JUDGMENT - DHANUKA D.R., J.:—This petition raises interesting questions of law concerning interpretation of section 33-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The said questions are formulated as under: (1) Whether the tenant of a landlady (landlady being a widow) who is a “certificated landlord” within the contemplation of section 88 of the Act is entitled to automatic statutory purchase of the land on final rejection of landlady's application for possession purported to have been made under section 33-B(1) of the Act even though such application is not a valid application, the same having not been made within three months of receipt of certificate of exemption under section 88-C of the Act and the same having not been preceded by service of notice of termination within the requisite period of three months commencing from the date of receipt of such certificate? (2) Whether in such a situation, section 33-C(3) of the Act is attracted or whether section 33-C(1) of the Act is applicable? I am of the opinion that the proceedings adopted by the landlady for recovery of possession under section 33-B of the Act are liable to be treated as without jurisdiction and non est in absence of service of notice of termination within three months from receipt of the certificate and when the same are ex facie time-barred. I am of the opinion that in such a situation section 33-C(3) of the Act is attracted and not section 33-C(1). I am of the opinion that in such a situation the tenant is not automatically entitled to purchase the land on rejection of landlady's application inter alia on the ground of the same being time-barred or non-maintainable. 2. By this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has impugned the judgment and order dated 21st November, 1980 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in (1) Revision Application No. M.RT.P.I. 3/79 (T.N.C.B. 16/79 and (2) Revision Application No. M.R.T.P.I. 2/79 (T.N.C.B. 15/79). This litigation has a chequered history. However, I propose to refer only to material facts emerging from the record of the case which are germane to the disposal of this petition. This litigation has a chequered history. However, I propose to refer only to material facts emerging from the record of the case which are germane to the disposal of this petition. The relevant facts are as under : (a) The petitioner is a tenant of two pieces of lands situate at Saswad Bearing Survey No. 185/16 having an area of 0.11 gunthas assessed at Rs. 2.44 and Survey No. 185/5-B having an area of 29 Gunthas and assessed at Rs. 6.38. At the material time, the respondent widow was the landlady of the said lands. The respondent widow is alive and continues to be the landlady in respect of the said lands. (b) By an order dated 31st October, 1961 (Exhibit 'A' to the petition), the Agricultural Lands Tribunal No. 1, Purandhar, held that the proceedings adopted under section 32-G of the Act for fixation of statutory purchase price were liable to be dropped in view of the fact that the landlady Smt. Gangubai was a widow since 1947 and also in view of the fact that she had acquired title to the said lands before 31st March, 1958. It is well settled law that right of statutory purchase cannot be exercised against the widow during her lifetime. (c) The respondent landlady made an application to the prescribed authority for grant of exemption certificate in respect of the said lands under section 88-C of the Act. Section 88-C of the Act provides for exemption of the lands leased by persons with annual income not exceeding Rs. 1,500/- from certain provisions of the Act. The said section 88-C(4) of the Act provides that the Mamlatdar shall issue a certificate in the prescribed form to the landlord/landlady who satisfies the prescribed conditions in respect of such exemption. By an order dated 19th June, 1962, it was directed by the prescribed authority that exemption certificate be granted to the respondent-landlady in respect of the lands bearing Survey Nos. 185/16 and 185/5-B of the village Saswad as contemplated under section 88-C of the Act. The respondent No. 1 received the said certificate of exemption soon thereafter. (d) In her capacity as a certificated landlady, the respondent made an application for possession of the said land to the Court of the Tenancy Aval Karkun purporting to invoke section 33-B of the said Act. The respondent No. 1 received the said certificate of exemption soon thereafter. (d) In her capacity as a certificated landlady, the respondent made an application for possession of the said land to the Court of the Tenancy Aval Karkun purporting to invoke section 33-B of the said Act. Section 33-B(1) read with section 33-B(3) of the Act provides that certificated landlord must serve notice of termination within three months of his receiving such certificate if an application for issue of the certificate under section 88-C of the Act was undisposed of on 1st January, 1962. The said section further prescribes that such application must necessarily be made within a period of three months of receiving the certificate by the landlord. The two periods of limitation prescribed by the abovereferred provision are mandatory. The said section does not make any provision whatsoever for extension of period of limitation for the purpose aforesaid. Only on 5th January, 1968 (i.e. several years after issue and receipt of the abovereferred certificate of exemption), the respondent