JUDGMENT A.U. Khan, Member - This full Bench has been constituted under the order 1.12.1990 of Hon'ble Chairman to consider the soundness of the legal position, handed down by Division Bench, consisting of Members Sri Majmudar I.A.S. and Sri R.P. Gupta, reported in 1990 R.D. Hindi 20. They have ruled that if a case under Section 229-B Z.A. and L.R. Act has been instituted in Revenue Court, the revision be dismissed. In view of this ruling precedent one of us did govern himself by and dismissed revision on 28.8.90 as he had to: 1982 A.W.C. 366, H.C. 2. The counsel for revisionist Sri B.L. Shukla moved a Review application, as he found patent error of law that needs reconsideration by larger Bench in view of AIR 1958 S.C. 975. One of us was convinced and this has led to this larger Bench. 3. The essential facts that bring out the controversy in hand are: upon submission of Reference No. 44/1982-83 the then Hon'ble Chairman Shri Viyas Bhiman, in line with the recommendation of Addl. Commissioner, has ordered mutation in favour of Rafiq, revisionist on 1.3.1984. Irfan Ali moved a Review application No. 784 (L.R.) 1983-84. The same was rejected by Division Bench on 10.7.90 but with the following observation. "When an applicant in Revision or Review has instituted a declaratory suit no interference be made in Review or Revision arising out of mutation or correction cases." Is this proposition supportable." 4. Heard the counsel and perused the record. 5. The propriety and legality of this generalisation is here for consideration. The outlook of a Division Bench that suits in terms of Section 220, Land Revenue Act is within the severe limitation set by Order 47, Rule 2 C.P.C. That is: was there the discovery of new and important matter of evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, not within Irfan Ali's knowledge. Was there a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the record in the order of 1.8.1984. The Bench, strictly obliged to make the exposition and treatment, within this vigorous limitation, handled the issue in the way it did, and had dismissed the Review application.' The questions are: Are the impugned observation germane to the finding in Review? Was the scope of revision in mutation and correction application cases up for exposition in Review? The Bench, strictly obliged to make the exposition and treatment, within this vigorous limitation, handled the issue in the way it did, and had dismissed the Review application.' The questions are: Are the impugned observation germane to the finding in Review? Was the scope of revision in mutation and correction application cases up for exposition in Review? Was a correction of paper dispute inclusive in the matter under review? Why were the revisions of Section 28 L.R. Act and Section 41, L.R. Act, to name only the two, excluded from similar treatment? Lastly, was the scope of revision in search of a new definition in review in 1990; untrammelled by a plethora i of cases from 1901 to 1990: 89 years, uncaring their significance, even of High Court, a Division Bench too? 6. Is it apt to dismiss the revision, without interference once the suit is filed? To begin with, the first of the case law, chronologically noticed here: 1965 R.D. 197 by Member R.K. Singh, who does not find any provision for staying the proceeding under Section 33/39 even so the matter directly and substantially in issue pends in another court and he alerts that Land Revenue Act is a self contained Act. 7. The then Chairman Shri S.K. Saigal in 1983 R.D. 116: the then Chairman Shri J.D. Shukla in 1971 R.D. 261: Member Shri G.S. Sial, 1978 R.D. 318; 1947 R.D. 214; 1983 Alld. Vidhi Nirnaya 138; 1984 R.D. 67; 1904 R.D. 21; 1984 A.W.C. 83 (Revenue) say, in full agreement, that mutation application surely, unhesitantly, no less with all expedition, be decided notwithstanding that a suit is going apace in revenue or civil court, as respects the same matter in issue here as also there. We say no more. The ratio of the decisions have to be assimilated here. To elucidate what is so overwhelmingly obvious by numerous citations, as illustrated in concerted cases, will be multiplication: to expose where exposure is manifestly unnecessary. 