P. K. SHYAMSUNDAR, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner a lady contested from a reserved constituency, reserved for women at the polls held to constitute the mandal panchayat, honnali, shimoga district. She was declared elected and was duly functioning as a member of that panchayat. ( 2 ) BUT then her apple-cart has been upset following a complaint made by rcspondent-2 also said to be a member of the same mandal panchayat, to the chief secretary respondent-1 alleging that the lady after having been successfully returned on a no parly label, i. e. , as an independent has since joined the bharatiya janata party, an act which amounted to defection within the meaning of the law and as a sequel thereto she should be held to be disqualified from continuing as a member. This complaint was investigated after notice to the petitioner. The learned first respondent made the impugned order dated 25-10-1991 (Annexure-G ). The effective portion of the order is mercifully very brief and it reads thus: earlier the chief secretary has set out the facts of the case and at paragraphs (a) and (b) has highlighted the arguments submitted by learned counsel appearing before him on either side. In the operative portion of the order to which I have drawn attention to, he simply rest it contained by declaring that he was satisfied that the petitioner was guilty of defection and was therefore disentitled to continue on the council of the mandal panchayat in question, as a result he struck her out from the array of members representing on the mandal panchayat committee. Not unnaturally petitioner feels aggrieved by the impugned order which has resulted in the forfeiture of true position in the mandal panchayat she had annexed following the triumph at the polls, where I am told she had to contend against several others who were in the fray. ( 3 ) THE controversy herein is all about the petitioner having joined a political party and accepted a new banner under which she has chosen to function in the mandal panchayat council. It is common ground that she contested and won the election as a non-party candidate, in other words as an independent. ( 3 ) THE controversy herein is all about the petitioner having joined a political party and accepted a new banner under which she has chosen to function in the mandal panchayat council. It is common ground that she contested and won the election as a non-party candidate, in other words as an independent. The charge of defection as made against her is that subsequently she had joined the bjp party, became a card holding member of that particular party and on that score the deputy commissioner now holds that she should seize to be a member of the mandal panchayat. The Provisions requisite for consideration in this behalf are Section 3 (1) and (2) of the Karnataka local authorities (prohibition of defection) Act, which reads:"3. Disqualification on the ground of defection: 1) subject to the Provisions of Section 4, a councillor or a member, belonging to any political party, shall be disqualified for being such councillor or member, a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political party; or b) if he votes or abstains from voting in the meeting of the municipal corporation, municipal council, zilla parishad or mandal panchayat contrary to any direction issued by the political party to which he belongs or by any person of authority authorised by it in this behalf, without obtaining, in cither case, the prior permission of such political party, person or authority and such voting or abstention has not been condoned by such political party, person or authority within fifteen days from the date of voting of such absention: provided that no councillor or member shall be so disqualified if the number of councillors or members so voting or abstaining from voting constitutes not less than one half of the total number of councillors or members belonging to the political party in the zilla parishad, mandal panchayat, municipal corporation or municipal council, as the case may be. Explanation. Explanation. For the purpose of this sub-section, a) a person elected as a councillor, or as the case may be, a member, shall be deemed to belong to the political party, if any, by which he was set up as a candidate for election as such councillor or member; b) a nominated member of a mandal panchayat shall, i) where he is a member of a political party on the date of his nomination as such member, be deemed to belong to such political party; or ii) in any other case, be deemed to belong to the political party of which he becomes a member before the expiry of six months from the date on which he is nominated as a member of the mandal panchayat. 2. An elected councillor, or, as the case may be, a member, who has been elected as such, otherwise than as a candidate set up by a political party shall be disqualified for being a councillor or, as the case may be a member, if he joins a political parly after such election. "a combined reading of Section 3 (1) and (2) of the Act, it is said operates against the petitioner resulting in her disqualification or forfeiting her position in the mandal panchayat. ( 4 ) I am a little hard put to comprehend as to how the process of disqualification could have been initiated in the case of the petitioner because this is not a case of a person belonging to any political party voluntarily giving up membership of that party which result would also follow if he or she joins some other party should be treated as arising even in case of a non-party candidate, joining a particular party after election. There is clearly a marked dichotomy between the Provisions of clauses (1) and (2) of Section 3 of the Act, and I for one would have thought, functioning under the banner of a political party by a person who was an independent earlier would not be a case of defection which expression as we understand in common parlance connotes shifting from one party to another but if the migration originates from nothing at all and later results in identifying with an entity in vogue whether in such circumstances, such an act would tantamount to defection is certainly not free from doubt. Mr. Mr. Narayan rao, learned senior counsel tells me that he also seeks to impugn clause (2) of Section 3 of the Act, as being ultra vires since it is patently inconsistent with clause (1) of Section 3 of the Act, but I do not wish to go into this controversy because I find from the order impugned as passed by the 1st respondent, there is no advertance at all to the material on record placed by the parties at the enquiry at which