S. N. Sapra, J. ( 1 ) BY the present petition, filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, petitioners have challenged the impugned order dated April 4, 1990, by which, the Appellate Tribunal, in exercise of its power, under Rulel4 (4)ofdelhi Municipal Corporation, Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1986, hereinafter called the Rules, permitted Smt. Nirmala Devi, respondent no. 3, to produce certain documents. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, the facts and circumstances, giving rise to the filing of the present petition, are, as under : According to petitioner, they are tenants in premises No. 1373, Kashmere Gate, Delhi, since March, 1978, under a lease-deed, executed between them and the landlord/owner, thereby, given them the right to run the Guest House or to use the premises for other commercial purposes. Smt. Nirmala Devi, respondent no. 3 herein, is iii occupation of premises No. 1372, Kashmere Gate, Delhi. According to petitioners, the premises in their occupation, is independent and similarly, the premises of respondent no. 3, is also independent. The stair case, leading to both the premises, is common. ( 3 ) AFTER getting the premises on lease, petitioners started running a guest house therein, under the name and style of Paul s Guest House. On account of various complaints. Authorities did not grant licence, in favour of petitioners, for running the Guest House. ( 4 ) RESPONDENT No. 3 also filed a suit in this Court, seeking various reliefs, including the relief of Injunction, to restrain petitioners from running the Guest house and from using the premises for commercial purposes. By an Interim order, petitioners were restrained from running the Guest House, on the ground, that petitioners did not bold a licence in their favour, for running the Guest House. According to petitioners, the object of respondent no. 3 was always to harass petitioners. The closure of Guest House did not satisfy respondent no. 3. She, through one of her sons, namely, Shri Jugal Kishore Gupta, went on sending complaints after complaints to the Authorities coacerned. ( 5 ) THE result was that under pressure from respondent no. 3 the officials of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi threatened to demolish various portions of the premises in occupation of petitioners. When challenged, in various legal proceedings, instituted by petitioners, the officers of the Corporation gave undertaking, that they would not demolish, without following procedure of law. ( 5 ) THE result was that under pressure from respondent no. 3 the officials of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi threatened to demolish various portions of the premises in occupation of petitioners. When challenged, in various legal proceedings, instituted by petitioners, the officers of the Corporation gave undertaking, that they would not demolish, without following procedure of law. Again, when officials of Corporation threatened to demolish the property, petitioners filed a civil writ petition No. 2403 of 1988, in the Delhi High Court. The Corporation conceded that demolition order had been passed without serving a notice on petitioners. This Court was pleaced to pass an order dated January 16, 1989, holding that the order of demolition had been passed, without serving statutory notice. The liberty was given to petitioners to challenge the order by an appeal, before the Appellate Authority, within the period of limitation. ( 6 ) PETITIONERS filed an appeal, under Section 347-A of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. before the Appellate Tribunal, Municipal Corporation of Delhi. During the pendency of the appeal, respondent no. 3 filed an application, under Order I Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code. for being Impleaded, as a party to the appea 1. ( 7 ) VIDE order dated May 24, 1989, learned Appellate Tribunal alloved the application of respondent no. 3, and impleaded her as a party, in the appeal. ( 8 ) AGGRIEVED by the aforesaid order, petitioners filed a petition, being C. M. (M) 161 of 1989, under Article 227 of the Constitution, in the High Court of Delhi. ( 9 ) VIDE Judgment dated January 16, 1990, A. B. Saharya, J. set aside the order dated May 24, 1989, with costs of Rs. 2. 000. 00. ( 10 ) AFTER setting aside of the aforesaid order, respondent no. 3 filed two applications, one under Rules 14 and 17 of the Rules and, another under Section 347-B (7) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, read with Rule 14 (4) of the Rules, thereby, seeking various reliefs, including the direction for placing certain documents on the record. ( 11 ) BY the impugned order dated April 4, 1990, the learned Appellate Tribunal, in exercise of its power, under Rule 14 (4) of the Rules, permitted Smt. Nirmala Devi, to produce the documents on the ground, that most of these documents related to the point in issue. ( 11 ) BY the impugned order dated April 4, 1990, the learned Appellate Tribunal, in exercise of its power, under Rule 14 (4) of the Rules, permitted Smt. Nirmala Devi, to produce the documents on