieve the submission of Sri Rastogi. It is, therefore, established that the petitioner tried to prolong his stay at Lucknow by concocting facts and filing writ petitions in this Court on such facts. The petitioner must, therefore, be saddled with exemplary costs. 26. Now coming to the reliefs to be granted in the case. In the first petition, apart from claiming quashing of the condition of discharge incorporated in the Service Rules, mandamus has been claimed to command the respondents to clear all arrears of salary. The petitioner has not worked from 7th September, 1990 onwards either at Lucknow or at Bhimtal. Accordingly he is not entitled to any payment of salary from that date. He has further prayed for mandamus to command opposite parties not to evict him from the official accommodation. Once the petitioner was transferred from Lucknow to Bhimtal, there was no occasion for him to continue to stay in the official accommodation allotted to him. Accordingly he cannot be granted mandamus claimed by him. Another mandamus claimed in this petition is to command the opposite parties to forbear from preventing the petitioner from discharging official duties of the post of Manager, Marketing. Till date of termination of his service, the opposite parties never prevented the petitioner from discharging duties of the post of Manager, Marketing. They were only requiring the petitioner to perform duties at Bhimtal, at which place he had been transferred. If the petitioner did not proceed to Bhimtal to discharge his duties, no blame can be attached to the opposite parties. Accordingly, this prayer cannot be granted. 27. In the second writ petition, main relief claimed is to quash the order of termination of service. The order terminating his service has been found to be justified. Therefore, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in this petition. 28. The basis for the last petition was interim order passed against the order terminating petitioner's service. 27. In the second writ petition, main relief claimed is to quash the order of termination of service. The order terminating his service has been found to be justified. Therefore, no relief can be granted to the petitioner in this petition. 28. The basis for the last petition was interim order passed against the order terminating petitioner's service. The petitioner's plea was that in view of the fact that the termination of his service had been stayed, there was no occasion for the opposite parties to pass order dated 22nd December, 1990 requiring him to report for duty at Bhimtal. The interim order of this Court passed in second writ petition merely stayed operation of the order of termination of service, but did not provide that the petitioner shall be retained at Lucknow. The order impugned in the third writ petition merely required petitioner to join at Bhimtal. Earlier the petitioner's service had been terminated, but this requirement was made in view of the interim order passed by this Court. In view of the fact that no order had been passed in any of the petitions staying operation of the transfer order, the third writ petition is entirely misconceived. 29. On a consideration of the facts and circumstances, I am of the opinion that all the three writ petitions are not only devoid of merits, but are absolutely frivolous. The petitioner has wasted the time of this Court and has involved the respondents in unnecessary litigation. 30. All the three writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissed and the interim orders are hereby a discharged. In each petition, petitioner will pay Rs. 1000/- (Rupees one thousand only) as costs to the respondents.