JASRAJ CHOPRA, J.—This case comes up before us on a reference being made by a learned single Judge of this Court in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 25 of 1989, Chouthmal and another V. Fazal Hussain vide his Order dated 21.7.1989. The learned single Judge has referred the following two questions for determination: (1) Whether a subordinate court should not record reasons for refusing documentary evidence sought to be adduced under O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. even though good cause has been shown for such late production and the document is a material one? (2) Whether no revision would lie against an order by which a subordinate court has refused to accept documentary evidence under O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. notwithstanding that good cause has been shown for late production and the document is of vital and material importance? The aforesaid questions arise out of certain conflicting judgments rendered by different Benches of this Court and, therefore, the learned single Judge has thought it fit that as these questions are important, they, need to be decided by a larger Bench and hence, this case comes up before us. 2. As regards the first question, learned single Judge of this Court in Jagjit Cotton Textiles Mills Ltd. V. Union of India (l) and other connected revision petitions took the following view. "It plainly says that no documentary evidence shall be received after the settlement of issues unless good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for its non-production and reasons shall be recorded for receiving it. Under the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the court has jurisdiction to hold rightly or wrongly that good cause to its satisfaction has been or has not been shown for the late production of a document. Such a decision has no relation to the question of jurisdiction of the Court. If the court has failed to record any reason for receiving any document at a late stage, it may be said that it has acted with material irregularity in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The above quoted provisions specifically require the recording of reasons by the court while accepting a document. However, no reason is required to be recorded for not accepting a document at a late stage. The above quoted provisions specifically require the recording of reasons by the court while accepting a document. However, no reason is required to be recorded for not accepting a document at a late stage. In such a case, there is no question of exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity." Thus, according to the learned single Judge of this Court in Jagjit Cotton Textiles Mills Ltd.s case (supra), recording of reasons by the Court are required only at the time of accepting the document. However, no reasons are required to be recorded for not accepting the document and in such a case, there is no question of exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. In other words, against such an order refusing to accept the document, no revision petition will lie. 3. A similar view was expressed by Honble G.M. Lodha, J. in Radhey Shyam V. Nathuram (2) wherein it has been observed as follows— "Whether a good cause has been shown under Order 13, R. 2 warranting admission of a document after framing of issues and whether the circumstances mentioned in the amended R. 17A of O. 13 for taking evidence even after it has been closed, are made out in a case or not, are questions on which the Court may express an opinion rightly or wrongly and while doing so, it may commit an error of law also by either wrong appreciation of the law on the point of the scope of Order 13, R. 2, C.P.C. or Order 3 8, r. 17 A or may commit a mistake in holding that there is no good cause when the one is proved but that would not result in bringing that case within any of the clauses (a), (b) or (c) or clause (1) of s. 115, C.P.C." It was because of these two decisions, a difficulty arose before the learned single Judge and the learned single Judge felt that while deciding Jagjit cotton Textiles Mills Ltd.s case (supra), Honble Milap Chandra, J. has, taken the very extreme view when he has held that no reasons are required to be recorded for not accepting the document at a late stage. 4. 4. The learned single Judge has further referred to a decision of this court in Municipal Council, Bharatpur V. Gokul Chand (3) wherein I.C. Israni, J. has held that the Amending Act of 1976 has amended the provisions of S. 115, C.P.C. and has increased the scope of revision and, therefore, refusal to accept such a document shall amount to exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. Reference has also been made to a decision of this Court in Banshilal V. Smt. Chhaganidevi (4) wherein it was observed as follows: "So far as the question of interference by this Court in revisional jurisdiction is concerned, suffice it to say that in the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the learned Addl. Munsif has committed a material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction while not accept the present receipt as he ought to have accepted the same. It will not prejudice any of the parties because the evidence has not been recorded so far." In this respect we may also notice a decision of this Court in Nanu Ram V. Vardichand (5). That case also related to the refusal of documents at the trial stage. In that case it, was observed as follows— "Where documents were sought to be produced by the plaintiff after framing of issues but before evidence and thereafter, even additional issue was framed and the plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that he could not produce them at the earlier stage as he was prevented by his sudden illness in another place and there was no counter affidavit controverting the fact" It was held on the basis of the aforesaid facts that the application for production of documents could not be said to be vexatious and dilatory and the lower court acted improperly in refusing to receive the documents, and consequently, the revision petition was allowed. In this case, this question was not directly at issue whether the revision petition is maintainable against an order passed under 0.13, 2. C.P.C. This fact was noticed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Radhey Shyams case (supra) and it was held that when this question was not directly at issue in Nanu Rams case (supra), that decision is of no assistance. 