JUDGMENT 1. 1. Heard.Three fold contentions were advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The first contention was that the case against the petitioner for the offence under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Tonk, as a warrant case and not by way of summary trial. The learned counsel referred to section 16(a) of the said Act which provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, all offences under sub-section (1) of section 16 shall be tried in a summary way by a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government or by a Metropolitan Magistrate and the provisions of Section 262 to 265 (both inclusive) of the said Code, shall as may be apply to such trial. There are two provisos appended to this section. The first proviso states that in the case of any conviction in a summary trial, the Magistrate can only pass a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year. The second proviso states that if during the course of the summary trial, it appears to the Magistrate that the nature of the case is such that a sentence of imprisonment for a term exceeding one year may have to be passed or that it is, for any other reason undesirable to try the case summarily, the Magistrate shall record an order to that effect and thereafter he may call any witness to hear or rehear the case in the manner provided by the Code. 2. It may be mentioned that the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to three years and with fine which shall be less than 1,000/-. The maximum sentence being three years, the case is otherwise triable as a warrant case. In my opinion the basic condition for the applicability of Section 16 (A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is that there should be a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered by the State Government to try offence under sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act in a summary manner. In my opinion the basic condition for the applicability of Section 16 (A) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 is that there should be a Judicial Magistrate of the first class specially empowered by the State Government to try offence under sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act in a summary manner. If there is such a specially empowered Judicial Magistrate of the first class, then offences under sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Act is to be tried in a summary way subject to the two provisions appended to the section. It was not at all shown that there was a Judicial Magistrate of the first lass at Tonk who was specially empowered by the State Govt. to try the offences under sub-section (1) of Section 16 in a summary way. In the absence of such a specially empowered Judicial Magistrate at Tonk, the offence will have to be tried as a warrant case and not in a summary way. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to two decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court viz. Jaswant Singh v. U. T. Chandigarh, 1991-III All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal 144 and Mahinder Singh v. State of Haryana, 1991 All India Prevention of Food Adulteration Journal 184. The former judgment itself records that "But the Judicial Magistrates can hold summary trial only if they are specially so empowered. So, unless they are specially so empowered, the question of their holding summary trial does not arise. However, once the Judicial Magistrates are specially so empowered, then they cannot discriminate between one case and the other; they shall have to try every offence under section 16 (1) in the first instance in a summary way." It is thus clear from this very decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner that unless a Judicial Magistrate is specially empowered to try the offence under section 16 (1) of the Act in a summary way, no question of holding trial in that manner would arise, the later decision does not show that the Judicial Magistrate who was trying the case was not specially empowered to try the offence under section 16 (1) of the Act in a summary way. The learned counsel also referred a decision to this Court in Man Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in, 1989 (2) RLR 553. The learned counsel also referred a decision to this Court in Man Singh v. State of Rajasthan reported in, 1989 (2) RLR 553. This judgment goes to show that in this case, the petitioner was not aggrieved against the conclusion of the Magistrate that the trial of the offence being summary trial, the Magistrate could not have acted on the evidence recorded by the other Magistrate as provisions of Section 326 (3) Criminal Procedure Code were not applicable. The only grievance of the petitioner in that case was that the case was of the year 1976 and the petitioner was a petty milk vendor and, therefore, after such a lapse of time, the Sessions Judge should not have remanded the case for retrial. This authority, therefore, not for the proposition that even where a Judicial Magistrate is not empowered by the State Govt., to try the offence under section 16(1) of the Act in summary manner, the trial has to be in a summary way. 4. None of these three decisions, therefore, help the petitioner. 5. Since it has not been shown that any Judicial Magistrate of the first class had been empowered by the State Govt. to try the offence Under section 16 (1) of the Act in a summary way, it cannot be held that a trial should have been in a summary manner. The objection raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is over-ruled. 6. The next contention advanced by the learned counsel was that the name of the public analyst who examined the sample and gave the report regarding adulteration of milk was not included in the list notified by the State Govt. 7. Reliance was placed upon Rule 6 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1954. This rule lays down the qualification needed by a person for appointment as a public analyst. The list shown by the learned counsel for the petitioner for the perusal of the Court is a list of candidates who had been declared successful in public analyst examination under Rule 6 (b) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1954 (since Sept. 1980). That list cannot help the petitioner for more that one reasons. Firstly, the alleged offence took place on 8th August, 1984 and the list is in respect of the period after Sept. 1989. 1980). That list cannot help the petitioner for more that one reasons. Firstly, the alleged offence took place on 8th August, 1984 and the list is in respect of the period after Sept. 1989. It was necessary for the petitioner to show that the public analyst who examined the sample did not hold the qualifications prescribed by Rule 6(a) of the Rules. There is a proviso also attached to Rule 6 which states that a person who is a public analyst on the date of commencement of the Prevention of Food Adulteration (Amendment) Rules, 1980 or who has worked as a public analyst for a period of three years before such commencement may hold office as such, even though he does not fulfill the qualifications laid down in clause (a) and clause (b). The burden lays upon the petitioner to establish that the public analyst who examined the sample was not a qualified person. He has failed to establish that fact and, therefore, he cannot reap out any advantage only by putting forward an argument. 8. The last contention advanced was that although by virtue of Section 20 AA of the Act, the provisions contained in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 and those contained in Section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 do not apply, but since the offence was committed 7 years back, the sentence awarded to the petitioner may be reduced to the period already undergone. In this connection, it may be mentioned that Section 16 (1) clearly provides that the minimum sentence will not be less than six months. The certified copy of the judgment shown by the learned counsel urged that this Court has in Bansi Lal v. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Cr. Revision Petition No. 119/90 decided on 10th August, 1990 reduced the sentence to the period already undergone. The certified copy of the judgment shown by the learned counsel goes to show that case related to curd at the shop which was meant for the purpose of making sweets. That is not the nature of the case in the present case. The second decision in the case of Prahlad v. State of Rajasthan goes to show that the petitioner was a small milk vendor and he had remained in jail for nine days and then sentence was reduced to the period already undergone. That is not the nature of the case in the present case. The second decision in the case of Prahlad v. State of Rajasthan goes to show that the petitioner was a small milk vendor and he had remained in jail for nine days and then sentence was reduced to the period already undergone. There was no discussion to the minimum sentence provided and section 16 of the Act. When minimum sentence is provided and when the age of the petitioner is not under 18 years and the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, and section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure are in-applicable, the provisions regarding minimum sentence have to be made applicable. The legislature has provided this minimum sentence to deter persons from selling adulterated articles. I am not ready to reduce the minimum sentence provided for under law. 9. This revision has no merit in it and it is hereby dismissed.Revision dismissed. *******