Judgment :- PADMINI JESUDURAI, J. ( 1 ) THIS application is by the accused in C. C. No. 450/90 on the file of the VII Metropolitan Magistrate, Goerge Town Madras facing trial for an offence under section 500, I. P. C. on a complaint filed by the respondent herein, invoking the inherent powers of this Court under section 482, Cr. P. C. to quash the above proceedings. ( 2 ) THE complaint has been filed by the respondent on the allegation that after nearly 30 years of meritorious service in the Bank of Baroda in various capacities, he relinquished his office for personal reasons and, thereafter, on 20/11/1988, he attended an interview before the petitioner for a suitable placement for him. The petitioner informed him that a membership fee of Rs. 5,000. 00 refundable in the event of the petitioner not being able to provide a job, had to be paid and accordingly he paid the same. Later, he found that the interview was only a hoax and he demanded the return of Rs. 5,000. 00. To prevent the respondent from initiating action against the complainant for return of the above amount obtained on false and fraudulent representation, the petitioner filed 0. S. 9681/89 on the me of VII Assistant City Civil Judge, Madras against him as the 7th defendant and 8 others for a token damage of Rs. 400. 00 for alleged illegal and unlawful facts in paragraph 5 of the plaint, the petitioner had alleged as follows:7th defendant claiming himself as General Manager of the Bank of Baroda forged the signatures of the 8th defendant for obtaining top level employment in the private sector having done malpractices in the Bank of Baroda. The above allegations were per se defamatory and were totally false. The 8th defendant, who was a former Minister, had never met the respondent. The respondents reputation had been greatly lowered in the estimation of others and hence the complaint under section 500, I. P. C. On process being issued to the petitioner, the present application has been filed by him to quash the proceeding. ( 3 ) DR. The 8th defendant, who was a former Minister, had never met the respondent. The respondents reputation had been greatly lowered in the estimation of others and hence the complaint under section 500, I. P. C. On process being issued to the petitioner, the present application has been filed by him to quash the proceeding. ( 3 ) DR. J. Sudershan the petitioner herein who initially appeared as party-petitioner, and later, on enrolment as an advocate, would submit that the civil suit he has filed must be allowed to be disposed of an merits and while it is still pending there could be no parallel proceeding like a criminal complaint of the present type as laid down by the Supreme Court in Ram Sumer Pun v. State of U. P. It was further urged that it is premature to file a criminal complaint and there was time enough for the respondent, if the suit is dismissed to initiate action against the petitioner and whatever has been stated in the plaint, would be substantiated by the petitioner during trial of the civil suit and averments in the plaint are absolutely privileged and cannot form the subject matter of a prosecution under section 500, I. P. C. Reference was made to certain decisions, which I shall refer to in the course of discussion. Per contra, Thiru A. Raghunathan, learned counsel for the respondent, would urge that the averments in a plaint or court proceedings are not absolutely privileged and the passage being per se defamatory, it is for the petitioner to bring his case within anyone of the exception to section 499, I. P. C. which could be done only during trial, that the allegations made were motivated and not necessary for the purpose of the civil suit, which itself is a frivolous one and filed merely to blackmail parties, as is seen from the status of the various defendants, against each of whom highly defamatory statements are made. The learned counsel relied upon a judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal and also upon other decision. ( 4 ) THE question that arises for consideration is whether the proceedings in C. C. 450/90 pending before the VII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras have to be quashed. The learned counsel relied upon a judgment of a Full Bench of this Court in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal and also upon other decision. ( 4 ) THE question that arises for consideration is whether the proceedings in C. C. 450/90 pending before the VII Metropolitan Magistrate, George Town, Madras have to be quashed. ( 5 ) IT is settled law that at this stage, when a mere process has been issued to the accused, all that the learned Magistrate has to see is to find out whether the averments made in the complaint, if accepted, constitute an offence. If they do not or if there, is any legal impediment to the commencement or continuance of the trial, it would be an abuse of the process of court and this court will have to invoke its inherent powers to quash the proceedings. If the averments make out an offence and there is no legal impediment to the trial, this court cannot stifle a prosecution at its very threshold. Every opportunity has to be given to a complainant to prove his case. Dr. J. Sudershan, rightly relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal and Others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and other for accepting the above proposition of law. ( 6 ) LET us take the first contention of Dr. J. Sudershan that what is stated in the plaint is absolutely privileged and can never be the subject matter of a prosecution for defamation. The definition of defamation in section 499 of the Indian Penal Code, does not exclude averments made in pleadings in judicial proceedings. However if the particular defamatory passage was made in such circumstances as would fall under anyone of the 10 Exceptions to section 499, the prosecution cannot succeed, though this is a matter which could be gone into only during trial. The illustration to Exception 8 would seem to indicate that it could be the possible Exception under which, the question of privilege to statements made in judicial Proceeding can be brought. Exception 8 is as follows:accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person. Eighth Exception. It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject of accusation. Exception 8 is as follows:accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person. Eighth Exception. It is not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to any of those who have lawful authority over that person with respect to the subject of accusation. ( 7 ) IT would now be useful to refer to certain decision on this aspect. Considering this Exception, a five judges Full Bench of this Court in Thiruvenkada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal (supra) held that no absolute privilege attaches to averments in a criminal complaint made in court but that the privilege is qualified in the sense, that the defamatory statement must have been made in good faith. In the case before the Full Bench, Thiruvengada Mudali had filed a private complaint against three persons for different offences, in which he described the first of them as being a paramour of the second Tirupurasundari Ammal. This led to a complaint by Tirupurasundari Ammal against Tiruvengada Mudali for an offence under section 500, I. P. C. A reference was made by the Division