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1991 DIGILAW 557 (DEL)

LOHA UDYOG v. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

1991-10-11

S.B.WAD, USHA MEHRA

body1991
Usha Mehra ( 1 ) THE Writ Petition was allowed vide order dated 21st November, 1990. By this we are giving the reasons for the same. ( 2 ) M/s. Loba Udyog in this writ petition has assailed the order of the Delhi Development Authority (hereinafter called the ODA) dated 25th February, 1988 thereby withdrawing the offer of allotment of alternative plot already made to the petitioner vide letter dated 16th July, 1985. ( 3 ) BRIEFLY the facts of the Case are that petitioner, M/s. Loha Udyog, a partnership firm stated to be M/s. Delhi Iron and Steel Stockists (CS.) Association Private Limited carrying on business of Iron and Steel at Motia Khan better known as Loha Mandi. Petitioner has been in occupation of Plot No 10186 measuring 287 square yards in Motia Khan, Delhi, since 1965. The business of Iron and Steel was carried on the said plot after raising pacca construction thereon. Petitioner also got electricity connection and was assessed to sales tax for the business being carried out at the said premises. In the year 1975 actual removal of unautorised occupation of the plots at Motia Khan, which was a non-confirming area, was started. Some of the persons were not allotted plots and therefore they filed Civil Writ Petition No. 1121/75 being Surajmal and Others v. Delhi Development Authority. Pursuant to the same, Delhi Development Authority passed aresolution on 11th October. 1977 regarding the manner-in-which the allotment was to be made. Earlier policy was that the person who were removed and were paying damages should be given alternative allotment at a reserve price. Whereas those who were not assessed to damages should be given the alternative plot at the average auction rate. The new policy classified the persons into two categories namely, the persons against whom proceedings were pending for assessment of damages but not final order had been passed and secondly, those against whom no such proceedings were Initiated and were in occupation thereof. The resolution reads as under: "resolved that the evictions of both the categories, mentioned in para 2 of the agenda-note, be allotted alternative plots in reserve price , provided the adduce satisfactory proof of their having occupied land at the Loha Mandi (Motia Khan) Clearance Site during 10 years, immediately preceding their eviction and also pay damages, plus an interest of 12. 5% per annum thereon for the same. 5% per annum thereon for the same. "because of this resolution even those persons who bad actually not paid damages but had some other proof of their land in Motia Khan during the last 10 years were offered the allotment of land at reserve price with the stipulation that they have to pay damages plus interest for the period. ( 4 ) DDA formulated this scheme with the intention to rehabilitate and give alternative plots to the occupants of Motia Khan where the business of Iron and Steel was being carried. Motia Khan was not a confirming area and therefore DDA decided to shift the occupants of non-confirming area to a confirming zone as per that scheme. They were to be shifted and provided alternative plots in Naraina Ware-Housing Scheme. According to petitioner he was a member of the iron Merchants Association. He was in occupation of the aforesaid plot at Motia Khan much before the formulation of the Scheme. But the DDA failed to allot alternative plot to the petitioner as per its declared public policy. Instead of allotting plots to occupants of Motia Khan, DDA decided to dispose of those plots at Naraina in public auction. Aggrieved by this action of DDA members of the Iron Merchants Association filed writ petitions. Counsel for the DDA made a statement that those plots would not be auctioned. On the basis of the said statement made by the Counsel for the DDA. the auctions were cancelled. That petition was ultimately withdrawn on account of the assurance given by the Delhi Development Authority. After protracted discussions and approaches made by the petitioner, respondent allotted an alternative plot in favour of the petitioner on 16th July, 1985. The possession of the alternative plot was to be given to the petitioner subject to his vacating the land in Motia Khan Petitioner approached the DDA for giving the exact number of the plot and also sought for the possession. The Technical Committee of the DDA vide its Agenda Item dated 12th February, 1987 recommnded that the remaining unauthorised occupants cases be considered and these unauthorised occupants including the petitioner should be allotted alternative plots in the same place If there was shortage of space then it was recommended that out of one of the four parking lots one plot be given to these persons. The case of the remaining unaurhirsed occupants was considered by various Committees of she respondent but no specific decision was taken. Petitioner was assessed for damages with effect from 1st June, 1961 to 31st August, 1985. Petitioner had been