8. Nevertheless, it is in order to take an insight from decisions of High Court; clear and consistent, on the point we are on. The insistent issue to loom large is in relation to consolidation proceeding, parallel to revision in mutation, when civil court is too seized of the cancellation of sale or gift deed etc. 8. Nevertheless, it is in order to take an insight from decisions of High Court; clear and consistent, on the point we are on. The insistent issue to loom large is in relation to consolidation proceeding, parallel to revision in mutation, when civil court is too seized of the cancellation of sale or gift deed etc. Hon'ble K.N. Mishra, J. in A.I.R. 1978 (NCC) (Alld.) 91 held that staying proceedings in the objection under Section 9 (2) C.H. Act until final decision of the civil court for cancellation of sale-deed suffers from manifest error. A contrary opinion meditated in A.I.R. 1978 (NCC) 45 Alld. R. 24 was not approved by Division Bench in Ram Sewak v. D.D.C. "Do not stay the hand." In addition, 1982 A.L.J. 1445; H.C. is elequent that consolidation court have to give effect to sale-deed which is voidable even if suit is pending for it's cancellation. So too are the observation in 1976 Lucknow L.J. 52 (F.B.). More, High Court in Smt. Hafiza's case, 1986 R.D. 186; has elucidated that consolidation court are in law not bound to stay the proceeding in the pending case before it because there is no specific provision within the Act or in the Rules to that effect. We think that when to stay the hand is without support of any provision, the dismissal of revision without determination on merits is negation thereof. High Court, in effect, says" steal a march over regular suit: this Bench says, "Dismiss" the revision shall be no more. To transplant, the essence of dilemma in familiar terms; High Court, remove poverty quickly not withstanding anti-poverty programme off Government. The Bench says kill the poor which, in effect, is removal of poverty. Needless the ratio and dictum of High Court is binding over subordinate judiciary; 1990 R.D. 131 H.C. 9. The settled opinion, formulated in numerous cases, ms that court under the Land Revenue Act should not stay put; should immediately and decisively decide the mutation application subject to modification, correction or regulation by the result of regular suit which may take it's own longer time. The Division Bench has, it seems in retrospect, distinguished between revisions where applicant is prosecuting only mutation application to its logical end and the revision where applicant before that has 'chosen also to institute a regular declaratory suit. Such a distinction is not just and proper. The Division Bench has, it seems in retrospect, distinguished between revisions where applicant is prosecuting only mutation application to its logical end and the revision where applicant before that has 'chosen also to institute a regular declaratory suit. Such a distinction is not just and proper. The applicant has both the options in law, to prosecute two remedies simultaneously or alternatively. If A's revision application is allowed and name is mutated, as so it be, he will not have to take up additional prosecution. Contrawise, if A's application in revision is not finally decided he will distinctly suffer in relation to those revisionists whose application is decided by Commissioner and the Board. This will be manifestly erroneous as it will be an outright denial of a legal right, to have the revision finally decided by the Court of final hearing. Still more, there are many imponderables. Say, evidence is filed by the opposite party in revision that a case under Section 229-B Z.A. and L.R. Act has been instituted by revisionist. May be so, but on that very day the revisionist is found absent and the case stands dismissed in default. The revisionist moves to say the suit no longer survives. What then? Still more, say S.D.O. orders mutation in favour of A.B. files a revision and Commissioner submit a reference in favour of B.B. having instituted a declaratory suit, the revision is dismissed. Will the formulated opinion of Commissioner favouring B go down, and that of S.D.O. for A will prevail. Will the dismissal of revision, without interference, be operative in Commissioner's Court? Many situations of confusion and chaos will arise if the fate of the revision is tied up with that of the fluctuating fortunes of a regular suit, The Bench was to evince interest in the very very limited scope of review; seized by this the members were, chiefly Irfan