5. C.P.C. This fact was noticed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Radhey Shyams case (supra) and it was held that when this question was not directly at issue in Nanu Rams case (supra), that decision is of no assistance. 5. In view of these conflicting judgments, the learned single Judge felt that the matter is of vital importance and, therefore, a reference be made to a larger Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on the aforesaid questions. While making the reference, the learned Judge felt that the documents which may be produced under O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. may be classified in three classes. Firstly, the document sought to be adduced may be wholly irrelevant and may have no bearing on the case at all. In refusing to accept such documents, the Court would not be committing any error of jurisdiction and such an order would not be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. In second class of documents, the documentary evidence sought to be adduced may be relevant but then it may not have much impact on the case either way. The document sought to be produced may not tilt the balance of the case on merits at all and its impact maybe altogether neutral. If such document is refused, notwithstanding that good or sufficient cause has been made out for late production, a revision would not lie because the jurisdiction exercised could not be said to be irregular However, matters shall stand differently if the document sought to be adduced is relevant and has a material being on the case and good and sufficient cause has been made for its late production. After mentioning the three classes of documents, the learned single Judge has observed that in his view refusal to accept such a document will amount to exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. It was further observed that although it is true that order 13 R. 2 (1) does not specifically require the court refusing such evidence to record the reasons for refusal but the principles of natural justice would require that a court refusing to accept such a document passes a speaking order regarding the reasons for not accepting such document. It was further observed that although it is true that order 13 R. 2 (1) does not specifically require the court refusing such evidence to record the reasons for refusal but the principles of natural justice would require that a court refusing to accept such a document passes a speaking order regarding the reasons for not accepting such document. In this respect the learned single Judge further observed as under— In my humble opinion, where such documentary evidence is of vital importance and may affect the merits of case and may tilt the balance of the case one way or other, refusing to accept such evidence is likely to result in failure of justice and in some cases, mis-carriage of justice. If in such a case, the documentary evidence is not received, inspite of the fact that good cause is shown for late production thereof, the Court would be committing not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction and such an order may amount to failure to exercise a jurisdiction vested in the Court by law. At any rate, it would be tantamount to acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or at any rate, with material irregularity." After expressing his own aforesaid views, the learned single Judge has observed that Honble Milap Chandra, J. was probably aware of this position and this is why, his Lordship observed as follows— "In all these four cases, the trial courts have given reasons in their orders for not receiving the documents. None of the documents is going to effect the ultimate decision of the case in which it has been filed." The learned single Judge further felt that this would go to show that the proposition laid down by his Lordship may not be applicable to a case, where the document sought to be produced is material and of vital importance. It was in the back drop of this conflict in the decisions that these two questions have been referred to us for decision. 6. It was in the back drop of this conflict in the decisions that these two questions have been referred to us for decision. 6. Before, we decide the first question, it will be useful here to quote the provisions of Order XIII, R. 2 C.P.C. which run as follows— "O. XIII R. 2 C.P.C. Effect of non-production of documents: (1) No documentary evidence in the possession or power of any party which should have been but has not been produced in accordance with the requirements of R. 1 shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non-production thereof; and the Court receiving any such evidence shall record the reasons for so doing. (2) Nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to documents— (a) produced for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party, or (b) handed over to a witness merely to refresh his memory." Order 13, r.2 C.P.C. has two parts. The first part casts a duty upon the party concerned to show good cause for non-production of the document before settlement of issues at the suit. The second part casts a duty upon the court to record its reasons for receiving such evidence. The reason which the court is to record for receiving such document, cannot be limited by the first part of the said provision. The court besides receiving a document and accepting the cause of delay is yet to apply its mind to find out even though in a summary manner that prima facie the document is a genuine document and that the document is relevant. Thus, the Court before whom, an application under O. 13 R. 2 C.P.C. has been made, has to apply its mind to two things. Firstly, it has to determine whether the party concerned has shown a good cause for non-production of the document before settlement of issues at the suit and that satisfaction has also to be a judicial satisfaction and it must be based on reasons. Firstly, it has to determine whether the party concerned has shown a good cause for non-production of the document before settlement of issues at the suit and that satisfaction has also to be a judicial satisfaction and it must be based on reasons. The Court will have to indicate in its order whether the reasons given by the applicant are sufficient or not and that sufficiency will have to be judged by the Court based on its judicial satisfaction and, therefore, this very much contemplates a speaking order by the Court as to whether