JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner who had joined service as L.D.C. was appointed as Accounts Clerk after passing qualifying examination meant for the post of Accounts Clerk. In the year 1970 he was posted at Government College, Karauli. The petitioner was placed under suspension by the Principal, Government College, Karauli vide order dated 12-7-70. A memorandum dated 19-2-74 was issued by the Director of College Education Rajasthan Jaipur and an enquiry under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958 (Thereafter to be referred as 'the Rules'), was initiated against the petitioner. Two criminal complaints were also filed against the petitioner by the Principal of the College alleging embazzlement and fraud but nothing was found against the petitioner. The petitioner made several applications for inspection of the record. According to him full record was not shown to him and, therefore, he could not submit a proper reply. Without giving full opportunity of filing a reply, Enquiry Officer was appointed. The enquiry was conducted in several stages and by different Enquiry Officers. After conclusion of the enquiry a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 28-4-79 by the Director of Education proposing a penalty of dismissal from service. Copy of Enquiry Report was sent to the petitioner along with the show cause notice. The petitioner submitted a detailed reply to the show cause notice on 23-7-79 and thereafter the Director College Education passed an order on July 7, 1980 and a penalty of removal from service was imposed on petitioner. It was also ordered that the petitioner will not be entitled to anything else than the subsistence allowance as already paid to him for the period of suspension. An appeal was filed by the petitioner before the Secretary Education and the same has been dismissed vide order dated 15-6-81. A review petition filed by the petitioner under Rule 34 of the Rules before the Hon'ble Governor was also dismissed and the petitioner has been communicated with the decision vide order dated 1-1-86. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order of removal from service as well as the orders passed in appeal and review petition on the grounds that departmental enquiry has been held in violation of the principles of natural justice and the provisions contained in Rule 16 of the Rules. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order of removal from service as well as the orders passed in appeal and review petition on the grounds that departmental enquiry has been held in violation of the principles of natural justice and the provisions contained in Rule 16 of the Rules. The petitioner has alleged that proper opportunity of defence was not given to him in as much as he was neither allowed inspection of the documents nor was he allowed copies of the documents for the purposes of filing reply to the Charge-sheet. The Enquiry Officer also did not summon the record. The Enquiry Officer did not summon the witnesses whose names were given by the petitioner. He has further submitted that the charges levelled against him were absolutely vague and the Enquiry Officer has not appreciated the evidence properly. While challenging the three orders, the petitioner has stated that they are non speaking orders. Appellate order has been passed in violation of Rule 30 (2) of the Rules. 3. No reply to the Writ Petition has been filed by the respondents despite the fact that the Writ Petition has remained pending for over four years. 4. The main contention advanced by Shri Rastogi, learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the order of punishment passed by the Director College Education on July 7, 1980 is absolutely laconic. The order does not contain reasons. It is not a speaking order. This order is not in conformity with Rule 16(9) and 16(12) of the Rules. The Disciplinary Authority did not objectively consider the reply filed by the petitioner. None of the contentions raised in the reply has been dealt with. Argument of the learned counsel is that passing of a speaking order is one of the essential requirements of the principles of natural justice which has to be complied with by every quasi-judicial authority. These reasons have to be communicated to the delinquent. In the absence of reasons, effective right of appeal, review and also a right to challenge such orders in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is denied to the delinquent. Countering the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Ashok Parihar, learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that full-fledged enquiry was held against the petitioner. He was given full opportunity of defending himself. Countering the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Ashok Parihar, learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that full-fledged enquiry was held against the petitioner. He was given full opportunity of defending himself. He has been found guilty of misappropriation of public funds and, therefore, the Court must not interfere with the order of punishment. Argument of Shri Parihar is that passing of a speaking order by a quasi-judicial authority is hypertechnical. The Court must appreciate the evidence which has come on record and if that is done, it would be agreed that charges have been proved against the petitioner. Shri Parihar further submits that the Disciplinary Authority has fully applied its mind to the record of the case and has then come to the conclusion that the punishment of removal from service is justified. Regarding appellate and review orders Shri Parihar argued that these orders merely confirm the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and therefore these orders cannot be faulted on the premise that they do not contain reasons. 