JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon and, J. - Petitioners are 'traders in the city of Gorakhpur. They have been granted lincences under the U.P. Scheduled Commodities Dealers (Licensing and Restriction on Hoarding) Order, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the Order). Edible Oil is one of scheduled commodities enumerated in the Order. Prior to the enforcement of the Order, the petitioners he licences for stocking edible oil under the Pulses, Edible Oilseeds and Edible Oil (Storage Control) Order, 1977 as amended by the Order of 1981. Under the aforesaid Order, Gorakhpur was categorised as "B" city as its population was three lacs and more but less than ten lacs. On that basis, the petitioners were permitted to keep in stock a certain quantity of edible oil. Under the Order, Gorakhpur has not been categorised as "B" city. Naturally, the limit of stock of edible oil which can be held at a particular time by a licensed dealer has been reduced. The petitioners challenge the non - categorisation of Gorakhpur as "B" city as shown in Schedule III of the Order. 2. Clause 2(b) of the Order defines "B" city to mean a city specified as such in column 2 of Schedule III. Schedule III has two columns. The first column contains category "A" cities having population of ten lacs and above. The second contains a list of the cities under the heading category "B" cities having population of three lacs and more but not more than ten lacs and capital city of the State. Six cities are mentioned in this category. They are : Agra, Varanasi, Allahabad, Meerut, Bareilly and Lucknow. 3. In paragraph 3 of the writ petition it is averred that in the year 1981 Gorakhpur city had a population of more than three lacs. This averment has not been denied in the counter-affidavit. This averment is corroborated by the fact that under the 1977 Order, as amended by 1981 Order, even the Central Government had accepted the position that the city of Gorakhpur had a population of three lacs and more but less than ten lacs. It is thus apparent that on or before 31st August, 1989, when the Order was enforced, the population of Gorakhpur city was three lacs and more. It is thus apparent that on or before 31st August, 1989, when the Order was enforced, the population of Gorakhpur city was three lacs and more. Therefore, the conclusion is inevitable that while drawing up Schedule III Gorakhpur city had been left out from Category "B" on account of some mistake or due to an inadvertence. 4. Having reached the irresistible conclusion that the drafts man clearly indicated that the cities having a population of three lacs and more but less than ten lacs should be placed in Schedule III and having found that there was an accidental slip or unintentional omission to mention Gorakhpur City in Schedule III the question is: Can we rectify the omission ? We can do so. 5. The rule of interpretation of Statutes, where relevant, apply to direct or subordinate legislation alike. In the field of interpretation there is mutual dependence of the Courts and the draftsmen. "Naked usurpation of legislative power" is beyond the bounds of the judiciary. Nonetheless, judges, while applying Statute law, some make a minor inroad in the legislative field. However, a maiden area or a sphere untouched by the legislature cannot be encroached upon by the judiciary. Also, an intentional omission by the legislature or its delegate cannot be corrected by Judges. Likewise, an interpretation which may lead to a situation where it can be said that the legislature has omitted something from the Statute should be eschewed. In other words, casus omissus (the omitted case) should be avoided while discerning the legislative intent. 6. Craise on Statute Law (Seventh Edition) at page 520 discusses "correction of mistakes". At page 522 he says : "An evidently accidental omission in the Schedule to an Act may be supplied." In the instant case there can be no two opinions that the omission in the Schedule III is evidently accidental. 7. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition) in Chapter XI at page 228 deals with "exceptional construction". Case of Cramas Properties Ltd. v. Cannought Fer Trimmings Ltd., (1965) 1 WLR 892 at page 899 is referred to wherein Lord Heid has said that he prefers to see a mistake on the part of the drafts man in doing his revision rather than a deliberte attempt to introduce an irrational rule : "The canons of construction are not so rigid as to prevent a realistic solution". So far as the instant case is concerned, we have already emphasised that the drafts men clearly intended that all cities having a population of three lacs of more and less than ten lacs should find place in Schedule III. Therefore, there was no question of deliberate or intentional attempt not to keep Gorakhpur city under the canopy of Schedule III. Lord Reid's dictum squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the instant case. 8. We are not oblivious of the opinion expressed by Marshall C.J. of the United States : "Judicial power is never exercised for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judges: always for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the legislature or in other words to the will of the law". In the case in hand while supplying the omission we will not be imposing our will. We shall be merely giving effect to the will of the draftsman. We are tempted to refer to the observations of Denning, L.J. His Lordship said : "When a defect appears a Judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must seek to work on the construction task of finding the intention of Parliament...........and then he must supplement the written words so as to give "force and life to the intention of the legislature".......A judge should ask himself the question how, if the makers of the Act had themselves came across this ruck in the texture of if, they would have straightened it out ? He must then do so as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he should iron out the creases". (Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, (1949) 2 All ER 155 at page 164. These observations have been quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in a number of cases. It will be sufficient to refer to the case of M. Pentiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 at page 1115. The aforequoted observations of Denning, LJ are apposite, as, in the instant case, the draftsman had no other intention but to put all the cities having a population of more than three lacs and less than ten lacs in Schedule III and the draftsman would have had no alternative but to rectify its mistake. 