The Federal Bank Ltd v. K. Meenakshi Kanikan — 1991 DIGILAW 548 (KER)

ORDER 1. The question which arises for consideration is whether the petitioner, a Scheduled Bank, as defined in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, is "a Corporation" or "any other financial agency not being a private agency" within the meaning of clause (c) of S.3 of the Kerala Scheduled Tribe (Restriction on Transfer of Lands and Restoration of Alienated Lands) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Clause (c) of S.3 of the Act lists the entities to whom the Act docs not apply. The question arises out of the facts stated in Para.2 and 3 below. I. The facts 2. The petitioner instituted suit No. 280/76, for recovery of Rs. 71,836.66 secured through mortgage of lands of the respondents. A final decree was made. In E. P. No. 182 of 1979, the property of the respondents was brought to sale. However, the respondents filed E.A. No. 414 of 1981 for postponement of the sale under R.83 of O.21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was dismissed. The respondents challenged the dismissal of E.A. No. 414 of 1981, in C.R.P. No. 1832 of 1981 B. While dismissing the C.R.P., this Court granted to the respondents six months' time, running from 6th November 1985, for the purpose of depositing the decretal debt and postponed the sale till then. The respondents did not urge in E.A. No. 414 of 1981 or in C.R.P. No. 1832 of 1981 that they were members of a Scheduled Tribe and that their properties were exempt from sale by virtue of the Act. 3. The respondents filed one more execution application E.A. No. 181/87. The respondents are admittedly members of a Scheduled Tribe. They claimed the benefits under the Act. In reply, the petitioner relied upon clause (c) of S.3 of the Act which takes away the benefit of the Act in certain cases. In his order dated 11th October 1990 in E.A. No. 181/87, which is impugned in this petition, the learned I Additional Sub Judge held that the petitioner was not "any other financial agency not being a private agency" and that therefore S.3 (c) of the Act did not assist them. Since the petitioner was out of the statutory exemption, the Act which makes the mortgage of lands by members of Scheduled Tribes to persons who are not members of such Tribes invalid, applies to them. Since the petitioner was out of the statutory exemption, the Act which makes the mortgage of lands by members of Scheduled Tribes to persons who are not members of such Tribes invalid, applies to them. Therefore the Trial Court concluded that the transfer of property by the respondents in favour of the petitioner is invalid. II. Res Judicata 4. Before proceeding to consider whether the petitioner falls within clause (c) of S.3 of the Act, I will dispose of a preliminary point urged by learned counsel for the petitioner. According to him the question whether the respondents as members of the Scheduled Tribe are entitled to the benefit of the Act, is barred by principles of res judicata for the simple reason that in C.R.P. No. 1832 of 1991-B disposed off by this Court on 6th November 1989, the respondents did not urge this point. The Act received the assent of the President of India on 11th November 1975 and was published in the Kerala Gazette Extra ordinary No. 673, dated 14th November 1975. But S.1 (3) of the Act stipulates that the Act shall come into force on such date as the Government may, by notification in the Gazette, appoint. In other words, the Act did not come into force immediately upon the President's assent or its publication in the Gazette. The date of its commencement was to be determined by the Government. The Act was brought into force by the Government's Notification No. G.O. (Ms.) 5/86/RD., dated 20th January 1986. The C.R.P. No. 1832/81 was disposed of on 6th November, 1985. Therefore, on the date on which the C.R.P. No. 1832/81-B was disposed of the notification dated 20th January 1986 whereunder the Act was brought into force had not been issued. Therefore, the petitioner could not have claimed the protection of the Act until 20th January 1986. No doubt the notification made the Act enforceable with effect from 1st January 1982. But the fact remains that the petitioner did not know about the commencement of the Act until 20th January 1986. The rights created by the Act were no doubt grounds of attack or defence in C.R.P. No. 1832 of 1981. But these rights became known and therefore available to the respondents only on and after 20th January 1986. But the fact remains that the petitioner did not know about the commencement of the Act until 20th January 1986. The rights created by the Act were no doubt grounds of attack or defence in C.R.P. No. 1832 of 1981. But these rights became known and therefore available to the respondents only on and after 20th January 1986. It cannot be said that on 6th November, 1985, when the C.R.P. No. 1832/81 was heard and disposed of, the respondents "might or ought" to have urged the protection under the Act. For this reason the issue about the respondents' right to urge that the transfer of their property to the petitioner, is invalid, is not barred by principles of res judicata. III. Object of the Act - Its Scheme 5. The question is whether the mortgage of the respondents' lands in favour of the petitioner Bank, is invalid by reason of S.4 and 5 which make such transfer by tribals to non tribals invalid. The petitioner relies upon clause (c) of S.3 which exempts from the Act, transfers to certain entities. A consideration of this question needs a careful examination of the scheme of the Act. There are stringent provisions, deliberately enacted, to protect the Scheduled Tribes against exploitation of their necessitous conditions and ignorance. The