made the abovereferred application for possession under section 33-B of the said Act in her capacity as certificated landlady. The said application was clearly barred by limitation as it was not made within three months of the receipt of the exemption certificate. The respondent had not served the necessary notice of termination within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certificate of exemption under section 88-C of the Act as provided by the mandatory provisions of section 33-B of the said Act. The said application was not a valid application and the said proceedings were without jurisdiction for non-compliance of the conditions precedent prescribed by the said section. By an order dated 31st December 1968, the Tenancy Aval Karkun, Purandhar, rejected the said application of the respondent-landlady. The said authority in terms held that the respondent had failed to serve the notice on the tenant within the prescribed period of limitation and the respondent had failed to present the application for possession in time as prescribed by sub-section (3) of section 33-B. In other words, the Tenancy Aval Karkun, Purandhar, rejected the said application as not maintainable on the footing that no valid application was presented by the respondent-landlady to the said authority in accordance with the mandate of section 33-B of the said Act. Issues Nos. Issues Nos. 5 and 6 framed by the said authority read as under :— “(5) Whether the applicant served the opponent as required by sub-section (3) of section 33-B of the Tenancy Act in the prescribed time and whether the copy of the notice was sent to the Mamlatdar, Purandhar? (6) Whether the applicant landlady has filed the present application in time prescribed by sub-section (3) of section 33-B?” The Tenancy Aval Karkun answered both the above questions in the negative. During the course of his order, the said authority referred to the notice of termination dated 27th June, 1967 issued by the respondent to the petitioner, clearly admitting the receipt of the said certificate of exemption. During the course of the said order, the said authority further observed that the respondent had served a subsequent notice of termination on the petitioner on 24th November, 1967 and had filed the said application for possession under section 33-B of the Act only on 5th January, 1968 by which time the remedy of seeking possession by the certificated landlord under section 33-B of the said Act had clearly and patently become time-barred by law of limitation, the same having not been invoked within three months from the receipt of the exemption certificate. The said order was ultimately confirmed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Pune, by its order dated 21st June, 1971. By the said order it was also directed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal that proceedings under section 33-C of the Act should not be held by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal. In such a situation, the due date for statutory purchase is postponed beyond the lifetime of the widow in terms of section 33-C(3) of the Act. (e) On 1st November, 1971, the petitioner tenant made an application to the Additional Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal, Purandhar, for statutory purchase of the said land on the assumption that the abovereferred application dated 5th January, 1968 was a valid application. By an order dated 31st July 1973, the Additional Tahsildar and Agricultural Lands Tribunal rejected the said application of the petitioner as premature and non-maintainable as obvious from the scheme of the Act and the plain reading of the provisions thereof. (f) Being aggrieved by the said order dated 31st July, 1973, the petitioner tenant filed Tenancy Appeal No. 39 of 1974 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Baramati Division, Baramati. (f) Being aggrieved by the said order dated 31st July, 1973, the petitioner tenant filed Tenancy Appeal No. 39 of 1974 before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Baramati Division, Baramati. By an order dated 18th October, 1978, the said appeal was allowed and the order of the ALT dated 31st July, 1973 was set aside. (g) In the meanwhile, the landlady had filed another application for possession against the petitioner invoking sections 14, 15 and 29 of the Act. The said application was rejected. Appeal of the landlady against the order of rejection was dismissed. (h) Both the parties therefore filed their respective revision applications before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal. By an order dated 21st November, 1980 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal in the revision application preferred by the tenant invoking section 33-C(1) of the Act, being Revision Application No. M.R.T.P.J. 2/79 (TEN.B.15/79), the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Baramati, in Tenancy Appeal No. 39 of 1974 was set aside and the order of the Additional Tahsildar and A.L.T., Purandhar, dated 31st July, 1973, was confirmed. Thus according to the view of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, the petitioner tenant is not entitled to statutory purchase of the said lands at this stage merely because of rejection of application for possession made by the landlady under section 33-B of the Act, the same having been rejected as time-barred. According to the Tribunal, section 33-C(1) of the Act and particularly the proviso thereto cannot be availed of by the tenant in a situation where the widow who is also a certificated landlady has not invoked section 33-B of the Act within time prescribed by the said section. 