the ground, that most of these documents related to the point in issue. As regards to the examination of the witnesses, the Tribunal held that the request would be considered, at the time of bearing of the arguments on merits of the appeal and, if necessary, the Tribunal would invoice its power, under the procedural Rules. The appellants, (the present petitioners), as well as, the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, were given liberty to file documents in rebuttal of the documents, placed on record, by Smt. Nirmala Devi. ( 12 ) VARIOUS contentions have been urged before me by Mr. R. P. Bansal, learned Counsel for petitioners, agains the impugned order. ( 13 ) THE first contention was that, in view of the Judgment of A. B. Saharya. J. in Hardyal Singh Mehta and another v. M. C. D. and Others AIR 1990 Delhi 170, between the same parties, the Appellate Tribunal has no joriadiction to allow a third party, either to place documents on record or / approach the Court, for appearing as a witness. In fact, respondent no. 3 has no right to participate In the proceedings. In the appeal, petitioners are aggrieved parties and other party is only Municipal Corporation of Delhi. The High Court, has already held that third parties could not be impleaded as parties in the appeal, filed under Section 347-A of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, nor the third party could be allowed to participate in the proceedings. Even, under the relevant Rules, only the parties can summon witnesses and place documents on the record. Mr. Bansal further argued that the third party has no Interest, of any kind whatsoever, in the appeal, as such has no right to either participate in the proceedings in the appeal or move another application for any purpose, whatsoever. Rule 14 (4) does not vest any Jurisdiction in the Appellate Tribunal, to consider and decide the application of the third party, for either producing the documents or for giving evidence. Rule 14 (4) does not vest any Jurisdiction in the Appellate Tribunal, to consider and decide the application of the third party, for either producing the documents or for giving evidence. If a person is not a party, how that party can be allowed to produce documents In fact, the Appellate Tribunal has not property interpreted the Judgment to A. B. Saharya, J. ( 14 ) IN exercise of powers, conferred by Section 347-C of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, the Central Government has made the Rules, called Delhi Municipal Corporation Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1986. With a view to properly appreciate the question involved, it will be proper to reproduce the Rules 14 and 17 of the Rules, which are as under : "14. PRODUCTION of additional evidence before the Tribunal (1) The appellant shall not be entitled to produce before the Tribunal any additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, other than the evidence produced by him during (he course of proceedings before the authority or officer which made the order or issued the notice appealed against, except in the following circumstances, namely:- (a) Where the authority or officer has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted; (b) Where the appellant was prevented by a sufficient cause from. producing the evidence which be was called upon to produce by that authority or officer; (e) Where the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from producing before the authority or officer any evidence, which is relevant to any of the grounds of appeal; (d) Where the authority or officer has made the order or issued the notice without giving sufficient opportunity to the appellant to adduce evidence relevant to any of the grounds of appeal. (2) No additional evidence shall be admitted under sub-rule (1) unless the Tribunal records in writing the reasons for its admission. (3) The Tribunal shall not take any additional evidence produced under sub-rule (1) unless the respondents has been allowed a reasonable opportunity:- (a) to examine the evidence or documents or to cross examining the witness produced by the appellant, or (b) to produce any evidence are any witness in rebuttal of the evidence produced by the appellant under sub-rule (1 ). (4) Nothing contained in this rule shall affect the powers of the Tribunal to direct the production of any document or the examination of any witness to enable the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal. " "17. ORDERS and directions in certain cases:-The Tribunal may, notwithstanding any of the foregoing provisions give such orders or give such directions, as may be necessary or expedient to secure the ends of justice. " ( 15 ) THE question, which arose, before A. B. Saharya, j. , for determination was, as to, who ought to be the parties in the appeal, filed against an order of demolition, under Section 347-A of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. ( 16 ) AFTER considering the various provisions, as contained in the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, the Rules framed thereunder, as well as, the Civil Procedure Code, my