general prohibition of transfer of lands by the Tribals is designed to neutralise and reverse the gain from exploitation made by transferees from the tribals (The statement of objects and reasons "In tribal areas unsophisticated tribals are being duped into transactions which make them part with their traditional land for very small sums of money......... special legislation should be introduced to protect the interests of the tribals in lands under their traditional occupations and that this legislation should result in a general prohibition of transfers........"). If the petitioner, a Scheduled Bank, is not exempted from the operation of the Act, the mortgage by the respondents who are admittedly tribals is clearly invalid. The petitioner seeks exemption from the operation of the Act under clause (c) of S.3 of the Act which lists the entities to whom the Act does not apply and claims the right to enforce the mortgage on the ground that it falls in the exempted category of creditors.-viz. "a corporation" or "any other financial agency not being a private agency." 6. "a corporation" or "any other financial agency not being a private agency." 6. The question arising in this petition is linked with the object of the Act. In order to understand the object, a reference to the scheme of the Act is necessary. Every transfer of immovable property made after commencement of the Act by a member of the Scheduled Tribe to a person other than a member of such tribe, without the previous consent, in writing, by the competent authority appointed under the Act is invalid (S.4 of the Act.). "Transfer" has been defined in a broad, all-embracing manner, to include in its sweep every disposition of property, including transfer by sale, mortgage, etc., "or in any other manner" (Section 2 (g) - Definition of ''Transfer".). "Scheduled Tribe" means any of the Scheduled Tribes in relation to the State as specified in the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order, 1950. Transfers of land by a member of a Scheduled Tribe to a person. who is not a member of the Tribe made before the commencement of the Act are invalid by virtue of S.4. S.5 makes invalid such transfers made between 1st January 1960 and the date of commencement of the Act. S.4 and 5 have overriding effect, because they operate notwithstanding anything contrary to any law, contract, custom, usage, decree, etc. The member of the Scheduled Tribe, the transfer of whose property is invalid, under S.4 or 5 is entitled to be restored into possession, either on his application (S.6 of the Act) or suo motu by the Government (Section 7 of the Act). The member of the Scheduled Tribe need not prove that the transfer is invalid. But a transferee, if he claims the transfer to be valid, carries the burden of proving the validity of the transfer (Section 8 of the Act). The deed of transfer hit by S.4 and 5 cannot be accepted for registration (S.9 of the Act). The right or interest of a member of a Scheduled Tribe in immovable property shall not be attached or sold in execution of a money decree (S.10 of the Act). There are other provisions like refund of consideration received by a member of the Scheduled Tribe from the transferee and advance of loan to him to enable him to repay the consideration (Sections 11 and 12 of the Act). 7. There are other provisions like refund of consideration received by a member of the Scheduled Tribe from the transferee and advance of loan to him to enable him to repay the consideration (Sections 11 and 12 of the Act). 7. The Act is meant for the benefit of members of Scheduled Tribes, who have alienated or who may after the commencement of the Act, alienate their lands. The Act is designed to restore such alienated lands to the members of the Scheduled Tribes (Preamble). The "transfer" by the Tribals has been so defined that no transferee should escape application of the Act by resorting to technical meaning of the word "transfer". The definition is so broad that it covers every disposition of immovable property except testamentary disposition. Past transfers by Tribals and transfers after the commencement of the Act are invalid. The lands shall be restored to the. Tribals. The land of the tribals cannot be subject matter of proceeding under S.145 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It cannot be attached. These provisions manifest legislative determination to prohibit transfer of lands by tribals to non tribals except with the permission of the competent authority. The determination is backed up by creation of a machinery to restore the lands to the tribals. The basic postulates of this legislative remedy are: (i) the tribals-ignorant, poor and gullible are exposed to the allurement offered by those who advance small amounts which alleviate the temporary needs of the tribals, (ii) the tribals in return, alienate their lands against disproportionately low prices and (iii) such unjust deprivation of immovable property needs to be reversed. The special legislation is meant to restore to the tribals, lands which they traditionally cultivated. The legislative urge to protect the tribals, from unjust deprivation of their lands is manifest in the determined and stringent provisions of the Act. This object of the law must inform a true interpretation of clause (c) of S.3 of the Act which is the foundation of the petitioner's case. IV. "A Corporation" - Interpretation of 8. Section 3 of the Act excludes from the operation of the Act, certain transfers of immovable property notwithstanding the fact that such transfers have been made by members of Scheduled Tribes. The restriction on transfers created by S.4 does not apply to such transfers. Nor are such transfers invalid by reason of S.5 of the Act. Section 3 of the