9. The aforequoted observations of Denning, LJ are apposite, as, in the instant case, the draftsman had no other intention but to put all the cities having a population of more than three lacs and less than ten lacs in Schedule III and the draftsman would have had no alternative but to rectify its mistake. 9. In P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries, AIR 1990 SC 933 , the controversy was as to what is the period prescribed for making an application under Rule 89 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure (as amended by the Act 104 of 1976). Prior to the enforcement of the Amending Act 104 of 1976, the period of limitation prescribed in Rule 92(2) of Order XXI was "within their days from the date of sale". At that stage, Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963 also prescribed a limitation of thirty days from the date of the sale. However, by the Amending Act 104 of 1976 "thirty days" in Article 127 was substituted by "sixty days". The High Court concerned opened that there was a defect or-an omission in Rule 92(2) of Order XXI and instead of thirty days, sixty days should be read in that provision. The Supreme Court observes that there is inconsistency between the two sets of provisions prescribing different periods of limitation. Both the provisions can be worked out. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read into it the words which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces intelligible result. The Court has quoted with approval the opinion expressed by Lord Halsbury in Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson Brothers, (1888) 13 AC 595 at page 602 : "No case can be found to authorise any Court to alter a word so as produce casus omissus". Again the Supreme Court has quoted with approval the opinion expressed in Craqford v. Spooner, (1846) 4 Moo Ind App 179 : "We cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add and mend, and, by construction, make up the deficiencies which are there". In this back drop, no doubt, the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 has observed : "assuming that there is a defect or omission in the words used in the legislation, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency". In this back drop, no doubt, the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 has observed : "assuming that there is a defect or omission in the words used in the legislation, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency". In our opinion the said observations of the Supreme Court do not militate against the view we are proposing to take that the instant case is a case of a purely accidental omission and, therefore, we shall be within our jurisdiction to rectify the defect. We may emphasise that the case' in hand is not the one where the intention of the draftsman is not clear, it is not a case where by our action we will be producing a casus omissus. On the contrary, a literal reading of Schedule III itself is producing a comprehensible result that Gorakhpur city is accidentally not finding a place in Schedule III when the intention is that it should. 10. Casus omissus means a case omitted. A matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a statute. The doctrine is a constraint on judicial law making. It puts a fetter on the law applying organ (the Court) to create law. It prevents the Court from supplementing the statute to fulfil the broader purpose beyond the statute. The doctrine has a negative implication acid that is that the legislature by its express of implied intendment occupied the field to the exclusion of the Court 11. Casus omissus rule plays a role in the operation of the plain meaning rule. If an idea has not been stated, the Court may not supply it. It does not come into play for the purpose of ascertaining the meaning of a statute. It has its utility after the meaning has been ascertained and when the inquiry is : what does the statute mean? At best, it may be described as an assumed limitation on the scope of judicial law making with respect to an area which has been left out untouched by a statute whose meaning has already been ascertained. We, therefore, take the view that casus omissus will not come into existence in a situation where, in spite of the intention of the draftsman to the contrary, an error or an omission has crept in and the same is rectified by the Court. 12. We, therefore, take the view that casus omissus will not come into existence in a situation where, in spite of the intention of the draftsman to the contrary, an error or an omission has crept in and the same is rectified by the Court. 12. We direct the respondent to treat the city of Gorakhpur as "B" city for the purposes of the Order. We also direct the respondent to permit the petitioners to hold the stock of such quantity of edible oil as can be held under the law by a licensed dealer in the category "B" city. 13. With these directions the petition is disposed of finally but without any order as to costs. 14. Copy of the order maybe given to the learned counsel for the petitioners on payment of usual charges.