5. It is apparent from the record of the Writ Petition that after the conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the Enquiry Officer had submitted a detailed report running into 14 pages. The Enquiry Officer found that major portion of charge No. 1 was proved against the petitioner. In respect of charge No. 2 he found that it was partly proved. He held that the charge No. 3 was not proved. In respect of charge No. 4 he found that charge of forgery and conspirasy with the contractor was not proved and only allegation of violation of Rules was established. In respect of charge No. 5 the Enquiry Officer found that it was partly proved. The Disciplinary authority issued a show cause notice dated 28-4-79 to the petitioner and proposed a penalty of dismissal from service of the petitioner. Copy of enquiry report was furnished to the petitioner along with the notice. In response to the show cause notice the petitioner submitted an application dated 10-5-79 that he has not been given certified copy of the enquiry report. He also stated that he has not been furnished with the copy of the decision of the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the enquiry report as required by Rule 16(9) of the Rules. In response to the show cause notice the petitioner submitted an application dated 10-5-79 that he has not been given certified copy of the enquiry report. He also stated that he has not been furnished with the copy of the decision of the Disciplinary Authority in respect of the enquiry report as required by Rule 16(9) of the Rules. He also complained that he has not been able to know as to how the Disciplinary Authority has recorded its finding in respect of the charges levelled against him. Thereafter he submitted a detailed reply to the show cause notice on 23-7-79. In this reply, which runs into over 38 typed pages, he first made a grievance that he had not been furnished with the copies of the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority after receipt of the report of the Enquiry Officer and the other records. According to him this was necessary to be done under Rule 16(9) of the Rules. He pointed out that the entire enquiry had been held against him on account of malice and because there was a tussle between the Principal and the Vice-Principal. He then challenged the order of suspension on the ground that it was wholly arbitrary and contrary to Government circulars. The second point raised by the petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice is that charges were vague and indefinite. He next challenged the proceedings of the enquiry on the ground of violation of Rules 16(3), 16(5) and 16(6) of the Rules of 1958. He complained that he was not allowed inspection of full record for preparing his reply. This record was not made available during the course of enquiry. He had submitted list of 43 witnesses and 57 documents in the first instance but the Enquiry Officer did not call the witnesses. Not only this, he issued summons to 12 witnesses but later on examined only 5 in support of his defence. The documents which were required for his defence were not produced or summoned. He then made detailed submission regarding the merits of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in respect of the charges levelled against him. It is, thus, clear that several contentions were advanced by the petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice. The documents which were required for his defence were not produced or summoned. He then made detailed submission regarding the merits of the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer in respect of the charges levelled against him. It is, thus, clear that several contentions were advanced by the petitioner in his reply to the show cause notice. The Disciplinary Authority has in its order dated July 7, 1980 observed that the enquiry proceedings and enquiry report has also been perused and he has again considered the same in the context of the representation of the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority then concluded that the petitioner has been afforded the necessary opportunity for defending himself. The documents were made available to him for inspection and he cross-examined the departmental witnesses. Opportunity was given to him to examine the witnesses and those produced by him were examined. The enquiry had been conducted in a fair and impartial manner by independent officers. Change in Enquiry Officers has not caused any prejudice to the delinquent. The petitioner was served with definite charges along with full particulars of the same and he has been given full scope to defend himself in the enquiry proceedings. The Disciplinary Authority then proceeded to reiterate its findings regarding charges No. 1, 2 and 5(b). In the end the Disciplinary Authority has recorded the following : "Further I have carefully considered what penalty should be imposed on Shri Prabhu Lal for the charges proved against him. I have considered his representation submitted in response to the proposed penalty mentioned in the show cause notice. Considering all the circumstances I impose the penalty of removal from service with immediate effect. Shri Prabhu Lal has already been paid subsistence allowance for the period he remained under suspension and nothing more is to be paid to him." A perusal of the order of the Disciplinary Authority shows that although it has made an attempt to show of passing a speaking order, in fact it is not an order which can be termed as a speaking order. In the opening part of the order merely bald expressions have been recorded that the enquiry has been held in accordance with Rules, opportunity of defence was given etc. In the opening part of the order merely bald expressions have been recorded that the enquiry has been held in accordance with Rules, opportunity of defence was given etc. In the end also the Disciplinary Authority has merely recorded that it has considered the representation of the petitioner submitted by him in response to show cause notice and considering all the circumstances it imposes a penalty of removal from service