waiting for all these years in the hope to get possession of alternative plot. hut instead of getting a plot he received aletter dated 25th Feb. , 1988 vide which the offer of allotment made earlier to the petitioner vide letter dated 16th July, 1985 lias been withdrawn by the DDA with malafide intention without assigning any reason. It is against this impugned letter that the present writ petition has been filed, inter alia, challenging the action of the DDA on the grounds of its being not only arbitrary but also violative of principles of natural justice. ( 5 ) DELHI Development Authority took up the defence primarily on two grounds namely that petitioner till date has not vacated the occupation of his plot at Motia Khan and secondly he has not completed ten years of occupation immediately preceding the order of eviction. Letter dated 16th July 1985 was issued by mistake. All those evictees who were covered within the policy adopted by the DDA were given alternative plots- Petitioner did not fall within the ambit of eligibility for an alternative site. He was not party to the Writ Petition No. 360/1981 in which directions for alternative plot were given to those set of petitioners. ( 6 ) PETITIONER s case is that he had been in occupation of the plot in Motia Khan for more than 10 years immediately preceding the eviction as required by the policy formulated by the DDA He has been also assessed and charged damages by the Estate Officer to the tune of Rs. 9,1321. 67 p with effect from 1st June, 1961. Thi s substantiate his contention that he has been in occupation of this plot at Motia Khan for more than 10 years. He fulfils both the conditions stipulated in DDA s resolution dated 11th October. 1977 The offer of allotment has been withdrawn. No alternative plot has been given therefore, the objection of the Respondent-DDA that petitioner is not entitled for alternative plot because he has not vacated the plot at Motia Khan is nothing but a figmentation of DDA s imagination. It is a sham defence. 1977 The offer of allotment has been withdrawn. No alternative plot has been given therefore, the objection of the Respondent-DDA that petitioner is not entitled for alternative plot because he has not vacated the plot at Motia Khan is nothing but a figmentation of DDA s imagination. It is a sham defence. Petitioner from the record placed has been able to show that he has always been ready and willing to handover the possession of the plot at Motia Khan provided be be given the specified plot at some other place in a conforming zone. To that extent the petitioner has filed an affidavit giving an undertaking that a8 and when he is allotted specific plot he would handover the possession of this plot at Motia Khan. Therefore, for these reasons we do not find any force in the submission of the Delhi Development Authority that petitioner could not be allotted alternative plot because be is still in occupation of the plot at Motia Khan. The other contention of the DDA that petitioner was not in occupation for over 10 years immediately preceding the eviction is also against the record. ( 7 ) SO far as the facts of this case are concerned, from the perusal of notice under sub-Section 3 of Section 7 of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter called the PP Act) dated 13th September, 1985 issued by the Estate Officer of the DDA It is clear that the respondent admitted the factum of petitioner s occupation of the plot at MotiaKhan since 1st June, 19 61. Basing on this fact, DDA calculated the damages from 1st June, 196110 31st August, 1985to be Rs. 9,131. 67p. This the petitioner paid as per the receipt placed on record dated 13th September, 1985. This was in compliance to the resolution of 11th October, 1977 REFERRED TO to above. Petitioner has thus established from the documentary evidence that he had been in occupation of lhe land at Motia Khan (Loha Mandi) Clearance Site for the last 10 years immediately preceding the eviction order and that he has paid damages as demanded by the DDA. DDA on the other hand has not been able to justify why lhe offer of allotment made vide letter dated 16th July, 1985 was withdrawn. Counsel for DDA could not justify the subsequent action of withdrawal. DDA on the other hand has not been able to justify why lhe offer of allotment made vide letter dated 16th July, 1985 was withdrawn. Counsel for DDA could not justify the subsequent action of withdrawal. Except the bald statement that letter of allotment was withdrawn after being scrutinised and keeping in view all the pros and cons of the case, is to our mind no justification. In fact no record was produced nor any document placed on record to establish that the case of the petitioner was considered or that he did not fall under either of the conditions REFERRED TO to in the resolution In fact the petitioner by the documentary evidence has proved beyond doubt that he fulfils the conditions stipulated in the above said resolution manely of being in occupation of the plot at Motia Khan for 10 years immediately preceding the eviction and has also paid the damages. We had the opportunity