Judgment :- Mishra, J.: This appeal has been listed after notice of motion. Since we intend to with the judgment of the learned single Judge as well as with the impugned order to be that of the prescribed authority under Sec.79(1) of the Tamil Nadu Town and Planning Act, 1971 on the question whether the latter order is one by a competent or vitiated on ac-count of sub-delegation of the statutory power to a so-called Committee, we think it is not necessary to wait for any counter affidavit or to discuss other contention raised before us by learned counsel for the parties. 2. It appears for the alleged violation of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Town and Planning Act, 1971, and rules and regulations framed thereunder in deviating and construction of and in a building from the approved plan, etc., a proceeding was against the petitioners-appellants under the Act. The petitioners-appellants meanwhile applied for a planning permission before the competent authority under and when the permission was not granted, appealed under Sec.79 of the Act before prescribed authority. The impugned order dated 29.5.1991 in G.O.Rt.No.288, Housing Urban Development Department, however shows that the competent authority in Housing and Urban Development Department disposed of the appeal in the light of certain recommendations of a certain Appeal Committee. The order reads: "The appeal has been examined under Sec.79 of the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1971; based on the remarks of the Member-Secretary, Madras Metropolitan Development authority in his letters second and fourth made by the appellant in reference third read above and placed before the Appeal Committee meeting held 26.4.91 for its recommendation on the appeal portion. 2. The Appeal Committee considered the appeal petition carefully and found that appellant’s proposal violates the following development control rules: 1. 9(d)(i) floor space index 2.00 2.23 Excess by 0.23. 2. O-b I (ii) 3(i) front set back 3.50 m. 0.18 m. less by 3.32 m. 3. 19-b (ii) 3(ii)(1) side set back 4.50 m. 1.29 m. less by 3.21 m. 0.83m. less by 3.67 m. 4. 19-b -I(ii) 3(iii) Rear set back 3.00 m. Nil. Less by 3.00 m. due to main columns in rear boundary. 5. 20 parkings cars 4 Nos. Nil. Less by 4 Nos. Office area exceeds the permissible limit 9.40 Sq.m. Plan does not reflect the site condition. ------ 3. less by 3.67 m. 4. 19-b -I(ii) 3(iii) Rear set back 3.00 m. Nil. Less by 3.00 m. due to main columns in rear boundary. 5. 20 parkings cars 4 Nos. Nil. Less by 4 Nos. Office area exceeds the permissible limit 9.40 Sq.m. Plan does not reflect the site condition. ------ 3. Though in approved plan, the appellants have given sufficient set backs, during construction they have completely deviated from the original approved plan. There is large scale violation of front set back, floors space index and parking space. In view of the above facts, appeal committee recommended for rejection of the appeal." Concluding on the said basis, the impugned order said that the Government accepted recommendation of the Appeal Committee and accordingly rejected the appeal preferred the petitioners. The petitioners appellants herein then moved this Court in W.P.No.8838 1991 questioning the validity of the said order on various grounds. 4. The learned single Judge of this Court, however, has dismissed the writ petition that the petitioners-appellants attempted to get the new construction regularised by application before the Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, which was rejected, they preferred an appeal, but the appeal was rejected by the State Government reasons stated therein. The only contention raised on behalf of the petitioners that natural justice were violated because a personal hearing was not given to them, was found to be devoid of merits, because Sec.79 of the Act never contemplated a hearing. 5. The learned single Judge, however, rejected the contention that no Appeal Committee had been contemplated under Sec.79 of the Act, saying that it is not as if the Government cannot appoint an Appeal Committee to assist it in the matter of deciding whether deviated constructions could be regularised or not, and that the Government is. At arrange its affairs so as to facilitate easy disposal on pending matters before it. The single Judge also held it is not as if the Government is blindly accepting the report Appeal Committee, and that the Government examines the report of the Appeal Committee independently, applied his mind and takes a decision, which is evident from the orders. The learned single Judge further observed that merely because the Committee was not constituted in deciding the appeal preferred by the petitioners and submitted its report, it would not violate Sec.79 of the Act. 6. Sec.79 of the Act reads as follows: "79. The learned single Judge further observed that merely because the Committee was not constituted in deciding the appeal preferred by the petitioners and submitted its report, it would not violate Sec.79 of the Act. 6. Sec.79 of the Act reads as follows: "79. (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the planning authority Sec.49 or Sub-sec(1) of Sec.54 may appeal to the prescribed authority. (2) An appeal under Sub-sec(1) shall be preferred within two months from the date the decision or order was communicated to him in the manner prescribed, but the authority may admit an appeal preferred after the said period of two months if it is that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the said (3) In disposing of an appeal, the prescribed authority may, after giving the parties opportunity of making their representations, pass such order thereon as the authority may deem fit. (4) The decision or order of the prescribed authority on such appeal shall be final. (5) the