Ali, after dismissal of his revision, has aspired to throw open the controversy once more, as if all important facts were still at large in first appeal. He succeeds in eluciting an appraisal in 67 lines; a scrutiny factual and factual, never set to crucial test of Order 47, Rule 2, C.P.C. Even so, the review was rejected. For determination of the concerns and points in review, the impugned drastic declaration was not germane to come to an ineluctable conclusion, upon whole of the evidence. He succeeds in eluciting an appraisal in 67 lines; a scrutiny factual and factual, never set to crucial test of Order 47, Rule 2, C.P.C. Even so, the review was rejected. For determination of the concerns and points in review, the impugned drastic declaration was not germane to come to an ineluctable conclusion, upon whole of the evidence. There was no occasion or material from which the proposition has come to be wrenched from, uprooted from it's subject altogether and stared at out of context; stands abstractly. It is well to remember Dean Pounds now famous aphorism: The law must be stable, and yet it must not stand still. In this the first thought is as significant as the second, and may embrace it. The law must be stable." 10. Equally in vain is to say, as is firmly said, that review dismissed, not when grounds alone of Order 47, Rule 2 C.P.C. are found absent but for a different new reasons, filing of a declaratory suit by the reviewer. This is to say the unsayable. My Lord, B.L. Yadav, J. in an attempt to clarify the concept of the proceeding in 1986 R.D. 36 H.C. states. An application moved it, then, should be subjected to a final conclusion, essentially a final order it should amount to. To stop a while or hold in abeyance the accelerating paces of it's motion cannot be countenanced." This is by what we govern ourselves by, 1990 R.D. 131 H.C. Still a revision No. 95 (L.R.) 1977-78 Aligarh 4.8.1990, an unreported one, by Hon'ble Chairman Dr. A.N. Segal, is to be reckoned here. He finds himself unable to agree with the view of impugned Division Bench, governs himself by quite a clear opinion, as he says, in 1986 R.D. 36 H.C. In that conflict he was bound, we say with respect, by the Division Bench of the Board of Revenue, in preference to that of High Court, 1982 A.W.C. 366 H.C. What a final order is? It should determine the proceeding (2) it should determine the rights and liabilities of the parties and (3) it should be on merits and should further be final and conclusive, so as to cover entire range of substantive rights and liabilities which form the subject matter of real controversy in the suit' or proceeding, AIR 1961 Alld. 245 H.C., F'.B. and AIR 1967 Alld. 245 H.C., F'.B. and AIR 1967 Alld. 51 H.C., F.B. A discrimination is in order as to the use of appropriate Hindi words for their originals in English. At play are two words; Review and revision, not here: restoration. Their Hindi eguivalents, receiving growing recognition are: Revision: fuxjkuh Review: iqujh{k.k Restoration: iquLZFkkiuk The use of Hindi word for iquLZFkkiuk review is inapt. The Bench has ruled dismissal of revision and review without decision on merits. The ruling is declared in derogation of, expressed without taking notice of, a string of decisions here and there; Unhistoric in the breath of it's formulation, anchored in jurisprudential desert. The opinion, 1990 R.D. (Hindi) 29 B.R. D.B. is not a valid legal proposition. We do not hereby overrule it and direct that this be placed before the referring Member (Judicial) for decision of Revision application in accordance with law. A.U. Khan, Member (Judicial) Judgments signed, dated and pronounced in open court today. Sarvasri N.M. Majmudar IAS, Rai Singh IAS and A.U. Khan: ORDER 1. This Full Bench was constituted under order of the Hon'ble Chairman, Board of Revenue, to consider the soundness, propriety and validity of the ruling given by the Divisional Bench comprising of Members of the Board of Revenue Sri N.M. Majmudar, IAS and Sri R.P. Gupta reported in 1990 R.D. (Hindi) 29 on a review application No. 217 LR 1989-90 Ghaziabad. The Divisional Bench so constituted have held that if a case under Section 229-B of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has been instituted in revenue court, the revision against the orders passed under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, be dismissed. In revision No. 249 to 231 under U.P. Land Revenue Act of 1987-88 Ghaziabad, one of us did not govern himself by the ruling handed down by the Divisional Bench mentioned above and dismissed this revision vide his order dated 28.8.90. 