( 1 ) THE petitioner joined service of the State Bank of Patiala as a Clerk in 1968 and was promoted to the post of Trainee Officer with effect from 1/08/1974. By letter No. Staff/genl/3749 dated 1/08/1974 the petitioner was informed that the Banks Board of Directors had approved his promotion as Trainee Officer under Group B Grade II with effect from 1/08/1974 in the scale of Rs. 500. 00-1,030. 00. By a subsequent letter dated 14/08/1975 he was informed that the Board of Directors had confirmed him as Officer Grade II with effect from 1/08/1975 in the said scale. When the petitioner was working as Branch Manager at Birhana Road, Kanpur, he is alleged to have committed some misdemeanour. By a letter dated 9/01/1980 he was called upon to explain the purchase bills in excess of his discretionary power of Rs. 1 lakh. The petitioner sent his reply to the said memorandum on 31/01/1980 contending that the purchase of the bills was within his discretionary limit. The petitioner was, thereafter, placed under suspension and was served with a charge-sheet. The Regional Manager of the Bank was appointed as Enquiry Officer to enquire into the alleged misconduct of the petitioner. The petitioner contested the enquiry and at the conclusion thereof the Enquiry Officer submitted his report to the Bank dated 27/09/1982. After considering the report of the Enquiry Officer the petitioner was removed from service by an order of the Managing Director dated 10/10/1983. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the Chairman, Executive Committee, Board of Directors of the Bank, but the same was dismissed on 26/10/1985. On the decision being communicated to him in due course he filed a writ petition in the High court of Punjab and Haryana which too was dismissed. Being aggrieved by the order made in the said writ petition the petitioner has approached this court in appeal. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of the appeal before this court the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging Regulations 67 (g) of the State Bank of Patiala (Officers) Service Regulations 1979 (hereinafter called the Regulations), as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. ( 2 ) DURING the pendency of the appeal before this court the petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging Regulations 67 (g) of the State Bank of Patiala (Officers) Service Regulations 1979 (hereinafter called the Regulations), as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The submission in this behalf is that the amended regulation permits hostile discrimination between employees of the Bank and the employees of the State who are governed by Article 311 of the Constitution and who can be dismissed from service by the authority which made the appointment or an officer higher in rank but not by an officer inferior in rank to the appointing authority. ( 3 ) MR R. K. Garg, learned counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to grounds (C) and (D) in the memorandum of appeal. By ground (C) the petitioner has raised the contention that since he was appointed Trainee Officer in 1974 and confirmed as such in 1975 by the Board of Directors, the Board of Directors alone could punish him since it had initiated the enquiry. By ground (D) the petitioner contends that under Service Regulation 68 (1) (ii) only the Board of Directors i. e. the authority which appointed him could terminate his employment and not the Managing Director who was a lower authority. The petitioner, therefore, contends that on the aforesaid two counts the order of removal from service was liable to be quashed and the High court failed to appreciate the same. ( 4 ) IN order to appreciate these submissions it is necessary to make a reference to the relevant regulations governing the service of thepetitioner. The expression competent authority as it stood before the Regulations were amended in 1979 read as under:" competent authority means Board in case of employees in the Grades of Sub-Accountants and above and the Managing Director in the case of Assistants, Head Cashiers, Assistant Cashiers, Godown Keepers and Subordinate Staff. "it is not in dispute that the post of a Trainee Officer was above that of a Sub-Accountant and, therefore, under this definition the competent authority qua the petitioner was undoubtedly the Board of Directors of the Bank. However, this definition underwent a change after the regulation was amended in 1979 in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 63 of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Bank) Act, 1959. However, this definition underwent a change after the regulation was amended in 1979 in exercise of the powers conferred by S. 63 of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Bank) Act, 1959. The amended definition found in Regulation 3 (l) (e) read as under:competent authority means the authority designated by the Board or the Executive Committee and till such authority is designated, authority for the purpose immediately prior to the appointed date. "the expressions Disciplinary Authority, Appellate Authority and Reviewing Authority have been defined by S. 3 (1) (p) to mean the authorities specified as such by the Executive Committee from time to time. By circular No. Per/45 of 1980 dated 6/10/1980 the Managing Director was designated as the Appointing Authority and the General Manager the Disciplinary Authority for Junior Management and Middle Management ranks. Regulation 68 (1) provides that the disciplinary authority may itself or shall when so directed by its superior authority institute disciplinary proceedings against an officer. Regulation 68 (l) (u) which is relevant for our purpose reads as under:"68. (1) (ii) The disciplinary authority or any authority higher than it may impose any of the penalties in Regulation 67 on an officer, provided that where the disciplinary authority in respect of the category of the officers to which the officer belongs no order imposing any of the major penalties specified in clauses (e), (f), (g) and (h) of Regulation 67 shall be made except by the appointing authority or any authority higher than it on the recommendations of the disciplinary authority. "it is, therefore, clear from the above that on 10/10/1980 when impugned order of removal was passed the appointing authority qua officers of the rank of the petitioner was the Managing Director. ( 5 ) THE first contention raised by the petitioner is clearly misconceived. It is clear from the charge-sheet dated 20/05/1980 that the same was issued by the General Manager (Operations ). The Enquiryofficer had forwarded the report to the said General Manager. It was thereafter that the Managing Director, the Appointing Authority, passed the impugned order of removal from service. The order so passed was communicated to the petitioner by the General Manager by his letter dated 10/10/1980. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the Board. Once the factual premise is found to be erroneous the contention founded thereon must fail. The order so passed was communicated to the petitioner by the General Manager by his letter dated 10/10/1980. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated by the Board. Once the factual premise is found to be erroneous the contention founded thereon must fail. ( 6 ) THE second contention raised by the petitioner seems to be covered by the decision of this court in State Bank of India v. S. Vijaya Kumar. In that case this court after considering the language of the relevant Regulation 55 (2) (o) came to the conclusion that under that regulation the appointing authority at the relevant date when the impugned order of punishment is passed is competent to make the order. Regulation 55 (2) (a) conferred powers of appointment and promotion on different functionaries of the Bank. It recognised the right of the Bank employees not to be dismissed or removed from service by an authority lower in rank than the appointing authority. In that case also the Bank employees were appointed by the Executive Committee but their services were terminated by the Chief General Manager who was their appointing authority on the date of the impugned order. This court held that the dismissal orders were valid even though the Chief General Manager was lower in rank than the Executive Committee as at the relevant date he was the appointing authority under the amended Regulations. The position is the same in our case also and, therefore, the petitioners contention in this behalf must be rejected as devoid of merit. ( 7 ) IT was then contended by Mr Garg that the Bank employees were entitled to claim protection under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution which permitted termination of employment by an authority which is not subordinate to that by which he was appointed. A similar contention was raised in S. Vijaya Kumar case also. This court after pointing to the difference in the language of the competing provisions observed that while Article 311 (1) uses the words by which he was appointed Regulation 55 (2) (a) uses the expression appointing authority which makes a substantial difference and permits the appointing authority for such category of employees at the date of the passing of the order to pass an order of punishment. We may usefully reproduce the pertinent observation in paragraph 24 of the judgment, with which we respectfully agree:"so far as the right of protection guaranteed under Article 311 of the Constitution is concerned, it applies to members of the Civil Service of the Union or an All India Service or a Civil Service of a 229 State or who holds a civil post under the Union of a State. Admittedly the employees of the State Bank do not fall under any-one of these categories and they cannot seek any protection under Article 311 (1) of the Constitution. The employees of the State Bank can only claim such rights which have been conferred under Regulation 55 (2) (a) of the General Regulations. The only right conferred under the said provision is that the officers or employees of the State Bank cannot be dismissed by an authority lower than the appointing authority. With the risk of repetition it may be stated that on the date when the order of dismissal has been passed, Chief General Manager had already become the appointing authority and as such the order of dismissal has not been passed by an authority lower than the appointing authority. "we are, therefore, inclined to think that the impugned order of removal passed by the Managing Director is unassailable. ( 8 ) MR Garg then submitted that the Regulation 67 (g) read with Regulation 68 (1 ) (ii) permits hostile discrimination, in that, while in the case of employees governed by Article 311 (1) only the authority which had actually appointed the officer can terminate his service whereas under the Regulations any officer even lower than the one who initially appointed him could be designated as the appointing authority and once so designated he can visit the employee with an order of major punishment. We do not think that the submission is well founded. Article 311 (1) governs those belonging to certain stated services to which employees the petitioner does not belong. The petitioner clearly belongs to a different class whose terms and conditions of employment are governed by a different set of regulations. The petitioner is, therefore, governed by the Regulations and as the Regulations stood at the date of the passing of the impugned order the Managing Director was clearly competent to pass the impugned order of removal. The petitioner clearly belongs to a different class whose terms and conditions of employment are governed by a different set of regulations. The petitioner is, therefore, governed by the Regulations and as the Regulations stood at the date of the passing of the impugned order the Managing Director was clearly competent to pass the impugned order of removal. The relevant regulation is not shown to be discriminatory and, therefore, it is wrong to invoke Article 14 of the Constitution. There is nothing obnoxious about authorising the appointing authority to terminate the service of delinquent officers. Merely because by amendment the appointing authority designated is lower in rank than the Board should make no difference. We, therefore, do not see any substance in this contention also. ( 9 ) IN view of the above we dismiss the appeal as well as the writ petition but make no order as to costs.