the late production of the document has been explained satisfactorily to the satisfaction of the court or not. True it is, that it has been provided in O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. that after showing good cause to the satisfaction of the Court for late production of the documents, still the court has discretion to receive any such documentary evidence on record and if it so receives, it has to record reasons for it. Thus, after coming to the conclusion that the delay has been satisfactorily explained or not explained, the Court is still required to decide whether the document has to be admitted in evidence. If the delay has not been satisfactorily explained, the Court may reject the application but if it has been satisfactorily explained, still the Court will have to decide whether the documents are relevant or not and whether they are genuine or not and if the Court comes to the conclusion that they are genuine and relevant, it will have to record reasons for admitting them. 7. It was strenuously contended by Mr. N. M. Lodha, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent that O. 13 R. 2 C.P.C. only requires the Court to record reasons, when it accepts the document at a late stage. He has further submitted that when the Court rejects the document then the Court is not required to give reasons. This particular view has also been taken by Honble Milap Chandra, J. in Jagjit Cotton Textiles Mills Ltds. case (supra). However, we are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Lodha in view of the submissions made by Mr. He has further submitted that when the Court rejects the document then the Court is not required to give reasons. This particular view has also been taken by Honble Milap Chandra, J. in Jagjit Cotton Textiles Mills Ltds. case (supra). However, we are unable to accept this contention of Mr. Lodha in view of the submissions made by Mr. A. L. Chopra, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, who has submitted that recording of satisfaction of the Court for late production of a document is also a matter of exercise of judicial discretion and rejection and acceptance of documents also is a matter of exercise of judicial discretion and judicial discretion has to be exercised by recording a speaking order. Whether it is a case of acceptance of documents or it is a case of rejection of documents, unless the Court records its reasons, the revisional or appellate court will have no opportunity to examine those reasons. It is true that every judicial order must be based on reasons and it must be a speaking order. May be that the relevant rule does not specifically provides for recording of reasons for rejection of documents but recording of reasons is very much necessary in view of the principles of natural justice. It was further contended by Mr. Chopra that discretion should be exercised so as to further the cause of justice. All the rules of procedure being meant for the administration of justice and hence too technical a view should not be taken. This very view has been upheld by a decision of the Orissa High Court in Property Association of Baptist Churches Vs. State of Orissa (6). It was submitted by him that when genuineness of a document is beyond doubt, there can be no reasonable objection to its reception even at a later stage. True that Sub-r. (1) makes the satisfactory explanation for non-production in accordance with R. 1, a condition precedent for the reception of documents produced beyond the time prescribed by O. 13 R. 1 C.P.C. but the sub-rule must be liberally construed so as to advance the cause of justice. The court is entitled to consider not only the reason for non-production but the authenticity of the document and the defying effect of the reception in evidence of the document. The court is entitled to consider not only the reason for non-production but the authenticity of the document and the defying effect of the reception in evidence of the document. In cases, where the document is of undoubted authenticity leave should ordinarily be granted but the discretion of the Court is there and the discretion should be exercised judiciously. 8. We have given our most earnest consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and in our considered opinion, the submissions made by Mr. A.L. Chopra, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners deserve to be sustained in view of the number of decisions of their lordships of the Supreme Court and this Court. In this respect, we may first refer to a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Smt. Swaran Lata V. Harendra Kumar (7), wherein it was observed as follows: "Trial of a civil dispute in Court is intended to achieve according to law and the procedure of the Court, a judicial determination between the contesting parties of the matter in controversy. A judicial determination of a disputed claim where substantial questions of law or fact arise is satisfactorily reached, only if it be supported by the most cogent reasons that suggest themselves to the Judge, a mere order deciding the matter in dispute not supported by reasons is no judgment at all. Recording of reasons is intended to ensure that the decision is not the result of whim or fancy, but of a judicial approach to the matter in contest, it is also intended to ensure adjudication of the matter according to law and the procedure established by law. A party to the dispute is ordinarily entitled to know the grounds on which the Court has decided against him, and more so, when the judgment is subject to appeal. The appellate Court will then have adequate material on which it may determine whether the facts are properly ascertained, the law has been correctly applied and the resultant decision is just." It was later observed that the conclusion of the Court ought normally to be supported by reasons duly recorded and this requirement transcends all technical rules of procedure. 