prescribed authority may pass such interlocutory orders pending the decision appeal as the prescribed authority may deed fit. (6) The prescribed authority may award costs in proceedings under this section to either out of the Fund Account or by such party to such appeal as the prescribed may deem fit." The plain meaning which this provision conveys is that the prescribed authority empowered to hear the appeal has to act quasi judicially and decide in accordance with law, whether accept the representations or to reject them. The expression "prescribed authority" the authority prescribed under the Act or the rules framed thereunder. If, however, Government is the prescribed authority, and it seems it is so for the purpose of Sec.79 of Act, it can delegate its powers under the Rules of the Executive Business upon an authority to exercise any of the powers vested in them. Such delegation of power the delegate the prescribed authority, and he shall be required to act quasi judicially. 7. It is well settled that a statutory authority shall act within the limits of the statute exercise its discretion only within such prescribed limits, and not beyond. A delegate statute will have no power to sub-delegate, and the maxim "delegatus non potest will be attracted if any function assigned to such an authority under the Act is found been delegated to any other person. 8. A delegate statute will have no power to sub-delegate, and the maxim "delegatus non potest will be attracted if any function assigned to such an authority under the Act is found been delegated to any other person. 8. In the case of Mangulal Chunilal v. Manilal Maganlal, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 822, a provision Sec.481 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act was considered empowered the Commissioner to take or withdraw from proceedings against any person is charged with any offence against the Act or any rule, regulation or by-law, etc. another provision in Sec.69 of the said Act which empowered the Commissioner to power duties or functions conferred or imposed upon him or vested in him to a officer. The Commissioner delegated his powers to the Deputy Health Officer. The Health Officer, however, allowed the Licence Inspector to take proceedings against accused under Sub-clauses (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i) of Sec.488(1). The Court, relying upon the observations of Hindayatullah, J., in the case of Ballavdas v. J.C.Chakravarthy, A.I.R. 1950 S.C. 576, held that the sub-delegation by the Deputy Health Officer, was not permissible. 9. We do not propose to multiply the decisions A distinction is to be drawn between authority delegating its power to some other authority, and employing assistants to discharging its functions. Whether in a particular situation it is a case of sub-delegation merely of employing assistants would depend upon the degree of control and supervision exercised by the delegating authority over the subordinate agency. If the control supervision over the subordinate is substantial, if the delegating authority lays down instructions as to how routine cases should be disposed of by it, and reserves the always deal personally with new and important cases itself, then it may be a case delegation but of employing assistants to help the authority in discharging its power. Such assistance, however, shall always be ministerial in nature for collection evidence or gathering informations. There can be no assistance taken in the quasi function, because if that is allowed, there shall be a division of statutory discretion. division of statutory discretion will render the function not only ineffective, but also. 10. We have taken care to compare the language in Sec.79 of the Tamil Nadu Town Country Planning Act, 1971, with that of Sec.91, where delegation of powers contemplated. division of statutory discretion will render the function not only ineffective, but also. 10. We have taken care to compare the language in Sec.79 of the Tamil Nadu Town Country Planning Act, 1971, with that of Sec.91, where delegation of powers contemplated. Sec.91 says that the Government or the Director may, by notification, authorise any officer or authority to exercise any of the powers vested in them or him Act, except the power of the Government to make rules and the power of the Director hear any appeal preferred under Sec.76. Whereas in Sec.76, the power to hear vested in the prescribed authority, and not the State Government. So, there is no and not the State Government. So, there is no authority given to the State Government hear any appeal under Sec.79 of the Act. The State Government may become the authority only when by prescription of law or notification issued in exercise of making powers of the State Government, the appellate power to hear appeals under Sec.79 is given to the State Government. That the Courts in India have distinguished between the power vested by an Act and the vested under an Act. Be that as it may, we are satisfied that the instant case is one in Appeal Committee had no jurisdiction to but in and since the impugned order is based the report of the Appeal Committee, the same is without jurisdiction. 11. For the above reason alone, we are inclined to set aside the order of the learned Judge in W.P.No.8838 of 1991, dated 28.6.1991 and quash G.O.Rt.No.288, Housing Urban Development Department, dated 29.5.1991. On the facts of this case, however, remit the case to the prescribed authority for rehearing and disposal in accordance with While saying so, we make it clear that we are in agreement with the view expressed learned single Judge that Sec.79 of the Act does not contemplate an oral hearing. With direction as above, the appeal is accordingly allowed. There will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed.