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Madras High Court · body

1991 DIGILAW 570 (MAD)

Raju Naicker v. Ananthakrishna Naicker and others

1991-08-13

M.SRINIVASAN

body1991
Judgment :- The plaintiff is the appellant. He filed the suit for a declaration of his right easement through the channel marked as A, B, C, D, E in the plaint plan and as described the Schedule to the plaint, for an injunction retraining the defendants from interfering the enjoyment and for a mandatory injunction directing the defendants to restore the schedule channel shown as A, B, E, F in the plaint plan. The case of the plaintiff is that purchased an extent of 2 acres and 67 cents in S.Nos.246/1 and 248/4 from Tiripurasundari Ammal for Rs.1,000 under the registered sale deed dated 4.6.1959. It is also his case he purchased another extent of 49 cents to the south of the said 2 acres and 67 cents and thus he was entitled to an extent of 3 acres and 15 cents in that area. According to under the sale deed in his favour, he was given right to take water from the maduvu on north through a channel to the east of the land purchased by him as described as A, B, in the plan. He said that he was enjoying the channel ever since his purchase and it was easement by grant as well as necessity. His further case is that on account misunderstanding with defendants, who are father and sons, are attempting to efface channel and they had obliterated A, B, E, F in the plaint plan. Hence he prayed for the as set out earlier. 2. The defendants contested the suit denying the claim of the plaintiff contending plaintiff had no right whatever, and there was no channel in existence as claimed plaintiff and claiming title under Exs.B-2, B-3 and B-1, dated 9.7.1962, 17.7.1962 9.10.1972 respectively. 3. The trial court appointed a Commissioner who inspected the property and submitted report as to the existing physical features. The trial court found that the plaintiff has out a case that he is entitled to take water from the maduvu through the channel lands and granted a decree as prayed for by the plaintiff. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge, Chengleput, has reversed the conclusion of the trial court and dismissed the suit. 4. Even at the outset it should be said that the conclusion of the lower appellate court, say the least, is perverse. On appeal, the Subordinate Judge, Chengleput, has reversed the conclusion of the trial court and dismissed the suit. 4. Even at the outset it should be said that the conclusion of the lower appellate court, say the least, is perverse. The learned Subordinate Judge has closed his eyes to the staring on the face of the court and has placed reliance on irrelevant matters to hold the plaintiff. 5. The case of the plaintiff is made out by a sale deed under which he purchased Tiripurasundari Ammal marked as Ex.A-1 dated 4.6.1959. There is a clear recital document that the purchaser was entitled to take water from the maduvu through a at the end of the land. It is not in dispute that Tiripurasundari Ammal was also the owner the land which was sold to the defendants. After selling to the plaintiff under Ex.A 4.6.1959, she sold adjacent portion of the land to Ellammal under Ex.A-4 on the same She also sold the other adjacent lands which are now owned by the defendants, to achala Naicker under Ex.B-2 on 9.7.1962 and Ex.B-5 on 20.8.1962. The said Venkatachala Naicker sold in turn to the 1st defendant under Ex.B-1 on 9.10.1972. The 1st defendant also purchased other lands from Chinnakulandai Ammal under Ex.B-3 on 17.7.1962. 6. The Commissioner who inspected the suit property found that there was a channel existence in a portion of the land marked as BCDE; that there was no channel in the marked as ABEF, but there was only a ridge of about 12 feet width; that there was a like provision at the point AF for bailing out water, indicating thereby that water would bailed out from the maduvu at that place. When the Commissioner has found that there a channel in existence in BCDE, it is quite natural and probable that the channel existed ABEF also. The channel that is found on the southern side should certainly have existed the northern side as otherwise, the water could not have been taken from the maduvu point AF to the plaintiff ’ s lands. But for ABEF, the portion marked as BCDE would have of no use whatever to the plaintiff. 7. The following passages found in the Commissioner’ s report are relevant: “Though I have stated that A, B, C, D, E, F is the channel I do not find any Channel F portion. But for ABEF, the portion marked as BCDE would have of no use whatever to the plaintiff. 7. The following passages found in the Commissioner’ s report are relevant: “Though I have stated that A, B, C, D, E, F is the channel I do not find any Channel F portion. A, B, E, F portion is simply ridge measuring 12’ width. But I do not find channel in B, C, D, E portion.” (The word ‘not’ obviously a typographical error as it from the subsequent sentence in the report as extracted hereunder). The total distance between A, F and C, D nearly 1000 ’ and the distance between A, F E is 400 and the distance between B, E and C, D is 600. As I have already mentioned the channel B, C, D, E is straight and clear in shape" (underlining is mine). "The width of the channel here is 22" and the ridges D, E B, C are of 12". I do not find any channel in A, B, E, F portion." 