9. In Radhey Shyam Vs. 9. In Radhey Shyam Vs. Lalli (8), it has been held by this Court as under:—"It must be impressed upon the trial courts that due weight should be given, while writing an order to the respective contentions of both the parties and proper reasons should be assigned for the conclusions arrived at by that court so that the appellate or the revisional court may be able to appreciate as to what grounds prevailed with the trial court while passing such an order. As the trial court has to exercise its judicial discretion while proceeding to allow or disallow an application for setting aside exparte decree, the trial court is expected to records its finding clearly as also the reasons upon which such finding is based. If that would have been done, I am sure that the suit would not have remained pending for such a long time. It is only because of the laconic nature of the order passed by the trial court that this revision application was entertained by this Court." Thus, this authority, clearly prescribes that the trial court must give due weight to the respective contentions of both the parties and it should assign proper reasons for the conclusions arrived by it so that the appellate court or the revisional court may be able to appreciate as to what grounds prevailed with the trial court while passing such an order. 10. Even while deciding the case of Radhey Shyam vs. Nathuram (supra), a learned single Judge of this court has observed that whether a good cause has been shown under O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. warranting admission of a document after framing of issues and whether the circumstances mentioned in the amended R. 17-A of O. 18 for taking evidence even after it has been closed, are made out in a case or not, are questions on which the Court may express an opinion rightly or wrongly and while doing so, it may commit an error of law also by either wrong appreciation of the law on the point of the scope of O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. or Order 18, R. 17-A or may commit a mistake in holding that there is no good cause when the one is proved but that would not result in bringing that sec. 115 C.P.C. This clearly shows that the Court has to form its opinion as regards the fact whether the delay has been properly explained or not ? It has also to form an opinion whether the document should be accepted or not. Thus, recording of a speaking order can also be inferred from the aforesaid decision in Radheyshyams case (supra). 11. In Nanurams case (supra), it was held that under O. 13, R. 2 C.P.C. discretion has been given to the Court to receive documents produced at a late stage or to reject them on the ground of late production and that discretion has to be exercised in the judicious manner. 12. We may also refer to certain observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S. N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India (9), wherein it was observed: "that with regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi judicial functions, the legislature while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the rquirement to record the reasons. The said requirement, cannot therefore as insisted upon in such a case. Therefore, cannot therefore be insisted upon in such a case. Therefore, except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that even while rejecting an application under O. 13. R. 2 C.P.C, the Court is required to record reasons not only regarding the fact whether the late production of the documents has been satisfactorily explained or not but it has also to record reasons why it is accepting the documents in evidence or rejecting them. R. 2 C.P.C, the Court is required to record reasons not only regarding the fact whether the late production of the documents has been satisfactorily explained or not but it has also to record reasons why it is accepting the documents in evidence or rejecting them. Thus, the first question referred by the learned single Judge is answered in the affirmative as aforesaid. 13. Now, we take up the second question for determination. Before we proceed to decide this question, it would be better to quote the provisions of s. 115 C.P.C., which are as follows: "S. 115. Revision : (1) The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such Subordinate Court appears : (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) to have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. the High Court may make such order in the case as it think fit: Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceedings, except where— (a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice, or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. (2) The High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court Subordinate thereto. Explanation:—In this section, the expression any case which has been decided includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding. It may be stated here that s. 115 C.P.C. was amended by Amendment Act of 1976 and prior to that sub-s. (1) of s. 115 C.P.C. was the law on the point. It may be stated here that s. 115 C.P.C. was amended by Amendment Act of 1976 and prior to that sub-s. (1) of s. 115 C.P.C. was the law on the point. Thereafter, the proviso has been added to sub-s. (1) of s. 115 C.P.C. and the earlier part of the section has been numbered as sub-s. (1) and a new sub-s. (2) has been added to it. Thus, proviso to sub-s. (1) and the entire sub-s. (2) alongwith its explanation have been added to section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the Amendment Act of 1976. 14. The learned single Judge felt that the decisions in Jagjit Cotton Textiles Mills Ltds. case (supra) and Radhey Shyam v. Nathurams case (supra), do not lay down the correct law on the point and according to him, the rejection of a document the late production of which has been satisfactorily explained and which is material for the decision of the case in a proper way results in failure of exercise of jurisdiction vested in the Court by the law or it may tantamount to acting in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. 15. Now, we will have to decide as to whether the decisions in Jagjit Cotton Textiles Mills Ltds. case (supra) and Radhey Shyam V. Nathurams case (supra) lay down the correct law on the point ? 