2. The counsel for the revisionist filed a review application against the orders dated 28.8.90 dismissing the revision Nos. 249 to 231/LR/1987-88/Ghaziabad as in his opinion there was a patent error of law that needed to be examined by Larger Bench. One of us was convinced of the need for reconsideration of the legal position and this review application was admitted by him. 3. Heard the learned counsels for both the parties and carefully went through the record on file. 4. One of us was convinced of the need for reconsideration of the legal position and this review application was admitted by him. 3. Heard the learned counsels for both the parties and carefully went through the record on file. 4. The basic question for consideration by the Full Bench is whether the revision filed under U.P. Land Revenue Act against the orders passed in mutation proceedings should continue till its final disposal on merit or whether it should be dismissed on the ground that a declaratory suit u/Sec. 229 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has been filed. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant argued that the revision filed against the orders passed in mutation proceedings should be heard till its final decision. In support of his arguments he cited the ruling of the Hon'ble High Court reported in 1986 R.D. (Hindi) 36 in which Hon'ble Justice Sri B.B. Yadav, held that in his opinion if mutation case has been filed u/Sec. 34-33 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act it should be finally disposed of and could not be stayed or abated. The learned counsel for the applicant also cited a ruling reported in 1971 R.D. 347 H.C. and said that if a revision was filed within time, it would be deemed to continue until final decision. He also cited a ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1970 AIR SC 1 and said that since the filing of revision the proceedings would be deemed to continue till its final disposal and added that once proceeding u/Sec. 34, Land Revenue Act were initiated, these would be deemed final only after decision in the revision u/Sec. 210 U.P. Land Revenue Act. The learned counsel further said that the revision u/Sec. 219 could not be dismissed on the ground that a declaratory suit u/Sec. 229-B had been instituted but instead the revision ought to have been decided on merit. He further referred to the ruling given by Dr. A.N. Segal, Hon'ble Chairman, Board of Revenue, vide his order dated 4.8.90 passed in revision No. 83/LR/77-78 Aligarh "Ram Prasad v. Mukandi". He further referred to the ruling given by Dr. A.N. Segal, Hon'ble Chairman, Board of Revenue, vide his order dated 4.8.90 passed in revision No. 83/LR/77-78 Aligarh "Ram Prasad v. Mukandi". In this case, the Hon'ble Chairman has ruled that revision filed under U.P. Land Revenue Act could not be dismissed on the ground that a declaratory suit u/Sec. 229-B has been filed but the revision must be decided on merit despite the fact of filing of a declaratory suit. In support of his contention he also referred to the ruling reported in 1983 AVN 138 which says that cases under U.P. Land Revenue Act will not be stayed/dismissed if a civil case has been filed. Continuing his arguments, the learned counsel for the applicant expressed his view that the Board of Revenue could not change the provisions made under U.P. Land Revenue Act. He fortified his view by referring to a ruling reported in 1981 RD 205. 6. The learned counsel for the applicant further added that the revisional authority of the Board of Revenue was discretionary authority and the revisionist had no statutory rights of filing a revision, but once the Board of Revenue in exercise of its discretionary authority admitted the revision for hearing the proceedings must continue till a final decision in the revision. The learned counsel further argued that under U.P. Land Revenue Act the proceedings were of summary nature and should be decided expeditiously. 