JUDGMENT - DHANUKA D.R., J.:—By this petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners have impugned order passed by Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal at Bombay on 15th July, 1981 in Revision Application No. 84 of 1981 and also order dated 19th May, 1991 passed by Assistant Collector, Niphad Division, Nasik in Valid Case No. 108 of 1975 in the proceedings adopted under section 4 of Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act of 1974. 2. The crucial facts required to be stated for disposal of this petition are as under :— (a) The petitioners are heirs and legal representatives of Shri Pundlik Trimbak Shinde (since deceased). Late Shri Pundlik was tenant of four agricultural lands being Gat Nos. 652, 653, 663 and 665 all situate at village 'Nandur' Madhmeshwar, Taluka Niphad, District Nasik. (b) One Smt. Parvatabai was the owner of the said lands. (c) Prior to 1st April, 1957, Smt. Parvatabai (who was a widow) had made an application to the prescribed authority under section 31 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for possession of the abovereferred lands for 'personal cultivation' to the extent permissible under the Act. Sections 31-B and 31-C of the Act provide that on the landlord proving his requirement of the land for personal cultivation within contemplation of section 31(1) of the said Act, application for possession shall be allowed by the Mamlatdar to the extent of half of the area of the land leased to the tenant. In other words, if an application made by the landlord under section 31 of the Act succeeds in entirety, then half of the land leased to the tenant shall have to be left with the tenant. Section 31-B of the Act provides that no tenancy shall be terminated under section 31 of the Act in a manner as will result, in leaving the tenant less than half of the area of the land leased to him. Section 31-C of the Act provides that the tenancy of the land left with the tenant after termination of tenancy order section 31 shall not thereafter be terminated again on the ground that the landlord bona fide required the land for personal cultivation. The abovereferred application of the landlady Smt. Parvatabai for possession made under section 31 of the Act was granted by the prescribed authority. The abovereferred application of the landlady Smt. Parvatabai for possession made under section 31 of the Act was granted by the prescribed authority. As a result thereof, Smt. Parvatabai got possession of half of the “suit lands”, and the tenant Pundlik Trimbak Shinde was left with remaining half of the said lads. Smt. Parvatabai got possession of lands bearing Gat Nos. 653 and 665. Pundlik Trimbak Shinde remained in possession of lands bearing Gat Nos. 652 and 663. In respect of these lands left with the petitioners i.e. land bearing Gat Nos. 652 and 663, the petitioners-tenants could not become statutory purchasers of the land under the Act during the lifetime of landlady Smt. Parvatabai as she was a widow. Smt. Parvatabai died 5 or 6 years prior to the delivery of judgment of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal dated 15th July, 1981. It is so stated in the judgment of the Tribunal. The correctness of this statement appearing in the above-referred judgment is not disputed before me. The exact date of death of Smt. Parvatabai is not known. Parvatabai died after 6th July, 1974 and not prior thereto. The petitioners could not become deemed purchasers of the said land upto 6th July, 1974 as the widowed landlady was alive till then. It is not relevant to enquire for purpose of this petition as to whether the petitioners became deemed purchasers of the said lands after 6th July, 1974. 3. Section 4 of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 (Maharashtra Act No. XIV of 1975) reads as under:— “4. It is not relevant to enquire for purpose of this petition as to whether the petitioners became deemed purchasers of the said lands after 6th July, 1974. 3. Section 4 of the Maharashtra Restoration of Lands to Scheduled Tribes Act, 1974 (Maharashtra Act No. XIV of 1975) reads as under:— “4. Where any land of a Tribal is, at any time on or after the 1st day of April 1957 and before the 6th day of July, 1974, purchased or deemed to have been purchased or acquired under or in accordance with the provisions of the relevant tenancy law by a non-Tribal transferee or where any acquisition has been regularised on payment of penalty under such law and such land is in possession of a non-Tribal transferee and has not been put to any non-agricultural use on or before the 6th day of July 1974, then the Collector shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, either suo motu at any time or on an application by the Tribal made within three years from the commencement of this Act and after making such inquiry as he thinks fit, direct that the land shall, subject to the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 3, be restored to the Tribal free from all encumbrances and that the amount of purchase price or a proportionate part thereof, if any, paid by such non-tribal transferee in respect of such land in accordance with the relevant tenancy law shall be refunded to such non-tribal transferee either in lump sum or in such annual instalments not exceeding twelve (with simple interest at 4½ per cent. per annum) as the Collector may direct. per annum) as the Collector may direct. The provisions of Clauses (d), (e), (f) and (g) of sub-section (4) of section 3 shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the recovery of the amount from the Tribal and payment thereof to the non-tribal and the persons claiming encumbrances, if any: Provided that, where land is purchased or acquired by a non-Tribal transferee before the 6th day of July, 1974, after such transferee was rendered landless by reason of acquisition of his land for a public