with immediate effect. There is no reference made to the contentions raised in the representation submitted by the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority has nowhere recorded even a conclusion what to say of reasons, that the reply submitted by the petitioner is not satisfactory or tenable or that the contentions raised by the petitioner are not having any merit. Recording of stock phrases in an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority, as has been done in the present case, is not sufficient for compliance with the requirement of speaking order. The requirement of passing of a speaking or by a quasi-judicial authority embraces within itself the requirement that the authority must apply its mind to the material which has come before it, consider that material objectively and then record its findings; conclusions with reasons. In departmental enquiries the proceedings are always quasi-judicial and, therefore, it is obligatory for the disciplinary authority to apply its mind to the reply/ representation submitted by a delinquent employee in response to a show cause notice or where show cause notice is not given in respect of the report of the Enquiry Officer. The Disciplinary Authority is also under an obligation to deal with the contentions raised in such reply/ representation and record reasons, though briefly for accepting or rejecting the particular contention. The application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority must be apparent on the face of the record which is ultimately communicated to the delinquent. Mere recording of reasons on the file is not sufficient compliance of the principles of natural justice. Reasons have to be communicated to the delinquent employee. The Disciplinary Authority must pass an order which indicates substantial compliance of the principles of natural justice in its true spirit. A mere show of compliance of the principles of natural justice is not enough. Reasons have to be communicated to the delinquent employee. The Disciplinary Authority must pass an order which indicates substantial compliance of the principles of natural justice in its true spirit. A mere show of compliance of the principles of natural justice is not enough. The Disciplinary Authority must endeavor to show that it has actually applied its mind to the reply/ representation and that it has not merely paid a lip sympathy or stock phrase tribute to this salutary requirement of the principles of natural justice. Requirement of recording of reasons and communication thereof has been emphasised time and again in the cases decided by the Apex Court and by this Court. In a recent decision a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court has reiterated this principle after discussing the American, l English and Australian cases. In S.N. Mukharjee v. Union of India 1990 (4) SCC 1594: ( AIR 1990 SC 1984 ) Shri S.C. Agarwal, J. observed as under (at page 1996 of AIR): "The object underlying the rules of natural justice 'is to prevent miscarriage of justice' and secure 'fair play in action'. As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where 'the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision." 6. The requirement of recording of reasons and communication of the same had already been emphasised in several decisions of various High Courts including the Rajasthan High Court. In Testeels Ltd. v. N.M. Desai, AIR 1970 Guj 1 : (1970 Lab IC 35) . P.N. Bhagwati, J. as he then was, spoke in the Full Bench of Gujarat High Court in the following words (at page 40 of LIC): "Another reason of equal cogency which weighs with us in spelling out the necessity for giving reasons is based on the power of judicial review which is possessed by the High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32. The High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 have the power to quash by certiorari a quasi-judicial order made by an administrative officer and this power of review exercisable by issue of certiorari can be effectively exercised only if the order is a speaking order and reasons are given in support of it. If no reasons are given, it would not be possible for the High Court or the Supreme Court exercising its power of judicial review to examine whether the administrative officer has made any error of law in making the order. It would be the easiest thing for an administrative officer to avoid judicial scrutiny and correction by omitting to give reasons in support of his order. The High Court and the Supreme Court would be powerless to interfere so as to keep the administrative officer within the limits of the law. It would be the easiest thing for an administrative officer to avoid judicial scrutiny and correction by omitting to give reasons in support of his order. The High Court and the Supreme Court would be powerless to interfere so as to keep the administrative officer within the limits of the law. The result would be that the power of judicial review would be stultified and no redress being available to the citizen there would be insidious encouragement to arbitrariness and caprice. The power of judicial review is a necessary concomitant of the rule of law and if judicial review is to be made an effective instrument for maintenance of the rule of law, discharging quasi-judicial functions must be required to give reasons in support of their orders so that they can be subject to judicial scrutiny and correction. This has always been regarded as a most important reason in the United States for insisting that quasi-judicial decisions must show reasons on their face. To quote from Schwartz's 'American Administrative Law' at page 166: "In the United States, perhaps the most important prominent reason advanced for the requirement of reasoned decisions is the rule of such decisions in facilitating review by the courts. If the bases of administrative decisions are not articulated, it is most difficult for a reviewing court to determine whether the