7. Sri R.N. Mishra, DGC (R) also appeared in this review petition. His contention was that U.P. Land Revenue Act did not provide for stay of correction proceedings on grounds of pendency of suit relating to the same subject matter between the same parties in an other courts. In support of his view he cited rulings reported in 1965 R.D. 197 and 1983 AVN 21. He further added that the revisional powers of the Board of Revenue could not be set aside on the ground that a case u/Sec. 229-B had been filed. In support of his view he cited rulings reported in 1965 R.D. 197 and 1983 AVN 21. He further added that the revisional powers of the Board of Revenue could not be set aside on the ground that a case u/Sec. 229-B had been filed. He further stated that if the Board of Revenue did not finally dispose of the revision on the ground that a declaratory suit under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act had been filed, the revisionist would be deprived of the remedy available to him under the revisional powers of the Board of Revenue and that was not the intention of the State Legislature in enacting the U.P. Land Revenue Act, particularly in view of the facts, unlike U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which provides for abatement of cases in certain circumstances, that there was no provision for stay or abatement under circumstances under the provisions of U.P. Land Revenue Act. 8. On behalf of the Opp. Parties it was argued by the learned counsel that the decision in the declaratory suit u/Sec. 229-B prevailed over the decision in the summary proceedings under U.P. Land Revenue Act. Therefore, once a declaratory suit was filed, the mutation proceedings under the revisional powers of the Board of Revenue became an exercise in futility. It was, therefore, better to wait for the final decision in the declaratory suit and there was no binding in continuing the proceedings under U.P. Land Revenue Act after a declaratory suit was filed under the provisions of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The learned counsel for the O.P. prayed that the proceedings in a revision under the U.P. Land Revenue Act be dismissed in view of the fact that a declaratory suit u/Sec. 229-B of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act was filed between the same parties as were contesting in the revision under U.P. Land Revenue Act. 9. Having heard the learned counsels for both the parties at length and after giving considerable thought to the various rulings quoted and un-quoted, I am of the view that the U.P. Land Revenue Act and the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act are two separate enactments passed by the State Legislature. Under the U.P. Land Revenue Act, the proceedings are primarily of summary nature. Under the U.P. Land Revenue Act, the proceedings are primarily of summary nature. The idea behind making provisions for summary proceedings under the U.P. Land Revenue Act is to ensure disposal of the cases expeditiously so that at all times the Land is recorded promptly in the name of the person who is the most rightful person entitled to the incorporation of his name in the revenue record, without going into the question of title in a detailed manner which of course will be looked into the cases being filed under the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. Second, I do not find any specific provision under the U.P. Land Revenue Act for stay and/or dismissal of the revision if a declaratory suit was filed u/Sec. 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act. Third, the parties have two different remedies available under the two enactments. They are free to prosecute the two remedies available to them simultaneously or alternatively. Fourth, Order XLVII, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code, lays down grounds on which a review can be dismissed. Filing of a declaratory suit u/Sec. 229-B of U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act is not one of the grounds for dismissal of the review under the aforesaid provision of Civil Procedure Code. Fifth, neither the C.P.C. nor the U.P. Land Revenue Act provided for dismissal of a review on grounds of filing of a declaratory suit and thus, dismissal of a revision under the U.P. Land Revenue Act on grounds of filing of declaratory suit under the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act will have no legal sanctity. Sixth, and lastly, it is not a question of exercise in futility if a revision under U.P. Land Revenue Act is allowed to continue till its final despite should the fact that a declaratory suit u/Sec. 229-B has been filed. But it is a question of providing maximum opportunities for redressal of grievances to aggrieved party. 