Act excludes from the operation of the Act, certain transfers of immovable property notwithstanding the fact that such transfers have been made by members of Scheduled Tribes. The restriction on transfers created by S.4 does not apply to such transfers. Nor are such transfers invalid by reason of S.5 of the Act. The petitioners urge that the mortgage by the respondents in their favour is excluded from the operation of the Act by virtue of clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. It is therefore necessary to understand what exactly is excluded by clause (c) of section 3 of the Act. 9. What is saved from the operation of S.4 and 5 of the Act is mortgage, pledge or hypothecation of any immovable property by a member of a Scheduled Tribe. But this exemption or exclusion is available only in cases of transfers in favour of the specified classes of creditors or transferees. In order to attract the exemption, the transferee must belong to one or the other of the following categories: (i) a cooperative society registered or deemed to be registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969. OR (ii) a Corporation OR (iii) a nationalised bank OR (iv) any other financial agency not being a private agency or a money lender. 10. The petitioner - the Federal Bank Ltd.- is admittedly not a cooperative society registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act. Nor is it a nationalised bank. Although in the Trial Court it was urged that the petitioner is a nationalised bank, this contention has been rightly given up before me. The only contention urged, is that the petitioner is either a corporation or any other financial agency not being a private agency. 11. The first question is whether the petitioner is a corporation. If it is, is it a Corporation entitled to the exemption from the operation of the Act? "Corporation" is a generic express on which denotes all incorporated bodies. A Corporation is - in the case of a Corporation aggregate - a body of persons, or - in the case of a Corporation sole - an office. It is recognised by law, as having a personality distinct from the separate personalities of the members of the body, of in the case of a Corporation sole, the personality of the individual holder of the office. It is recognised by law, as having a personality distinct from the separate personalities of the members of the body, of in the case of a Corporation sole, the personality of the individual holder of the office. The examples of corporation aggregate are: companies registered under Acts of Parliament or State legislatures and Companies registered under the Indian Companies Act. The corporations may be trading corporations or non trading corporations. The essence of a Corporation is its distinct legal personality and continuing identity, notwithstanding the change in the composition of membership. In the broad generic sense the petitioner is a Corporation because it is incorporated and registered under the Companies Act and has a legal personality, distinct from its members. Therefore it has all the attributes of a Corporation. Is transfer in favour of every corporation out of the restrictions of the Act ? Or has the expression "Corporation" used in clause (c) of S.3 of the Act a special meaning? No doubt, the legislature has used the word "Corporation" as one of the entities, transfer in whose favour, is excluded from the operation of the Act. But counsel for the respondents drew my attention to the fact that the word "Corporation" is used in a special enactment designed to promote the interests of a class of persons known as Scheduled Tribes. He urged that "Corporation" should be so interpreted as to advance the purpose of the Act. According to him "a Corporation" does not just mean any company. It has a particular meaning. 12. In construing a statute, the object or policy of the legislation often affords the answers to problems arising from ambiguities. The object of the Act has been set out in Para.5-7 above. If words are general and not precise, they are to be restricted to the fitness of the matter (Wandsworth Board of Works v. United Telephone Co. 1884 (13) QBD 904 quoted in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Page 86. Twelfth Edn.) which means that if a word is intended to convey a particular meaning, as opposed to general meaning, it shall be construed as having particular meaning. In this case the petitioner has urged that as "a Corporation", it falls within clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. Twelfth Edn.) which means that if a word is intended to convey a particular meaning, as opposed to general meaning, it shall be construed as having particular meaning. In this case the petitioner has urged that as "a Corporation", it falls within clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. The respondents dispute this and urge that having regard to its true meaning in the context of the object of the Act the petitioner is not "a Corporation" within the meaning of clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. It is therefore necessary to understand not only the general meaning of "a Corporation" but also its meaning in the context of the object of the Act. Some of the well known rules of interpretation will be set down below. The object of interpretation is to see what is intended by the words used. But from the imperfection of language, it is often impossible to know what that intention is, without inquiring further. It is this further inquiry that calls for application of the rules of interpretation, which guide the course of inquiry into the legislative intent. There is no hierarchy amongst these or any other rules of interpretation. Any one or more rules can be picked up for application depending upon the circumstances of the case. With this introduction I will reproduce below five of the numerous rules of interpretation of statutes. 13. The primary rule of construction of statutes is known as the rule of literal, natural of grammatical construction. The essence of this rule is that the legislature means what it says. If the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous then no more need to be done than to expound these words in their ordinary and natural sense. This rule means that construction is to "intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, twelfth Edition, Page 28.)", for, the words alone do best declare the intention of the law-giver. The second rule which is a corollary to the first, is that the court is not entitled to read words into an Act of legislature unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself (Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans, (1910) A.C. 444 quoted in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, P. 33.). It follows by implication, that words may be added to the statute only if there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the legislature intended something which it omitted to express. The third principle of interpretation is that the court may take into account the law as it was before the enactment under consideration and discern (i) the mischief and defect not provided by the previous law, (ii) the remedy provided by the Act under consideration. to cure the mis chief/defect and (iii) the true reasons of the remedy (The rules laid down in Heydon's case Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Page 40, Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, Pages 96-98.). This is also known as the mischief rule. The court's function in such cases is to so interpret the law as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. The fourth rule known as the Golden rule is a variation" of the primary rule of literal or grammatical construction. Adherence to the grammatical or literal meaning of words of a statute may lead to interpretation which is manifestly absurd, at variance wither repugnant to the legislative intent. In such cases the language of the statute may be varied or modified. In other words, a construction based on literal or grammatical meaning of words, which by reason by its absurdity, or repugnance to the legislative intent, reduces the legislation to futility, should be avoided. In such cases the bolder construction based the view that the legislature would legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective result should be accepted (Max well on Interpretation of Statutes, Page 43. Craies on Statute Law, Pages 86-88.). Words of a statute - like "Corporation" - are not considered in isolation but may have their meaning determined by other word in the section in which the) occur (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, Page 58.). This may be called the fifth rule. 14. The word "a corporation" taken literally, includes every company even if it were engaged in the business of private commercial financing. The cooperative societies too are corporations. There may be corporations who acquire property of tribals. If "a Corporation"-meaning every company were exempt from the provision of the Act, any corporation could come within the excepted category. 14. The word "a corporation" taken literally, includes every company even if it were engaged in the business of private commercial financing. The cooperative societies too are corporations. There may be corporations who acquire property of tribals. If "a Corporation"-meaning every company were exempt from the provision of the Act, any corporation could come within the excepted category. The statute has, in clause (c) of S.3, categorised the transferees from Tribals, with reference to the nature of the activities, of the transferees. For instance a cooperative society, also a Corporation, is one of the exempted entities. It has a distinct cooperative character. Again clause (c) of S.3 has used the words "not being a private agency." By the same clause the statute has exempted "a Corporation," which literally understood, is not wholly consistent with "not being a private agency". For instance, is a company registered under the Companies Act, exempt even if has acquired the land of tribals by advancing money? Does possession of a corporate personality by itself exempt a company from the operation of the Act? Is the nature of its activity relevant? The answers to these questions are not found in the literal meaning of "a Corporation". The literal or grammatical meaning of the word "Corporation" does not convey what exactly the legislature intended. Therefore I will attempt a further inquiry into the legislative intent. For this purpose, the object of the Act which has exempted "Corporation" from the operation of the Act, is of cardinal importance. 