3. It is necessary to refer to the relevant statutory provisions of the Act before I deal with the submissions made by the learned Counsel for both sides at the hearing of this petition. 4. Sub-chapter (II-A) of Chapter III of the Act specially deals with the subject of termination of tenancy by certificated landlords and statutory purchase by tenants of lands to which section 88-C applies. The said sub-chapter consists of sections 33-A to section 33-C of the Act. 4. Sub-chapter (II-A) of Chapter III of the Act specially deals with the subject of termination of tenancy by certificated landlords and statutory purchase by tenants of lands to which section 88-C applies. The said sub-chapter consists of sections 33-A to section 33-C of the Act. Section 33-A of the Act defines the expression “certificated landlord” for the purposes of sections 33-B and 33-C of the Act as a person who holds a certificate of exemption issued to him under sub-section (4) of section 88-C excluding from the purview thereof a landlady within the meaning of Chapter XXI-A holding a similar certificate. Sub-clause (ii) of section 33-A of the Act defines the expression “excluded tenant” as a tenant of land to which sections 32 to 32-R do not apply by virtue of sub-section (1) of section 88-C. Section 88-C of the Act provides for issue of exemption certificate in respect of lands leased by any person if such land does not exceed an economic holding and the total annual income of such person including the rent of such land does not exceed Rs. 1,500. It is not necessary to refer to the proviso to section 88-C(1) of the said Act for the purpose of this petition. 5. The provisions contained in section 32-F of the Act and other connected sections make special provisions in respect of disabled landlords and widows i.e. category of landlords where the landlord is a minor or a widow or a person subject to any mental or physical disability. Landlords/landladies belonging to any of these specified categories are eligible to apply for certificate of exemption under section 88-C of the Act. In the event of certificate of exemption being granted to landlords of this category, such landlords are entitled to invoke the benefit of the special provisions available to certificated landlords contained in sub-chapter (II-A) of Chapter III of the said Act, consisting of sections 33-A to 33-C of the Act. 6. In the event of certificate of exemption being granted to landlords of this category, such landlords are entitled to invoke the benefit of the special provisions available to certificated landlords contained in sub-chapter (II-A) of Chapter III of the said Act, consisting of sections 33-A to 33-C of the Act. 6. Sections 33-B(1), 33-B(2), 33-B(3) and 33-B(4) of the said Act read as under:— “33-B.(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 31, 31-A or 31-B, a certificated landlord may, after giving notice and making an application for possession as provided in sub-section (3), terminate the tenancy of an excluded tenant, if the landlord bona fide requires such land for cultivating it personally; (2) The notice may be given and an application made by a certificated landlord under sub-section (3), notwithstanding that in respect of the same tenancy an application of the landlord made in accordance with sub-section (2) of section 31— (i) is pending before the Mamlatdar or in appeal before the Collector, or in revision before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, on the date of the commencement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Amendment) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to in this section as “the commencement date”), or (ii) has been rejected by any authority before the commencement date. (2) The notice required to be given under sub-section (1) shall be in writing, and shall be served on the tenant— (a) before the first day of January 1962, but (b) if an application under section 88-C is undisposed of and pending on that date then within three months of his receiving such certificate, and a copy of the notice shall, at the same time, be sent to the Mamlatdar. An application for possession of the land shall be made thereafter under section 29 to the Mamlatdar before the 1st day of April 1962, in the case falling under (a) and within three months of his receiving the certificate in the case falling under (b). An application for possession of the land shall be made thereafter under section 29 to the Mamlatdar before the 1st day of April 1962, in the case falling under (a) and within three months of his receiving the certificate in the case falling under (b). (4) Where the certificated landlord belongs to any of the following categories, namely:— (a) a minor, (b) a widow, (c) (deleted) (d) a person subject to any physical or mental disability, then, if he has not given notice and not made an application as required by sub-sections (1) and (3), such notice may be given and such application made— (A) by the landlord within one year from the date on which he,—(i) in the case of category (a) attains majority; (ii) (deleted) (iii) in the case of category (d), ceases to be subject to such physical or mental disability; and (B) in the case of a widow, by the successor-in-title within one year from the date on which widow's interest in the land ceases: Provided that, where a person belonging to any category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if anyone member of the joint family does not belong to any of the categories mentioned in this sub-section, unless the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds before 31st day of March 1958 and the Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated (having regard to the area, assessment, classification and value of the land) in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and not in a larger proportion.” 