10. As said earlier, the U.P Land Revenue Act and the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provides to the applicant with two options in law which he or she may prosecute simultaneously or alternatively. There is no question of shutting one of the two remedies available to the applicant. 11. 10. As said earlier, the U.P Land Revenue Act and the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provides to the applicant with two options in law which he or she may prosecute simultaneously or alternatively. There is no question of shutting one of the two remedies available to the applicant. 11. In view of the above discussion, I am inclined to hold the view that a revision filed under the U.P. Land Revenue Act need not be dismissed in view of the fact that a declaratory suit u/Sec. 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act has been filed but instead it should continue till its final disposal. Accordingly, I hereby hold that the orders dated 28.8.90 of the referring Judicial Member dismissing the revision on the ground that the revisionist has filed a regular suit u/Sec. 229-B of the U.P. Z.A. and L.R. Act be set aside. I further order that this revision be heard and finally disposed of on merit after giving opportunities of hearing to both the parties, by the referring Members (Judicial). I further order that this revision be heard and finally disposed of on merit after giving opportunities of hearing to both the parties, by the referring Members (Judicial). Lal Singh, Member (Judicial) U;k;ky; jktLo ifj"kn] mRrj izns'k] y[kum loZJh ,u0,e0 eteqnkj] vkbZ0,0,l0] jk;flag] vkbZ0,0,l0] ,0;w0 [kku fu.kZ; eq>s vius lg;ksxh & lnL;ksa ls vlger gksus ds nq[kn% drZO; dk fuoZgu djuk iM+ jgk gSA 1- iw.kZ ihB ds le{k fopkjk/khu iz'u ;g gS fd ;fn fdlh ekfyd ds lEifRr ds lEcU/k esa vk;qDr@ifj"kn ds le{k m0iz0 Hkw&jktLo vf/kfu;e 1901 dh /kkjk 218@219 ds vUrxZr fuxjkuh fopkjk/khu gS] vkSj mlh Hkwfe ds lEcU/k esa ijxukf/kdkjh ds U;k;ky; esa m0iz0 tehankjh fouk'k rFkk Hkwfe lq/kkj vf/kfu;e 1950 dh /kkjk 229ch ds vUrxZr LoRo dk nkok Hkh fopkjk/khu gks rks ml ifjfLFkfr esa ifj"kn dks fuxjkuh esa xq.k&nks"kksa ds vk/kkj ij fu.kZ; nsuk pkfg, ;k ughaA 2- esjs lg;ksxh & lnL;ksa dk ;g er gS fd ,slh ifjfLFkfr esa Hkh ifj"kn dks xq.k&nks"kksa ds vk/kkj ij fuxjkuh dks fuf.kZr djuk pkfg,A vius bl er ds leFkZu esa mUgksaus fo}rkiw.kZ rdZ fn;sA bu rdksZa esa ls eq[; :i ls esa nks rdksZa dh foospuk djuk pkgwWaxkA 3- ekuuh; bykgkckn mPpU;k;ky; ds ekuuh; U;k;ewfrZ Jh ch0,y0 ;kno }kjk fn;s x;s fu.kZ; 1986@vkj0Mh0@fgUnh@36 esa ;g dgk x;k gS fd nkf[ky&[kkfjt dh dk;Zokgh esa fopkj.kh; U;k;ky; dks vafre fu.kZ; nsuk pkfg, vkSj ,slh dk;Zokgh dks LFkfxr ;k vcsV ugha djuk pkfg,A muds fu.kZ; esa ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; 1970@,0vkbZ0vkj0,l0lh0@1 dk Hkh mYys[k fd;k x;k gS ftlesa ;g dgk x;k gS fd fuxjkuh izLrqr djus ij tc rd mldk vfUre :i ls fuLrkj.k ugha gksrk gS rc rd dk;Zokgh (Proceedings) lekIr ugha ekuh tk;sxhA eSa bl fu.kZ; ds ihNs tks n`f"Vdks.k rFkk rdZ gS mlls bl lhek rd lger gwWa fd fopkj.kh; U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu nkf[ky&[kkfjt dh dk;Zokgh dks bl dkj.k ls LFkfxr ugha j[kk tk ldrk Fkk vcsV ugha fd;k tk ldrk fd blh Hkwfe ds lEcU/k esa LoRo dk nkok ijxukf/kdkjh ds l{ke U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gS ijUrq blls ;g vFkZ ugha yxk;k tk ldrk fd ;g fLFkfr fopkjk/khu fuxjkuh ds ekeys esa Hkh ykxw gksrh gSA 4- bl lEcU/k esa eSa vU; dksbZ fVIi.kh d:Wa mlls igys ;g vko';d gS fd lEcfU/kr vf/kfu;eksa dks ;kstuk (Scheme of the Act) dk ijh{k.k fd;k tk,A nkf[ky&[kkfjt dh dk;Zokgh dk izkfo/kku m0iz0 Hkw&jktLo vf/kfu;e&1901 dh /kkjk&34 rFkk vU; lEc) /kkjkvksa esa fd;k x;k gSA ;g vf/kfu;e jktLo fo/kku (Fiscal Legislation) gS vkSj nhokuh fo/kku (Civil Legislation) ugha gSA nkf[ky&[kkfjt dk mn~ns'; ek= ;g fu/kkZfjr djus dk gS fd fdlh [kkrsnkj dh e`R;q dh fLFkfr esa ;k mlds }kjk fodz; vkfn }kjk gLrkUrj.k dh fLFkfr esa Hkw&jktLo fdl O;fDr ls olwy fd;k tk,A bl dk;Zokgh ds Lo:i ds lEcU/k esa fizoh dkSafly esa fuekZ.k flag fo:) yky:nz izrki ukjk;.k flag 10 vkj0Mh0 241 ih0lh0 ds vius fu.kZ; esa fLFkfr Li"V dj nh FkhA bl fu.kZ; dk izklfxad m)j.k fuEukuqlkj gS% 5. "The perusal