learned brother A. B. Saharya, J. held that the Appellate Tribunal has no power to add anyone, except the Corporation and its offisers or servants, as parties to an appeal, filed against the order, directing the demolition of construction, It was held: "the argument that the Tribunal has the same powers as are vested in the Court of the District Judge under Section 457 of the ^ Act is wholly misconceived It is no doubt true that the before the Amendment Act of 1984 came into force with effect from 2nd of June 1984, an appeal under section 343 (2) could be preferred to the Court of the District Judge, Delhi, and in such a case the procedure provided in the Civil Procedure Code. in regard to suits could be allowed by virtue of Section 457 of the Act. Mr. Manmohan Krishan has argued that the Amending Act of 1984 has merely substituted the Tribunal as the forum for an appeal instead of the Court of the District Judge and therefore, the provision made in Section 457 of the Act is still applicable for the purpose of disposal of the appeal by the Tribunal. Firstly, in view of the peculiar nature and the limited scope of the " subject matter of an appeal under Section 343, the provision made in Order I Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code. could not be invoked to add a party like respondent no. 4. Firstly, in view of the peculiar nature and the limited scope of the " subject matter of an appeal under Section 343, the provision made in Order I Rule 10 Civil Procedure Code. could not be invoked to add a party like respondent no. 4. Such a provision would be inconsistent with the nature of the dispute and it cannot be "made applicable" for the disposal of the appeal. Secondly, the Amending Act of 1984 has not only substituted the Tribunal as the forum for an appeal under Sec-tion 343 but it has also introduced in the Act Section 347-C which expressly provides for the procedure of the Appellate Tribunal. This provision has been especially made for the particular purpose of the Tribunal which has been established specifically for the purpose of Chapter XVI of the Act. Thus, it necessarily excludes the general powers and procedures laid down in Section 457 under Chapter XXII of the Act. Thirdly, after amendment of the Act in 1984, it is clear that the legislature has converted Chapter XVI into a self contained Code with regard to Building Regulations, with an express provision for appeals arising under it to be decided by the Tribunal in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the same Chapter. In this way, the Legislature has clearly distinguished between the procedure to be followed for purposes of appeals under Chapter XVI as against the general provision made under Section 456 in Chapter XXII for the purposes of appeals under other provisions of the Act, for example, appeals arising out of the assessment of taxes etc, under Section 169 in Chapter VIII of the Act. The next argument based upon the power of the Tribunal to - direct the production of any document or the examination of any witness under sub rule (4) of Rule 14 is also misconceived. This argument overlooks the essential difference between the power of the Tribunal to direct the production of any document or the examination of any witness on one band and the power to add a party to the appeal on the other. A person_producing a document or appearing as a witness cannot claim a right to participate in the proceedings, A respondent in an appeal can be only such ,a person against whom any right to relief is claimed in the appeal. A person_producing a document or appearing as a witness cannot claim a right to participate in the proceedings, A respondent in an appeal can be only such ,a person against whom any right to relief is claimed in the appeal. In the present case, the petitioner have claimedno right to relief against respondent no. 4 nor has respondent no. 4 even set up any adversary interest in the appeal. Indeed, Mr. Manmoban Krisban frankly conceded during the bearing that the Tribunal has no power to decide any dispute between the petitioners and his client or between the Corporation and his client. The only interest evinced by respondent no. 4 is bee decree to produce some documentary evidence to assist (he Taibunal to effectively dispose of the appeal. On this basis, respondent no. 4 could, if at all, be examined as a witness but she cannot be added as a party to the appeal. The provision made in sub-rule (4) of rule 14, with regard to the power of the Tribunal to direct the production of any document or the examination of any witness, is of no avail to the respondents. This provision does not show that the Tribunal has the power to add respondent no. 4 as a party to the appeal. The pertinent question is : who are the parties to the appeal 7 The answer is simple and there can be no doubt about it. The appeal is preferred by the aggrieved person who would be the appellant. The grievance in the appeal would be against the demolition order made by the Commissioner. So, the Commissioner, who is an Authority under the Corporation, would be called upon to defend the order in