15. The scheme of S.3 of the Act is to exempt certain transfers of land by tribals to non tribals. Some of the transfers falling within the exemption are there (a) leases of the lands of tribals granted to public servants like Adms. General/Official receiver; (b) mortgages of the lands by tribals in favour of the Government for securing loan from Government; (c) mortgages of immovable property by tribals in favour of cooperative societies. The transfers and transferees referred to in (a), (b) and (e) have one quality in common. The Admn. General and official receiver are appointed pursuant to statutes and perform public duties. In the transfers of immovable property of tribals in their favour there is no scope for exploitation of the poverty, need or ignorance of tribals. These entities are accountable to the public. The Admn. General and official receiver are appointed pursuant to statutes and perform public duties. In the transfers of immovable property of tribals in their favour there is no scope for exploitation of the poverty, need or ignorance of tribals. These entities are accountable to the public. The legislature has assumed that in view of the absence of the element of exploitation and the motive for unjust usurpation of the land of tribals, the transfers and transferees referred to in (a) and (b) of S.3 should not be subjected to the Act. Cooperative societies stand on similar footing. The history of Cooperative Movement in India shows that the philosophy of cooperation was conceived in public interest. Cooperation is a form of organisation wherein persons voluntarily associate together, on the basis of equality for the promotion of the economic, educational or social interest of themselves, A cooperative society, is an association for the purpose of joint, collective betterment, originating among the weak and conducted always in an unselfish spirit (The Cooperative Movement in India - By Pachanandas Mukherji, Second Edition (1917). The Law and Principles of Cooperation, Second Edition, (1921) by H. Calvert, I. C. S.). Cooperation is an alternative to the purely commercial enterprises designed to generate private profit. Cooperative societies by reason of their constitution and concept, have the good of the community as their purpose. The Legislature, aware of this, considered that cooperative societies should be trusted with exemption from the Act. 16. The word "Corporation" if understood in its literal sense, and" placed amidst, the entities set out at (a), (b) and (c) above, appears incongruous by reason of the nature of its business which is incompatible with the objects and function of the entities at (a), (b) and (c). They just don't hang together. 17. Is the Act different from the law as it stood before in its enactment? What change has been brought in by the Act? These questions need to be gone into to understand what the Act seeks to prevent or remedy. It is here that the mischief rule of interpretation becomes relevant. The general law as it stood before the enactment of the Act, did not prohibit acquisition of immovable property of tribals, against advance of loan or otherwise. These questions need to be gone into to understand what the Act seeks to prevent or remedy. It is here that the mischief rule of interpretation becomes relevant. The general law as it stood before the enactment of the Act, did not prohibit acquisition of immovable property of tribals, against advance of loan or otherwise. Experience shows that the tribals lost their cherished, priceless possession - the lands which they cultivated - in exchange of paltry sums of money advanced as loans by crafty lenders. Yet there was no law to protect their interests. Transfer of lands of tribals by mortgage, sale or by other modes, was valid. The external form of legal documentation, was completed to meet legal requirements of transfer. The existing laws were helpless to prevent the exploitation and unjust deprivation of immovable property. In the result, the transferees armed with the documents, continued to own and possess the lands. Then the legislature stepped in by enacting the Kerala Scheduled Tribes (Restriction on Transfer of Lands and Restoration of Alienated Lands) Act, 1975. The avowed object of the Act is to prevent non tribals from acquiring rights in the immovable property of tribals and where it has been acquired, to restore it to the tribals. Thus, in order to prevent the harm or injury to the economy of the tribals, the Act provides the remedies of invalidation of transfers and restoration of the property to the tribals. This then is the mischief sought to be prevented and the remedy provided by the Act. 18. In interpreting the word "a Corporation" the object of the Act set out earlier, the mischief provided for and the remedy are important. "A Corporation" if literally construed, takes in its sweep every legal entity irrespective of the nature of its activity. Any company engaged in private profit making,- estate brokers, builders, mine prospectors - may acquire the immovable property of tribals. Such a construction of "a corporation" is too literal, to express what the legislature intends. An interpretation of the word "a corporation" to mean every company registered or incorporated under the law will be the negation of the object and purpose of the Act. Such a construction of "a corporation" is too literal, to express what the legislature intends. An interpretation of the word "a corporation" to mean every company registered or incorporated under the law will be the negation of the object and purpose of the Act. Therefore, having regard to the object of the Act, the rules of interpretation of statutes and the scheme of the Act, I am certain that the legislature did not use the word "a corporation" in clause (c) of S.3 of the Act, to mean every company which has a personality distinct from its members. 