of the judgment leads their Lordships to think that its judgment is to a great degree based on the mischievous but persistent error that the proceeding for mutation of names is a judicial proceedings, in which the title to and the proprietary rights in immovable property are determined. They are nothing of the kind, as has been pointed out times innumerable by the Judicial Committee, They are much more in the nature of fiscal inquiries instituted in the interest of the State for the purpose of ascertaining which of the several claimants for the occupation of certain denominations of immovable property may be put into occupation of it with the greater confidence that the revenue for it will be paid. It is little less than a travesty of judicial proceeding to regard the (mutation) orders as judicial determinations expelling proprio vigore individual from any proprietrary right or interest he claim in immovable property." 6- jktLo vf/kdkfj;ksa dk ;g mRrjnkf;Ro gS fd os Hkw&vfHkys[kksa dh lgh rFkk v/kkof/kd j[ksa ftlls fd mi;qDr O;fDr ls jktLo dh olwyh gks ldsA blh dkj.k ls ;fn fdlh U;k;ky; esa LoRo dk okn fopkjk/khu Hkh gS rks ml ifjfLFkfr esa nkf[ky [kkfjt dh dk;Zokgh u rks LFkfxr gksxh vkSj u gh vosB gksxh] D;kssafd okn dks LFkfxr ;k vcSV djus ls Hkw&vfHkys[kksa dh v/kkof/kd j[kus dk mn~ns'; foQy gksxkA vkSj nkf[ky&[kkfjt ds vkns'k ds vHkko esa Hkw&jktLo dh olwyh esa dfBukbZ vk;sxhA ijUrq ,d ckj fopkj.kh; U;k;ky; esa nkf[ky&[kkfjt dk vkns'k dj fn;k rks jktLo ds mn~ns'; dh iwfrZ gsrq Hkw&vfHkys[k lg gks x;s vkSj Hkw&jktLo dks olwyh lqfuf'pr gks x;hA bl i'pkr~ dh vihy@fuxjkuh dh dk;Zokgh fopkjk/khu jgus ls Hkw&jktLo dh olwyh esa dksbZ dfBukbZ ugha vk;sxh] ftl dkj.k ls fopkj.kh; U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu nkf[ky&[kkfjt dh dk;Zokgh vkSj mlds vihy@fuxjkuh dh dk;Zokgh dh rqyuk ugha gks ldrhA 7- esjs lg;ksxh & lnL;ksa us ;g er O;Dr fd;k gS fd nkf[ky&[kkfjt dh fjiksVZ rFkk LoRo dk nkok] ;s nksuksa dk;Zokfg;kWa ,d lkFk gks ldrh gS vkSj ,d&nwljs ds fodYi ds :i esa Hkh gks ldrh gSA ;g lgh gS fd ;s nksuksa dk;Zokfg;kWa ,d lkFk gks ldrh gS ijUrq ;g iw.kZ:i ls lgh ugha gS fd ;s nksuksa dk;Zokfg;kWa ,d&nwljs ds fodYi ds :i esa Hkh nwj gks ldrh gSA m0iz0 Hkw&jktLo vf/kfu;e&1901 dh /kkjk&34( 5) dk izkfo/kku tks fuEukuqlkj gS] bl lEcU/k esa /;ku nsus ;ksX; gS% 8. No Revenue Court shall entertain a suit or application by the person so succeeding or otherwise obtaining possession until such person has made the report required by this Section. No Revenue Court shall entertain a suit or application by the person so succeeding or otherwise obtaining possession until such person has made the report required by this Section. mijksDr /kkjk esa ;g Li"V :i ls dgk x;k gS fd dksbZ jktLo U;k;ky; mRrjkf/kdkj ;k vU; izdkj ls gLrkUrj.k ds lEcU/k esa nkok rc rd Lohdkj ugha djsxk tc rd fd ,slk nkok djus okys O;fDr us mijksDr /kkjk dh mi/kkjk&1 d vUrxZr rglhynkj dks nkf[ky&[kkfjt dh fjiksVZ izLrqr u dh gksA ,slh ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa ;g nksuksa dk;Zokfg;kWa ,d&nwljs ds fodYi ds :i esa ugha gS] ijUrq m0iz0 tehankjh fouk'k rFkk Hkwfe lq/kkj vf/kfu;e&1950 dh /kkjk&229ch ds vUrxZr nkok rHkh gks ldrk gS tcfd nkok djus okys O;fDr us /kkjk&34 ds vUrxZr rglhynkj dks fjiksVZ Hkh izLrqr dj nh gksA vr% bu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa nksuksa nkoksa dk ,d lkFk djuk vfuok;Z gSA blds ihNs fo/kkfodk dk mn~ns'; ;gh gS fd ,sls mRrjkf/kdkjh rFkk gLrkUrj.k dh lwpuk rglhynkj dks izkIr gksrh jgs ftlds vk/kkj ij os ljljh tkWap djds Hkw&vfHkys[kksa esa la'kks/ku dj nsaA 9- ;g fufoZokn gS fd tks fu.kZ; mijksDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&229ch ds vUrxZr gksxk og /kkjk&34 ds vUrxZr fn;s x;s fu.kZ; dh vfrdzfer djsxkA bl dkj.k ls ;fn /kkjk&34 dh dk;Zokgh lekIr gksus ls iwoZ /kkjk&229ch ds vUrxZr l{ke U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; gks tkrk gS rks /kkjk&34 ds vUrxZr Hkh nkf[ky&[kkfjt /kkjk&229ch ds fu.kZ; ds vuq:i djus ds fy, uk;c rglhynkj@rglhynkj ck/; gksaxsA /kkjk&229ch dk fu.kZ; gksus dh fLFkfr esa /kkjk&34 ds vUrxZr fopkj.kh; U;k;ky;] vihy U;k;ky; ;k fuxjkuh U;k;ky; }kjk fn;s x;s fu.kZ; ,sls fu.kZ; ls Lor% vfrdzfer gks tk;saxsA blh izdkj ls /kkjk&229ch dh dk;Zokgh izkjEHk gks tkus ds i'pkr~ vikrh;@fuxjkuh U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; egRoghu vkSj fujFkZd gks tkrk gS vkSj ,slh vihy@fuxjkuh dh lquokbZ fujFkZd iz;kl (Exercise