16. S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has three parts. The first part relates to the fact that the High Court can call for the record of any case which has been decided by the Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto and if such Subordinate Court appears to have exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. In such a case, the High Court can make such an order in the case as it thinks fit. In other words, the High Court can entertain such revisions in such cases where it appears to the Court that the subordinate Court has exercised its jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or it has failed to exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. These are the three conditions for entertaining revisions by the High Court. In other words, the High Court can entertain such revisions in such cases where it appears to the Court that the subordinate Court has exercised its jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or it has failed to exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. These are the three conditions for entertaining revisions by the High Court. Further, a rider has been provided in proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 115 C.P.C that the High Court shall not under this section vary or reverse any order made or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings or the order if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. This proviso does not relate to the entertainment of revisions by the High Court. It only puts a rider on the powers of the High Court as regards its decision on the revision petitions can be entertained by the High Court in three contingencies as provided by sub-s. (1) of s. 115 C.P.C. Even if the High Court comes to the conclusion that the subordinate Court has exercised its jurisdiction not vested in it by law or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity then too it will not vary or reverse any order so made by the subordinate except where the order if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings, or the order if allowed to stand would occasion to a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Thus, this second par of section 115 C. P. C. limits the powers of the High Court to vary or reverse any order made by the subordinate court which is under revision. The third part of section 115 C.P.C. is that the High Court shall not under this section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. The third part of section 115 C.P.C. is that the High Court shall not under this section vary or reverse any decree or order against which an appeal lies either to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. Thus, this third part of s. l15 C.P.C. restricts the powers of the High Court to entertain revisions in cases where against the order impugned, an appeal lies wither to the High Court or to any Court subordinate thereto. An explanation has also been added to s. 115 C.P.C. Earlier, there was a great conflict in the decisions on the point as to what has to be treated as a case decided. To reserve this controversy, an explanation has been added to s. 115 C.P.C. and it has been provided that any case which has been decided includes any order, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding. 17. The Joint Committee of the Law C ommission felt that the expression case decided should be defined so that the doubt as to whether s. 115 applies to an interlocutory order may be set at rest. Accordingly, the Committee have added a proviso and an explanation to s. 115 C.P.C. This explanation has been added to s. 115 C.P.C. after this expression has been interpreted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Major S. S. Khanna V. Brig. F. J. Dillon (10) and Baldevdas V. Filmistan Distribution (11). In Baldevdas case (supra), their Lordships of the Supreme Court have observed that the expression case is not limited in its import to the entirety of the matter in dispute in an action. The expression case is a word of comprehensive import, it includes a civil proceedings and is not restricted by anything contained in s. 115 of the Code to the entirety of the proceeding in a civil court. To interpret the expression case as an entire proceeding only and not a part of the proceeding imposes an unwarranted restriction on the exercise of powers of superintendence and may result in certain cases in denying relief to the aggrieved litigant where it is most needed and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. But every order of the Court in the course of a suit does not amount to a case decided. But every order of the Court in the course of a suit does not amount to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided, if the court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some rights or obligation of the parties in controversy, every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a case decided within the meaning of s. 115 C.P.C. 18. The explanation under the present section now makes it clear that the expression includes any order made or any order deciding any issue in the course of the suit or other proceedings. Thus, by adding this explanation to s. 115 of the Code, the scope of expression case decided has been widened and it has been provided that the expression any case which has been decided includes any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding will be revisable only when the three conditions mentioned in s. 115 (1) of the Code are attracted and such an order can only be reversed or varied if either of the two conditions mentioned in the proviso to sub-s. (1) of s. 115 are attracted. 19. However, it may be stated here that the view that has been taken include only that order by which some alleged obligations of the parties controversy have been decided. A similar view has been taken by a Division Bench of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Harvinder Kaur V. Godha Ram (12), wherein it has been held that the explanation cannot be given the meaning that every order made in the course of a suit or other proceeding would be revisable. As per the High Court, an order that determines or adjudicates some rights or obligations of the parties in the controversy would only be revisable. This view is absolutely in consonance with the view taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Baldevdass case (supra). The learned Authors V. R. Manohar and W. W. Chitaley in A.I.R. Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure (Volume 2) (10th Edition) have also stated that this view appears to be more rational. 20. A view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Manoharlal vs. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd.(13) wherein while interpreting the explanation u/sec. The learned Authors V. R. Manohar and W. W. Chitaley in A.I.R. Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure (Volume 2) (10th Edition) have also stated that this view appears to be more rational. 20. A view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Manoharlal vs. Valerior (Cawnpore) Pvt. Ltd.