purpose, then only half the land so purchased or acquired shall be restored to the tribal transferor.” Section 3 of the said Act No. XIV of 1975 deals with restoration of lands to tribals in the contingencies specified therein. Section 3 of the said Act is not relevant for our purpose. In the present case, the learned counsel appearing at the hearing of this petition on all the sides have referred to and relied upon section 4 of the said 1975 Act in support of their respective contentions. The controversy which is subject-matter of this petition must therefore be resolved with reference to the provisions contained in section 4 of the said 1975 Act. 4. Two questions arise for consideration of the Court. They are: (1) Whether Smt. Manjulabai alias Durpadabai Murlidhar Ghadge, respondent No. I herein (being successor-in-title of Smt. Parvatabai) is a tribal within meaning of section 2(j) of Maharashtra Act XIV of 1975? (2) Whether the petitioners are “deemed purchasers of the lands” bearing Gat Nos. 652 and 663 under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 ? Whether such deemed purchase took place between 6th April, 1957 and 5th July, 1974 i.e. between the dates specified in section 4 of Maharashtra Act XIV of 1975? 5. In the proceedings for restoration of the abovereferred lands which were left over with the petitioners after the respondent-landlady acquired possession of Gat Nos. 653 and 665 in the proceedings adopted by her under section 29 read with section 31 of the Act, the Assistant Collector, Niphad Division, Nasik, held that the applicant Smt. Manjulabai Ghadge was a 'tribal' within the meaning of the said 1975 Act. The Assistant Collector further held that the applicant Smt. Manjulabai Ghadge did not belong to the caste 'Taral' as a alleged by the petitioner. The Assistant Collector further held that the applicant Smt. Manjulabai Ghadge did not belong to the caste 'Taral' as a alleged by the petitioner. After considering the relevant material in detail, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal held that the applicant Smt. Manjulabai Ghadge was “Mahadeo Koli (i.e. a member of Scheduled Tribes) and was thus a tribal within the meaning of section 2(j) of the said 1975 Act. The Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal highlighted the fact that the petitioners themselves have admitted in the relevant proceeding; that the respondent was a “Hindu Mahadeo Koli” i.e. a member of a Scheduled Tribe specified in the Schedule to the relevant Act. The expression “tribal” has been defined under the Act to mean a person belonging to Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of Explanation to section 36 of the Code i.e. the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966. Explanation to section 36 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code reads as under:— “Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “Scheduled Tribes” means such tribes or tribal communities or parts of, or groups within, such tribes or tribal communities as are deemed to be Scheduled Tribes in relation to the State of Maharashtra under Article 342 of the Constitution of India and persons, who belong to the tribes of Tribal communities, or parts of, or groups within tribes or tribal communities specified in Part VIIA of the Schedule to the other made under the said Article 342, but who are not resident in the localities specified in that order who nevertheless need the protection of this section and section 36-A (and it is hereby declared that they do need such protection) shall, for the purposes of those sections be treated in the same manner as members of the Scheduled Tribes.” 6. The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Orders (Amendment) Act, 1976 read with the Schedules appended thereto treats “Taral” as a Scheduled Caste and “Mahadeo Koli” as a Scheduled Tribe in Maharashtra. In my judgment, no case is made out for interference with the finding of fact recorded by the two authorities below holding that the applicant Smt. Manjulabai was a tribal within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Act as she was a Hindu Mahadeo Koli. In my judgment, no case is made out for interference with the finding of fact recorded by the two authorities below holding that the applicant Smt. Manjulabai was a tribal within the meaning of section 2(j) of the Act as she was a Hindu Mahadeo Koli. Even if on evidence it is possible to taken different view, the Court is not entitled to substitute its view in place of the view taken by the authorities concerned unless the view taken by the authorities below is perverse. In my judgment, the view taken by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal is a reasonable view and the said view has been taken after considering the admissions of the parties including various school leaving certificates and other certificates produced by them. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has invited my attention to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (Narayan v. Gopal)1, reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 100, wherein it was held that an admission was the best evidence that an opposite party could rely upon and though not conclusive was decisive of the matter unless successfully withdrawn or proved erroneous. In the present case, the Court of facts have evaluated the admission of the petitioners along with other material on record and was not satisfied that the admission made by the petitioners on this aspect was erroneous or that it was withdrawn. I, therefore, refuse to interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the authorities below on this aspect. I hold that the respondent was and is a Tribal within meaning of the Act under consideration. 