decision is a proper one. We must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong, reads on oftcited statement of Cardozo, J. for judicial control to be of practical value the administrative tribunal or agency, 'in making its order should not make it an unspeaking or unintelligible order, but should in some way, state upon the face of the order the elements which had led to the decision'. The words quoted are from a noted judgment of Lord Cairns, L.C. in which he laid down the distinction between 'speaking' and unspeaking or unintelligible order', he obviously means an order which gives no reasons. If the administrator does not give reasons, he obviously means an order which gives no reasons. If the administrator does not give reasons, he in effect, disarms the exercise of the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction. If the administrator does not give reasons, he obviously means an order which gives no reasons. If the administrator does not give reasons, he in effect, disarms the exercise of the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction. In such a case, the Court cannot examine further than the face of the challenged decision, which in Lord Summer's famous phrase, 'speaks' only which 'inscrutable face of a sphinx'." It is therefore necessary for giving full meaning and content to the power of judicial review conferred on the High Court and the Supreme Court by the Constitution that every administrative officer exercising quasi-judicial functions must make a speaking order, that is, give reasons in support of the order. If the order speaks only with the 'inscrutable face of a sphinx' it would be impossible for the High Court and the Supreme Court to effectively exercise their power of judicial review by means of certiorari." 7. In Union of India v. Ramgopal AIR 1972 Raj 196 , C. B. Bhargava, J. had observed "There can also be no doubt that the punishing authority in exercise of its quasi-judicial powers was bound to make a judicial approach to the question and should have given reasons for its decision particularly when its order was subject of appeal to a higher authority". In Ram Khilari v. Union of India, 1976 RLW 320 : ( AIR 1976 Raj 219 ) a Division Bench made a detailed examination of the question relating to the requirement of recording of reasons and communication thereof by quasi-judicial authorities after detailed survey of the case. The Division Bench observed as under (at page 237): "Communication of the order is an absolutely essential requirement since the assessee is then immediately made aware of the reasons which impelled the authorities to pass the order..... it is submitted, on behalf of the Revenue, that the very fact that reasons are recorded in the file, although these are not communicated to the assessee, fully meets the requirement of Section 127(1). We are unable to accept this submission...... it is submitted, on behalf of the Revenue, that the very fact that reasons are recorded in the file, although these are not communicated to the assessee, fully meets the requirement of Section 127(1). We are unable to accept this submission...... The reasons for recording of reasons in the order and making these reasons known to the assessee is to enable an opportunity to approach the High Court under its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and even to this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution in an appropriate case for challenging the order, inter alia, either on the ground that it is malafide or arbitrary or that it is based on irrelavant and extraneous considerations...... When law requires reasons to be recorded in a particular order affecting prejudicially the interests of any person, who can challenge the order in Court, it ceases to be a mere administrative order and the vice of violation of the principle of natural justice on account of omission to communicate the reasons is not expatiated." 8. In State of Rajasthan v. Amolakchand, 1983 RLR 246 : (1983 Lab IC NOC 41) a Division Bench of this Bench again reiterated the requirement of reasons by a quasi-judicial authority. The Division Bench took notice of the provisions of Rule 16 in particular of Rule 16(9) of the 1958 Rules in holding that a disciplinary authority must pass a speaking order and communicate the same to the delinquent employee. 9. From the scheme of Rules 14, 16 and in particular 16(9), 16(10) and 16(12), it is clearly borne out that it is obligatory for the disciplinary authority to record reasons in support of the order of punishment. There is no express or implied exclusion of the requirement of recording of reasons and communication thereof. In fact the very opening words of Rule 14 makes it abundantly clear that requirement of recording of reasons is expressly provided in the Rules. There is no express or implied exclusion of the requirement of recording of reasons and communication thereof. In fact the very opening words of Rule 14 makes it abundantly clear that requirement of recording of reasons is expressly provided in the Rules. Rule 14 begins with the following words : "The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, which shall be recorded and as hereinafter provided, be imposed on a Government servant, namely : (i) censure; (ii) withholding of increments or promotion; (iii) recovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government by negligence or breach of any law, rule or order; (iv) reduction to a lower service, grade or post, or to a lower time scale or to a lower stage in the time scale or in the case of pension to an amount lower than that due under the rules; (v) compulsory retirement on proportionate pension; (vi) removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for further employment; (vii) dismissal from service which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for further employment." 