7. Section 33-C(3) of the said Act reads as under: “33-C(3). Section 33-C(3) of the said Act reads as under: “33-C(3). Where the certificated landlord, belonging to any of the categories specified in sub-section (4) of section 33-B, has not given notice of termination of the tenancy of an excluded tenant in accordance with sub-section (3) of that section, or has given such notice but has not made an application thereafter under section 29 for possession as required by the said sub-section (3), such excluded tenant shall have the right to purchase the land held by him as tenant within one year from the expiry of the period specified in sub-section (4) of section 33-B: Provided that where the tenancy is terminated and application for possession is made in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 33-B, the tenant shall, within one year from the date on which such application is finally decided, be entitled to purchase the land which he is entitled to retain in possession after such decision.” 8. It is thus clear on the plain reading of section 33-C(3) of the Act that the said section shall be applicable where no notice of termination of tenancy of an excluded tenant has been served by the certificated landlord “in accordance with sub-section (3) of that section” i.e. within period of three months from receipt of such certificate where certificate is issued after 1st January, 1962 (the Italics is done to supply emphasis). It is clear from the plain reading of sub-section (3) of section 33-B of the said Act that the said section shall not operate unless the certificated landlord has made an application for possession to the prescribed authority within the period of limitation as contemplated by section 33-B(3) of the said Act. In the instant case, neither the notice was issued by respondent landlady within statutory period of three months from the date of receipt of such certificate nor the application was made within the period of three months from the date of receipt of such certificate. Section 33-C(3) provides that where the certificated landlord has not invoked section 33-B of the said Act in accordance with the mandate of the said section, the excluded tenants of such certificated landlords shall have the right to purchase the land held by him as tenant within one year from the expiry of the period specified in sub-section (4) of section 33-B of the Act and not earlier. Section 33-B(4) of the said Act prescribes that where the certificated landlord is a widow, her successor-in-title may serve the requisite notice on the tenant within one year from the date of her ceasing to have any interest in the property. Sub-section (3) of section 33-C provides that in all such cases the excluded tenant i.e. the tenant of the certificated landlord belonging to the categories specified in sub-section (4) of section 33-B shall have right to purchase the land held by him as tenant within one year from the expiry of the period prescribed for termination of tenancy by the successor-in-title of the widow i.e. a period of two years after the widow ceasing to have interest in the land in the manner prescribed, and subject to the provisions contained therein. 9. Shri C.R. Dalvi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has submitted as under: The respondent landlady was not merely a widow but also a certificated landlady. The respondent had an option to make an application for possession during her lifetime in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 33-B of the Act although she was not bound to do so. In this case, the respondent had exercised such option by making an application for possession under section 33-B(1) read with sub-section (3) of section 33-B of the said Act. Having exercised her option by making an application in her lifetime and invoked the abovereferred provision, the petitioner tenant became entitled to automatic statutory purchase of the said land during lifetime of the widow on rejection of the said application for possession made by the respondent under section 33-B of the said Act on whatever ground. Once the application for possession made by the respondent-landlady under section 33-B of the Act was finally rejected by the Tribunal, the option available to the landlady to seek possession of the land under section 33-B(1) of the Act, was exhausted. In such a case, the question of the predecessor-in-title to the widow terminating the tenancy within period of one year after cessation of the interest of the widow in the said lands would not arise. In all such cases, sub-section (4) of section 33-B or sub-clause (3) of section 33-C shall have no application. In such a case, the question of the predecessor-in-title to the widow terminating the tenancy within period of one year after cessation of the interest of the widow in the said lands would not arise. In all such cases, sub-section (4) of section 33-B or sub-clause (3) of section 33-C shall have no application. Since the respondent had already exercised the option available to her to make an application for possession of the said lands for personal cultivation within contemplation of section 33-B of the said Act, the petitioner tenant was governed by the provisions contained in section 33-C(1) of the said Act. Proviso to section 33-C(1) of the said Act clearly provides that where the landlord had made such an application for possession, the tenant becomes deemed purchaser of the land on the date on which the said application was finally rejected. For the reasons discussed in later part of this judgment, I find no merit in the submission of Shri Dalvi. 10. The learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that there is a clear fallacy in the argument of Shri Dalvi and in the instant case the matter was clearly governed by sub-section (3) of section 33-C of the Act. The learned Counsel submitted that no valid application was made by the respondent landlady at all and it cannot be said that the respondent landlady had invoked the provisions of section 33-B of the said Act when the purported application for possession made by the landlady under section 33-B of the Act was hopelessly time-barred and could not be entertained at all. It is not disputed, and it is not disputable, that the purported application made by the respondent for possession purporting to invoke section 33-B of the Act was hopelessly time- barred on the face of it and was not preceded by service of notice on the tenant within period of three months from receipt of the certificate of exemption as required by mandatory provision of law. The learned Counsel for the respondent has emphasised the plain language of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of section 33-C of the Act. The learned Counsel for the respondent has emphasised the plain language of the provisions contained in sub-section (3) of section 33-C of the Act. The opening words of the said sub-section provide that it shall be applicable in a situation where the certificated landlord had not given notice of termination of the tenancy to the excluded tenant in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 33-B or had not made an application in accordance with the said provision, sub-section (3) of section 33-C will apply. (The Italics is done to supply emphasis). The question to be asked is as to whether the abovereferred application of the respondent could be considered as an application made in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 33-B. The answer is clearly in the negative. The question to be asked is as to whether the respondent landlady had given notice of termination of tenancy to the petitioner in accordance with the mandate of sub-section (3) of section 33-B which necessarily means that such notice ought to have been served within the prescribed period of limitation i.e. three months from receipt of certificate of exemption. Once again, the answer is in the negative. If a valid application was made by the landlady for possession within the period of limitation to the prescribed authority under section 33-B of the said Act and the said application was rejected on merits, proviso to section 33-C(1) of the said Act would have applied and in view of the qualifying conditions prescribed for applicability of sub-section (3) of section 33-C of the said Act, section 33-C(3) of the Act postponing the statutory purchase would not have applied. Shri Dalvi submits that the fact that the application made by the landlady under section 33-B of the Act was time-barred is of no consequence. I do not agree. Shri Dalvi submits that the fact that the application was rejected on the same being not maintainable is of no consequence. It is undoubtedly true that the tenant's right to make statutory purchase in such a case is intertwined with the right of the disabled landlord or successor-in-title in case of the widow to resume possession after termination of tenancy on the ground of personal cultivation as provided under the relevant sections. It is undoubtedly true that the tenant's right to make statutory purchase in such a case is intertwined with the right of the disabled landlord or successor-in-title in case of the widow to resume possession after termination of tenancy on the ground of personal cultivation as provided under the relevant sections. Merely because some sort of application was made by the respondent landlady to the prescribed authority purporting to invoke section 33-B of the said Act, it does not follow that the said application was made in accordance with the mandate of the said section. Thus the right of the successor-in-title of the respondent to serve notice of termination within one year after cessation of the interest of the widow in the said land is not affected merely because of the proceedings adopted by section 33-B of the Act which were without jurisdiction, the same being ex facie time-barred. In this view of the matter, the right of the petitioner to claim statutory purchase of the said lands is deferred by operation of law in terms of section 33-C(3) of the Act and the same cannot be exercised at this stage during the lifetime of the widow. 