8. The principal question surviving for consideration of the Court is as to whether the petitioner can be said to have become “deemed purchasers” of the lands left over with them on successful completion of the proceedings adopted by the landlord for resumption of land under section 31 of the Act during the lifetime of the widowed landlady Smt. Parvatabai. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners cannot be deemed to have purchased the said lands as an application made by the landlady under section 31 of the Act was allowed to the extent permissible in law and the same was not rejected. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners cannot be deemed to have purchased the said lands as an application made by the landlady under section 31 of the Act was allowed to the extent permissible in law and the same was not rejected. Proviso to section 32(1) of the Act provides that if an application made by the landlord under section 29 of the Act for obtaining possession of the land is rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the date on which the final order of rejection is passed on such an application by the authority concerned. In this case, the application made by the landlady was not rejected but was allowed. The question which arises for consideration of the Court is as to whether the petitioners can be said to be deemed purchasers of “remaining half of the land” left over with the petitioners. Sections 31-B and 31-C of the Act provide that the petitioners shall be deemed to be tenants of the left over land and such tenancy shall not be liable to be terminated again on the ground that the landlady bona fide requires the land for personal cultivation. In other words, notice of termination of tenancy served by the landlady on the tenant prior to 31st December, 1956 shall not be treated as operative in respect of “half of the area of the land leased to the tenant” and the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of half of the said land permitted to be retained by the tenant as aforesaid shall continue to subsist. Section 32(1) of the Act provides for statutory vesting of the land subject to the other provisions of section 32 and also the provisions of the succeeding sections. It cannot be said that the main part of section 32(1) of the Act is applicable in this case. It is common ground in this petition that the landlady had terminated the tenancy of the tenant under section 31 of the Act prior to 31st December, 1956 and had made an application for possession prior to 31st March, 1957. Proviso to section 32(1) of the said Act cannot apply as the relevant application was allowed and was not rejected. It is common ground in this petition that the landlady had terminated the tenancy of the tenant under section 31 of the Act prior to 31st December, 1956 and had made an application for possession prior to 31st March, 1957. Proviso to section 32(1) of the said Act cannot apply as the relevant application was allowed and was not rejected. The question which still arises for consideration of the Court is as to whether the petitioners could be deemed to have purchased the remaining half of the land under the provisions of tenancy law and, if so, on what day and under what provision. Section 32-F of the Act provides that the tenant cannot invoke the provision for statutory purchase of the tenanted land against the widow during her lifetime. In other words, the date of-statutory purchase is postponed under the provisions of the said Act and such postponed date is to arrive two years after the date of death of the widowed landlady. The said postponed date of purchase beyond the lifetime of the widow operates subject to proviso to section 32(1) of the Act. Proviso to section 32(1) of the Act is not attracted in this case. Section 4 of the 1975 Act provides that if the deemed date of purchase, is after 6th July, 1974, section 4 of the said Act would not be applicable. 9. Both the authorities below have not addressed themselves to the principal question as to whether the petitioners can be deemed to have purchased the said land under the provisions of the tenancy legislation and, if so, from what date. No relevant discussion on the principal question formulated above is to be found in the orders of the two authorities below. Since this is an old matter, passing of an order of remand at this stage would not be in the interest of justice. It is desirable that the question of law urged by the learned Counsel in this case should be decided by the High Court here and now. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that condition precedent prescribed for applicability of section 4 of the 1975 Act is not satisfied in this case as the petitioners cannot be said to be actual purchasers or deemed purchasers of the left over lands between the two dates in opening part of section 4 of the 1975 Act. 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that condition precedent prescribed for applicability of section 4 of the 1975 Act is not satisfied in this case as the petitioners cannot be said to be actual purchasers or deemed purchasers of the left over lands between the two dates in opening part of section 4 of the 1975 Act. 10. The learned Counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioners are deemed to have purchased the said lands sometime in the year 1 961 when the application of the landlady made prior to 31st March, 1957 for possession of the said lands under section 31 of the Act was allowed and the landlady secured possession of half of the land as discussed in earlier part of this judgment. Shri Karandikar, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent, invited my attention to the Division Bench judgment of our High Court in the case of (Nago Dattu v. Yeshodabai Huna)2, reported in 1976(78) Bom.L.R. 427. In this case, the application made by the widow for possession under section 31 read with section 29 of the Act was rejected on December 26, 1958 and the order of rejection was confirmed by the Tribunal in revision on June 15, 1964. In this case, the principal question before the Court was as to whether the widowed landlady could rely on section 32-F of the Act once she had exercised the option to make an application for possession on ground of personal cultivation prior to 1st April, 1957 and such application was rejected by the authority concerned. It was held by the Division Bench of our High Court in the above case that the tenant could become deemed purchasers of the land if the application made by the landlady for possession of the land under section 31(1) of the Act was rejected. With respect, this judgment has no relevance to this case as the application made by the landlady for possession in this case was allowed, by the authorities concerned to the extent permissible and not rejected. 