(13) wherein while interpreting the explanation u/sec. 115 the learned single Judge of the Allahabad High Court has observed that the explanation added to the section does not indicate anything to the contrary. It only suggests that the order in question need not dispose of the entire suit in order to amount to a case decided. It is fairly settled that in order constitute a case decided, the order must adjudicate upon some rights or obligation of the parties in controversy. In taking this view, the learned Judge in this case has dissented with the view taken by the Orrisa High Court in A.I.R. 1978 Orissa 179(14). 21. Our attention was also drawn by Mr. Lodha to a single Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Maheshwari Oil Mill V. M/s Girjanath Durga Saran (15) wherein it has been observed that an order refusing to grant leave to a party to deliver interrogatories is not a case decided. 22. Our attention was also drawn to a Single Bench decision of the Patna High Court in Ramgulam Choudhary Vs. Nawin Choudhary (16). This is a case relating to the interpretation of Section 115 C.P.C. decided prior to amendment of 1976, N.L. Untwalia J. (as he then was) has observed that a case decided must be construed in a wider sense as it will include all decisions at various stages of the suit provided there are adjudications of rights or obligations of the parties in controversy for the purposes of the suit. This view is based on AIR 1970 S.C. 406 (17), wherein while detailing certain cases which may not be construed as cases decided, the learned Judge observed that wrong admission of documents in evidence is not a case decided. This was a case where the documents have been admitted and thereafter a revision was filed against that admission and it has been held that wrong admission of documents does not amount to a case decided. This was a case where the documents have been admitted and thereafter a revision was filed against that admission and it has been held that wrong admission of documents does not amount to a case decided. This case however does not relate to refusal to admit a document even when the delay has been explained and the document is relevant to the controversy which has been raised between the parties. 23. However, the Orissa High Court has taken a different view in Tata Iron and Steel Co. V. Rajrishi Exports (18) wherein it has been held that the addition of the explanation to s. 115 (2) by the 1976 Amendment Act has widened the scope and ambit of s.115 and as held in the undermentioned case, the limitation put on the expression any case which has been decided by the aforesaid Supreme Court decision would no longer hold good. Major S.S. Khannas case (supra), Baldevdass case (supra) and Madhu Limayes case (supra) were referred to by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Ghewar Chand V. Gaj Singh (19) wherein it has been observed as follows: "Even when interlocutory order does not adjudicate or determine any rights or obligations of the parties in controversy in the suit, still such an interlocutory order may occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury and as such, it can be said that such an order is revisable. The expression any case which has been decided includes any order made. It is true that the expression any order made includes within its embrace all sorts of orders such a wide connotation of course cannot be given to the expression any order. An order which may ultimately affect the decision of the suit or which may ultimately affect the rights of the party, though it is not adjudicating the right, may, in my opinion are be covered under the expression any order. Take for example, partys evidence is closed without any rhyms or reasons. Assistance of issue of process has been illegally refused. It may be stated that no right in controversy has been adjudged, but, as such orders ultimately affect the right of the party or affect the decision of the suit and so, in my opinion, would be covered under the expression any order. Assistance of issue of process has been illegally refused. It may be stated that no right in controversy has been adjudged, but, as such orders ultimately affect the right of the party or affect the decision of the suit and so, in my opinion, would be covered under the expression any order. There are catena of decisions of this Court where this Court has interfered with such orders, which may not have determined the rights and obligations of the party in controversy in the suit by way of the nature but which may have affected the decision of the suit and whereby some illegality or material irregularity has been committed in the exercise of jurisdiction" To us, this view appears to be just and proper in every respect. Any order which does not determine any right or obligation of the parties in controversy but which may ultimately affect the decision of the suit should be allowed to be included in the expression any order made or the expression case decided, because that order will have material bearing on the ultimate decision of the case. 24. Almost, a similar view, to the one that has been taken by Honble Shri M. C. Jain J. in Ghewar Chands case (supra) has been taken by the Himachal Pradesh High Court in A.I.R. 1977 H.P. P. 18 (20). It is a D.B. decision wherein it has been ordered that a case is decided when there is an adjudication on the rights or obligations of the parties in controversy. Such adjudication may be in the nature of a decision expressly deciding those rights or obligations- For example, entire suit or appeal may be disposed of or a distinct part of the suit or appeal may be disposed of finally so far as the subordinate Court is concerned or the adjudication may be such as to take the necessary effect of deciding these rights or obligations, The rejection of an application for amending the plaint by addition of further items which relief is sought in the suit would give rise to a case decided. Thus, the learned Judges of the Division Bench have held that not only when the rights and obligations of the parties are decided by the subordinate court but the adjudication may also be such as to take necessary effect of deciding those rights or obligations meaning thereby that if they have some effect on the ultimate decision then also, it will amount to a case decided. A l though, it has not been so specifically held in very specific term but this is what can be deducted by necessary inference in such matters. The learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court in Mahanth Som Prakash Das V. Sri Udasin Panchayati Akhara Bara (21) took a categorical view that refusal of Court to entertain documents affects a valuable right of the party to file documents in a suit. When such a valuable right is denied, it amounts to a case decided and a revision would lie. The learned Judge placed reliance not only on Baldeodas vs. Filmistan Distribution (supra) but also on 1972 Patna P. 499 in support of this view not admitting a document for insufficient reasons has been held to be jurisdictional error as also an error of procedure and it has been held that a revision is maintainable. This Court in 1983 W.L.N. (U.C.) P. 242 (22) has taken the view that the order tempts to decide or atleast affect the controversy between the parties amounts to a case decided. It has been held in A.I.R. 1982 Rajasthan 79 (23) that an order dismissing application to frame the issues, amounts to a case decided. 