8. A reading of the above passage clearly shows that the Commissioner has found a channel in existence at B, C, D, E and not in A, B, E, F. Learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the sentence - "I do not find clear channel in B, C, D, E portion" and contends that the Commissioner did not find a channel in B, C, D, E portion. As I have already pointed out the word ‘not’ is a typographical error and that could not represent the intention of Commissioner correctly and this is evident from the later sentence where the Commissioner says categorically that the channel B, C, D, E is straight and clear in shape. It is mentioned by the Commissioner in his report that he has seen a heap of fresh mud kept A, F portion and the plaintiff’s representative pointed out that a similar set up for bailing water from the maduvu to the lands had been fixed in the adjacent lands on the west. 9. Thus a perusal of the Commissioner’s report shows that the lands on the west of disputed channel were being irrigated with the water from the maduvu which is bailed out suitable apparatus. 9. Thus a perusal of the Commissioner’s report shows that the lands on the west of disputed channel were being irrigated with the water from the maduvu which is bailed out suitable apparatus. A reading of the recitals in Ex.A-1 along with the report of Commissioner’s report will prove beyond doubt that the plaintiff is entitled to take from the maduvu to his lands through the channel. There is absolutely no suggestion whatever as to why the common owner Tiripura-sundari Ammal should insert a false in Ex. A-1 which came into existence long prior to the sale deeds in favour of the defendants and their predecessors-in-title. Further the said Tiripura-sundari Ammal had no motive defraud anybody by including a false recital with regard to the right to take water Ex.A-1. Hence the recitals in Ex.A-1 should be given proper and due weight. It follows the plaintiff had the right to take water through a channel from the maduvu situate on north. 10. Reliance was placed by the respondents on certain discrepancies in the oral adduced by the plaintiff and his clients. It should not be forgotten that the witnesses examined about 71/2 years after the suit was filed. Naturally there are some discrepancies but they are not material and are not sufficient to discredit the evidence given witnesses of the plaintiff. In particular, learned counsel for the respondents submits P.W.4 deposed that the obliteration of the channel was about eight years prior deposition, whereas the case of the plaintiff was that it was a few days prior to Learned counsel for the respondents obviously forgets that the suit filed in the year and the deposition was given in December, 1989. Hence, there is no discrepancy the deposition of P.W.4 and the case set out by the plaintiff. 11. It is then contended that the channel is not shown in the village map or in the map. There is no substance in this argument because the channel in question is private one owned by a person who owned vast lands in that locality and the same to the plaintiff when the owner sold certain portions of the land owned by the owner. other portions were sold by her later to other persons and therefore the subsequent purchasers are bound by the earlier sale effected by the vendor. 12. other portions were sold by her later to other persons and therefore the subsequent purchasers are bound by the earlier sale effected by the vendor. 12. The next argument is that the sale deed in favour of the 1st defendant under Ex.B attested by the plaintiff and therefore he is estopped from contending that he has a have the channel through the land of the defendants. It is also submitted that there recital in Ex.B-1 as to the existence of the channel or the right of the plaintiff to take to that land. I do not agree with this contention. There is no question of estoppel here. attestation of a document will not create an estoppel and it should be proved contents of the document were known to the attestor and that other circumstances known to him and yet he did not protest against the recitals. At any rate, the absence recital in Ex.B-1 regarding the right of the plaintiff to take water to his land maduvu through the land of the defendants will not in any way prevent the plaintiff establishing his right. The document in favour of the plaintiff is much earlierTiripurasundari Ammal having conveyed in favour of the plaintiff with a right to take through her other lands when she sold the suit land to the plaintiff, could not derogated from that grant and sold any higher right to defendants. The sale deeds in of the defendants and their predecessors are subject to the rights conveyed in favour plaintiff under Ex.A-1. 13. It is the case of the defendants that both parties were taking water from one Chinna Rasappan and neither of them took water through channel in question. This case has not been made out by any evidence. The fact defendants ’ lands are in lower level than the plaintiff ’ s lands or that they are in lower than the disputed channel will not affect the case of the plaintiff. The case of the plaintiff he is taking water to his lands by bailing out water by a suitable apparatus from lower to higher level, is made out by evidence on record. Unfortunately the lower appellate has not kept in mind these facts which have been proved beyond doubt. The case of the plaintiff he is taking water to his lands by bailing out water by a suitable apparatus from lower to higher level, is made out by evidence on record. Unfortunately the lower appellate has not kept in mind these facts which have been proved beyond doubt. It is contended there is a well in the plaintiff ’ s land and he is taking water from the well and therefore case of easement of necessity has not been made out. This is a case in which the sale in favour of the plaintiff has granted the right of easement and there is no necessity plaintiff to rely on the case of easement of necessity. The case of easement by supported by the production of relevant records has to be upheld as done by the trial. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on the judgment of Ismail, (as he then was) reported in Ramaswamy Gounder v. Anantha Padmanabha lyer, M.L.J. 392, wherein the learned Judge has held that: “......Where a person, having a tangible interest in the property affected by a deed, that deed, his attestation should be taken as proof of his consent to and knowledge correctness of the recitals in the deed.” The judgment therein was rendered on the facts and circumstances of that case. The case law on the subject was referred to by me in Nagarathi-namma v. Rajammal, 100 363, and I have held that on the facts it should be proved that the attesting consented to the transaction for invoking the rule of estoppel. 15. However, on the facts of this case, the decision relied on by learned counsel respondent will not apply to this case. As pointed out already, there is no necessity recital in Ex.B-1 to the effect that the plaintiff had a right to take water over that Whatever right is conveyed under Ex.B-1 in favour of the defendants was clearly subject the rights conveyed under Ex.A-1 in favour of the plaintiff. Hence the principles of are not applicable to this case. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents further relied on Samiappa Nainar v. Annamalai Chettiar, (1972)1 M.L.J. 317 , wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that: “ Recitals as to boundaries in documents not inter parte are inadmissible in evidence Secs.11, 13(a), 32(3) and 32(7) of the Act. Hence the principles of are not applicable to this case. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents further relied on Samiappa Nainar v. Annamalai Chettiar, (1972)1 M.L.J. 317 , wherein the Division Bench of this Court has held that: “ Recitals as to boundaries in documents not inter parte are inadmissible in evidence Secs.11, 13(a), 32(3) and 32(7) of the Act. The only method by which recitals in a document not inter partes could be admitted in evidence is by examination of the executant document in which such recitals as to boundaries are found. ” This is not a case of boundary recital but it is a case of grant of right to take water through channel from maduvu. The parties here claim rights under the same owner. The recitals Ex.A-1 are binding on the defendants who claim under the subsequent purchases. Therefore, the above decision will not apply to this case. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents invites my attention to the judgment in Ibrahim v. Mohammed Abdullah, (1978)1 M.L.J. 386 , wherein it has been held that a person cannot acquire an easement unless he acts with the knowledge that it is a case of dominant and servient tenement and he is exercising a right over property which does not belong him. It is pointed out that if he enjoys a right under the supposition that he is the owner the property he does not acquire an easement. The above ruling has nothing to do with facts of present case. 18. My attention was also drawn to a decision reported in Santosh Kumar v. Krishna Kant Gupta, A.I.R. 1985 Pat. 124, wherein it was held that the claim for easement of necessity arise only if two lands were brought in a single unit under a common owner and if there were two owners, the question of easement would not arise. The above decision is not applicable to the case on hand. Here it is admitted that Tiripurasundari Ammal was the owner of lands and she sold certain lands on the west to the plaintiff and Ellammal and certain lands on the east to the defendants and their predecessors-in-title. Hence the principles easement will apply and in this case in favour of the plaintiff. 19. In the result, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are wholly unsustainable and are set aside. Hence the principles easement will apply and in this case in favour of the plaintiff. 19. In the result, the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are wholly unsustainable and are set aside. The plaintiff is entitled to take water through the channel from maduvu as claimed by him. But according to the plaint plan the width of the channel the northern side marked as A, B, E, F is more than the width of the channel on the southern side B, C, D, E. The plaintiff cannot claim a larger width on the northern side and smaller width on the southern side. the Commissioner found the channel to be in existence at the portion marked as B, C, D, the plaintiff will have the channel of the same width upto the northern end that is upto from B, E. In fact, the Commissioner has marked the point ‘F on the northern side extending D, E upto the northern boundary by drawing a straight line. Therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to a width of 22". In A, B, C, D, E, F in the Commissioner ’ s plan marked as There will be an injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the plaintiffs and enjoyment of the said channel. There will be a mandatory injunction directing defendants to restore the channel at the point A, B, E, F in Ex.C-2. The defendants granted two months time from this date to restore the channel. If they failed to do so, it be open to the plaintiffs to get it done through the executing court. The second appeal allowed on the above terms. The parties will bear their own costs. Appeal allowed.