11. With respect, this judgment has no relevance to this case as the application made by the landlady for possession in this case was allowed, by the authorities concerned to the extent permissible and not rejected. 11. Realising the difficulty in his way, Shri Karandikar argued that the above referred application for possession made by the landlady was granted in respect of half area of the land only and the same must be deemed to I have been rejected in respect of the remaining half of the land which was allowed to be left over with the tenant. There is an obvious fallacy in this submission. Sections 31-B and 31-C of the Act clearly point out that on the application under section 31-C being allowed, the possession of the land to be awarded to the landlord shall be only to the extent of half of the land leased by the landlord and the relationship of landlord and tenant in respect of the remaining half shall continue. In view of these provisions, it must be held that the application of the landlady for possession was granted in full to the extent permissible under the law and it is not a case where the application made by the landlady for possession was “rejected” within meaning of the proviso to section 32(1) of the Act or otherwise. Mr. Karandikar then came forward with another argument and submitted that, the expression “rejected” used in the proviso to section 32(1) of the Act must be equated to use of the word “decided” and relied on the terminology used in proviso to section 33-C(1) of the said Act by analogy. It is not possible to interpret the proviso to section 32(1) of the said Act with reference to the terminology used in the proviso to section 33-C of the said Act. The language used in the two provisos is totally different and it will be a terror in construction if the language used in proviso to section 33-C(1) of the said Act is applied mutatis mutandis to the proviso contained in section 32(1) of the said Act. In my judgment, there is no force in this contention of Mr. Karandikar. 12. Mr. Karandikar also relied on the judgment in the case of (Sujataali v. Rupchand)3, reported in 1973 Mh.L.J 766 delivered by Vaidya, J. With respect, the said judgment has no relevance to this case. In my judgment, there is no force in this contention of Mr. Karandikar. 12. Mr. Karandikar also relied on the judgment in the case of (Sujataali v. Rupchand)3, reported in 1973 Mh.L.J 766 delivered by Vaidya, J. With respect, the said judgment has no relevance to this case. It is therefore not possible for me to apply the ratio of this judgment delivered by Vaidya, J., to this case. 13. In view of the above discussion, I hold that, the petitioners were not the deemed purchasers of the said land between the two dates specified in section 4 of the 1975 Act. It is not necessary to decide in this petition as to whether the petitioners have become deemed purchasers of the said lands on a subsequent date. Onus of proof was on the respondent to plead and prove that the petitioners or their predecessor-in-title became deemed purchasers of the said lands within the dates specified in section 4 of the said Act. The respondent has failed to discharge the said onus. 14. One more aspect in the passing. If the petitioners were deemed purchasers of the said land from the year 1961 as now contended by the respondent, proceedings under section 32-G of the Act would have been adopted and the petitioners would have been declared as the statutory purchasers long time ago. The very fact that the petitioners are not declared as statutory purchasers of the said land left over with them during the last 30 years also fortifies the view which I have taken. The petitioners have never claimed to be statutory purchasers of these lands at any time so far. Maharashtra Act No. XIV of 1975 is a recent legislation. The predecessor-in-title of the petitioners or the petitioners could not have anticipated that during the year 1975 the Maharashtra Act No. XIV of 1975 would be passed and brought into force. In the normal course, the petitioners would have invoked section 32-G of the Act if the petitioners were deemed purchasers of the lands. The above discussion is not directly germane to the determination of legal issues arising in this case. The conduct of the parties for all these years supports the view taken by the Court in this petition. 15. In the normal course, the petitioners would have invoked section 32-G of the Act if the petitioners were deemed purchasers of the lands. The above discussion is not directly germane to the determination of legal issues arising in this case. The conduct of the parties for all these years supports the view taken by the Court in this petition. 15. In the result, the petition succeeds and the rule is made absolute on the limited ground that one of the conditions precedent prescribed Wider section 4 of Maharashtra Act No. XIV of 1975 is not satisfied. Both the orders impugned in this petition are therefore quashed and set aside. 16. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. Order accordingly. -----