in futility) gh gksxkA 10- tgkWa rd vihy dh lquokbZ dk iz'u gS mijksDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk&210 ds vUrxZr vihy djuk lEcfU/kr i{k dk vf/kdkj gks tkrk gS D;ksafd mijksDr /kkjk esa Appeals shall lie 'kCn iz;ksx fd;k x;k gSA bl ifjfLFkfr esa vihy tc U;k;ky; ds le{k izLrqr gksrh gS rks ml fLFkfr dks NksM+dj ftlesa ,slh vihy ekU; u gks] vihy U;k;ky; dks ,slh vihy esa xq.k&nks"kksa ds vk/kkj ij viuk fu.kZ; nsuk gh gksxk ftlds fy, os vf/kfu;e ds izkfo/kkuksa ds vUrxZr ck/; gSA 11- ijUrq fuxjkuh dh fLFkfr ewy dk;Zokgh rFkk vihy dh dk;Zokgh ls fHkUu gSA mijksDr /kkjk&218&219 ds vUrxZr fdlh Hkh okndkjh dh fuxjkuh izLrqr djus dk vf/kdkj fof/k }kjk ugha fn;k x;k gSA lEcfU/kr /kkjkvksa esa fuxjkuh 'kCn dk iz;ksx Hkh dgha ij ugha gqvk gS] ijUrq ek= vk;qDr@ifj"kn dks ;g vf/kdkj fn;k x;k gS fd os vius v/khuLFk U;k;ky;ksa ds vfHkys[kksa dks eaxok ldrs gS vkSj ;g ik;s tkus ij fd v/khuLFk U;k;ky; esa dksbZ voS/kkfudrk ;k vuksfpRo fd;k gS rks ml ifjfLFkfr esa v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds vkns';k dks la'kksf/kr ;k fujLr djus ds fy, vk;qDr ifj"kn dks lUnHkZ Hkst ldrs gS vkSj os ifj"kn Lo;a vkns'k ikfjr dj ldrs gSA izR;sd fuxjkuh ds izkFkZuk i= ij vfHkys[kksa dks eaxokdj xq.k&nks"kksa ds vk/kkj ij fu.kZ; nsus ds fy, vk;qDr@ifj"kn ck/; ugha gSA fuxjkuhdrkZ vius fuxjkuh ds izkFkZuk i= }kjk ek= vk;qDr@ifj"kn dk /;ku muds v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk fd;s x;s fdlh dfFkr voS/kkfudrk ;k vukSfpR; ds izfr vkdf"kZr djrk gS vkSj mlds i'pkr~ vk;qDr@ifj"kn dk foosd gS fd os v/khuLFk U;k;ky;ksa ds vfHkys[k eaxokdj mudk ijh{k.k djsa ;k izkjafEHkd Lrj ij gh fuxjkuh ds izkFkZuk i= dks vLohdkj djrs gq, ;g fu.kZ; ys fd os v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds vfHkys[kksa dks eaxokdj mldk ijh{k.k djuk mfpr ugha le>rsA /kkjk&218 ds izkjEHk esa "The Commissioner may call for and examine the record..." 'kCnksa ds iz;ksx fd;s x;s gS blh izdkj ls /kkjk&219 ds izkjaHk esa Hkh "The Board may call for Record ..." tks ;g Li"V djrs gS fd /kkjk&218@219 ds vUrxZr i{kksa dks dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha gS ijUrq ;g vk;qDr@ifj"kn dk foosd gS fd os gLr{ksi djs ;k u djsA ;g lgh gS fd bl ekeys esa mudk foosd U;kf;d foosd (Judicial Discretion) gS] blh dkj.k ls mUgsa bldk iz;ksx U;kf;d <+ax ls (Judicially) rFkk foosdiw.kZ <+ax ls (Discreetly) djuk pkfg,A 12- fuxjkuh dh dk;Zokgh dk mn~ns'; U;k; (Justice) dks vkxs c<+kuk (Promote) gS vkSj ;fn vk;qDr@ifj"kn fuxjkuh ds vk/kkfjr ;k izkjfEHkad ijh{k.k djus ds i'pkr~ bl fu.kZ; ij igqWaprs gS fd voj U;k;ky;ksa ds fu.kZ;ksa ls pkgs dqN rduhdh =qfV;kWa jgh gks ijUrq lexz :i ls ,sls fu.kZ; us U;kf;d mn~ns'; dh iwfrz dh gS vkSj izR;{k :i ls dksbZ U;k; gk gkzl (Failure of Justice) ugha gqvk gS rks ml ifjfLFkfr esa vk;qDr@ifj"kn dk foosdiw.kZ fu.kZ; ogh gksxk fd os izkjafEHkd Lrj ij gh ,slh fuxjkuh dks vLohdkj dj nsA blh i`"BHkwfe esa esjk ;g er gS fd tc i{kksa ds chp esa l{ke U;k;ky; esa LoRo dk fu;fer okn py jgk gks rks ml fLFkfr dh tkudkjh gksus ds mijkUr Hkh izkjfEHkd Lrj ij fuxjkuh dks Lohdkj djuk ;k vfUre Lrj ij fuxjkuh dks xq.k&nks"kksa ds vk/kkj ij fuf.kZr djuk U;k;ky; ds le; rFkk 'kfDr dk viO;; gS vkSj bl dkj.k ls ,sls ekeyksa esa foosdiw.kZ fu.kZ; ugha gksxk fd fuxjkuh dh izkjafEHkd Lrj ij gh vLohdkj dj fn;k tk, vkSj ;fn LoRo ds nkos dh lwpuk U;k;ky; ds le{k okn esa vkrk gS rks fuxjkuh dks fujLr djrs gq, i{kksa ds HkkX; dk fu.kZ; ml l{k; U;k;ky; ij NksM+ fn;k tk, ftlesa /kkjk&229 ch ds vUrxZr dk;Zokgh fopkjk/khu gksA 13- ;g fLFkfr loZfofnr gS fd ifj"kn esa m0iz0 Hkw&jktLo vf/kfu;e&1901 ds vUrxZr fopkjk/khu dh dk;ZokbZ;ksa dh la[;k gh 10 gtkj ls mij gSA dbZ fuxjkfu;ksa@funsZ'kksa dh lquokbZ dh ckjh 6 ;k 7 o"kZ ds i'pkr~ vkrh gSA ;g fLFkfr larks"ktud ugha gS vkSj mlds lq/kkj ykus ds fy, vusd fn'kkvksa esa iz;kl visf{kr gS( ijUrq ,slh fLFkfr esa U;kf;d dk;Z dk izcU/k (Management) fo'ks"k egRo /kkj.k djrk gSA esjs er esa bl fLFkfr es ifj"kn dks viuk le; rFkk 'kfDr vuko';d :i ls tk;k ugha djuk pkfg,] tcfd mls ;g Kkr gks fd ,slk djuk fujFkZd iz;kl (Exercise in futility) gS vkSj bl Je vkSj 'kfDr dk mi;ksx ,sls oknksa ds fu.kZ; djus esa gks ldrk gS tks fujFkZd ;k egRoghu u gksA 14- iw.kZ ihB esa esjs }kjk fn;k x;k ;g fu.kZ; vYier fu.kZ gS vkSj fof/kd n`f"V ls esjk er fu"izHkkoh gksxk ijUrq ;fn eSa viuk er ftlesa eq>s iw.kZ vkLFkk gS] O;fDr ugha djrk rks ;g esjs U;kf;d drZO; dh foQyrk (Failure of Judicial Duty) gksxhA