appeal. Thus, the Corporation and the Commissioner would be the respondents in the appeal. Any other person, like respondent no. 4, who may have furnished any information or material to the Commissioner for initiating action for demolition could be only a witness or the source from which relevant material or information could be obtained in the appeal also because it is merely a continuation of the proceedings under Section 343. The Tribunal may, in the exercise of its power under Rule 14 (4) direct such a person to produce any document or it may even direct the examination of such a person as a witness, to enable the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal. The Tribunal may, in the exercise of its power under Rule 14 (4) direct such a person to produce any document or it may even direct the examination of such a person as a witness, to enable the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal. But, this would not justify (he addition of such a person as a party to the appeal. Only a person who has an interest in the subject mat (er of the appeal can be a party. Since such a person, as already discussed, has No. 1nterest in the order made by the Commissioner refusing to demolish or directing demolition of the building he canno ( claim any in (erest in the decision of the appeal either. Thus, the provisions made in Sections 343, 347-C and 347-D clearly show that intervention in such proceedings by a person like - respondent no. 4 is wholly unwarranted. To add such a person as a party to the appeal would only cause embrassment in the proceedings and would completely upset the scheme prescribed under the Act and the Rules for a proper decision and disposal of an appeal under Section 343. With regard to the first and the second ground, it appears that the Tribunal has proceeded on a misconception of the scope of the appeal the nature of disputes between the petitioners and respondent no. 4 and between respondent no. 4 and the Corporation, as also the nature and effect of the suit, filed by respondent no. 4 which is pending on the original side of this Court. The first aspect, namely, the scope and the subject matter of the appeal has already been discussed earlier and what has been said above need not be repeated. The subject matter of dispute (s) between the petitioners and respond dent no. 4, between respondent no. 4 and the Corporation and also between respondent no. 4 and various other persons and authorities like the alleged damage caused to the property of respondent no. 4 disturbance or nuisance caused to her and to the members of her family by the business carried on by the petitioners or by the additions or alterations etc. 4, between respondent no. 4 and the Corporation and also between respondent no. 4 and various other persons and authorities like the alleged damage caused to the property of respondent no. 4 disturbance or nuisance caused to her and to the members of her family by the business carried on by the petitioners or by the additions or alterations etc. in the building alleged to have been made by the petitioners and the alleged dereliction of the performance of public duties by the Corporation and the Commissioner of Police, are all extraneous to the appeal and are the subject matter of the suit filed by respondent no. 4 which is still pending on the original side of this Court. The Tribunal was not justified in holding that respondent no. 4 has interest in the subject matter and in the decision of the appeal merely for the reason that she is the owner and occupier of the adjoining property with a common stair case and that she has claimed a mandatory injunction in her suit pending in this Court for a direction to be issued to the Corporation to demolish the alleged unauthorised construction in the property. The question whether the alleged construction is in accordance with law or otherwise would be only one of the aspects in respect of which respondent no. 4 could, if at all, furnish any information or material in the proceedings before the Commissioner or in the appeal before the Tribunal. Respondent no. 4, would, therefore, if at all, be a witness in the proceedings. This cannot justify the finding that she has an "interest" in the appeal. Learned counsel for the respondents rightly conceded, in view of the limited scope of the appeal under Section 343, that the Tribunal has no power or jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the disputes between the petitioners and respondent no. 4 and those between her and the Corporation which are the subject matter of the suit pending in this Court. Here, it would be significant to add tbat none of the respondents have even contended that the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the suit in respect of the subject matter thereof is barred by any provision made in the Act or in any other law. In this view of the matter, it is apparent that the Tribunal went wrong in holding that by adding respondent no. In this view of the matter, it is apparent that the Tribunal went wrong in holding that by adding respondent no. 4 as a party to the appeal it would enable the Tribunal