25. Our attention has been drawn to a D.B. decision of this Court in Yaqoob Ali Vs. F. Haji Taj Khanji Ibrahimji, Udaipur (24). It was a case of reference wherein the view taken by this Court in Narayanlals case (supra) and in Ramchand Vs. Laxmikumar (25) has been held to be against the law and both these decisions have been over ruled. Their Lordships of the D.B. while considering both these cases in the light of the proviso (b) of Sec. 114 C.P.C. r/w Sec. 105 C.P.C. held that they do not lay down the correct law in view of the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S.S. Khannas case (supra). Their Lordships of the D.B. while considering both these cases in the light of the proviso (b) of Sec. 114 C.P.C. r/w Sec. 105 C.P.C. held that they do not lay down the correct law in view of the decisions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in S.S. Khannas case (supra). It was clearly laid down in S.S. Khannas case that where the decision itself is not appealable to the High Court, direct exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court would not be deemed excluded. Thereafter, the learned Judges of the Division Bench discussed the effect of Sec. 115 and its proviso with special reference to any case which has been decided and have observed as under: "Apart from that the object behind s. 115 C.P.C. is to provide means to an aggrieved party to obtain correction or rectification of non appealable order though this power has to be exercised on the fulfilment of all the conditions laid down in it. If the interpretation which has been taken in Narainlals case (supra) and Ramchands case (supra) is accepted, that will, in our opinion, frustrate the very purpose and object of s. 115 C.P.C.. Apart from this, it should also not be lent sight of that, amongst, others, the explanation to s. 115 unambiguously lays down that in sec. 115, expression "any case which has been decided" includes any order made in the course of a suit or any other proceeding. This explanation is more than clear that case decided means even a part of case and as such on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in proviso (b), interferences can be made with the order refusing to record evidence. It follows from what has been discussed that if any jurisdictional error has been committed by the subordinate court in the course of a suit or other proceeding, it can be corrected in revision provided that order has been occasioned failure of justice or caused irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. It follows from what has been discussed that if any jurisdictional error has been committed by the subordinate court in the course of a suit or other proceeding, it can be corrected in revision provided that order has been occasioned failure of justice or caused irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. The mere fact that such an order can be challenged by setting forth an objection in memo of appeal against the decree under s. 105 C.P.C. would not be sufficient for not invoking the revisional jurisdiction under s. 115 C.P.C. on the ground that as that order can be challenged by setting forth as a ground of objection in the memo of appeal against the decree in an appeal, it cannot be said to occasion a failure of justice or not to have caused irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. On the basis of S.S. Khannas case (supra) and Baldevdass case (supra) and the Explanation to s. 115 C.P.C. we are unhesitatingly of the opinion that the interlocutory order relating to jurisdictional error and if it falls within the expression "any case which has been decided" can be challenged in revision provided the aggrieved party satisfied the High Court that order has resulted in failure of justice or has caused irreparable injury to him. The contrary view taken in Narainlals case (supra) and Ramchands case (supra) is over ruled." The learned Judges felt that even if against an order, a plea can be raised in ground of appeal which may be filed against the final decision of the suit that would not bar the entertainment of the revision-petition. Honble G. M. Lodha J. (as he then was) took the view that when such as opportunity is available to challenge that order in the memo of appeal i.e. filed against the final decision of the case then it doesnt cause irreparable injury. Honble G. M. Lodha J. (as he then was) took the view that when such as opportunity is available to challenge that order in the memo of appeal i.e. filed against the final decision of the case then it doesnt cause irreparable injury. That contention has been repelled by the D.B. decision in Yaqoob Alis case (supra) while following S.S. Khannas case and Baldevdass case (supra) and the explanation to s. 115 C.P.C. and the learned Judges of the Division Bench unhesitatingly stated that they are firmly of the opinion that the interlocutory orders which relates to jurisdictional order fall within the expression "any case which has been decided" and they can be challenged in revision provided the aggrieved party satisfies the High Court that the order has resulted in failure of justice or has caused irreparable injury to him. 26. On a careful consideration of the entire authorities that have been cited by both the learned counsel for the parties, we can safely say that the illegal assumption and non exercise of jurisdiction have reference usually to the initial stage of a case. But acting illegally or with material irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction comes after the Court has validly assumed jurisdiction. If after assuming such a jurisdiction which is vested in the Court, the Court acts illegally or with material irregularity which means that where there is exercise of jurisdiction which the Court possesses but the exercise has been in a manner which is illegal or materially irregular then cl. (c) would be attracted. It must be kept in view that these powers which have been conferred on the revisional Courts by sec. 115 C.P.C. are intended to be exercised with a view to subserve and not to defeat the ends of justice. The learned Authors V.R. Mano-har and W.W. Chitaley in their book AIR. Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure 10th Edn- have mentioned at page 371 some of the cases where it has been held that the jurisdiction has been exercised illegally or with material irregularity. On the strength of A.I.R. 1978 Allahabad 525 F.B. (26) and 1985 Raj L.R. 186 (27) and number of other decisions, the learned authors felt that where the lower Court decides a case without considering the materials placed before it or in disregard of the evidence, it amounts to a case decided. On the strength of A.I.R. 1978 Allahabad 525 F.B. (26) and 1985 Raj L.R. 186 (27) and number of other decisions, the learned authors felt that where the lower Court decides a case without considering the materials placed before it or in disregard of the evidence, it amounts to a case decided. Thus, perverse exercise of power is a jurisdictional error and where a case has been decided on the basis of certain material which doesnt exist on record, it may also be a case of exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. On the strength of AIR 1977 NOC 146 (All), (28), AIR 1985 Patna 163, (29), AIR 1984 Delhi 39 (30)and in number of other authorities, the learned Authors observed that where the learned lower Court decides a case without giving reasons for its judgment then too it amounts to exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. In Jagjit Cotton Textiles Mills Ltd.s case, the learned Judge took the view that for refusing the documents, no reasons are to be recorded. Such decisions by themselves will be amontable to revisional jurisdiction as a conclusion without reasons amounts exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. 27. We have already held while answering question No. 1 that every judicial order his to be a reasoned order and the aforesaid authorities, it has been held by the different High Courts that where a controversy is decided without giving reasons in the order, it amounts to an exercise of jurisdiction with material irregularity. On the strength of A.I.R. 1970 Rajasthan 77 at p. 83, (31), A..LR. 1983 (NDC) 184 Gauhati (32) and some other authorities, the learned authors have observed that where the Subordinate fails to follow a decision of the High Court to which it is subordinate or pronounces a decision without noticing that authority and without holding that it does not apply to that case as was done in A.I.R. 1941 Peshawar 76, (33) it will amount to a material irregularity in the exercise of the jurisdiction by a subordinate Court. A Division Bench of this Court has held in Gyaniram vs. Gulab Chand (34), that in admitting documents produced at a stage later than the first hearing the Courts should be liberal and should not exclude documents which are above suspicion, if they are necessary for the proper decision of the case. A Division Bench of this Court has held in Gyaniram vs. Gulab Chand (34), that in admitting documents produced at a stage later than the first hearing the Courts should be liberal and should not exclude documents which are above suspicion, if they are necessary for the proper decision of the case. Where the document sought to be produced by the defendant at the stage of his examination as witness was a registered partition deed, which had obviously a material bearing on the controversy between the parties it was held that the Court ought to have allowed the production of the document and it acted wrongly in rejecting it. When this is the considered view of this Court that in admitting documents, the Court should be liberal and a document which has an important bearing to the facts of the case and which may ultimately affect the decision of a case, should not be refused merely because it has been produced late, then, overlooking a D. B. decision of this Court a!sp renders the decision unsustainable as this also amounts to a jurisdictional error where the jurisdiction vested in the Court has been exercised illegally or atleast with the material irregularity. We are, therefore, firmly of the view that the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge in Jagjit Cotton Textiles Mills Ltd. (supra) alongwith three other revision petitions decided by a common order dated April 13, 1989 and the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge in Radhey Shyam Vs. Nathuram (supra), does not lay down the correct law. Any interlocutory order which does not adjudicate or finally determine any rights or obligations of the parties in controversy in the suit may still come in the purview of a case decided it they affect the ultimate decision of the suit, then that order should be treated as covered in the category of a case decided and if in deciding such cases, some illegality or material irregularity has been committed in the exercise of the jurisdiction then certainly the order is revisable u/sec. 115 C.P.C. because such cases will come under the category of Cl. 115 C.P.C. because such cases will come under the category of Cl. c of sub-section 1 of Sec. 115 C.P.C. However, before the court can vary or reverse such an order, it will have to further satisfy itself that the order if it has been made in favour of the party applying for revision would finally dispose of the suit or other proceedings or the order is of such an character that if allowed to stand would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to any party against whom it was made. 28. So far as the question No. 2 is concerned, it is answered in the affirmative that a revision would lie against an order by which the subordinate court has refused to accept documentary evidence under O. 13 r. 2 C.P.C. notwithstanding that good cause has been shown for late production and the document is of vital and material importanee. Thus, both these questions referred to by the learned Single Judge are answered in the affirmative as aforesaid and in view of the answers so furnished, the reference stands disposed of accordingly on merits without any order as to costs.