19. My conclusion recorded in the last paragraph may be considered in the context of the objects of the petitioner Bank. The Memorandum of Association of the Federal Bank Limited shows that its object is to carry on the business of banking which includes lending money against the security of immovable property. The objects of the petitioner - a Corporation - puts it in the same class of legal entities that carry on business for private profit. Such an entity merely because it has legal personality, is clearly not intended to be exempted from the operation of the Act. 20. The interpretation of the word "Corporation" made in the above paragraphs establishes that the word "Corporation" is not used in the general or generic sense. The object of the Act points to the need to restrict the general meaning of the word "Corporation". But then the real question is: if the general meaning is not the meaning intended by the legislature, what is the true meaning of "a Corporation"? It is exceedingly difficult to interpret correctly the word "a Corporation" by reading it in isolation and divorced from the other words used in clause (c). I have already stated in Para.16 and 17 how incongruous "a Corporation" is rendered if it is understood in its literal sense. In the art of construction of statutes two rules must not be lost sight of. First, a clause is best interpreted by reference to what precedes it and what follows it (A selection of Legal Maxims - H. Broom, 10th Edn. P. 389) Secondly, the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it (A selection of Legal Maxims - H. Broom, 10th Edn. P. 396). First, a clause is best interpreted by reference to what precedes it and what follows it (A selection of Legal Maxims - H. Broom, 10th Edn. P. 389) Secondly, the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it (A selection of Legal Maxims - H. Broom, 10th Edn. P. 396). The word "a Corporation" is separated from the words following it, by the disjunctive "OR". If the word 'a Corporation" is read in association with the words following it a clear picture merges. Thus "a Corporation of a nationalised bank or any other financial agency" which occur together represent, a group of entities which have a common quality. They are all financial agencies. The words "other financial agency" suggest that "a Corporation" like the "nationalised bank" has to be a financial agency. It is a company which deals in finance like a bank. On a proper understanding therefore, the word "a Corporation" occurring in clause (c) of S.3 means a Corporation engaged in activities similar to a Bank. The words "a Corporation", "a nationalised bank" and "any other financial agency" should be read together as a group of financial agencies. The qualifying words "not being a private agency" have been deliberately associated with the preceding words. These words describe the essential quality of each of the three financial agencies. The "Corporation" must not be a private agency. The legislative object is to exclude lenders of money who have acquisition of the land of the tribals as their motive. The words "not being a private agency" exclude private corporate banks, like the petitioner, from the meaning of "a Corporation". The word "a Corporation" therefore means "a Corporation not being a private financial agency". The petitioner is a private agency because its objects evident from the Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association, are, to do the business of advancing loan, acquisition of immovable property and promotion and advancement of such business. The objects of the petitioner reveal total absence of the element of public interest or public service similar to the one promoted by the agencies set out at (a), (b) and (c) in Para.15 above. 21. "A Corporation" as contemplated by clause (c) of S.3 is a financial agency. The objects of the petitioner reveal total absence of the element of public interest or public service similar to the one promoted by the agencies set out at (a), (b) and (c) in Para.15 above. 21. "A Corporation" as contemplated by clause (c) of S.3 is a financial agency. In order to come within the exempted categories cited in clause (c) of S.3 it should not be a private financial agency. Having regard to the objects of the petitioner Bank, it is a private financial agency. This construction put by me is based on consideration of the words associated with "a Corporation" in the scheme of S.3. V. Ejusdem Generis Rule - Application of 22. The influence of associated words on the meaning of the word "a Corporation" in the context of the object of the Act has been considered in the foregoing paragraphs. This is one way of interpreting words used in a statute. There is another rule of construction involving the impact of associated words. It is known as the ejusdem generis rule. In clause (c) of S.3 of the Act, the word "a Corporation" is preceded by a solitary category of entities viz. "a Cooperative Society registered or deemed to be registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act". It is succeeded by a specific class of financial agency viz. a nationalised bank. "A Corporation" by itself is a word of general meaning embracing all legal persons registered under or created by the relevant Act of the legislature. The words used in a statute are construed in the light of associated words if it is indicated that general words are not intended to be applied without some limitation. The associated words are considered to see, what limitations or qualifications need to be placed on the meaning of general words. This consideration brings in the ejusdem generis rule. 23. The ejusdem generis rule may be stated as under: Where there are general words following particular and specific words. The general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified (Craies on Statute Law, Page 179). The general expression is to be read as comprehending only things of the same kind as that designated by the preceding particular expression (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Page 297). The general words must be confined to things of the same kind as those specified (Craies on Statute Law, Page 179). The general expression is to be read as comprehending only things of the same kind as that designated by the preceding particular expression (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Page 297). In this case, the preceding particular expression is "a Cooperative Society registered or deemed to be registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act". The succeeding general expression is "a Corporation". Is the meaning of "a Corporation" limited to such corporations as are of the same kind as Cooperative Societies? 