10. Perusal of Rule 14 shows that the reasons which are required to be recorded must be good and sufficient. The appellate authority while deciding appeal under Rule 30(2) of the 1958 Rules and the High Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can examine whether the reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority are valid or not and whether there are sufficient grounds for imposing a particular punishment. The argument of the respondents that when the Disciplinary Authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and gives a show cause notice, thereafter, it is not obliged to pass a a& detailed reasoned order after receipt of the reply by the delinquent, cannot be accepted. Where the Enquiry Officer is different from the Disciplinary Authority, the delinquent employee gets his first opportunity, while submitting his representation, to show that the Enquiry Officer has not complied with the provisions of the Rules while holding the enquiry or that he has not acted in confirmity with the principles of natural justice. It is at that stage when the delinquent can show that the Enquiry Officer has relied upon illegal and inadmissible evidence or that he has taken into consideration extraneous material/evidence or such material of which no notice was given to the delinquent. It is at that stage when the delinquent can show that the Enquiry Officer has relied upon illegal and inadmissible evidence or that he has taken into consideration extraneous material/evidence or such material of which no notice was given to the delinquent. He can show that the Enquiry Officer has misread the evidence or has not appreciated the evidence produced during the course of enquiry or that the Enquiry Officer has ignored the evidence. He can show that the conclusions drawn by the Enquiry Officer on the basis of the evidence are not warranted. He can plead that even if the findings/ conclusions of the Enquiry Officer are correct, he cannot be punished on account of his good record or that the proposed punishment is excessive or disproportionate to the allegations levelled against him and found proved. He can also plead that the Enquiry Officer had not acted impartially or had acted with bias. All these points cannot always be raised before the Enquiry Officer. The delinquent gets the first opportunity to raise these points when he submits his representation in respect of the findings/conclusions recorded by the Enquiry Officer. It is only after this that the Disciplinary Authority gets an opportunity to examine the points raised by the delinquent and decide them. If the Disciplinary Authority was merely to write that it has considered the report of the Enquiry Officer and representation of the delinquent and it is satisfied that the charges are proved and the punishment is warranted, the opportunity given to the delinquent to submit representation will be reduced to a farce. It must, therefore, be held that the Disciplinary Authority must consider the representation of the delinquent employee and then pass a speaking order. 11. In the light of the above observation, it must be held that order dated 7-7-80 has been passed in contravention of principles of natural justice and it is liable to be quashed. 12. So far as the appellate order is concerned, a perusal of the same indicates that in para Nos. 1 and 2, reference has been made to the charge-sheet, the enquiry and the order of punishment passed by the Director College of Education. 12. So far as the appellate order is concerned, a perusal of the same indicates that in para Nos. 1 and 2, reference has been made to the charge-sheet, the enquiry and the order of punishment passed by the Director College of Education. In the last paragraph after making a mention in the appeal filed by the petitioner before the Secretary, Education, a bald conclusion has been recorded that after a careful examination of the entire record it has been found that the charge Nos. 1, 2 and 5(b) are fully proved against the petitioner and in these circumstances the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 7-7-80 is justified and no interference is called for. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Likewise in the order by which decision of review petition has been communicated, it is recorded that after careful examination of the record it has been found that charges levelled against the petitioner have been fully proved and, therefore, the order passed by the Government on 15-6- 81 is justified and no interference is called for. An appeal under 1958 Rules is required to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30. An appeal under 1958 Rules is required to be decided in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30. Rule 30 Clause (2) reads as under : "In the case of an appeal against an order imposing any of the penalties specified in rule 14, the appellate authority shall consider:- (a) whether the procedure prescribed in these rules has been complied with and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of Constitution or in failure of justice; (b) whether the facts on which the order was passed have been established; (c) whether the facts established afford sufficient justification for making an order; and (d) Whether the penalty imposed is excessive, adequate or inadequate : and after giving a personal hearing to Government servant to explain his case, if he desires so, and after consultation with the Commission if such consultation is necessary in the case, pass order:- (i) setting aside, reducing, confirming or enhancing the penalty; or (ii) remitting the case to authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case: Provided that : (i) the appellate authority shall not impose any enhanced penalty which neither such authority nor the authority which made the order appealed against is competent in the case to impose; (ii) no order imposing an enhanced penalty shall be passed unless the appellant is given an opportunity of making any representation which he may wish to make against such enhanced penalty; and (iii) if the enhanced