the complaint of defection reduced to unjustified. ( 5 ) THERE was in fact an enquiry at which the petitioner and the 2nd respondent were examined and were also cross-examined. Both sides claim to have produced documents and so much is apparent from the impugned order itself. But then as to what both of them stated before the officer and how they fared in the course of the cross-examination by counsel and what stand they took regards the documents produced by either side are all aspects over which the 1st respondent does not shed any light and that is because he docs not advert to them at all. ( 6 ) IN any event he appears to have thought that in these matters it is just sufficient to make an order without any reason. Parties expect the authority in-charge of an investigation to write or make an order which prima facie discloses the reason that compelled the authority to take a particular view. The power vested in the chief secretary, zilla parishad to oust a duly elected candidate on the ground that the person in question stood disqualified at a subsequent stage, is indeed a quasi-judicial one to be passed after due investigation as enjoined by the statute. Though the enquiry may be summary, it is expected of the authority to make atleast a brief reference to whatever material is placed before him, whatever statement is made before him and then to say, he accepts one and rejects the other, of course for reasons to be stated. This is the accepted form of exercising jurisdiction in these matters and time and again it has been held by this court, by the apex court and by all the authorities who believe in the auxiomatic principle that Justice must not seem to be done but must appear to be done as well. ( 7 ) MR. This is the accepted form of exercising jurisdiction in these matters and time and again it has been held by this court, by the apex court and by all the authorities who believe in the auxiomatic principle that Justice must not seem to be done but must appear to be done as well. ( 7 ) MR. Vinod prasad, appearing for respondent-2 addressed me at length and advised me not to entertain this writ petition because he said the petitioner, a lady of all persons, had come to this court with unclean hands and also said the petitioner probably had placed the 1st respondent on the horns of a dilemma because she had made before him not one but two statements each contradicting the other and the fact that the document which is now assailed as a bogus one and one which is fabricated, was not placed before the appropriate authority, namely, the police for taking action against those who might have been guilty of such fabrication although counsel mentioned that the petitioner had talked of taking intimidatory action but had not done so, the inference counsel draws is that all this is merely a case of all empty symbol making a lot of noise. ( 8 ) I am afraid I can not hasten to counsel's submission that merely because the petitioner had not rushed to the police to lodge a criminal complaint against those trying to malign her and was responsible for unseating her on the basis of documents which according to her had been fabricated. Such quiescent conduct does not mean that the petitioner had made those allegations in a light hearted fashion and the fael that she had taken may be an equivocal stand before the authority is again not a matter on which I should be asked to terminate the proceedings saying that her conduct being so unworthy, her case deserves to be rejected in limine by this court. I am afraid I can not do that. Now reverting back to the post-mortem conducted on the impugned Order, I have no hesitation in saying that it fails to pass the elementary test of a quasi-judicial order in that of being laced with reasons that had compelled the authority to make an order against the petitioner. I am afraid I can not do that. Now reverting back to the post-mortem conducted on the impugned Order, I have no hesitation in saying that it fails to pass the elementary test of a quasi-judicial order in that of being laced with reasons that had compelled the authority to make an order against the petitioner. It has got to be remembered that the 1st respondent was exercising jurisdiction which would set at naught the aspirations of the electorate who had returned the petitioner and made her a member of the mandal panchayat so that she could serve their interest. However, if she has to be turned out from that office which she holds in trust for the electorate, there must be compelling grounds and they must manifest themselves in the order made, under which that position was being taken away from the petitioner. I am afraid the order is too bald for even meriting a reiteration. I see nothing therein except mentioning that record has been considered and on a consideration of the same the learned 1st respondent would declare the complaint defection to be found established. The point is about the way in which the jurisdiction of the 1st respondent should be exercised in regard to the manner of deciding disputed questions of fact. I do not expect from on a judgment befitting a court of law but even if it is summary Justice in a summary proceeding, the order must say what prevailed or persuaded the authority to arrive at a particular conclusion. If that be the requisite parameter to be adapted then the order in question fails all the way. Therefore, I will not accept the exuberant submission of Mr. Vinod prasad, urging me to dismiss the writ petition, but on the contrary I should allow this writ petition, strike down the impugned order at Annexure-G and remand this case back to the 1st respondent for a tenable disposal in the light of the observations made hereinbefore after hearing both sides and of course in accordance with law. ( 9 ) I would also say that the learned chief secretary, of respondent-1 shall dispose of the matter anew without being influenced by any of the observations I may have made touching the vires of Section 3 (2) of the Act, itself. ( 9 ) I would also say that the learned chief secretary, of respondent-1 shall dispose of the matter anew without being influenced by any of the observations I may have made touching the vires of Section 3 (2) of the Act, itself. ( 10 ) THE 1st respondent will dispose of the matter on remit within four weeks from the date of receipt of this order. ( 11 ) SRI Raghavendrachar, who also appears for the petitioner wants me to say that all contentions urged herein be kept open to be urged before the 1st respondent. Of course everything is left open for a de novo decision. ( 12 ) RULE issued and affirmed. --- *** --- .