24. The rule is generally applied to general words following words which are less general. The expression "words" is used in plural. This means that it applies if "a Corporation" were to follow more than one clause or categories of specific entities. For example, the general words "of otherwise" following plurality of words "tenure custom, prescription" were interpreted to apply to the obligations imposed on land (Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Page 298). In cases where the rule has been applied there are more than one word of specific meaning which precede the word having general meaning. The presence of a solitary general word (a Corporation) and a solitary specific expression (a Cooperative Society) raise a doubt whether, in such a case, the rule is applicable. Another difficulty in the application of the rule is that in order to attract application of the rule, the specific words which limit the meaning of general words must represent a genus or category. Does the mention of a solitary species, like a Cooperative Society, constitute a genus? These two difficulties need to be overcome before the rule is applied to this case. 25. In United Towns Electric Co. Ltd. (United Towns Electric Co. Ltd. v. Attorney General for Newfoundland (1939 (1) All ER 423), the English Court declined to apply ejusdem generis rule because the single word "taxation" did not represent a genus (Craies on Statute Law, Page 181). Therefore the rule appears to be that the preceding specific words must denote a distinct category or genus. By itself the solitary expression "a Cooperative Society registered to deemed to be registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act" does not appear to denote a genus or a class - for, a class needs more than one member. Therefore the rule appears to be that the preceding specific words must denote a distinct category or genus. By itself the solitary expression "a Cooperative Society registered to deemed to be registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act" does not appear to denote a genus or a class - for, a class needs more than one member. It has indeed been held that there must be more than one species mentioned, to constitute a genus (Maxwell on Interpretation of the Statutes, P 299. United Towns Electric Co. Ltd. v. Attorney General for Newfoundland (1939 (1) All ER 423). It has been held that "water rates" does not constitute a genus (United Towns Electric Co. Ltd. v. Attorney General for Newfoundland (1939 (1) All ER 423). But then is a current of opinion in England, where the rule originated, that the mention of more than one word is not an absolute necessity for the application of the ejusdem generis rule. In Alexander (Alexander v. Tredegar Iron and Coal Co. Ltd. (1944) KB 390=(1945) AC 286) the rule was held applicable to two-word phrases. Similarly in Hadley (Hadley v. Perks (1866) L. R.1 Q.B. 444.) "having" was construed ejusdem generis with "conveying". In Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron Co. (Ashbury railway carriage and Iron Co. v. Riche, (1875) LR 7 H.L. 653)) applying the rule to "Mechanical Engineers and general contractors" the expression "general contractors" was construed ejusdem generis with "mechanical engineers" and the meaning of "general contractors" was limited to "mechanical engineers". Again in Humber conservancy board (Humber conservancy board v. Federated Coal and Shipping Co. Ltd. (1928 (1) KB 492.), the word "place" following "port" was interpreted ejusdem generis with "port". Similarly in Attorney General (The Attorney General v. Seccombe, 1911 (2) LRKB 688), the word "otherwise" was read ejusdem generis, thereby limiting the meaning of "otherwise" to transaction like a contract. 26. Now therefore' the mention of more than one or more, specific words to precede the general word, is not an absolute rule. In England the rule has been modified and applied to single words. The English cases suggest that a single phrase-not plural-denoting an entity or object, of distinct characteristics may constitute a genus. Thus the initial difficulty in the application of the ejusdem generis rule, to single phrase like "a Cooperative Society" followed by "a Corporation" in clause (c) of S.3 is, afterall, not a hurdle. The English cases suggest that a single phrase-not plural-denoting an entity or object, of distinct characteristics may constitute a genus. Thus the initial difficulty in the application of the ejusdem generis rule, to single phrase like "a Cooperative Society" followed by "a Corporation" in clause (c) of S.3 is, afterall, not a hurdle. The doctrine of ejusdem generis is not the beginning and end of all rules of interpretation. It is only a part of a wider principle of construction, which enables the interpreter to assign meaning to each and every word consistent with the object of the law. I see no difficulty in extending the application of the rule to this case, notwithstanding the fact that a single specific and single general expression are mentioned in clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. 