to examine the record in this case and found that no reasoning has been assigned by the DDA why the offer of allotment in the case of the petitioner was withdrawn. Therefore, it cannot be not be said that the DDA scrutinized the case of the petitioner or that it applied its mind. ( 8 ) IN an earlier writ petition filed by other set of unauthorised occupants of Motia Khan namely 0m Parkash Gupta and Others v. DDA and Others In Writ Petition No. 368 of 1988, the resolution of the DDA dated 11th October, 1977 came up for consideration. After considering all the asspects of the case the Division Bench held that the said resolution was a promise by the DDA and, therefore, created a right in favour of the petitioners. DDA was estopped on account of the promissory estoppel from going back to its promise. The facts of this case are in no way different to that of 0m Parkash Gupta s case (supra ). The offer of allotment made vide letter dated 16th July, 1985 is a promise held out by the DDA to the petitioner that alternative plot is going to be given to him. It was in a way an assurance issued by the DDA that in due course of time he shall be given possession of a specific alternative plot in a confirming area. Petitioner believed the same. It was in a way an assurance issued by the DDA that in due course of time he shall be given possession of a specific alternative plot in a confirming area. Petitioner believed the same. Hence this promise to allot the specific plot at a subsequent stage amounts to promis- sory estoppel. The withdrawal of the same at a subsequent stage has effected the vested right of the petitioner, therefore, the prinicple of promissory estoppel squarely applies to the facts of this case. Lord Denning in High Tree Houses case 1947 KB 113 revived the doctrine of promissory estoppel. The principle formulated by Lord Denning was, "that a promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its term properly apply. Lord Denning rejected detriment as an essential ingredient of promissory estoppel. ( 9 ) IN Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, reported in AIR 1979 Supreme Court page 621 Mr. Justice P. N. Bhagwati, who spoke for the Court observed about promissory estoppel that it is a principle evolved by equity to avoid injustice, it is neither in the realm of contract nor in the realm of estoppel. The true principle of promissory estoppel, it has been held, seems to be that where one party has by bis words of conduct made to the other a clear promise which is intended to create legal relation or effect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is infact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it. ( 10 ) LETTER dated 16th July, 1985 was issued by the DDA which is in the form of promise Acting on this promise the petitioner paid damages as assessed by the Estate Officer. Now if he is deprived of the alternative plot as per the scheme of the DDA, in a confirming area his business will be ruined and he Will suffer untold miscries for no fault of bis. Now if he is deprived of the alternative plot as per the scheme of the DDA, in a confirming area his business will be ruined and he Will suffer untold miscries for no fault of bis. The withdrawal vide the impugned letter dated 28th February, 1988, to our mind, is discriminatory and illegal The respondent cannot now be permitted to take advantage of its own wrong and withdraw the letter of offer dated 16th July, 1985. ( 11 ) THE only other question which remains is that the Delhi Development Authority has no plot at Naraina Warehousing Scheme. The DDA has other places where commercial plots are auctioned and allotted. Petitioner can be accommodated there. Because of the fault of DDA, the petitioner cannot be deprived of his right to enforce the DDA to fulfil its promise nor he can be deprived of his right which has already accrued in his favour because of the assurance held out by the respondent vide letter dated 16th July, 1985. Applying the ratio of the Division Bench judgment s case in Shri 0m Prakash Gupta and Others v. Delhi Development Authority and Others, reported in Writ Petition No. 368/81 decided on January, 1984 we are of the view that a plot has to be allotted to the petitioner at the reserve price as the petitioner has already paid the damages with effect from 1st June, 1961. His claim was verified and since he fulfilled all the conditions stipulate in the resolution dated 11th October, 1977. ( 12 ) INVIEW of our above observations we allow the writ petition by giving directions to the Respondent DDA to allot to the petitioner a plot at reserve price in accordance with the Scheme formulated by resolution dated 11th October, 1977. The petition is decided accordingly and the rule is made absolute as Petitioner was asked to file the affidavit giving an undertaking that he will vacate the plot at Motia Khan (Loha Mandi) in case he is allotted the alternative plot by the Delhi Development Authority. In accordance with the same he lias filed an affidavit which is taken on record. Petition is allowed with costs and Counsel s fee Rs. 3,000/. Petition allowed.