to completely and effectively adjudicate upon the. disputes between the parties and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Indeed, both of the learned counsel who appeared for the Corporation and for respondent no. 4 were candid in expressing their view that it would be not only beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal but it would be improper for it to toy with the idea of ruling upon or deciding a controversy between the parties which is within the jurisdiction of this Court and is the subject matter of proceedings in the suit pending on the Original side of this Court in pursuance of the avowed object to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. " ( 17 ) I am in respectful agreement with the views, expressed by brother Saharya, J. in Hardayal Singh (supra ). ( 18 ) SUB-RULE I of Rule 14 of the Rules, provides that appellant shall not be entitled to produce before the Tribunal, any additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, other than the evidence, produced by him during the course of proceedings before the Authority, except in the circumstances, as mentioned in Clauses A to D. In other words, under the aforesaid sub-rule, only the appellant has been given the right to move the Tribunal to produce additional evidence, if he satisfies the conditions, as laid down in Clauses A to D. Sub- ^- rule 2 provides that, In case, the Tribunal decides to allow the production of additional evidence, then, in that case, the Tribunal shall record in writing the reasons for its admission. ( 19 ) SUB-RULE 4 provides, that nothing contained in sub rules I to 3, shall affect the power of the Tribunal, to direct the production of any document or the examination of any witness, to enable the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal. ( 20 ) IN my view, the power under sub-rule 4 can be exercised by the Tribunal in exceptional cases and even sue moto if, the Tribunal is satisfied that the production of any document or the examination of witness is necessary to enable the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal. ( 20 ) IN my view, the power under sub-rule 4 can be exercised by the Tribunal in exceptional cases and even sue moto if, the Tribunal is satisfied that the production of any document or the examination of witness is necessary to enable the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal. A. B. Saharya, J. in his judgment In Hardayal Singh (supra), while making reference to sub-rule 4 of Rule 14 observed that, on the basis of this sub-rule, respondent could, if at all, be examined as a witness, but she could not be added as a party to the appeal. While making reference to sub-rule 4, Saharya, J. further observed that the Tribunal may, in the exercise of its power, under Rule 14 (4) of the Rules, might direct such a person to produce any document even, prior to the examination of such a person, as a witness to enable the Tribunal to dispose of the appeal. All this would not justify the addition of such a party, as a party to the appeal. Again, in the same judgment, Saharya, J. observed that respondent no. 4, would therefore, if at all be awitness in the proceedings, or, could furnish any material or information in the appeal. The judgment is crystal clear and it follows that respondent no. 3 has no right of any kind, whatsoever, to participate in the appeal, now pending before the Tribunal, nor respondent no. 3 has any right to address arguments. ( 21 ) I have already observed, that the power under Rule 14 (4), can bo exercised only in such exceptional cases, where the Tribunal is satisfied that the production of document or examination of a witness, is otherwise necessary to enable the Tribunal to decide the appeal. ( 22 ) IN my view, generally, this does not give right to the third party to approach the Appellate Tribunal, for either producing the documents or for giving statement before the Tribunal. In its discretion, however, the Tribunal, in exercise of its bower under Rule 14 (4) of the Rules can direct the production of documents and/or examination of a person, as a witness, if the Tribunal is satisfied that this is essential that this will enable the Tribunal to arrive at just conclusion. In its discretion, however, the Tribunal, in exercise of its bower under Rule 14 (4) of the Rules can direct the production of documents and/or examination of a person, as a witness, if the Tribunal is satisfied that this is essential that this will enable the Tribunal to arrive at just conclusion. ( 23 ) BY the impugned order, the learned Appellate Tribunal, has only permitted Smt. Nirmala Devi, to produce certain documents on the ground, that the same related to the point in issue. No-doubt, Smt. Nirmala Devi could not participate in the proceedings, but, as the Tribunal has exercised its jurisdiction under Rule 14 (4) of the Rules, I am not inclined to interfere in the exercise of Jurisdiction, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as, I do not find any jurisdictional error, in it. ( 24 ) UNDER the circumstances, the petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.