JUDGMENT Devinder Gupta, J.—This is plaintiffs Second Appeal against the judgment and decree passed on January 22, 1979 by District Judge, Hamirpur and Una Districts at Una, dismissing their appeal and thereby confirming the judgment and decree passed on September 13, 1977, by Sub-Judge III Class, Una, dismissing their suit. 2. Ganga Ram, appellant No. 1, and Mangal predecessor-in-interest of appellants No. 2 to 6 on October 17, 1974 filed a suit for grant of decree for injunction restraining the defendants-respondents from causing any interference in their possession over the suit property, which they claimed to have been in their occupation as tenant under various owners It was averred by them that defendants, who had purchased land to the extent of 11 marlas only from some of the owners had merely stepped into the shoes of the owners and had no right to cause any interference with their possession The suit was resisted by the defendants by denying that there existed any relationship of landlord and tenant or that plaintiffs were ever in occupation of the property. The defendants pleaded that they had rightly purchased 11 marlas of land and were actually put in possession thereof and now they had converted the land as Abadi and constructed houses thereon and were residing therein. It was further stated by the defendants in the written statement that plaintiffs had also by purchase of fraction of share in the property became co-owners in the entire Khata. 3. The trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs by holding that they were neither the tenants nor were ever in occupation of the suit property. Both the plaintiffs preferred appeal During the pendency of the appeal, Mangal plaintiff appellant died and his legal representatives, namely, appellants No. 2 to 6 were brought on record before the lower appellate Court. The appeal was dismissed by holding that the appellants were co-sharers in the suit property alongwith respondents and as respondents were entered in the revenue records in possession of 11 marlas of land, therefore, the suit for grant of decree for permanent prohibitory injunction was not maintainable. The appellants have now preferred the present Second Appeal before this Court. 4. During the pendency of the appeal before this Court, appellant Ganga Ram died. The appellants have now preferred the present Second Appeal before this Court. 4. During the pendency of the appeal before this Court, appellant Ganga Ram died. An application for bringing on record his legal representatives was not made within the period of limitation but after the expiry of the same, applications for condoning the delay in moving application for setting aside the abatement, for setting aside the abatement and for bringing on record the legal representatives of deceased appellant Ganga Ram were moved. All these applications were dismissed by this Court on March 15,1991. As such, the appeal, in so far as appellant No. 1 is concerned, stood abated. The appeal was directed to be listed for final hearing. 5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have also gone through the records. On behalf of the respondents a preliminary objection has been taken that the entire appeal has abated in view of the abatement of appeal qua appellant No. 1. It has further been contended that interest of the deceased appellant and the surviving appellants was joint and inseparable. Their suit had been dismissed. The surviving appellants alone could not have maintained the action against the respondents without impleading the deceased appellant as party. In the absence of appellant No. 1 neither the original suit, nor the appeal could be said to have been properly constituted. The success of the appeal, in the absence of appellant No. 1, will lead the Court in passing a decree which will be in conflict with the decree between the deceased and the respondents. As such, the abatement of appeal qua Ganga Ram appellant has the effect of the entire appeal having abated. In support of the arguments, learned Counsel for the respondents, placed reliance upon State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89; Union of India v. Shree Ram Bohra and others, AIR 1965 SC 1531 ; Ram Agua Prasad Gupta and others v. Murli Prasad and others, AIR 1972 SC 1181 ; and Babu Sukhram Singh v. Ram Dular Singh and others, AIR 1973 SC 204. 6. 6. While rebutting these arguments, the learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the heirs of Mangal plaintiff were already on record as appellants No 2 to 6 and they had the same interest which could have been represented by the heirs of Ganga Ram, because the interest of the heirs of both of them was joint in estate and this being so the surviving appellants would be deemed to be sufficiently representing the estate jointly owned by Ganga Ram and Mangal. In support of the arguments, reliance was placed by the learned Counsel on a decision of this Court in Shiv Ram v. Bhagat Ram and others, ILR 1978 HP 158 (DB). 7. After having gone through the rival contentions and the decisions cited at the Bar, I am of the opinion that the submissions made on behalf of the appellants have no force and the appeal deserves dismissal This was a case in which there was no question of the deceased having joint estate with the heirs of Mangal. They were not joint in an estate and were thus not covered by the doctrine of survivorship. Admittedly, the estate of Ganga Ram had devolved upon his natural heirs and not on the surviving appellants. None of them could have maintained either the original suit or the appeal without joining the other as party. As a matter of fact, both of them had jointly filed the suit, which resulted in a decree of dismissal. The success of appeal will amount to passing conflicting decrees, namely, the suit qua the estate of Mangal being decreed and qua the estate of Ganga Ram being dismissed. The decision in Shiv Rams case (supra), has no bearing to the facts of the present case. That was a case of tenancy-in-common and not of joint tenancy. The submission made on behaif of the appellants that by virtue of the provisions of Himachal Pradesh Tenancy and Land Reforms Act, 1972, heirs of Mangal and Ganga Ram would be deemed to be co-owners of the property, has also no force. It is settled principle of law that when a co-owner dies, his interest can be represented only by his own legal representatives and not by the other surviving owners. In the case of joint owners, the position is different. It is settled principle of law that when a co-owner dies, his interest can be represented only by his own legal representatives and not by the other surviving owners. In the case of joint owners, the position is different. In that case, the surviving joint owners can represent the interest of the deceased, as joint owners as effectively as the heirs of the joint owners could. The decisions relied upon on behalf of the respondents are fully applicable to the facts of the present case, The success of appeal is likely to lead in conflicting decisions and the surviving appellants alone could not have brought the action for the relief in question against the respondents. 8. In view of the above, the abatement of appeal qua Ganga Rain deceased appellant has the effect of the whole appeal abating and on that ground the same is dismissed. Costs on parties. Appeal dismissed.