27. The object of the Act expounded in Para.5, 6 and 7 above, requires that the general word "a Corporation" is not intended to be applied without some limitation. What limitation needs to be placed on the meaning of the general word, "a Corporation" depends upon the quality or characteristics possessed by the limiting clause "a cooperative society registered or deemed to be registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act." 28. By its concept and constitution a cooperative society is unselfish in its object. The absence of the motive to make private profit leading to enrichment of individuals, as distinct from the community of its members, is a distinguishing feature of cooperative societies. The word "a Corporation" should be understood ejusdem generis with a cooperative society which possesses the aforesaid distinct feature. The words "a cooperative society registered or deemed to be registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act", though a single category, denotes a genus of which Cooperative Society is a species. The legislature intended that the word "a Corporation" means such Corporations as are similar in their objects and purpose to Cooperative Societies. "A Corporation" must therefore be construed to mean such incorporated bodies as are engaged in economic betterment of its members on principles, similar to Cooperation. The meaning of Corporation must therefore be limited to Corporations who have as their object joint collective betterment. It follows that commercial enterprises engaged non cooperative commercial or banking activity are clearly excluded from the exemption created by clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. VI. Not being a private agency 29. The meaning of Corporation must therefore be limited to Corporations who have as their object joint collective betterment. It follows that commercial enterprises engaged non cooperative commercial or banking activity are clearly excluded from the exemption created by clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. VI. Not being a private agency 29. The words "public" and "private" differ in their connotation according to the context. In its ordinary meaning the word "public" suggests something in which the community or a section of a community has interest. The railways, nationalised banks, and similar other organisations are public in their character. A financial agency like the petitioner in which the community or a section of the community, has no immediate and direct interest is a private agency. The reason is that the object of its business is to make profit for the purpose of distribution amongst its members. This profit sharing is select because it is shared by the members only. The profits of a public financial agency, are received by the public though the Government or appropriation by the legislature. 30. The petitioner's objects as seen from its articles, show that it is engaged in business, the profits from which are distributed amongst its members, and arc not received by the public. Therefore, the petitioner is a private financial agency. The petitioner is not a financial agency not being a private agency. For this reason also it does not fall within the exemption created by clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. VII. Conclusions To sum up, therefore, my conclusions are as under; (i) Where on the date of the disposal of the previous C.R.P. No. 1832 of 1981 the Kerala Scheduled Tribe (Restriction on Transfer of Lands and Restoration of Alienated Lands) Act, 1975 had not come into force, a party to the said C.R.P. could not have invoked the provisions of the said Act. If the provisions could not have been urged by reason of the fact that the provisions had not come into force, it cannot be said that such party "might" or "ought" to have urged the protection under the Act. Consequently therefore the issue about such a right under the Act is not barred by principles of res judicata. If the provisions could not have been urged by reason of the fact that the provisions had not come into force, it cannot be said that such party "might" or "ought" to have urged the protection under the Act. Consequently therefore the issue about such a right under the Act is not barred by principles of res judicata. (ii) The object of the Kerala Scheduled Tribe (Restriction on Transfer of Lands and Restoration of Alienated Lands) Act, 1975, is to restore to the tribals the lands alienated by them to non tribals against advance of loans and reverse the unjust gains of exploitation. With this object in mind, the legislature intended that the word "a Corporation" occurring in clause (c) of S.3 of the Act does not include every incorporated entity. The word "a Corporation" means a Corporation which serves public interest and is not engaged in private profit making business. (iii) The ejusdem generis rule of interpretation of statutes applies even in cases where a single phrase, like a Cooperative Society, is followed by another single phrase, like a Corporation. The specific category, e.g. a Cooperative Society, though alone and unaccompanied by plurality of specific categories, forms a genus or a class of entities for the purpose of this rule. (iv) Upon construction of "a Corporation" ejusdem generis with a Cooperative Society registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, the legislative intent becomes clear. The legislature intended that the word "a Corporation" means such Corporations as are similar in their objects and purposes to Cooperative Societies which have unselfish public interest as their object. (v) The petitioner, as a Corporate Financial Agency has, as its object, the business of banking for the purpose of distribution of profits amongst its members. This select profit-making and distribution, makes it private financial agency and is outside clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. (vi) The petitioner is not a Corporation within the legislative intendment. It is a Private Financial Agency. It is outside the exemption created by clause (c) of S.3 of the Act. VIII. Order For the reasons stated in the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, the petition is dismissed with costs.