Bench to the Full Bench, as to whether the privilege to the statement made in the complaint, was absolute or qualified. The Full Bench made it clear that under section 499, I. P. C. , which alone would have to be looked into, without importing into it common law principles, proof of good faith, being one of the ingredients of Exception 8, the privilege is not absolutes but only qualified. The Supreme Court in M. C. Verghese v. T. J. Ponnan referred to and accepted the law laid down in the above decision and reiterated that a person making a libelous statement in his complaint filed in court, is not absolutely protected in a criminal proceeding for defamation, for under Exception 8 and as seen from illustration to section 499, I. P. C. , the statements are privileged, only when they are made in good faith. The petitioner, therefore, cannot contend that the averments have been made by him in a plaint and are, therefore, absolutely privileged. In the event of the petitioner claiming the benefit of Exception which could be done only during trial, since the averment is per se defamatory, he would have to establish good faith as required under the above Exception. The petitioner, therefore, cannot contend that the averments have been made by him in a plaint and are, therefore, absolutely privileged. In the event of the petitioner claiming the benefit of Exception which could be done only during trial, since the averment is per se defamatory, he would have to establish good faith as required under the above Exception. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon a decision in Bhagat Singh v. Zinda Lal, wherein also, the decision in Thiruvengada Mudali v. Tirupurasundari Ammal (Supra) has been followed to hold, that the privilege is not absolute but only qualified and proof of good faith is necessary. A learned Judge of this Court in Thangavelu v. Ponnammal, confirmed the conviction of the accused for the offence under section 500, I. P. C. relating to a defamatory statement made in his plaint in small Cause No. 349/93 on the file of the District Munsif, Thirunelveli, wherein the plaintiff had described one Ponnammal, as concubine of Namasivaya Udayar. Ponnammal had filed the criminal complaint for defamation. The trial court, as well as the appellate court, had held that there was absence of good faith and since the findings were concurrent, this court in the revision, declined to interfere with the conviction. ( 8 ) THESE decisions would show that averments made in the plaint, if they are defamatory, can form the subject matter of a criminal prosecution and the privilege is only a qualified one. ( 9 ) THE next contention of Dr. J. Sudershan is that, the present prosecution is premature and the respondent would have to wait till the civil suit is ultimately disposed of and in the event of the suit being dismissed, the petitioner could be subjected to any criminal prosecution. This contention is totally untenable. The allegation in the plaint is that the agents, servants and workmen of the defendants, entered the office of the petitioner on several occasions, threatened to dispose him and to cause injury, damage, alienate and remove valuable property, including important case documents. Nothing more is averred in the plaint. In this context reliance is placed by the petitioner on the decision in Ram Sumet Pun v. State of U. P. (supra) to contend that when the civil suit is pending a parallel prosecution for defamation, could not be proceeded with. Nothing more is averred in the plaint. In this context reliance is placed by the petitioner on the decision in Ram Sumet Pun v. State of U. P. (supra) to contend that when the civil suit is pending a parallel prosecution for defamation, could not be proceeded with. Such a proposition of law cannot be deduced from the above decision. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, when a civil court is seized of the question of disputed possession between rival parties, parallel proceedings by the Executive Magistrate under section 145, Cr. P. C. also to decide possession ought not to be proceeded with. This has no bearing on the case before us. The offending passage is per se defamatory and it is open to the respondent to choose to prosecute the petitioner, irrespective of the tendency or the result of the civil litigation. The civil court would confine its decision to the trespass, threat of injury and damage by the servants, agents and workmen of the various defendants and the entitlement of token damages by the respondent, while the criminal court, the passage being per se defamatory, would proceed to find out whether anyone of the 10 Exceptions to section 499, I. P. C. would apply. The scope of the two proceedings are entirely different. They are not parallel. ( 10 ) DR. J. Sudershan then relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar and others v. Kripalu Shankar and others wherein, the Supreme Court held that there could be no contempt or defamation even if the nothings in the office internal files are derogatory of courts order, since they are privileged under sections 123 and 162 of the Evidence Act. Reliance was also placed on a decision Dhulabhai v. State of M. P. , wherein the Supreme Court held that under the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act, (30 of 1950) the jurisdiction of the civil courts was excluded. These decisions have no relevancy to the issues before us. ( 11 ) FINALLY Dr. J. Sudershan, referred to a decision of a learned Judge of this Court in Duraiswamy Thevar v. K. N. K. L. Lakshmanan Chettiar wherein the learned Judge held that the statements made before a tribunal exercising judicial functions, were absolutely privileged and could not form the basis for a tortious claim in a civil suit for damages for defamation. J. Sudershan, referred to a decision of a learned Judge of this Court in Duraiswamy Thevar v. K. N. K. L. Lakshmanan Chettiar wherein the learned Judge held that the statements made before a tribunal exercising judicial functions, were absolutely privileged and could not form the basis for a tortious claim in a civil suit for damages for defamation. We are presently concerned not with -the law relating to tortious liability but only with the ambit of a criminal prosecution under section 499, I. P. C. Even the Full Bench in Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tripurasuridari Ammal (supra) while answering the reference made it clear, that the question referred to them related solely to criminal proceedings against a complaint and that they were saying nothing, as to how far one might be protected from civil proceedings. The Bench added that this was apparently anomalous, that while one should be protected against civil proceedings, he would still be exposed to criminal proceedings, but that this was so, in view of the fact that criminal law in India is codified and the law of civil wrong is not. The above decision, therefore, does not help the petitioner, this being a criminal prosecution. ( 12 ) NOT being able to accept any of the contentions of Dr. J. Sudershan, this petition is dismissed. It is however, made clear that the observations made by this court in this order, touching the merits of the case, will not affect the parties either in the civil litigation or in the criminal prosecution. They have been made for the limited purpose of disposing of this application. Petition dismissed.