JUDGMENT D. P. Sood, J.—In this Regular Second Appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the sole question for consideration of this Court is whether the learned first appellate Court has wholly misread and mis-appreciated the oral as also the documentary evidence adduced by the appellant while reversing the judgment of the trial Court and thus the findings arrived at by the said court are wholly arbitrary and perverse. On the consideration of the oral evidence alone read with the concession so made by the plaintiff in the trial Court, this question has to be answered in the affirmative 2. Shortly stated, the facts in the barest form for the purpose of understanding the real controversy arising between the parties are that respondent being plaintiff in the trial Court, filed a suit for possession of the land by redemption of mortgage. The land in dispute constituted of respective shares of the khatas detailed as under:- Old Khata No. Khatauni No. New Khata No. Khata uni. " Area Land 6 8 9 11 8K 14M 1/4 2K 3M 7 9 to 13 10 12 to 17 8K4M 3/16 3K 9M 8 14 11 18 3K18M 7/24 IK 3M 10 18 13 21 0 10M 7/48 0 1M (hereinafter referred to as the suit land). There is no dispute in between the parties that the suit land prior to the creation of the mortgage was under the tenancy of the appellant. The entire area measured 8 kanals and 14 marlas as per the entries reflected by jamabandi 1935-56 (Ex P-3) mortgage was created on April 21, 1955 which resulted in the attestation and sanction of mutation Ex. PC- The consideration for the aforesaid mortgage was Rs 1,000. This factual position is not controverted by the parties before this Court. 3. The legal position is that if the land comprised the tenancy of a tenant is mortgaged to him with possession by the landowner and such land is subsequently redeemed by the landowner, the tenant was notwithstanding such redemption or any other law for the time being in force, be deemed to be the tenant of the landowner in respect of such land on the same terms and conditions on which it was held by him immediately before the execution of the mortgage as if the mortgaged land had never been executed", is not disputed. In other words, in case the appellant is found to be the tenant of the mortgaged land prior thereto then its redemption will have no effect upon his tenancy interest. 4. It is to be noted that the plaintiff through his Counsel had made a categorical concession before the trial Court to the effect : "In regard to the land comprised in khata No. 6 (New khata No. 9) khatauni No. 8 (New Khatauni No. 11) the share of plaintiff being 2 kanal 3 marlas, it was stated at the bar by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff that in regard to the land in this khata No. the defendant father has been shown as a tenant prior to the date of mortgage and this is not being challenged by him." 5. This fact is also corroborated by the entries in jamabandi for the years 1943-44 and 1955-56 that is Ex. D-3 and P-4 respectively and in that view of the matter, the learned trial Court was within its legal jurisdiction to have passed the decree for redemption of mortgage but without possession of the land to the extent of 2 Kanals 3 Marlas. 6. So far as the first appellate Court is concerned, in the first instance respondent had no right to challenge the decree to the extent of 2 kanals and 3 marlas contained in khata No. 6, referred to above, passed against him in view of the clear cut concession having been made before the trial Court Even otherwise on the basis of the entries in the jamabandis for the year 1943-44 and that of 1955-56 which pertain to the period prior to the creation of mortgage on April 21, 1955, the appellant had been recorded as a tenant in possession of the suit land measuring 8 kanals 14 marlas. Admittedly the one fourth share was mortgaged with possession with the mother of the appellant in which the appellant was a cultivating tenant for a consideration of Rs. 1,000. This aspect of tenancy, as stated above, has been corroborated in the entries in the revenue records and no evidence oral or documentary has been produced by the respondent to rebut the said entries. 1,000. This aspect of tenancy, as stated above, has been corroborated in the entries in the revenue records and no evidence oral or documentary has been produced by the respondent to rebut the said entries. Learned first appellate Court was not within its right to have firstly allowed this point to be raised in appeal and secondly it had not taken into consideration the entries of the revenue record incorporated in the aforesaid jamabandis which were prior to the date of creation of the mortgage. 7. Learned Counsel for the respondent has not been able to show this Court any other piece of evidence except drawing the attention of this Court to the contents of the report-roznameha wakayati and khasra girdwari annexed with the grounds of appeal which reflect that the name of the appellant was not shown as a tenant in any of the revenue-records prior to 21st April, 1955. This document has neither been exhibited nor allowed to be produced in evidence nor it is in consonance with the entries in the earlier jamabandis D-3 and P-3 respectively. Thus this fact cannot be taken into consideration at all. Rather the learned first appellate Court has wrongly taken into consideration the entry of the jamabandi for the year 1951-52 (P-2) alone and reversed the findings of the learned trial Court holding that the appellant is only a tenant on land measuring 9 marlas only. This approach of the learned first appellate Court in ignoring the entries in the revenue records not only produced by the plaintiff-respondent but also by the appellant is wholly arbitrary and perverse due to which the error crept in and the judgment of the trial Court was reversed. 8. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment of the first appellate Court is liable to be set aside and that of the trial Court is to be restored. 9 In view of the discussion made above, the appeal is accepted, impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court dated 31st May, 19 2 is set aside and that of the trial Court dated January 29, 1979 is affirmed However, in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. The appeal is disposed of accordingly Appeal allowed.