penalty which the appellate authority proposes to impose is one of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 14 and an inquiry under Rule 16 has not already been held in the case, the appellate authority shall, subject to the provisions of Rule 18, itself hold such inquiry or direct that such inquiry be held and thereafter on consideration of the proceedings of such inquiry pass such orders as it may deem fit." 13. A bare look at the provisions of Rule 30 makes it clear that the appellate authority is required to consider as to whether the enquiry had been held in accordance with the Rules and principles of natural justice and if there is a violation of the Rules of procedure or the principles of natural justice where prejudice has been caused to the appellant. It is then required to consider as to whether the findings recorded against the delinquent in respect of the charges are justified. Lastly, the appellate authority has to consider whether the punishment is adequate or not. Then it has, to make an order disposing of the appeal under Rule 30(2). Rule 30(2) is couched in mandatory form and, therefore, it is obligatory for every appellate authority to take into consideration the record of the enquiry, the order of punishment and the appeal then decide the appeal by keeping in mind the requirement of Rule 30(2). It is implicit in Rule 30 that the appellate authority must pass a speaking order giving reasons, though briefly, for rejecting or accepting the contentions advanced by the appellant in the memo of appeal. It cannot rest content by using stock phrase used in Rule 30(2) of the Rules. The appellate order must show a real application of mind by the appellate authority to the requirements of Rule 30(2) while deciding the appeal. Rule 30(2) has been considered by S.C. Agarwal, J. as he then was, in Poonam Chand v. State of Rajasthan, 1980 WLN UC 311 and it has been held that the provisions of Rule 30(2) of the Rules are mandatory. Non-compliance of the requirements of Rule 30(2) of the Rules has the result of vitiating the order of appellate authority. Similar view has been expressed by their Lordships of Supreme Court in Ram Chander v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 1173 : (1986 Lab IC 885) . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court were considering the provisions of Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 which are in pari materia with the provisions of Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1958. 14. In the present case the appellate order dated 15-6-81 completely fails to satisfy the requirement of passing of an order by the appellate authority in accordance with Rule 30(2) of the Rules. The appellate authority has completely failed to apply its mind to the memo of appeal submitted by the petitioner. The appellate authority has not cared to look into the memo of appeal. Stock phrase like after careful examination of the entire record has been employed by the appellate authority. This is wholly an unsatisfactory method of deciding the appeal by the appellate authority. 15. The appellate authority has not cared to look into the memo of appeal. Stock phrase like after careful examination of the entire record has been employed by the appellate authority. This is wholly an unsatisfactory method of deciding the appeal by the appellate authority. 15. Likewise, the order passed in review petition shows non-application of mind by the competent authority. In fact the reviewing authority has also failed to apply its mind while disposing the review petition. The argument that the appellate authority deciding the review petition has confirmed the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and, therefore, they need not record detailed reasons, is absolutely fallacious. At the stage of appeal the delinquent employee (appellant) has a right to show that the Disciplinary Authority has not acted in conformity with Rules 16(9), 16(10) and 16(12) of the 1958 Rules. The appellant can show that the Disciplinary Authority has not considered the evidence properly or has not acted in conformity with the principles of natural justice. It is at the appellate stage that the delinquent can point out the infirmities in the enquiry proceedings which may have escaped the notice of the Disciplinary Authority. The appellant has urged that principles of natural justice have not been followed. The appellant can plead that the punishment is harsh or disproportionate or excessive. Similar contentions can be advanced in the review petition. If the appellate authority and the reviewing authority were merely to use language in the Rule, the whole purpose of making a provision for making an appeal or review would be rendered meaningless. 16. In my considered opinion, both the appellate authority as well as the reviewing authority must pass order which indicate application of mind. The appellate authority is under a statutory obligation to pass a speaking order in conformity with Rule 30(2) of 1958 Rules. Both the appeal as well as the review orders in the present case do not stand the close scrutiny with reference to the requirement of passing an order in conformity with Rule 30(2) of the Rules and the principles of natural justice. 17. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. Orders dated 7-7-80, 15-6-81 and 1- 1-81 are declared illegal and are hereby quashed. The petitioner will be entitled to reinstatement and consequential benefits. 17. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. Orders dated 7-7-80, 15-6-81 and 1- 1-81 are declared illegal and are hereby quashed. The petitioner will be entitled to reinstatement and consequential benefits. The respondents will be free to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The Disciplinary Authority shall, however, take notice of the fact that the petitioner stands retired and the question relates to the year 1968 to 1970. Parties are left to bear their own costs.Petition allowed. *******