11. Shri Dalvi, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, relied by analogy on the provisions contained in section 31 of the said Act. Section 31(1) and section 31(2) of the said Act deal with a situation where a landlord terminated tenancy of the tenant on or before 31st December, 1956 and made an application for possession on or before 31st March, 1957. It has been held by the Division Bench of our High Court in the case of (Nago Dattu v. Yeshodabai)1, reported in 78 Bom.L.R. 427, that a widow or other disabled landlord could invoke section 31(1) of the Act if she or he had served notice terminating the tenancy of the tenant concerned before 31st December, 1956 and had made the application for possession to the prescribed authority on or before 31st of March, 1957 within the contemplation of section 31(1) and section 31(2) of the Act. It was held in this case that in such a situation, the widow could not invoke another option which would have been otherwise available to her under section 31(1) of the Act. It was held in this case that in such a situation, the widow could not invoke another option which would have been otherwise available to her under section 31(1) of the Act. In my judgment, the provisions contained in sub-chapter (II-A) of Chapter III of the Act are special specific provisions and the provisions contained in sections 33-B and 33-C of the Act cannot be interpreted by applying the analogy contained in section 31 of the said Act. It cannot be forgotten that in (Quinn v. Leathem)2, 1901 Appeal Cases 495 at 506, it was observed by Lord Halsbury that “every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case...” It was observed that a case was an authority for what it actually decides and its ratio cannot be extended by analogy. It is, therefore, not possible for me to extend the ratio of the judgment of the Division Bench of our High Court in the case of Nago Dattu (supra) interpreting altogether different provisions of the Act by analogy in a matter arising under different provisions of the Act. In the abovereferred judgment, the Hon'ble Division Bench was not concerned with the interpretation of section 33-C or section 33-B of the Act. Moreover, the factual situation in this case is also totally different. I am, therefore, unable to apply the ratio of this judgment which interprets an altogether different provision by analogy to the questions arising in this case. 12. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment in the case of (Kondiba Yeshwant v. Gajanan)3, 1974 Mh.L.J 275. In this case, Malvankar, J., held as under:— “Under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, an excluded tenant of a certificated landlord belonging to the category of persons subject to any physical or mental disability, is not required to inform his landlord and the Tribunal within one year as required by section 33-C(4) of the Act, if such a landlord has given notice and made an application as required by section 33-B(1) and (3) of the Act and his application is finally rejected. The case of such an excluded tenant is governed by the proviso to section 33-C(1) and not by the proviso to section 33-C(3) of the Act.” I am in respectful agreement with the view taken by Malvankar, J., in the abovereferred case. If in this case it would have been shown that the respondent landlady has made a valid application for possession under section 33-B of the Act in accordance with the provisions of the said section, I would have undoubtedly held that section 33-C(1) of the Act was applicable and the tenant had become entitled to automatic purchase of the land on final rejection of such an application, the ultimate result of the application being irrelevant. In the present case, however, I have already held that the respondent had not made an application within time and the application of the respondent for possession could not be treated as a valid application at all. In this view of the matter, applying the ratio of this very judgment which has been relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, I hold that section 33-C(3) of the Act is applicable and not the proviso to section 33-C(1) of the Act. 13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon an unreported judgment of Deshpande, J., (as he then was) delivered on 22nd December, 1976 in Special Civil Application No. 216 of 1973 in the case of (Vithal Govind Adhav v. Smt. Parvatibai Aphale)4. This also was not a case where the application of the widow invoking section 33-B of the Act was time-barred and was not maintainable at all. In my judgment, when an application is rejected on the ground of the same being not maintainable or on the ground of the same being time-barred, it has to be equated with a situation where no application is made at all. I, therefore, hold that the respondent had not invoked, in the eyes of law, the provisions contained in section 33-B of the Act inasmuch as neither the notice was served nor the application was made within time. In view of the above discussion, it will have to be held that the application dated 5th January, 1968 filed by the respondent in this case and all the orders passed thereon was null and void. In view of the above discussion, it will have to be held that the application dated 5th January, 1968 filed by the respondent in this case and all the orders passed thereon was null and void. The entire proceedings adopted under section 33-B of the Act are liable to be treated as without jurisdiction and nullity for reasons already discussed. 14. In the result, the petition fails. Rule is discharged, with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed. -----